Anna Wong · Chief US Economist, Bloomberg Economics. University of Chicago PhD in economics; a decade at the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the White House, where she was chief international economist (2019–20). A macro economist, not a stock picker — names appear only as data points.
CPI data point, no view: a lodging-price jump from an Airbnb policy change was half of August 2026's 5 bp core-CPI surprise — a one-off Wong says should not have moved Fed hike odds.
Private — Wong's employer and data source: the Bloomberg Price Project (1m+ prices across 300,000 categories a month) is how she attributed the August 2026 CPI surprise to wireless plans and hotels.
CPI data point, no view: Verizon's wireless plan price increase drove August 2026's jump in the wireless phone services category — one of two one-off items behind the 5 bp core-CPI surprise.
In one line: Wong reads the September 2026 Fed as walking into a policy mistake — hiking on a 5 bp core-CPI surprise from one-off categories and a seasonally flattered payroll print, into a fragile early-to-mid-cycle recovery, after a ~50 bp rise in the 10-year that has already done ~100 bp of tightening. Her method is to look through the headline to the categories, the unadjusted data and the transmission lags; her forecast is one hike this year and headline CPI possibly below 2% by Q1 2027 if oil normalises.
Read the categories, not the print. August core CPI missed by 5 bp (0.29 vs 0.24) — "entirely due to wireless telephones and Airbnb shifting their policy" — while rents, food and drug prices disinflated. Rounding to 0.3 turned it into a "hot CPI" and hike odds jumped ~20 points in a day.
Payroll strength was a seasonal quirk. Non-seasonally-adjusted August payrolls were weaker than a year earlier, yet produced +162k seasonally adjusted, versus +20k from last year's stronger raw number.
Warsh boxed the Fed in — and escaped the blame. Trading forward guidance for "the unfiltered market signal to shape economic reality" left no room for nuance once markets priced ~90%; but he can tell Trump he was outvoted and the long end would otherwise blow out — "a masterful job at managing the politics." She expects only one hike this year.
The long end has already hiked. The 10-year is up at least 0.5 pp since March — "equivalent to about 100 basis points of rate hikes." At 5% it is "absolutely restraining"; October 2023's 5% led the 2024 labour slowdown and the August 2024 flash crash. The Fed "tends to hike late cycle, not in the early to middle cycle."
Oil is a headline problem that reverses fast. Diesel at $6 passes through to groceries and heavy appliances, and September headline CPI is likely ≥0.4%; but with crude back to $60–70, headline could fall below 2% in Q1 2027 — "the faster it rises, the faster it falls."
Sympathetic to Bessent, but size it bigger. The long end is illiquid (a $4bn buyback moved yields far more than 1/100th of Operation Twist's $400bn), so intervention works — but the FX-intervention rules (disorderly market, surprise, abundant resources, all in) say $6bn per operation is too small. Issuing short at ~4.2% instead of ~5% long saves "hundreds of billions" at a ~6% deficit.
The oil–yield correlation is the worry. Long yields rising with oil means global risk aversion is pulling money out of Treasuries instead of into them — "a bit concerning."
Fiscal first: grow, and keep the tariffs. The IEEPA ruling costs ~$1tn over 10 years; a Fed-induced slowdown at a 6% deficit leaves no fiscal space. Tariffs "have been generating revenues without tanking the economy" with bipartisan support.
AI capex has peaked as a growth driver. Its growth rate, not its level, adds to GDP: ~1 pp in H1 2026, falling to ~0.5 pp or lower next year even as spending keeps rising.
Transcripts
One dated page per appearance — each has its stock table, talking points, and the saved transcript. Newest first.