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David Hay — Portfolio Update: One "HAL" of an Opportunity

A two-name oil-service update that is really one switch: Halliburton (HAL) joins the Buy List as a Strong Buy at $36.79 — the first new lot since Aug-28's GNRC — funded by trimming Schlumberger (SLB), which moves back to the Holds/Trims table rated H/T after a run from $45 to nearly $60. The set-up is a headline Haymaker refuses to trade: Trump's "THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN HISTORY!" Venezuela announcement is dismissed on three grounds — the timeline ("it will take a decade or so before they are ready for harvest"), the legal obstacle ("selling Venezuela's oil reserves to a foreign entity violates its constitution"), and the counterparty memory ("decades of having their assets in Venezuela appropriated and/or nationalized" — even Exxon's won judgements were uncollectable) — with the motive named outright: "a cynic could view this as the latest move by the Trump administration to depress oil prices in the run-up to the mid-term elections." Conclusion: "meaningful production gains are unlikely to have any practical impact on current oil prices." What survives the debunking is the supplier: "a big winner from this deal, if it actually happens in some form, might be U.S. oil service companies" — and behind Venezuela sits the far larger job, "the more pressing issue of repairing the Middle East's war-ravaged production facilities," against a standing house view restated at its strongest: oil supplies "have, indeed, been enormously depleted" after the attacks plus "the loss of around half of the normal shipments through the Strait of Hormuz" — "this has been the greatest oil-supply shock in history." HAL is the cheap, lagging half: repeatedly topped out "around $43," knocked "back into the low-30s in late July" by a slide in oil and a guarded Q2 outlook, and now "has rarely traded as inexpensively as it is now on a P/E basis" — with the honest caveat that on Price/Sales "it looks cheap, but not as decidedly," and the reason that matters: "neither revenues nor profits are maxed out; in fact, we'd argue they are far from peak levels." SLB is the winner being harvested: "up a roaring 52% in 2025 versus a still very respectable 30% for HAL," "the most international of all global oil service companies" with "a thriving digital division… increasingly a software company in drag," now through shorter-term resistance and testing a three-year ceiling near a five-year high. Its whole ratings history is laid out as a swing-trading record ($36 fondness in Aug-2022 → profit-taking at ~$50 → harvests in Jul and Sep 2023 → "as cheap as it had ever been at a sub-10 P/E" at $32½ in Apr-2025 → reinforced at $37 → $50 → $57 → $45 → ~$60), and the call follows from it: "harvesting some of the latest appreciation might make sense, and an obvious redeployment candidate is HALwe wouldn't, by any means, suggest exiting SLB in full… we suspect there's more near-term upside with HAL." Both are "poised to experience that happy combination of rising earnings and expanding P/E ratios." Full Buys / Holds-Trims / Sells tables published with this issue (images; transcribed in the article text).
2026-AUG-31 · Haymaker (Substack newsletter, paid) · The Haymaker Team / David Hay · Monday Portfolio Update · ↗ Read · article text · actionable insights
One-line take: a pair trade inside the same industryHAL added as a Strong Buy at $36.79, SLB trimmed at ~$59.47 and moved back to Holds/Trims (H/T) — argued from a rebuild thesis rather than from a headline. The headline is dismantled first, and that is the method. Trump's "THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN HISTORY!" — "This Historic Transaction MORE THAN DOUBLES American Oil Reserves… and will substantially lower Gas Prices for all Americans, long into the future" — is met with three specific obstacles rather than a general scepticism: time ("the fruits of this supposed transaction won't manifest overnight. More likely, it will take a decade or so"), law ("selling Venezuela's oil reserves to a foreign entity violates its constitution," though joint ventures and production-sharing arrangements are not banned), and counterparty history ("overseas oil companies have a bitter aftertaste from decades of having their assets in Venezuela appropriated and/or nationalized… even when companies like Exxon won judgement via international courts, Venezuela's destitute financial condition made collection nearly impossible. In other words, they may not hurry back, despite the mammoth upside"). Marco Rubio's "$100 billion of private investment" is quoted and left to stand against that. The motive is named: "a cynic could view this as the latest move by the Trump administration to depress oil prices in the run-up to the mid-term elections. This would be consistent with their steady stream of social media posts declaring the Strait of Hormuz open, or soon to be (many of which were front-run by not-so-mysterious insiders)." Verdict on the price impact: "because of the chronologically distant nature of any restart of Venezuela's dilapidated oil and gas infrastructure, meaningful production gains are unlikely to have any practical impact on current oil prices." What is left standing is the picks-and-shovels leg. "On the other hand, a big winner from this deal, if it actually happens in some form, might be U.S. oil service companies" — and the far bigger job is not Venezuela at all: "besides the need for vast sums to be invested in resuscitating Venezuela's oil industry… there is the more pressing issue of repairing the Middle East's war-ravaged production facilities." The house supply view is restated at full strength — "this newsletter continues to be totally convinced that oil supplies have, indeed, been enormously depleted after the steady string of attacks on said facilities, plus the loss of around half of the normal shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. (It continues to amaze us how many deny this virtually inescapable reality.)" — and converted into the thesis: "the bottom line is that this has been the greatest oil-supply shock in history. Consequently, those companies, like HAL, that have the unique set of capabilities to rebuild global oil stocks should have a number of robust operating years ahead of them." HAL — the cheap, stuck half. The share price "has struggled to achieve a new multi-year high. It has repeatedly topped out around $43," and "we opined back in May that this time might be different" — an admission the earlier call did not work: "a sharp slide in oil prices, and a guarded outlook in conjunction with its second quarter earnings release, knocked it back into the low-30s in late July. Since then, it has been working its way higher, including in a soft tape today." Valuation is given with its own qualifier attached: "HAL has rarely traded as inexpensively as it is now on a P/E basis. Admittedly, using the Price/Sales ratio, it looks cheap, but not as decidedly." The cross-check is turned into the bull point: "oil service industry conditions remain far from boom times. Therefore, neither revenues nor profits are maxed out; in fact, we'd argue they are far from peak levels" — i.e. a low P/E on depressed earnings, not peak-cycle earnings. SLB — the winner, and a fourteen-year swing-trading record. "Originally founded in France in the 1920s," headquartered in Houston, "it may be the most international of all global oil service companies" — the offered reason it "has performed considerably better than HAL this year, possibly because investors feel it can better capitalize on the Mid-East rebuild" ("up a roaring 52% in 2025 versus a still very respectable 30% for HAL; take that, S&P 500!"). Plus "a thriving digital division, with some asserting it is increasingly a software company in drag." Technically it "has broken above shorter-term resistance and may be in the process of taking out the ceiling going back almost three years… not far from making a new five-year high. If so, that would be a highly bullish development in our book." Valuation relative rather than absolute: "SLB's not nearly as inexpensive as is HAL. Yet, relative to its own history, it is underpriced, particularly on a P/E basis. For many years, SLB traded at a significant premium to the S&P 500. Presently, it's at a slight discount." The trading record is published in full as the justification for trimming again: fondness at $36 (Aug 2022) → profit-taking at ~$50 (Oct 2022) → gain-harvesting (Jul 2023) → again in early Sep 2023 → back to $32½ (Apr 2025) "as cheap as it had ever been at a sub-10 P/E," risk/reward "highly favorable" → reinforced at $37 (Dec) → $50 (Jan) → $57 (mid-May) → "sold off hard, sliding quickly to $45" → "its latest run-up to nearly $60." The switch: "at this point, harvesting some of the latest appreciation might make sense, and an obvious redeployment candidate is HAL. However, we wouldn't, by any means, suggest exiting SLB in full. Breaking above $60 could, and should, happen, likely leading to additional gains. At this point, though, we suspect there's more near-term upside with HAL." The shared destination: "in our view, both it and HAL are poised to experience that happy combination of rising earnings and expanding P/E ratios" — multiple expansion on top of earnings growth, the double count. Portfolio tables published with this issue (as images; transcribed in the article text): HAL enters the Buys table rated SB, dated 08/31/2026 at $36.79 with no cost basis yet; SLB is highlighted on Holds/Trims at H/T ($59.47, lot 09/23/2024 @ $42.00, +41.60%); other highlighted rows are CRH (SB, 01/29/2024 lot), EOG (SB), GNRC (B — the Aug-28 POW! pick's first table appearance, lot 08/28/2026 @ $186.18), DVN (H), EL (H) and GDXJ (H/T).

1. Stocks & names mentioned

TickerNameResearchViewWhat he saidAt
HALHalliburtonQT · SA · STK · FAPositiveThe featured name — added to the Buy List as a STRONG BUY, dated 08/31/2026 at $36.79 (the title's "One 'HAL' of an Opportunity"). Chosen as the cheap, lagging half of the oil-service pair: "we'll look at HAL first since it has been a recent highlight and it's also been stuck in the drilling mud." The chart problem is stated plainly — the share price "has struggled to achieve a new multi-year high. It has repeatedly topped out around $43. We opined back in May that this time might be different" — and the failure owned: "but, alas, a sharp slide in oil prices, and a guarded outlook in conjunction with its second quarter earnings release, knocked it back into the low-30s in late July. Since then, it has been working its way higher, including in a soft tape today." Valuation is the case, with the cross-check disclosed rather than hidden: "HAL has rarely traded as inexpensively as it is now on a P/E basis. Admittedly, using the Price/Sales ratio, it looks cheap, but not as decidedly." That gap is then turned into the argument — "it is certainly fair to say that oil service industry conditions remain far from boom times. Therefore, neither revenues nor profits are maxed out; in fact, we'd argue they are far from peak levels" — a low multiple on trough earnings rather than a value trap on peak ones. The demand thesis is a rebuild, not a headline. The Venezuela deal is only the trigger — "a big winner from this deal, if it actually happens in some form, might be U.S. oil service companies" — while the near-term work is elsewhere: "besides the need for vast sums to be invested in resuscitating Venezuela's oil industry, regardless of who eventually finances that effort, there is the more pressing issue of repairing the Middle East's war-ravaged production facilities." And the house supply view supplies the multi-year runway: oil supplies "have, indeed, been enormously depleted" after the attacks plus "the loss of around half of the normal shipments through the Strait of Hormuz" — "this has been the greatest oil-supply shock in history. Consequently, those companies, like HAL, that have the unique set of capabilities to rebuild global oil stocks should have a number of robust operating years ahead of them." Preferred over SLB for the near term — SLB's trim proceeds are pointed here ("an obvious redeployment candidate is HAL… we suspect there's more near-term upside with HAL") — and both are "poised to experience that happy combination of rising earnings and expanding P/E ratios."read ↗
SLBSchlumberger (SLB)QT · SA · STK · FAPositiveConstructive, but this issue's action is a TRIM — moved back to the Holds/Trims table rated H/T (highlighted; $59.47 against the 09/23/2024 lot at $42.00, +41.60%), reversing the Jul-20 promotion to the Buy List. The company case is unchanged and strong: "originally founded in France in the 1920s," now Houston-headquartered, "it may be the most international of all global oil service companies" — offered as the reason "it has performed considerably better than HAL this year, possibly because investors feel it can better capitalize on the Mid-East rebuild" ("up a roaring 52% in 2025 versus a still very respectable 30% for HAL; take that, S&P 500!"), plus "a thriving digital division, with some asserting it is increasingly a software company in drag." Technically the strongest it has looked in years: the share price "has broken above shorter-term resistance and may be in the process of taking out the ceiling going back almost three years. It's also not far from making a new five-year high. If so, that would be a highly bullish development in our book." Valuation is relative, not absolute: "SLB's not nearly as inexpensive as is HAL. Yet, relative to its own history, it is underpriced, particularly on a P/E basis. For many years, SLB traded at a significant premium to the S&P 500. Presently, it's at a slight discount." The trim is justified by a published fourteen-year record of trading the same name's swings — "this newsletter has played those swings quite well": bullish on the group and SLB at $36 (Aug 2022) → "we advised some profit-taking" at ~$50 (Oct 2022) → "gain-harvesting" (Jul 2023) → "once more in early September, 2023, at even higher prices" → down to $32½ (Apr 2025), "as cheap as it had ever been at a sub-10 P/E," risk/reward "highly favorable" → reinforced at $37 (Dec) → $50 (Jan) → $57 (mid-May) → "sold off hard, sliding quickly to $45" → "its latest run-up to nearly $60." Hence: "at this point, harvesting some of the latest appreciation might make sense, and an obvious redeployment candidate is HAL. However, we wouldn't, by any means, suggest exiting SLB in full. Breaking above $60 could, and should, happen, likely leading to additional gains. At this point, though, we suspect there's more near-term upside with HAL." Same destination as HAL: "poised to experience that happy combination of rising earnings and expanding P/E ratios."read ↗
XOMExxon MobilQT · SA · STK · FANeutralPassing mention — cited as the cautionary precedent, not as a recommendation. Exxon appears only inside the Venezuela debunking, as the example of why the majors "may not hurry back, despite the mammoth upside": "overseas oil companies have a bitter aftertaste from decades of having their assets in Venezuela appropriated and/or nationalized. Years of convoluted litigation ensued, and even when companies like Exxon won judgement via international courts, Venezuela's destitute financial condition made collection nearly impossible." No stance is taken on the shares. (For the record, the published tables carry XOM on the Sells list — exited 03/02/2026 at $160.64 for a +34.93% gain on a $114.30 cost — a prior disposal, not an action this week.)read ↗

"View" is Haymaker's stance in this post. Only HAL and SLB are argued — a two-name oil-service update; XOM is a passing historical reference. Referenced only (not rowed): Venezuela (the country with "the world's largest oil reserves"), Donald Trump ("THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN HISTORY!"), Secretary of State Marco Rubio ("$100 billion of private investment"), the Strait of Hormuz, the Seattle Mariners (a joke), and Bloomberg (the four charts — five-year price and five-year Price/Sales & P/E for each name). The Buys / Holds-Trims / Sells tables published with this issue are portfolio state, not commentary, and are transcribed at the end of the article text rather than rowed here — the ones changed this week are HAL (new, SB), SLB (H/T), CRH (SB), EOG (SB), GNRC (B), DVN (H), EL (H) and GDXJ (H/T). Research: QT Qualtrim · SA Seeking Alpha · STK Stock Analysis.

2. Talking points

The headline — "THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN HISTORY!"

Obstacle one — the timeline

Obstacle two — the constitution (with the loophole named)

Obstacle three — the counterparty's own history

The motive — a mid-term oil-price suppression campaign

What survives the debunking — the service companies

HAL's chart problem — and the May call that didn't work

HAL's valuation — and the ratio that disagrees

The real job — the Middle East rebuild, then Venezuela

"The greatest oil-supply shock in history"

SLB — the most international of the group

SLB's technical setup — a three-year ceiling in play

SLB's valuation — cheap against itself, not against HAL

The fourteen-year swing-trading record, published in full

The switch — trim SLB, redeploy into HAL

The shared destination — earnings and the multiple, together

The tables — what changed this week

3. In plain English

A jargon-free note on why each name is cited. (Companion to the table above; renders on each name's consolidated page.)

HAL — Halliburton Positive

Halliburton does not own oil. It is one of the handful of firms the world hires to get oil out of the ground — drilling wells, fracturing rock to make it flow, cementing and completing the holes, and keeping the equipment running afterwards. That distinction matters more than it sounds. An oil producer's profits swing with the price of the barrel; a service company's profits swing with how much work the industry is doing. The two usually move together, but they are not the same bet, and this week Haymaker is making the second one.

The trigger was a headline he does not believe. Trump announced what he called "THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN HISTORY" — an arrangement over Venezuela, the country holding the world's largest oil reserves — claiming it "MORE THAN DOUBLES American Oil Reserves" and will lower petrol prices "long into the future." Haymaker takes it apart on three specifics rather than dismissing it in general. First, time: even if it happens, "it will take a decade or so before they are ready for harvest." Second, law: selling those reserves to a foreign entity "violates its constitution" — though, fairly noted, joint ventures and production-sharing deals are not banned. Third, memory: foreign oil companies spent decades having assets in Venezuela seized, and even when Exxon won in international courts, the country was too broke to pay, so "they may not hurry back, despite the mammoth upside." He also names the likely motive plainly — a way to talk oil prices down before the mid-term elections, of a piece with the steady stream of official posts declaring the Strait of Hormuz open.

So the headline changes no barrels this year. But notice what it does not touch: whoever eventually rebuilds Venezuela's wrecked oil infrastructure will have to hire somebody to do the physical work — and the same is true, far sooner and on a far larger scale, of "the Middle East's war-ravaged production facilities." That is the actual thesis. Haymaker's standing view is that world oil supply has been genuinely depleted by the attacks on those facilities plus the loss of roughly half the normal shipments through the Strait of Hormuz — "the greatest oil-supply shock in history." Rebuilding that lost supply is years of work, and the firms with "the unique set of capabilities to rebuild global oil stocks should have a number of robust operating years ahead of them."

The reason to buy Halliburton specifically is that it has been left behind. The shares keep running into a ceiling around $43 and failing; a May call that "this time might be different" was wrong, and after a drop in oil prices and a cautious outlook alongside second-quarter results the stock fell back into the low $30s in late July. It has been grinding higher since. On earnings-based valuation it "has rarely traded as inexpensively as it is now."

The most useful part of the write-up is the honesty about that cheapness. Haymaker checks it against a second measure — price compared to sales rather than to profits — and admits the stock "looks cheap, but not as decidedly" on that one. The gap between the two is the whole argument. Price-to-earnings can look artificially low when profits are at a peak and about to fall; that is the classic trap in a cyclical business. Here it is the opposite: industry conditions "remain far from boom times," so "neither revenues nor profits are maxed out; in fact, we'd argue they are far from peak levels." A low multiple on depressed earnings is the good version. If the rebuild work arrives, profits rise and investors are usually willing to pay a higher multiple for them at the same time — what he calls "that happy combination of rising earnings and expanding P/E ratios," two effects that multiply.

Practically: Halliburton is added to Haymaker's Buy List as a Strong Buy at $36.79, and it is where he suggests putting money taken off the table in Schlumberger, on the view that "there's more near-term upside with HAL."

SLB — Schlumberger Positive

Schlumberger is Halliburton's larger, more global rival — the same business of drilling, measuring and completing oil wells for the companies that own them, but spread across more countries than anyone else in the industry. Founded in France in the 1920s and now run from Houston, it is, as Haymaker puts it, "the most international of all global oil service companies." It also has a substantial software and data business attached, to the point that "some asserting it is increasingly a software company in drag."

That international reach is the offered explanation for why it has beaten its rival this year — investors think it is better placed to win the work of repairing the Middle East's damaged oil facilities. The scoreboard: SLB up 52% in 2025 against 30% for Halliburton, both well ahead of the broad US market.

Nothing about the business case has soured. The chart is arguably the stronger of the two: the shares have pushed through near-term resistance and may be about to clear a ceiling that has capped them for almost three years, with a five-year high not far above — which he says "would be a highly bullish development in our book." On valuation it is not cheap the way Halliburton is cheap, but it is cheap against its own past: for years Schlumberger commanded a meaningful premium to the wider US market, and today it trades at a slight discount.

So why trim it? Because the position has done its job, and because this is a name Haymaker has deliberately traded in swings rather than simply held. He publishes the whole record as the justification, which is unusually checkable: liking the group and SLB at $36 in August 2022, advising profit-taking at about $50 that October, harvesting gains again in July 2023 and once more that September at higher prices; then, when the shares had fallen all the way to $32.50 in April 2025 — "as cheap as it had ever been," on a price-to-earnings ratio under 10 — calling the risk/reward "highly favorable," reinforcing that at $37 in December, and watching it run to $50 in January, $57 by mid-May, back down hard to $45, and now up to nearly $60. That is the pattern being repeated: buy the trough multiple, sell into strength, keep a core.

The instruction is therefore a partial one, and the limits are stated as clearly as the action. "Harvesting some of the latest appreciation might make sense, and an obvious redeployment candidate is HAL" — but "we wouldn't, by any means, suggest exiting SLB in full," because "breaking above $60 could, and should, happen, likely leading to additional gains." In other words this is not a negative call on Schlumberger at all; it is a judgement that the cheaper, more-lagged sibling has more room over the next few months. Both, he expects, will get the same double benefit of rising profits and a higher multiple paid for them. On the published portfolio tables the name moves back from the Buy List to Holds/Trims, rated Hold/Trim, against a September 2024 cost of $42 and a current $59.47 — a 41.6% gain being partly banked, not abandoned.


Summary derived from the paid Haymaker newsletter (text in transcript.txt, with the portfolio tables transcribed from the published images). For personal study. Not investment advice. © Haymaker / David Hay for source material.