Hay is a macro / sector investor — several names below are ETFs used to express a theme, or single names cited as evidence (Chevron/Exxon on inventories, Cisco as the 2000 analogue) rather than formal ratings. Stance reflects how each was framed by Hay, in this interview — the New Harbor Financial segment that follows his exit at 1:26:34 is summarised in the talking points but is not attributed to him. Research: QT Qualtrim · SA Seeking Alpha · STK Stock Analysis. The macro substance also feeds the master macro viewpoints.
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he said | At |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EOG | EOG Resources | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | "A specific recommendation" written up in Haymaker on June 17 — "one of the premier oil and gas producers in the United States," PE of 10 with a mid-range price-to-sales that should fall further as higher oil prices lift sales, sitting "right on the cusp" of a multi-year breakout on the five-year chart ("when it does, it likely is going to run a bit more"). Also "a takeover candidate, though you never bet on that — that would be a kicker." | 22:27 |
| XLE | Energy Select Sector SPDR | QT · SA · STK | Positive | Where the upside still is: XLE +33% YTD vs the NASDAQ's ~8%, energy tied with technology for the highest five-year returns of any sector — and it's "3% of the S&P, it's peanuts… incredibly neglected." Energy equities are "a more realistic way for almost all of your listeners to play" the oil shortage than the commodity. | 19:57 |
| UNG | United States Natural Gas Fund | QT · SA · STK | Positive | US gas at ~$3/MMBtu is "just ridiculously cheap" against a world price "now pushing over 20" — "I really like US natural gas, US natural gas producers which are also very cheap." Europe's gas in storage "has fallen off the cliff" to the lowest of the last 15 years and "they're going to pay a severe price this winter." | 23:09 |
| YACAF | Yancoal Australia (ADR) | QT · SA · STK | Positive | Half of the Monday buy alert on "two Australian coal companies" (the fuller write-up landing the next day). Look at "that pounding that it's had this year, like so many commodities" — that "created a big opportunity." Both names had already "popped a little bit… about four or 5%" since publication. Credit to Trader Ferg, "really bullish on these coal companies." | 37:32 |
| NHC | New Hope Corp (Australian coal; ADR NHPEF) | QT · SA · STK | Positive | The other half of the coal alert and the sturdier chart — "New Hope has been holding up much better." The mechanism: Hormuz threatens LNG as well as oil, so "Asia is going to have no choice," while Indonesia — "the largest exporter of thermal coal… in the world" — is "drastically reducing their coal exports" to keep the coal at home. | 37:50 |
| SRUUF | Sprott Physical Uranium Trust | QT · SA · STK | Positive | "One of my favorite plays right now." Uranium spot is ~$85/lb, the Sprott trust is "effectively pricing at about 77" — a ~10% discount — and spot itself sits below the ~$95 long-term contract market (where nearly all volume trades, with escalators and ~$150 ceilings, floors near current prices): "you're getting a discount upon a discount… really a 20% discount." Right now "it's pretty out of favor." | 28:01 |
| Aalo Atomics | Aalo Atomics (private) — microreactor startup | — | Positive | "As long as we bullish on Alo, we've touted Alo" — and it "did just get DOE approval along with three others" for criticality, "so there's four total now… really good news happening in that area and I think there's going to be a lot of money made. I hope Aalo is one of those big money makers." Caveat: even if highly successful, "they're probably three to four years away from producing in size" (10 MW next year is "a drop in the bucket"). | 33:13 |
| KRE | SPDR S&P Regional Banking ETF | QT · SA · STK | Positive | "I think the breakout by the regional bank index is very bullish. It looks great" — he is "seeing so many of these regional bank stocks that either have broken out or very close to it and they're very reasonably priced 10 11 12 times earnings." One of the "positive slides" he deliberately led with. Entry discipline: it's extended above the breakout and the 200-day, so "I like to look at breakouts and then buy them when they pull back." | 50:09 |
| SLV | iShares Silver Trust | QT · SA · STK | Positive | Having flagged the early-year run to "close to 120" as a blow-off top and advised gradual profit-taking into it, "at this point, I think it looks pretty interesting for a recovery." Unlike gold, silver has heavy industrial use, "all these military applications" (armaments destroyed and needing replacement) and "a big part of improving the grid" — and "it still gets pulled along with gold when it rises." | 1:17:37 |
| GLD | SPDR Gold Shares | QT · SA · STK | Positive | Gold "has become the central banker's reserve asset of choice more than any bond," and on a tonnage basis official buying stayed high (last year's dip likely China stepping back at high prices, "just like they do with oil") — he expects "another surge of central bank gold purchases at the lower prices." With governments running "project Zimbabwe"-style games to avoid a debt meltdown, "there's going to be this persistent bid under precious metals… I think gold's going to rally too." | 1:20:14 |
| GDX | VanEck Gold Miners ETF | QT · SA · STK | Positive | His fund-flow chart shows the largest outflow year on record was last year — after "tremendous returns" and "really good profits" — which he reads not as a warning but as "a lot of investor apathy" (the mirror image of the dangerous 2016 inflow spike): "the gold miners and silver miners look pretty interesting." He also sees the sector "starting to emulate the energy industry" on capital discipline after years of being "very poorly run." | 1:21:17 |
| GDXJ | VanEck Junior Gold Miners ETF | QT · SA · STK | Positive | The junior-miner leg of the same apathy chart ("GDXJ is the junior gold miner ETF") — record outflows despite the miners' banner year, which on his contrarian read is why the group "looks pretty interesting." Same fundamental kicker: rising margins plus incoming capital discipline. | 1:20:58 |
| USO | United States Oil Fund | QT · SA · STK | Neutral | Taking profits after the monster move. He was long 10,000 barrels of futures at the end of June and "now that it's had this monster rally, I've been gradually liquidating some of my futures contracts": "if they want to take some profits on oil, anybody that's following us, like with USO, I don't disagree." Still constructive, not out — "any dip is to be bought," he has "a lot of contracts left," and a blow-off top like gold/silver's is possible ("I'm not going to bet the ranch on that"). | 7:28 |
| CVX | Chevron | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Cited as corroboration, not a rating: on the inevitability of SPR "day zero" it "wasn't just Jeff [Currie], it was also Mike Worth, the CEO of Chevron" saying the same thing. | 16:14 |
| XOM | ExxonMobil | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Same corroborating role — "one of the senior Exxon executives as well… was saying the same thing" about forced SPR refilling at any price. | 16:14 |
| GOOGL | Alphabet | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Still "my favorite in the space for a long long time," but the earnings quality is the warning: of the very good results reported that day, "almost two-thirds… have come from the gains on their venture capital investments in these entities which are big customers" — booked in other income, legitimate but "very unsustainable" — "it is a circular financing type of situation." The stock got "a whack" despite good numbers because it raised capex targets, and a large depreciation schedule has yet to hit the P&L. Also the broader lament: these were capital-light, high-FCF businesses once at "10 11 times earnings" — "maybe someday they'll be back there given what they're doing." | 38:59 |
| META | Meta Platforms | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | A hypothetical, not a call: "perhaps it's going to be Meta is going to go 'guys, we're actually going to cut way back on our AI capex' — that stock might go straight up," which "perhaps will give the other ones a reason to… at least a pause." | 45:16 |
| MSFT | Microsoft | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Grouped with Alphabet and Apple as former capital-light compounders now spending like industrials — "it wasn't that long ago they were trading at 10 11 times earnings but maybe someday they'll be back there." Also cited (per the host) as asking permission to use cheaper Chinese models over OpenAI/Anthropic. | 45:45 |
| AAPL | Apple | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Named in passing in the same breath — one of the "very low capex, very high free cash flow… capital light" models with "great network effects" that made them "such great stocks for so long," a status the AI spending era is eroding. | 45:45 |
| CSCO | Cisco Systems | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | The historical tell, not a rating: at the March-2000 NASDAQ peak "it was companies like Cisco reporting great earnings and the stocks went down" — exactly what Google just did, so "maybe this is the big shakeout we've been looking for with tech." | 24:02 |
| TSLA | Tesla | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | A one-line market observation while pulling up SpaceX's quote: "Tesla's getting clobbered today." | 25:26 |
| Anthropic | Anthropic (private) | — | Neutral | Cited as the mechanism inside Alphabet's earnings and backlog rather than as a view on the company: the ~34% earnings contribution is "largely coming from Google's stake" in Anthropic (or OpenAI), and on the hyperscaler backlog chart "anthropic is the big part of their there" — so "there's some questions about the health of those backlogs." | 40:20 |
| DeepSeek | DeepSeek (private) — Chinese open-weight AI models | — | Neutral | Agreed with the host's point that cheap Chinese open models are real competition — Microsoft wanting government permission to use DeepSeek because it's "so much more affordable than Open AI and Anthropic" as token costs soar: "No, that's true." | 44:10 |
| SPCX | SpaceX | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | The post-IPO wreck that vindicates his mega-IPO warning: "look what's happened to SpaceX" — the bond it issued has been "the space shuttle crashing back down to Earth… a disaster," and the average weighted price paid in the secondary market after the IPO was "something like 170 per share" against ~$116 as they recorded: "those people… are seriously underwater. That's a lot of money." It IPO'd near ~100× sales. | 24:46 |
| OpenAI | OpenAI (private) | — | Negative | "The whole OpenAI business model I think is coming under tremendous suspicion and questions, and it should, because the capex is ginormous" (~$700B this year toward ~$1T next). On the >$1T IPO: "I don't know about that. I think there's a good chance that IPO gets pulled and if they try to ram it through, it could be quite a fiasco" — and he doubts the ROI is achievable ("really really tough to do, and I think the market's starting to wake up to that"). | 43:00 |
| ORCL | Oracle | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | The AI-credit canary: "Oracle bonds are trading almost like junk" — remarkable for a company that "at one point got up close to a trillion dollar market cap" but "really leveraged up… trash balance sheet. The market's kind of unforgiving." He recalls it adding ~$200B of market cap in a day on its AI-spend announcement a year ago: "when you see that kind of stuff on the upside… almost invariably you're going to get the payback on the downside." | 47:00 |
| IBM | International Business Machines | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | Sold and stays sold — "we had bought that one on its breakout… and we put out a sell on it a few months ago", just before it lost 25% of its value in a single day. "IBM's been known to disappoint a lot… it was called big blue in the old days and its shareholders have had a lot of blue over the last 20 years." Used as proof of "how vicious the market can be in this space when it wants to punish you." | 47:58 |
| MU | Micron Technology | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | The cheap-looking semi that isn't: "their pees are very low, single digits. Their price to sales though are extremely high because their margins are just off the charts" — and those margins come from scarcity, not innovation ("they haven't changed the product really at all"). With "a lot of overordering going on in the semiconductor world," if data-center growth merely slows "those boom earnings can turn to bust… those stocks just hit air pockets" — semis being "about as cyclical as an industry can get… especially RAMs." | 41:28 |
| CAT | Caterpillar | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | A "smoke stack industrial" swept into the AI mania: the stock "just exploded" off a good 2023–24 breakout near 200 and is "now very extended" at ~32× earnings and 6× sales — "way above anything it's ever seen before" on a cyclical. The turbine story is capacity-constrained ("can they really make that many more? Well somewhat"), so "if the AI data center buildout starts to slow down, Caterpillar is going to get hit hard. If your viewers have got a big position of CAT, they may want to take some partial profits at least." | 57:43 |
Stance = how each name was framed by David Hay in this interview (a sector/rotation view, a trade, or supporting evidence), not a formal price rating. Names raised only in the New Harbor Financial recap after 1:26:34 are deliberately excluded. Research legend: QT Qualtrim · SA Seeking Alpha · STK Stock Analysis.
A jargon-free summary of the thesis behind each name — what it actually is and why he holds that view. (Plain-language companion to the table above; renders on each ticker's consolidated page.)
EOG is one of the biggest and best-run oil and gas producers in the United States, and it's the single stock Hay names as a formal Haymaker recommendation (written up on June 17). The pitch is simple arithmetic: it earns a lot relative to its share price — a price-to-earnings ratio of 10, versus a US market well north of 20 — and that "E" should get bigger, not smaller, because oil has jumped from the high 60s to the 90s since he wrote it up.
He also likes the chart. Over five years the stock has repeatedly stalled at roughly the same ceiling, and it is now pressing against it again — what he calls a multi-year breakout setting up. His experience is that when a stock finally clears a ceiling it has been rejected at for years, it tends to keep running, because there is no trapped seller left overhead. A possible takeover bid is a free extra ("you never bet on that — that would be a kicker").
The wider point: he is taking money out of oil futures and leaving it in energy shares, because the commodity has already made its move and the equities haven't caught up.
XLE is a single fund that holds the large US energy companies, so buying it is a one-click way to own the sector. Hay offers it as the sensible way for ordinary investors to play the oil shortage instead of trading futures contracts, which are borrowed-money bets that can be brutally volatile.
Two facts do the arguing. First, energy has quietly matched technology for the best five-year returns of any sector — almost nobody knows this. Second, it is up about 33% this year while the tech-heavy NASDAQ is up single digits, and it was already rising before the war started. Yet energy is still only about 3% of the S&P 500: "it's peanuts… incredibly neglected."
In other words, a sector that has quietly won for five years is still owned by almost nobody — which is exactly the kind of gap he hunts for.
UNG tracks the US price of natural gas. Hay's case is a price gap so wide it looks like a mistake: American gas sells for about $3 per unit while the same fuel sells for over $20 in Europe and Asia (shipped there in liquefied form, as LNG). Gaps like that tend to close, and they close by the cheap side rising.
The trigger he's watching is the coming winter. Europe's gas in storage has "fallen off the cliff" to the lowest level in at least fifteen years, just as Middle East hostilities threaten LNG cargoes. If Europe has a cold winter, it will bid aggressively for whatever gas is available: "I think they're going to pay a severe price this winter."
He likes both the commodity and the companies that produce it — "US natural gas producers which are also very cheap" — as a rare corner of the market where the asset is cheap and demand is about to rise.
Yancoal is a large Australian coal miner, and it is one of the two names Haymaker put out a buy alert on the Monday before this interview. Coal is deeply unfashionable, which is a large part of why it's cheap: Yancoal has been beaten down hard all year along with the rest of the commodity complex.
The reason to own it now is substitution. Most of Asia burns coal to make electricity, and its alternative — imported LNG — is exactly what Middle East hostilities are choking off. When gas gets scarce and expensive, power stations burn more coal, so coal prices rise. On top of that, Indonesia (the world's largest exporter of thermal coal, the kind used for electricity) is sharply cutting exports to keep supply at home.
He frames the whole group the same way: "the whole complex got sold off very very hard and I think created just a tremendous buying opportunity." He credits the Australia-based analyst Trader Ferg with the work behind the call.
New Hope is the other half of the coal pair (US investors buy it as NHPEF). It is the sturdier of the two — "New Hope has been holding up much better" — so it carries less of the deep-discount bargain appeal and more of the quality.
The thesis is identical: Asian power generators need fuel, the LNG they would otherwise import is at risk from Middle East disruption, and Indonesia is cutting the thermal coal it exports. As Hay puts it, "Asia is going to have no choice." Both names had already popped 4–5% in the days after his alert, and the fuller written analysis was due the next day.
SRUUF is a trust that simply owns physical uranium in storage — so its value is the value of the metal inside it, and holding it is a direct bet on the uranium price. Hay calls it "one of my favorite plays right now," and says uranium today "looks like oil in late June": ignored, cheap, and sitting on a genuine shortage.
The bargain has two layers, which is why he calls it "a discount upon a discount." Layer one: uranium trades around $85 a pound in the spot market, but the trust is priced as if its uranium were worth only about $77 — roughly a 10% discount, because the fund is out of favour and trades below the value of what it holds. Layer two: the spot market isn't the real market. Almost all uranium changes hands in multi-year contracts between miners and utilities, and those contracts are being struck around $95, typically with price escalators, ceilings near $150 and floors close to today's levels. So you are buying at ~$77 an asset whose real-world price is ~$95 with limited downside built in — about a 20% discount all in.
The shortage behind it is structural: the old sources of cheap supply (converted Soviet warheads under Megatons to Megawatts, post-Fukushima stockpiles) are gone, new Western mines are nearly impossible to permit and take five to ten years, Russia controls roughly 35% of enrichment/conversion — while 70 large reactors are under construction worldwide.
Aalo is a private startup building "microreactors" — nuclear reactors small enough to be mass-produced in a factory and trucked to wherever the power is needed, rather than built as a one-off gigawatt plant. Hay and the host have both said publicly they own the theme, and Aalo has just received Department of Energy approval to go critical (start its reaction), joining only three other companies at that stage.
Why small matters: the American electricity grid is already fragile. Building giant reactors far from customers means pushing more power through wires that can't take it. Put a microreactor on-site at a data centre and the electricity never touches the grid at all — which is why he thinks small, mass-produced reactors, not big ones, are the future of US nuclear.
His honest caveat is timing. Even if Aalo succeeds, it is "three to four years away from producing in size"; a 10-megawatt unit next year is "a drop in the bucket." It is a private company, so it isn't investable for most people — a thesis to follow, not a trade.
KRE is a fund holding America's small and mid-sized banks — the ones left for dead after the 2023 regional-bank scare. Hay deliberately opened his stock-market section with this chart because he wanted to make clear he is "just as bullish on certain areas of the market as I am bearish on others."
What he sees: the regional bank index has completed a breakout above a ceiling that held for years, which he reads as "very bullish," and the individual names are still cheap at 10, 11, 12 times earnings — less than half the multiple of the big index. Financials were also one of the groups that quietly went up during the 2000–02 tech crash, which is the historical rhyme he's playing.
One discipline: it has run too far above its breakout point and its 200-day average (a common trend gauge) for him to chase. His rule is to spot the breakout and then wait — "buy them when they pull back after they break out."
SLV is the big silver fund — owning it is essentially owning silver. Hay has credibility on this one in both directions: he flagged the early-year run toward $120 as a "blow-off top" (a vertical, unsustainable final surge) and told subscribers to sell gradually into it. Silver then crashed.
Now, after months of grinding sideways and a lot of investor fatigue, he says "it looks pretty interesting for a recovery." A stock-market scare would help by convincing traders the Federal Reserve won't raise rates; his own view is the Fed sits still — no hike, no cut.
Silver's advantage over gold is that people actually consume it: it goes into electronics, into military equipment (much of which is being destroyed and replaced right now), and into rebuilding electrical grids, where it's one of the best conductors there is. And when gold rallies, silver usually gets pulled along for the ride.
GLD is the large gold fund. Hay's bull case isn't about jewellery or inflation hedging in the abstract — it's about who is buying. Central banks, he argues, have made gold "the central banker's reserve asset of choice more than any bond," meaning they'd now rather park national savings in metal than in government IOUs.
He answers the standard rebuttal (that central-bank gold buying only looks big because the price went up) by measuring it in tonnes rather than dollars: the tonnage is still high, and last year's dip was probably China stepping back at expensive prices — "just like they do with oil." At today's lower prices he expects "another surge of central bank gold purchases."
Behind it sits his bigger view: governments buried in debt will keep improvising — twisting the yield curve, changing bank rules, eventually having the Treasury buy stocks — rather than allow a debt reckoning. All of that debases money, which is why he expects "a persistent bid under precious metals" and thinks "gold's going to rally too."
GDX holds the large gold-mining companies — a way to own the profits of digging gold up rather than the metal itself. Miners are more volatile than bullion because their profit is the gap between the gold price and their fixed costs, so a modest move in gold swings earnings a lot.
Hay's chart is a contrarian one: last year was the largest year of money leaving these funds on record — even though the miners had a spectacular year and were reporting real profits. Normally you'd expect floods of money chasing that, which is a classic warning sign (as it was in 2016). Getting the opposite tells him there is "a lot of investor apathy," which is what cheap, unloved sectors look like before they work.
He adds a fundamental improvement: mining "has been very poorly run for a long time," but it is starting to copy the energy industry's newfound capital discipline — spending less and returning more instead of splurging every time prices rise. Cheap, profitable, hated and better managed is his preferred combination.
GDXJ is the same idea as GDX but with smaller mining companies — "juniors." Smaller miners are riskier and swing harder, so they usually fall further in a downturn and rise further in an upturn.
It appears on the same fund-flow chart, showing the same record outflows in a year when the miners actually made good money. Hay's read applies to both: the money leaving is apathy, not information, and "the gold miners and silver miners look pretty interesting" as a result.
USO is a fund that tracks the price of crude oil. Hay's call to buy oil at the end of June — when almost everyone was mocking the bulls — has worked spectacularly: WTI went from about $69 to $93 and Brent above $100 in under a month. He was long 10,000 barrels of futures contracts through it.
So this is a profit-taking message, not a change of mind. He has been "gradually liquidating some of my futures contracts" simply because the move was so big, and he tells viewers plainly: "if they want to take some profits on oil, anybody that's following us, like with USO, I don't disagree."
But he is not out and not bearish. He still holds "a lot of contracts," believes "any dip is to be bought," and thinks a blow-off top — a final vertical spike like gold and silver had earlier in the year — is genuinely possible, though he won't "bet the ranch on that." His preferred way to stay exposed from here is energy shares, which have lagged the commodity, rather than the oil price itself.
Google's parent has been "my favorite in the space for a long long time," so this is a caution about the numbers rather than a rejection of the company. The catch is where the profits are coming from: of the very good quarter reported the day they spoke, "almost two-thirds" of earnings came from writing up the value of Alphabet's stakes in AI companies — which are themselves big paying customers of Alphabet's cloud.
That is what he means by "circular financing": Alphabet invests in an AI firm, the AI firm spends the money buying Alphabet's computing, and Alphabet books both the revenue and a paper gain on the stake. It is entirely legal — accounting rules require those gains to be recorded — but it isn't repeatable, so headline earnings flatter the business.
There is a second, delayed problem: the enormous spending on data centres is written off gradually as "depreciation," a cost that "has really yet to hit the P&L." Strip out the one-time gains and add the depreciation coming, and a stock that looks like it trades at a teens-to-twenties multiple of earnings is far more expensive. The market seems to be noticing — Alphabet fell on good results because it raised its spending plans, which is exactly what happened to great companies at the top in early 2000.
SpaceX went public in the wave of giant IPOs Hay had warned about, and it is now his exhibit A for what happens when a company lists at an extreme valuation — roughly 100 times its annual sales at the peak, a level that historically was considered absurd.
The damage is on both sides of the balance sheet. The bond it issued has been "the space shuttle crashing back down to Earth… a disaster" — meaning lenders are demanding a much higher yield, so the price of the debt has collapsed. And on the equity side, ordinary investors who couldn't get shares at the offering had to buy in the open market afterwards, paying an average of about $170 a share; the stock was around $116 while they recorded. "Those people are seriously underwater. That's a lot of money."
The lesson he draws is behavioural as much as financial: it is the clearest example of investors adding to a winner right up to the point the story changes.
OpenAI is the private company behind ChatGPT, and Hay's problem is arithmetic rather than technology. Industry-wide AI capital spending is heading toward roughly $700 billion this year and perhaps $1 trillion next. On numbers that large, "how are you going to get an ROI on that?" — a return on investment big enough to justify the outlay. His answer: "really really tough to do, and I think the market's starting to wake up to that."
That matters beyond OpenAI itself, because the cloud giants' reported order books lean heavily on a handful of AI customers. If those customers' business models are shaky, the backlogs everyone is valuing the hyperscalers on are shakier than they look: "are some of these customers like OpenAI really that solid?"
On the widely expected trillion-dollar-plus listing, he is blunt: "there's a good chance that IPO gets pulled, and if they try to ram it through it could be quite a fiasco." (The host notes reports of a slip to 2027.)
Oracle is the database and cloud giant that borrowed heavily to build AI capacity. The warning sign Hay points to isn't the share price — it's the bonds. "Oracle bonds are trading almost like junk," meaning lenders now demand nearly the yield they'd want from a speculative-grade borrower, which is remarkable for a company that briefly approached a trillion-dollar market value.
The reason is the balance sheet: it "really leveraged up… trashed balance sheet. The market's kind of unforgiving." Bond investors get paid only if they're repaid, so they tend to notice strain before equity investors do — which is why he treats the credit market as the early-warning system for a bubble.
He also draws a symmetry lesson. A year ago Oracle added roughly $200 billion of market value in a single day on an AI-spending announcement, back when spending was cheered. "When you see that kind of stuff on the upside, almost invariably you're going to get the payback on the downside."
IBM is a position Haymaker owned and exited. They bought it on a technical breakout, it "ran tremendously," and they "put out a sell on it a few months ago" — which turned out to be just before the stock lost 25% of its value in a single day. Hay is modest about it ("we usually aren't that prescient") but the sale stands.
His view of the company is unsentimental: "IBM's been known to disappoint a lot… it was called big blue in the old days and its shareholders have had a lot of blue over the last 20 years."
He uses it mainly to make a point about the current market. Losing a quarter of a very large company's value in one session shows "how vicious the market can be in this space when it wants to punish you" — the same risk sitting under every AI-adjacent stock priced for perfection.
Micron makes memory chips, and it looks cheap on the most common measure: single-digit price-to-earnings. Hay's warning is that this cheapness is a trap, and the giveaway is a different ratio — price-to-sales, which is "extremely high." Put together, those two facts mean profit margins are at extraordinary highs, and the "E" in the P/E is temporarily inflated.
Crucially, those margins come from shortage, not skill: "they haven't changed the product really at all." Prices are high because buyers are desperate. That reverses fast, and it reverses violently, because customers over-order during a shortage — "a lot of overordering going on in the semiconductor world. That's always been the case in that industry."
So if data-centre construction merely slows (his expectation — still growing, just less), "those boom earnings can turn to bust" and the stocks "hit air pockets." Memory chips are the most cyclical corner of the most cyclical industry: "especially RAMs."
Caterpillar makes construction machinery and power-generation turbines — an old-economy industrial that most people wouldn't think of as an AI stock. But it has been swept into the data-centre trade because those sites need turbines for electricity, and the stock "just exploded."
The valuation is now, in his words, "way above anything it's ever seen before": about 32 times earnings and 6 times sales. For a cyclical company — one whose profits swing with the economy — that is exceptional, because the market is paying a premium multiple on earnings that are at a peak rather than a trough. He notes the double warning: Scott McNealy famously mocked investors for paying 10 times sales for Sun Microsystems in 2000, and here is a "gears and wheels" company at 6.
He also doubts the turbine story can grow much further — capacity is constrained, so "can they really make that many more? Well somewhat." Conclusion: "if the AI data center buildout starts to slow down, Caterpillar is going to get hit hard. If your viewers have got a big position of CAT, they may want to take some partial profits at least."
Summary & timestamps derived from the public YouTube video (transcript in transcript.txt) for personal study. Not investment advice. © Thoughtful Money / Haymaker for source material.