1. When the rate call flips, hedge with the asset priced off the part of the curve that will move — not the one in the headlines
The repeatable method
- Admit the change in your base case explicitly and date it. A hedge put on while still defending the old view is sized for the wrong world.
- Write both branches of the decision and who loses in each. If the central bank hikes, which borrowers reprice immediately? If it does not, which assets reprice through the long end instead?
- For each branch, identify the benchmark the damaged asset is priced off. Residential mortgages follow the 10-year; commercial property loans, leveraged loans and small-cap floating debt follow SOFR, which tracks the policy rate almost one-for-one. A hike can lower the 10-year (growth fear) while raising SOFR.
- Within the exposed sector, screen for concentration against capital (for banks, non-owner-occupied CRE to total risk-based capital against the 300% supervisory line), low non-interest income to absorb losses, reserves below peers, and dependence on wholesale funding.
- Check the quality of any de-risking, not just its size: a lender that cut its concentration by selling performing loans has a worse residual book than the ratio suggests.
- Time the entry to price, and size the squeeze risk before shorting: prefer a name near its highs with modest short interest and moderate days-to-cover over a crowded short.
Here: the flip is stated — "I was not expecting a hike, but now it looks like there's a high probability of a hike" (CME 87%) — and both branches are written out: "if they hike, that's going to be very bad for commercial real estate… if they don't hike, the 10-year could go higher, which is going to be bad for tech." The transmission point: "if the US Fed hikes, the 10-year might actually fall because of growth expectations falling, but commercial real estate is not valued on the back end of the curve… commercial real estate is benchmarked off SOFR." The name: VLY — "a total loan book of about 51 billion… commercial real estate exposure of 30 billion… about 329% of total risk-based capital," fee income "only 13%," an ACL that "has historically trailed" peers, and a de-risking that "sold a lot of its good properties and kept a lot of the bad properties." Price and positioning: "around 13.80," near a five-year high, with short interest "around 9%… this is a short that I can put on and not be as scared… if the short interest was like 15, 20%, I would be more worried." Target: "down 20-30% on an interest rate scare." The same logic at index level: IWM short (40-45% unprofitable, 30-45% floating-rate debt) against IJR long (a positive-earnings entry screen).
Watch for
- The FOMC statement on September 16 and whether the path is priced as "one and done" (his view) or two hikes (the desks'); SOFR and the 2-year versus the 10-year — the hedge works on the front end, and the call closed with the 10-year falling on growth fear while the Russell was the least-weak index; the bank's next quarterly CRE concentration disclosure (the call and deck print 317-333%); any extension of criticized-loan or provision guidance; and the rating agencies — S&P's positive outlook predates any expectation of a hike.
2. Own a listed wrapper around a private asset only while the private asset is free — and compute the implied private mark to know when it stops being free
The repeatable method
- Find listed companies holding a meaningful stake in a private company that investors cannot otherwise buy — the wrapper is the trade.
- Value the operating business on its own, neutrally, as if the stake did not exist.
- Subtract that from the wrapper's market value. Divide the remainder by the stake size to get the private valuation the market is implicitly assigning.
- Enter when that implied mark is near zero or far below credible private-round marks: the stake is optionality for free.
- Exit when the implied mark reaches or exceeds the most optimistic credible valuation — at that point you hold a fairly valued core business plus downside to any markdown, not an option.
- Pull the exit forward when a catalyst for the private asset (a listing, a round) becomes less certain, and state plainly that you can re-enter lower.
Here: SKM — "a high asymmetry deep value proxy trade, a dividend-paying Korean telecom holding 3.7 million shares of Anthropic, giving massive private exposure relative to its $15 billion market cap." Entry logic: "at its lows of 19 to 20… SKM was fundamentally dirt cheap, providing Anthropic optionality for near free." Exit arithmetic: at $38-40 "the stock was already pricing in a neutral core telecom at 11 billion for the core business, plus Anthropic at a private mark of 1.7 trillion… the market had fully credited the bulk of the upcoming IPO upside." The catalyst weakens the same weekend — Amodei's pacing letter and Altman's "ill-advised moment to go public" — so "we think that he's going to delay his IPO till October at the earliest, next year is the most likely… I doubt Anthropic is going to be worth more than 1.7 trillion anytime soon." Execution: "we're selling in the pre-market near highs… if you need to buy it cheaper, you can always buy it cheaper."
Watch for
- Anthropic's S-1 timing and reported pricing range (the deck says an October 2026 target at ~$2T; the call says October 26th); secondary-market marks on the private stake; the wrapper's own dividend and Korean-market discount, which dominate once the option is priced; and a sell-off that brings the implied mark back well below credible valuations — the re-entry condition, stated in the deck title as "Can Re-enter Later."
3. Classify a scary headline as sentiment or fundamental — and write down in advance the evidence that would reclassify it
The repeatable method
- Read the primary document, not the coverage. List what it actually commits to: numbers, dates, spending, launches.
- If it changes none of those, it is sentiment risk. Expect multiple pressure and "chop," but do not trade it as an earnings event.
- Compare the speakers' incentives. A caution that costs one party nothing and another party a great deal (because only one is about to raise money) carries different information from each.
- Note the defensive tell: when an executive feels obliged to explain that a word does not mean what it sounds like, the market will spend days debating it anyway.
- Write the reclassification triggers as concrete, observable events — a delayed product, a pushed deployment, lower component demand, a guidance cut citing the theme.
- Separately, trace the second-order funding chain that could turn sentiment into fundamentals later, and position lightly for that path (sell the most exposed proxy) rather than for the headline.
Here: the Amodei letter — "it's not a growth warning… there is nothing in the letter about delaying model launches, cutting compute, reducing capex, or lowering revenue expectations. He does not touch the numbers at all." The incentive contrast: "Altman can afford to sound cautious because OpenAI is not trying to price an IPO next month, but Anthropic is. So you have to take Dario more seriously." The tell: "when the CEO has to explain that slowing down does not actually mean slowing down, investors are probably going to spend at least a few days debating what slow means." The classification and triggers: "for now, this is sentiment risk, not fundamental risk… it becomes a fundamentally different story only when pacing turns into an actually delayed model, a push compute deployment, lower accelerated demand, or a company guides citing lower AI spending. Until then, do not confuse uncomfortable headlines with a capex cut that nobody has actually made." The second-order chain, in his own words: "the real risk is that Anthropic or OpenAI run into funding issues and slow down cloud spending, which in turn lowers the backlog growth of Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, who then… cut capex" — expressed through the SKM exit, not an NVDA short.
Watch for
- The four named triggers, one by one; hyperscaler capex guidance at the next prints (none had moved as of the call); the Anthropic IPO date and pricing; OpenAI financing headlines; semiconductor-versus-energy relative performance on the Monday open, which he flagged as the first positioning read; and the 2027 S&P EPS estimate ($416) — the place a real slowdown would show up first.
4. Buy the forced selling from a small issuer's convertible — size the hedge flow against the market cap before you size your position
The repeatable method
- Screen for convertible issuance by small-cap companies, especially where the convert is large relative to market capitalisation and daily volume.
- Estimate the hedge flow: convert size × initial delta (roughly 0.5-0.65) = dollars of stock convert-arbitrage buyers must short. Compare it to the market cap and a day's liquidity.
- If the flow is a large fraction of the float and must be done fast, a sharp drop is mechanical. Confirm what else was announced the same day (asset sales, book-value hits) and whether it is material.
- Check the purpose and terms: refinancing a nearer maturity at a lower coupon and a premium near book is balance-sheet repair, not distress.
- Look for an issuer buyback run concurrently — a buyer of last resort into the hedge selling.
- Apply a management filter (capital-allocation history, alignment with holders) and check the credit quality of the underlying assets, then size for the risk that remains (here, interest-rate marks) and add in steps rather than all at once. Consider the issuer's senior exchange-traded debt as the lower-risk expression.
Here: RWT — "a 150 million convert… to refi a 2027 bond… at a 35% premium… and… a 7% coupon." The flow math: "assuming an initial delta between 50 and 65%, hedge fund arbitragers had to short between 75 million and 100 million worth of common stock… with a company with about a $500 million market cap, dumping 75 million of short selling into the open market in a single trading session creates an immediate downward pressure. So the stock was down like 22%." The side-news graded: a "2% book value hit" for selling $190M of legacy bridge loans — "not bad." The backstop: "Redwood then said it was going to buy 20 million of its stock… at a big discount to book." The management filter: "I personally have talked to the CEO several times… customers… around 750 FICO… it's not like the UWMC." The stepped entry: 3.41-3.45, then 3.21, "average below 3.60," plus baby bonds at ~11% "likely… repaid at par." The sizing caveat: "you can't have too big of a position here because interest rates continue to be a risk." Third-party confirmation: UBS — "rather than a materially deteriorating credit profile."
Watch for
- The final conversion price and how much of the 2027 bond is actually retired (UBS's open item); execution of the $20M concurrent buyback and the remaining ~$111M authorization; short interest and borrow data normalising as the hedge settles; mortgage rates (the named residual risk, near 6.85-7%); and the next quarter's book value, since the thesis is "price below book, not a credit event."
5. Publish a DCF on a contested buyout — then discount your own number and trade the vote math, not the fair value
The repeatable method
- Build the valuation transparently: cost of equity from CAPM (current 10-year as the risk-free rate, an explicit equity risk premium, the company's beta), cost of debt, free cash flow to the firm, terminal value, minus net debt.
- Add an explicit small-cap premium to the discount rate rather than an unexplained haircut at the end.
- Then list the risks the model does not capture (disruption exposure, acquisitions, leverage) and state that the fair price should trade at a discount to your output. The model sets direction and magnitude, not a target.
- Identify the governance mechanism that can force a better outcome — for a controlling-holder buyout, the majority-of-the-minority vote — and do the arithmetic of how many independent votes the objectors still need.
- Name the loophole: decisions the controller can take without that vote (acquisitions, capital deployment) erode the thesis and explain part of the discount.
- Harvest partially into strength, keep the remainder for the bump, and publish the level at which you would rebuild.
Here: PRTH — the analyst model uses "the CAPM… the new 10-year Treasury as a risk-free rate… a risk premium of 4%," FCFF, terminal value and net debt; on "200 million of unlevered free cash flow… even penalizing this company with a 2% small cap premium… that gives us about $21 a share." The self-discount: "it should probably trade at a discount to this $21, but it probably should not trade at 5.94." The vote math: "you basically need a majority of the minority… there's 4% activists of the 40%, they need to convince another basically 16 plus percent." The loophole: "he can make these acquisitions because he does control the shares and the majority of the minority doesn't apply… it only applies when he's bidding on the business" — a $15M roll-up last month. The trade management: "we bought this in the low fives, we sold half of it above six… over a 15% profit… we can add back to it if it sells off… back in the fives," with the realistic bump named at "nine to 10 dollars a share just to get you guys off my back." Same method, lighter touch, on EVC: "these are not perfect calculations, but this implies roughly 59% upside."
Watch for
- Special-committee communications and any revised bid; additional holders joining the objection (the gap to a blocking minority); further acquisitions announced by the controller; leverage covenants as debt service rises with rates; and — for the model itself — how much of the output is terminal value, since a 2% change in the discount rate on a small cap moves the answer far more than a year of cash flow.
6. Convert every arbitrage spread to an annual return and compare it to your unlevered hurdle — a spread that only works with borrowed money is not your trade
The repeatable method
- Express the spread as an IRR to a realistic closing date, not as a percentage to the deal price. Regulatory reviews stretch dates; use the later estimate.
- Estimate the break probability and where the target falls if the deal breaks (the unaffected price, adjusted for what has changed since).
- Note who is setting the spread. When large funds that use leverage are "putting the spread on," the market-clearing IRR is set for levered capital.
- If your book does not use leverage, require an unlevered return that compensates for the break risk on its own. If the IRR does not clear it, pass, however likely the close.
- Prefer situations whose width comes from size, complexity or a contested process — small caps, two bidders, a controlling holder — where levered institutional capital does not compress the spread.
- For those, bracket explicitly: unaffected price (floor), current bid (base), topping-bid range (upside), and check for a financing condition.
Here, a pass and a buy on the same page. The pass: ROKU/FOXA — DOJ probe expanding, "70/30 odds of clearing," the spread "widened out to a 6.5% IRR to a Feb close," with "a lot of big hedge funds putting the spread on" — "that spread is not wide enough for us to make any money on because I'm not going to borrow money to put on a silly spread like that." The buy: RSVR — a small float (Wesbild 44% + Irenic 9.2% = 53%), a $10.50 cash bid with "no financing condition," a rival bidder, shares bought "in the low nines." The bracket: "the unaffected price was around 7.50… worst-case… below eight. Best-case… above 10.50 because there's a bidding war." The underlying cash flow that supports the floor: "70 million of EBITDA… about an 8% free cash flow yield." And the book-level statement of where the width lives: "most of our merger arb exposure is in much smaller names."
Watch for
- ROKU/FOXA's second-request timeline and any widening that pushes the unlevered IRR past his threshold; the RSVR special committee's response to Irenic and any definitive agreement (there is "no close date… because it's not clear which bidder is going to win yet"); the gap between the RSVR price and $10.50 narrowing, which reduces the remaining reward; and the general rule's failure mode — a small-cap spread wide for a reason (financing, a controller who can walk) rather than for size.
7. Before pricing a takeover, normalise the earnings base the buyer will pay for
The repeatable method
- When a company announces a sale process, pull the holder list first: who controls the vote, and whose exit is this (a sponsor, a group of asset managers, management)?
- Compute the multiple on both forward and trailing earnings. A large gap between them means recent earnings jumped, and the takeout price depends on which base a buyer accepts.
- Decompose the jump: volume and contracted fees (durable) versus commodity-price participation or one-offs (cyclical). Buyers pay full multiples only for the durable part.
- Get outside calibration — analysts covering the sector, precedent transactions — before estimating a bid.
- Only then compare the implied takeout range to the current price. Until you can, keep it on a watch list and say so.
Here: KNTK — "Bloomberg reported that Kinetik… is going to sell itself. So that's on the watch list. We haven't added it yet. We don't know enough about the situation." Holders pulled live: "Blackstone owns about 14.8%… BlackRock owns 11%… Goldman Sachs owns 10%… Jamie Welch… about 4%." The multiple gap: "about 13 times forward EBITDA, about 25 times trailing EBITDA… their EBITDA… more than doubled from the first quarter to the second quarter." The decomposition question: a Permian gatherer whose profitability "improved following a run up in commodity prices after the wars in Ukraine and Iran" and which "also takes a percentage of the price exposure" — "so I need to understand what drove that before I can determine… the takeout potential." The calibration step: "I do have a call with Jefferies and one of the Goldman analysts next week to figure out what would be an appropriate takeout bid."
Watch for
- The split of recent EBITDA growth between fee-based throughput and commodity-linked margin; Waha and Permian gas prices, since the commodity component moves with them; named bidders (the deck mentions ET, TRGP and PSX, and earlier Western Midstream interest) and whether they are strategic buyers who could pay for synergies; Blackstone's Class C voting control (close to half the vote per the deck), which decides whether the sale happens on the sponsor's timetable; and the follow-up write-up after the analyst calls.
8. Read an index near its high through breadth and multiple decomposition — then make the cheap-looking forward multiple conditional on the growth that supports it
The repeatable method
- When the index barely falls despite a stack of adverse macro news, check participation: the share of members above their 20- and 50-day moving averages, and the equal-weight index versus cap-weight.
- Identify the ballast — how much of the index weight is doing the holding up, and how far it has rallied.
- Decompose the year's return into earnings growth and multiple change. A flat-ish index can hide a large de-rating offset by earnings.
- Strip out one-off earnings (unrealised gains on private stakes) before accepting the growth figure.
- Compute the forward multiple on next year's estimate, then ask what that multiple becomes under the specific risk you are worried about. A "cheap" forward multiple is only cheap if the forecast survives.
- Respect the counter-evidence: if earnings have beaten all year, estimates may keep rising for a while before reality tests them.
Here: the stack — Brent +7%, diesel above $6, the 2-year +30bp, the 10-year to 4.96%, hike odds 60% → 89% — and "the S&P 500 was down less than 1% on the week." Participation: "a mere 17% of the names in the index were trading above their 20-day moving average and only 33% were trading above their 50-day… far closer to an internal washout." Ballast: "its 34% weight to the Mag 7… the 12% rally in the Mag 7 since the start of August." Decomposition: "a 13% decline in its forward P multiple and still deliver a 12% year-to-date return," with the Mag 7's multiple −30% since last October. The conditional multiple: "7600… divided by 416, that gives you 18 times forward… which doesn't look that expensive. But these growth estimates might be cut after this AI slowdown… is 18 the real multiple? Is it 19? Is it 20?" — tied to his earlier point that "half of their growth has been coming from these two companies, OpenAI and Anthropic." The counter-evidence respected: "taking the under on earnings estimates has been precisely wrong all of this year."
Watch for
- Breadth recovering or failing to recover on any index bounce; the equal-weight S&P's broken uptrend (Fundstrat); revisions to 2027 EPS ($416) — the first number to crack if the AI funding chain slows; the Mag 7 multiple versus its 2022 lows; and the oil-yield correlation (0.85), which is the channel through which the energy shock reaches valuations.
9. On a contested macro call, print the strongest quantified opposing framework — and note exactly which new fact it predates
The repeatable method
- State your own number and horizon.
- Find the best-argued opposing view that comes with a model, not just a conclusion — ideally one built from an observable input and a published elasticity.
- Reproduce its arithmetic: the input, the sensitivity, the implied price.
- List its qualitative reasons separately from the math, so you can test each.
- Identify which facts arrived after it was written, and whether they change its input — that is where your disagreement actually lives.
- Keep both views in front of subscribers; update toward whichever input proves right.
Here: his view — "we think oil could rise 100 to $120 a barrel in short order if both straits are closed… I believe oil should be higher than 100 right now, should be closer to 120." The other side, with its model: Robin Brooks — "oil out of the Persian Gulf is averaging around 15 million barrels a day. So we're running at 75% capacity… based on standard price elasticities of demand, a 33% premium over pre-war prices. So Brent should trade around 95" (the deck: a 0.15 midpoint elasticity; a $70 pre-war base; a former $125 peak case now "over"). His qualitative reasons listed: market psychology, the narrative shift on Iran, learning-by-doing on supply chains, lower Chinese imports. The fact that postdates it: "now he wrote this piece before the Yanbu issue… this is before the East-West pipeline blew up" — which removes 4-5 mb/d of bypass capacity, i.e. the model's input. The principle, stated: "for a lot of these controversial topics, I like to give you two views."
Watch for
- Actual Persian Gulf export volumes (Brooks' input) after the pipeline strike and after any repair; Yanbu loadings (2.9-3.7 mb/d before the attack); Hormuz transits (5-10/day vs 85 pre-crisis) and Bab el-Mandeb transits (26-28/day vs ~70); Saudi output (6.2 mb/d, the lowest since 1990); the rescheduled GCC-Iran meeting and any US position on a transit corridor; and tanker day-rates as the market's own real-time read of rerouting.
Methods distilled from the premium Special Situations Report weekly call (2026-09-13; transcript, report, agenda and weekly-deck PDFs in this folder, plus the EVC/PRTH model workbooks and third-party research circulated with the call; notes in transcript.md) for personal study. Not investment advice. © Special Situations Report for source material.