David Hay — Haymaker Daily: The Power Shortfall's Powerful Solution — the US faces a mammoth electricity deficit while China builds 36 reactors and Russia holds 43% of world enrichment; with conversion and enrichment barely investable and U-92 miners still mostly profitless, SRUUF is named as one of the few vehicles for the nuclear renaissance (Sep 9 2026)

A two-chart Daily that starts from a demand fact and ends at the only vehicle the author thinks retail can actually use. The premise is put bluntly: "one would have to be virtually brain-dead, similar to the condition of most U.S. politicians, not to realize the U.S. is facing a mammoth deficit of electricity over the next decade." The supply menu is narrow — "the most effective ways to cope with this looming crisis are natural gas, nuclear, and coal" — and two of the three are already going the wrong way: "while natural gas' share of the USA's overall electricity output has been steadily increasing, nuclear and, particularly, coal have been shrinking." The tie-breaker is stated as a one-liner rather than argued: "nuclear, of course, is the emission-free solution." The contrast is geopolitical. "Russia and China are taking a radically different tack. Both are aggressively expanding their nuclear-generation footprints," and China is simultaneously "dramatically ramping up coal-fired plants with more under development than the rest of the world combined." The scoreboard: China "has the most atomic energy plants under construction, at 36, approximately half of all the new atomic energy facilities being developed globally… in stark contrast to the U.S., which has precisely none" (excluding SMRs, "still in the proof-of-concept phase"). Russia is the exporter: "the planet's largest exporter of atomic power plants, with 21 of its designs currently in the build-out process, per industry authority Justin Huhn of Uranium Insider," another six in planning, "the collective capacity of these total 40 gigawatts. To put this in context, the entire existing U.S. nuclear power fleet sums to 97 gigawatts." Then the chokepoint chart: Russia's share of the fuel cycle — 14% mining, 20% conversion, 43% enrichment — with enrichment "particularly impressive, more than twice that of the second-largest, which is, unsurprisingly, China." And the practical problem that follows from it: "publicly traded investment options in the conversion and enrichment cycle are extremely limited." What is investable is the commodity: "the number of new nuclear facilities under construction globally, along with a double-digit number of restarts of previously mothballed plants, does paint a very bullish picture for future uranium demand" — so "one of the few vehicles available for U.S. investors to participate in this nuclear renaissance, other than mostly profitless (for now) U-92 miners, is the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (SRUUF)."

One-line take: the shortest possible route from a demand fact to a single ticker, and the interesting part is the elimination round in the middle. The demand claim is not defended at all — the electricity shortfall is treated as settled, which is consistent with the archive's AI-build-out and grid notes. What Hay actually does here is walk the supply chain and cross out everything that cannot be bought. Of the three "most effective" answers, coal is shrinking in the US (the EIA chart shows it falling from a ~2,000 bkWh peak in 2007 to roughly 650 today) and gas is already the winner nobody needs to be told about (up to ~1,900 bkWh over the same span) — which leaves nuclear, flat at ~800 bkWh for three decades, as the underbuilt option. Note that the EIA chart quietly makes the note's real point: total US generation was flat for roughly fifteen years and has only just turned up, so the entire shortfall is a step-change in demand hitting a fleet built for a plateau. The China/Russia comparison then converts "we should build" into "someone else already is" — 36 reactors under construction in China against none in the US, and Russia exporting 21 designs totalling 40 GW, which he benchmarks against the 97 GW of the whole American fleet. That 40-vs-97 framing is the note's best line: a single exporter's order book is roughly 40% of the entire installed US capacity. The fuel-cycle chart is where the investment logic bites, and it is a chokepoint argument rather than a demand argument. Uranium mining is diffuse (Russia only ~14%); the concentration is downstream — 20% of conversion and 43% of enrichment, the latter more than double China's. A single sanctionable state controlling nearly half of world enrichment capacity is exactly the kind of bottleneck that should be the trade — and Hay says so, then immediately concedes it isn't one: "publicly traded investment options in the conversion and enrichment cycle are extremely limited." That admission is the whole reason the note lands on a physical-commodity trust. He is explicit that the equity route is unsatisfying too — "mostly profitless (for now) U-92 miners" — so the position is deliberately the commodity, not the operators: no cost curve, no permitting timeline, no earnings to disappoint, just the metal that every one of those 36+21 reactors has to be fed. What is rowed: one row. SRUUF is rowed Positive — the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust is the only named security in the post and the explicit conclusion of the argument, though note it is presented as the accessible vehicle rather than as a fresh Buy with a price or sizing; it is an existing Haymaker Buy-list holding (see Jul-16) and no new call is issued here. Uranium Insider / Justin Huhn is a cited data source, not a security; Rosatom, ARMZ and Uranium One appear only inside the sourced chart's footnotes as Russian state entities, not as investable rows; natural gas, coal and "U-92 miners" are asset classes, and no producer is named, so none is inferred.

1. Stocks & names mentioned

Ticker	Name	Research	View	What he said	At
SRUUF	Sprott Physical Uranium Trust	QT · SA · STK	Positive	The single named conclusion of the post — reached by elimination, and chosen for being the commodity rather than an operator. The demand case is the global build-out: "the number of new nuclear facilities under construction globally, along with a double-digit number of restarts of previously mothballed plants, does paint a very bullish picture for future uranium demand." The reason the trade isn't further down the chain is stated first: Russia holds 20% of conversion and 43% of enrichment, but "publicly traded investment options in the conversion and enrichment cycle are extremely limited." And the reason it isn't the equities is stated too — "mostly profitless (for now) U-92 miners." What is left: "one of the few vehicles available for U.S. investors to participate in this nuclear renaissance… is the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (SRUUF)." No price, target, sizing or new rating is given in this post; SRUUF is an existing Haymaker Buy-list position (two lots), and the standing thesis — a decade of utilities contracting below consumption since Fukushima, depleted inventories, 70+ planned reactors and 16+ restarts — was laid out in Jul-16.	read ↗

Only one security is named. Uranium Insider / Justin Huhn is the cited data source for both graphics (and is a separately tracked source in this hub); Rosatom, ARMZ and Uranium One appear only in the fuel-cycle chart's footnotes as Russian state entities; natural gas, coal, renewables and "U-92 miners" are asset classes rather than rows, and no producer, utility or SMR developer is named, so none is inferred.

2. Key points

The premise — a mammoth electricity deficit, treated as settled

Stated without hedging or supporting data: "one would have to be virtually brain-dead, similar to the condition of most U.S. politicians, not to realize the U.S. is facing a mammoth deficit of electricity over the next decade."
The supply menu is deliberately short: "the most effective ways to cope with this looming crisis are natural gas, nuclear, and coal" — renewables are on the chart but are not offered as a solution to the shortfall.
Two of the three are moving the wrong way: "while natural gas' share of the USA's overall electricity output has been steadily increasing, nuclear and, particularly, coal have been shrinking."

The EIA chart — a flat fleet meeting a step-change in demand

The graphic (credited to Uranium Insider) is the EIA's "U.S. electricity generation by major energy source, 1950-2025," in billion kilowatthours.
The detail that carries the note: total generation plateaued near 4,100 bkWh around 2007 and ran flat for roughly fifteen years (a horizontal arrow is drawn across it) before turning up at the far right to ~4,400. The shortfall is therefore a demand inflection against a fleet built for a plateau.
Inside that flat total the mix churned violently: coal from a ~2,000 peak in 2007 to roughly 650; natural gas from under 500 in 2000 to roughly 1,900; nuclear flat at ~800 since the early 1990s.
The tie-breaker is asserted rather than argued: "nuclear, of course, is the emission-free solution."

The contrast — China and Russia are building, the US is not

"Russia and China are taking a radically different tack. Both are aggressively expanding their nuclear-generation footprints."
China is not choosing between the options: it is "also dramatically ramping up coal-fired plants with more under development than the rest of the world combined."
The scoreboard: China "has the most atomic energy plants under construction, at 36, approximately half of all the new atomic energy facilities being developed globally… that's in stark contrast to the U.S., which has precisely none."
The caveat is given rather than buried: the count is "exclusive of smaller nuclear reactors, which are still in the proof-of-concept phase" — i.e. the SMR story is not counted as capacity.

Russia as the export machine — 40 GW against a 97 GW fleet

"It is the planet's largest exporter of atomic power plants, with 21 of its designs currently in the build-out process, per industry authority Justin Huhn of Uranium Insider. It has another six in the planning stage."
The benchmark is what makes the number legible: "the collective capacity of these total 40 gigawatts. To put this in context, the entire existing U.S. nuclear power fleet sums to 97 gigawatts."
Read as a ratio: one exporter's order book is roughly 40% of all installed American nuclear capacity.

The fuel cycle — where the real concentration sits

The second graphic (also Justin Huhn / Uranium Insider) is "Russia's share of the nuclear fuel cycle," 2024, including Uranium One's equity production in Kazakhstan.
Mining 14% — ARMZ Russia 2,738 tU plus Uranium One Kazakhstan 5,829 tU = 8,567 tU of 60,213 tU world (attributable equity, not 100% of the Kazakh JV output; the footnote notes the share drops to ~13% after 2025 asset sales).
Conversion (UF6) 20% — Seversk production, 11,375 tU of 56,259 tU of world primary UF6.
Enrichment (SWU) 43% — Rosatom 27.1 million SWU of 62.6 million world capacity; "its enrichment market-share is particularly impressive, more than twice that of the second-largest, which is, unsurprisingly, China."
Sources on the graphic: WNA World Nuclear Fuel Report 2025; WNA Uranium Production by Country / Company 2024.

The investability problem — and why it lands on the metal

The chokepoint is identified and then written off as untradeable: "publicly traded investment options in the conversion and enrichment cycle are extremely limited."
What survives is the demand read on the commodity: "the number of new nuclear facilities under construction globally, along with a double-digit number of restarts of previously mothballed plants, does paint a very bullish picture for future uranium demand."
The equity route is dismissed on earnings quality, not on thesis: "mostly profitless (for now) U-92 miners" — note the "(for now)", which concedes the miners may be the higher-beta expression later.
Conclusion, and the only ticker in the post: "one of the few vehicles available for U.S. investors to participate in this nuclear renaissance… is the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (SRUUF)."

Housekeeping

Two images, both credited to Uranium Insider; they are transcribed as bracketed placeholders in transcript.txt.
No portfolio tables are published with this issue, and no new rating, price or sizing is attached to SRUUF.
Signed "The Haymaker Team."

3. In plain English

SRUUF — Sprott Physical Uranium Trust Positive

Start with the problem. America is going to need a lot more electricity over the next decade — data centres, electrification, reshored manufacturing — and the chart in this post shows that the country's total power generation barely grew at all for about fifteen years before turning up recently. Building that much new supply takes years, so the shortfall is a fairly safe prediction. Hay's list of things that can actually deliver reliable, around-the-clock power at scale is short: natural gas, nuclear, and coal. Coal is being retired in the US, gas is already growing fast, and nuclear has been flat for thirty years despite being the one option that produces no emissions. That is the gap he thinks gets filled.

Now the part that decides the investment. Nuclear isn't one industry, it's a chain: dig up uranium ore, convert it into a gas (UF6), enrich that gas so it has enough of the fissile isotope, fabricate it into fuel rods, then run it in a reactor. Russia is a modest player in the first step — about 14% of world mining — but controls roughly 20% of conversion and a striking 43% of the world's enrichment capacity, more than double China's. In any other industry a bottleneck like that owned by a sanctionable country would be the obvious thing to own around, because everyone else has to build alternatives. The trouble, as Hay says plainly, is that almost nothing in conversion or enrichment is listed on a stock exchange you can buy. The best part of the chain is off the table.

So he steps back to the raw material. Every one of the reactors being built — 36 in China alone, half the world's total, versus zero under construction in the US — plus the dozen-plus mothballed plants being restarted, has to be fed uranium for decades. That is demand you can forecast from a construction schedule rather than from a guess about the economy.

The last choice is how to own it. Uranium mining companies are the leveraged bet, but most of them still don't make money — Hay's phrase is "mostly profitless (for now) U-92 miners" (U-92 is uranium's atomic number). Buying a miner means also buying its mine permits, its cost overruns, and its dilution risk. The Sprott Physical Uranium Trust sidesteps all of that: it is a closed-end fund whose only job is to hold physical uranium in storage. Buying a unit is close to buying a slice of the stockpile itself. You get no dividends and no production growth, just the metal's price — which is exactly the exposure someone who trusts the demand forecast but not the operators would want.

One caveat on how to read this: it is a reiteration, not a new call. SRUUF is already a Haymaker holding, and this post gives no price, target, or position size — it names the vehicle at the end of a supply-chain argument, which is a different thing from a fresh buy recommendation.

One security named (SRUUF). Summary derived from the paid Haymaker Daily (text in transcript.txt) for personal study. The two Uranium Insider graphics referenced in the original are described rather than reproduced. Not investment advice. © Haymaker / David Hay for source material; charts © EIA and Uranium Insider / Justin Huhn.