Ben Finegold — Investing in the nuclear reactor supply chain
Filmed at the WNA Symposium in London. Ocean Wall's new report, "From Blueprint to Fleet: Mapping the Nuclear Trade," breaks the Westinghouse AP1000 into its parts and scores 144 suppliers. The conclusions are Westinghouse (via Cameco for now), Doosan and BWXT: suppliers that get paid whichever reactor design wins. His conference takeaway on the fuel side: "Canada, Canada, Canada," with better value in the Athabasca juniors than in Cameco.
One-line take: the fuel trade has worked, but the next leg is demand-led: new reactors actually being built, which the East is doing and the West is not yet. The AP1000 pipeline is now 91 reactors (per Cameco's last call), and the next five years will be about getting projects to FID. Ocean Wall's screen scores each supplier out of 25 on deliverability and supply-chain localization. It deliberately avoids "binary tech risk" and backs companies that service reactors regardless of design: Doosan (the only allied source of large reactor-pressure-vessel forgings) and BWXT (heavy nuclear components, 70% US-government revenue, a winner of whichever SMR wins). The bottleneck is long-lead-time "golden screws." That is why Siemens Energy and GE Vernova trade at 70–80x earnings on order books sold out for five years. On fuel, the ~50m lb/yr supply deficit falls mostly on the West, so Canada has to fill it. He owns Cameco but calls it "not cheap," and prefers the Athabasca juniors into a coming M&A wave.
1. Stocks & names mentioned
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he said | At |
|---|
| Westinghouse | Westinghouse Electric (private — Cameco 49% / Brookfield 51%) | — | Positive | "Probably the best proxy" for the demand-led build-out: the AP1000 pipeline is now 91 reactors globally. Westinghouse "has filed to go public… an obvious name to own as and when you can own it in public markets"; until then, exposure is via Cameco's 49%. | 03:04 |
| 034020.KS | Doosan Enerbility (KRX: 034020) | STK | Positive | One of the report's three conclusions. It is a tech-agnostic supplier with "pretty much a monopoly" on reactor pressure vessels and forgings for the West: "the only allied country capable of forging these large reactor pressure vessels." | 04:06 |
| BWXT | BWX Technologies | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | "An absolute behemoth" in large nuclear components. It just raised North American heavy-manufacturing capacity 50%, and 70% of revenue is locked up in US-government/military contracts, making it a "very, very sticky, recurring revenue business." "Whoever wins the SMR race, BWXT is going to be a winner, too." | 04:32 |
| CCJ | Cameco | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | The listed route into Westinghouse (49%) plus fuel exposure. "I'm a big fan of Cameco, I'm a shareholder of Cameco, but relatively priced is not cheap." He sees relatively better value in the junior explorers. | 09:02 |
| Uranium | Uranium (U3O8 — commodity) | — | Positive | A global supply deficit of "call it 50 million pounds per year" is "not geographically equal. The East is far better coverage than the West," so Canada has to play an outsized role. His WNA takeaway trade on fuel: "Canada, Canada, Canada." He favors the Athabasca Basin juniors, which have "fallen under the radar," and expects a consolidation wave like the last cycle's. | 08:37 |
| ENR.DE | Siemens Energy | QT · SA · STK | Neutral | His example of what long-lead-time "golden screws" are worth: trading "at 70–80 times earnings today because their forward order book is sold out for the next five years." | 05:59 |
| GEV | GE Vernova | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Paired with Siemens Energy: "70–80 times earnings" on a forward order book "sold out for the next five years." It illustrates the scarcity premium on bottleneck equipment and is not called a buy. | 05:59 |
| EDF | Électricité de France (French state-owned — private) | — | Neutral | "The bastion of European nuclear" is "sending their engineers on secondment to China" to learn how China builds reactors "for sub 6 billion US." He cites it as evidence of the West's cost and speed gap. | 06:22 |
Not tabled: Vogtle 3 & 4 (Southern Co) is cited only as the build-time benchmark for the last US AP1000s. Amazon comes up only as a sign of who now attends WNA. Ocean Wall's own 5T Nuclear Fund is a product, not a pick (see the hub). The Fox and Pheasant and New Explorer pubs are not securities.
2. Talking points
00:09 The report: "From Blueprint to Fleet"
- Ocean Wall's new report maps the supply chain of the Westinghouse AP1000.
00:32 The next leg is demand-led
- Ocean Wall has backed nuclear fuel for 7 years, since it was founded, and still sees money to be made there.
- The next leg is new capacity actually coming online. The East is building and the West is not yet. Westinghouse is "the best proxy."
01:19 Pick the reactor apart
- The AP1000 pipeline is 91 reactors globally. The questions: which EPC firms are first in line, and who supplies the pressure vessels, steam turbines, compressors and software?
01:49 From rhetoric to FID; the 25-point screen
- The last 6 years brought rhetoric, policy and financing. The next 5 will be defined by getting projects to final investment decision.
- They screened 144 companies and scored each out of 25 on deliverability and supply-chain localization.
- Connor: too much focus on miners, while many of the best performers have been outside mining.
02:44 Westinghouse via Cameco — for now
- The 91-reactor figure came from Cameco's last conference call. Cameco owns 49% of Westinghouse, which has filed to go public.
- Westinghouse is "an obvious name to own" once it lists. Until then Cameco gives that exposure plus fuel exposure.
03:26 Doosan & BWXT: take the tech risk out
- The report's other conclusions are Doosan and BWXT. The 5T Nuclear Fund (run with 5T, Zurich) also carries large supply-chain exposure.
- Avoid "binary tech risk." Back the companies that service reactors whichever design wins, AP1000 or SMR.
04:06 What Doosan and BWXT do
- Doosan is effectively the only allied source of large reactor pressure vessel forgings (from the matrix built by analyst Alex).
- BWXT: +50% North American heavy-manufacturing capacity, 70% of revenue from US-government contracts. Ocean Wall's BWXT report argues it wins whichever SMR wins.
05:09 Can 91 get built? Long-lead "golden screws"
- Only two AP1000s run in the US (Vogtle 3 & 4, slow to build) and four in China. A modernized US licensing framework should speed things up.
- The binding constraint is procuring long-lead equipment such as pressure vessels. The report tables each component's lead time.
- Siemens Energy and GE Vernova trade at 70–80x earnings because their order books are sold out for five years.
05:59 Why China builds faster
- China builds reactors for under $6bn. EDF is seconding engineers to China to learn how.
- The reasons he gives: regulation, no NIMBYism, "Breakneck" (the engineering state vs the lawyerly state, 70% engineers vs 70% lawyers), heavy subsidies to reach FID, and cheap, skilled labor.
06:55 UK SMR development capital
- Ocean Wall is assembling development capital for a UK SMR project. That money is not a pool large infrastructure funds usually hold, so government covering the first $300–500m to get "shovels in the ground" is a massive help.
07:33 WNA takeaways: Canada, Canada, Canada
- Seven "golden years" at WNA. The crowd now includes Amazon-type hyperscalers and oil & gas companies.
- Canada becomes far more strategic. The Athabasca juniors have "fallen under the radar" and should catch up.
- The ~50m lb/yr global deficit is uneven, with the East better covered than the West.
08:37 Juniors over majors; M&A wave
- He sees relatively better value in the smaller names. Cameco is owned but "not cheap."
- Expects a consolidation wave like the previous cycle's, with M&A upside for investors.
3. In plain English
Westinghouse — private reactor designer Positive
Westinghouse designs the AP1000, a large nuclear reactor that has become the West's standard design, and it earns money on building and then fuelling and servicing each one. About 91 are in the global pipeline. It is private today (Cameco owns 49%), but it has filed to list on the stock market. Finegold calls it "an obvious name to own" once investors can buy it directly.
034020.KS — Doosan Enerbility Positive
A South Korean heavy-industry company that forges the giant steel pressure vessels at the heart of large reactors. Very few factories in the world can make them, and among countries allied with the US, Doosan is essentially the only one. So nearly every Western large-reactor project has to go through it, whichever design is chosen.
BWXT — BWX Technologies Positive
A US maker of heavy nuclear parts, and the builder of the reactors that power US Navy submarines and carriers. About 70% of its revenue comes from long US-government contracts, which makes its income steady and predictable. It has just expanded its factories by half. Because it makes components rather than betting on one reactor design, it should win business whichever small modular reactor (SMR) design comes out on top.
CCJ — Cameco Positive
Canada's biggest uranium miner, which also owns nearly half of Westinghouse. Buying Cameco gets you both the nuclear fuel and a stake in the reactor builder. Finegold owns it, but he thinks the share price already reflects much of that, so it is "not cheap" compared with smaller uranium explorers.
Uranium — the fuel Positive
The world uses roughly 50 million pounds more uranium each year than mines produce. The shortfall hits the West harder, because China and Russia have secured more of their own supply. Canada's Athabasca Basin holds the West's richest deposits, so he expects the small exploration companies there to catch up. He also expects bigger companies to buy them out, as happened last cycle.
For personal study — not investment advice. Source material © Jimmy Connor / Ocean Wall.