Stance reflects how each is framed in this interview. Research legend: QT Qualtrim · SA Seeking Alpha · STK Stock Analysis.
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he said | At |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SCR.TO | Strathcona Resources | SA · STK · FA | Positive | Pro pick — owned. Adam Waterous arbitraged gas for oil (sold Montney, took Tourmaline stock). "Adam needs float" (super-tight register), so incentives say he closes MEG; if not, the settling cash + second fund fund an acquisition spree in all-stock deals. A founder-led business acts fast in a crisis and earns more per dollar of pay. Top-five Canadian producer once MEG closes. | 44:34 |
| CVE | Cenovus Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Pro pick — owned. Spin the US refineries (priced at zero). Wild theory: Li Ka-shing's standstill ends late 2025 → Cenovus "in play"; Elliott + Suncor could take it out all-stock and spin the US refinery assets into a US listing (~35% odds). Good upstream assets mis-priced by the refinery drag. | 52:32 |
| MEG.TO | MEG Energy | SA · STK | Positive | Owned — the Strathcona hostile target. Deal will close (maybe a bump); at a 12% premium the arb community now sets the price. Waterous's incentives are "better for me than MEG's board." MEG + SCR both bring NOL pools — the combined entity can then fund cash-tax-funded premiums on the next deal. | 45:14 |
| IMO | Imperial Oil | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Owned since summer 2024 (Exxon is its "daddy" — cheap cost of capital). One of the best performers since. But at the investor day their "top idea is dividend growth" — "look at the wasteland around us; that's foolish." Should just keep buying back stock. Owned, critical of the capital-allocation pivot. | 39:24 |
| COP | ConocoPhillips | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Owned (US portfolio). A pure E&P upstream major — produces better returns than integrated peers. Doug Terreson's Can't Deny It argues upstream, midstream and downstream "have no business being together"; Conoco is the proof. "Diversification is for people who don't want to care." | 38:19 |
| GLEN | Glencore | SA · STK | Positive | Pro pick — recently started buying. ~30–40% coal (thermal + met), plus copper/zinc + a trading arm. Through-cycle ~10% ROIC on long-cycle, hard-to-replace tangible assets; M&A "in their DNA" (took out Teck's Elk Valley/EVR). "When commodities become a small-g god, Glencore becomes a small-g god among generalists." | 56:53 |
| WHC.AX | Whitehaven Coal | SA · STK | Positive | Owned — the pure-play thermal-coal expression of his energy-transition point: every transition pulls forward use of the old fuel (2024 was the biggest coal year ever). Poor prior sentiment on China/steel = the opportunity; running-water-and-electricity demand is met primarily by coal. | 56:53 |
| WCP.TO | Whitecap Resources | SA · STK · FA | Negative | Not owned. The 8.4% dividend is "a red flag" — an equity-cost liability the market is starting to question (Desjardins called a "right-sizing" necessary). The Veren merger was the moment to reset capital policy and they didn't. Would only re-look if they cut the dividend and pivoted to buybacks. | 25:52 |
| BTE | Baytex Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Not owned. Poor returns on invested capital; stopped buybacks to focus on debt (which just adds back to book, not returns). A takeout target eventually — wipe the management team, the public listing, the duplicated costs. "The sub-C$4B market-cap world is littered with stuff like that." | 29:30 |
| ATH | Athabasca Oil | SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Not owned. Run through Waterous's public underwriting criteria (low break-evens + high reserve life): Athabasca has reserve life "like very few do," so it "looks obvious" as a natural target if investors ever fall out of love with it. Priced differently than MEG, which is why MEG was the opportunistic bid. | 31:48 |
| CNQ | Canadian Natural Resources | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Not owned. The generalist's default Canadian name (Murray Edwards is "daddy") — high quality, diversified, dominant liquidity, but not the highest-return producer. Will CNQ ever get a bid? Unlikely — it's more the buyer. | 35:48 |
| SU | Suncor Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Not owned. Central to the wild Cenovus theory: Elliott (already involved) + Suncor take out Cenovus all-stock and spin the US refineries; Suncor's lone US (Denver) refinery pairs with Cenovus's US refining. Would be Suncor's largest deal ever. Rich Kruger runs it. | 53:41 |
| TOU | Tourmaline Oil | SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Not owned. If forced to own one gas name, "Tourmaline" — Mike Rose is "the best capital allocator in the space." A big, liquid stock. But Smead doesn't own any direct gas; he prefers oil (gas has "negative convexity" at the lows). Rose took Waterous's Montney gas for stock, signaling gas is relatively pricey. | 43:46 |
| NVA.TO | NuVista Energy | SA · STK | Neutral | Not owned — pass. Asked whether gas names like NuVista or ARC are a buy: likes commodities long-term "but it's just not for us." Would revisit only if oil re-rates well above gas. | 43:20 |
| ARX.TO | ARC Resources | SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Not owned — pass. Same answer as NuVista; a buyer of Waterous's Montney gas (with CNQ/Tourmaline). Fine business, wrong side of Smead's oil-over-gas preference. | 43:20 |
| VET | Vermilion Energy | SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Not owned — consolidation reference. Just sold some assets; has a green-field heavy-oil opportunity that could be bought as heavy-oil consolidation accelerates (cash is flowing toward heavy oil). Named as the kind of asset a Strathcona could pick off. | 51:36 |
| TECK | Teck Resources | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Not owned — reference. Prefers Glencore over Teck simply because Glencore is bigger in coal. Notes Glencore's near-hostile take of Teck's Elk Valley (EVR) met-coal business, and the interesting preferred/call-option structure Teck first proposed. Based near Smead's Seattle roots. | 59:17 |
| PSX | Phillips 66 | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Reference — Doug Terreson (author of Can't Deny It) sits on the board, with Elliott involved. The example behind "upstream/midstream/downstream don't belong together." | 37:49 |
| XOM | ExxonMobil | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Reference — Imperial's "daddy": provides its capital structure/credit rating, participates in the buyback, but hasn't bought anything "in 100 years," so Imperial will never be a consolidator. Nationalization fear is why Exxon never fully consolidates it. | 40:17 |
| VRN | Veren | SA · STK | Neutral | Reference — in the Whitecap merger, Veren holders are the majority owners, so the deal was the natural chance to reset Whitecap's dividend policy (and they didn't). Cited to explain why the combined dividend looks stretched. | 29:02 |
Stance = how each name is framed in this interview, not a price rating. Macro substance feeds the master macro viewpoints: a delevered industry deserving higher multiples, the "who's your daddy" consolidation-to-4–5-majors theory, the gas-for-oil arbitrage, oil-over-gas ("negative convexity"), the WTI-WCS diff compressing as pipelines multiply, and "commodities beat stocks over the next 10 years."
A jargon-free summary of the thesis behind each argued pick — what the business does and why he holds the stance. (Plain-language companion to the table; renders on the consolidated ticker page.)
Strathcona is run by dealmaker Adam Waterous, who just made a hostile bid for MEG Energy. Smead's read is that Waterous is a shrewd capital allocator: he sold his natural-gas assets (which everyone loves because of AI/electricity demand) and is buying oil (which everyone hates) — a classic buy-low/sell-high swap. Strathcona's own shares barely trade because insiders hold most of them, so Waterous needs more freely-trading stock ("float") to keep doing deals. Buying MEG, a similar oil-sands business, gives him that float — which is why Smead is confident the deal closes and Strathcona keeps rolling up the industry.
Cenovus is Smead's owned Canadian oil-sands major. Two catalysts: first, the market values its US refineries at essentially zero, so spinning them off into a separate US-listed company would surface hidden value. Second — his "wild theory" — Li Ka-shing's Hong Kong entities, big Cenovus holders, have a standstill agreement expiring in late 2025, after which Cenovus could be "in play." He spins a scenario where activist Elliott teams up with Suncor to buy Cenovus in an all-stock deal and spin off the combined US refineries. He puts maybe a 35% chance on it — the point is the good upstream assets are being masked by the refinery drag.
Glencore is a giant miner-and-trader Smead recently started buying as a broad commodity bet. Roughly a third of it is coal (both the kind burned for power and the kind used to make steel), plus copper and zinc, plus a trading desk that reliably makes money. His contrarian point: everyone assumes coal is dying, but every energy transition actually increases use of the old fuel — 2024 was the biggest year for coal in history, because poorer countries just want reliable electricity. The assets are hard to replace, the returns are steady through the cycle, and dealmaking is in the company's DNA.
Whitehaven is an Australian coal miner Smead owns as a pure-play version of the same idea behind Glencore's coal exposure. Sentiment is awful because of worries about China and steelmaking, which is exactly why it's cheap. Smead's thesis is that global demand for reliable, affordable electricity keeps coal in heavy use far longer than the "energy transition" narrative implies.
Imperial remains a Smead holding, bought in summer 2024 because 70%-owner ExxonMobil lends it a cheap cost of capital while it earns solid returns. But here he's openly critical: at its investor day the company's headline priority was "dividend growth," which Smead thinks is a weak use of cash when the stock could instead keep shrinking its share count through buybacks. He still owns it, but he's unhappy with the capital-allocation choice.
Whitecap pays an 8.4% dividend, which Smead treats as a warning sign, not an attraction: it's a huge, guaranteed cash obligation to shareholders that pressures the business and usually ends in a cut. Its merger with Veren was the natural moment to reset that policy toward buybacks, and management didn't take it. He doesn't own it and would only reconsider if they cut the dividend and pivoted to repurchasing stock.
Summary & timestamps derived from the public YouTube video (transcript in transcript.txt) for personal study. Not investment advice. © In the Money with Amber Kanwar & Cole Smead / Smead Capital Management for source material.