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Actionable insights — No ETF, No Futures Market: Why 17% Of His Money Is In This Metal

The repeatable analysis behind the picks: not what he owns, but how he sizes, screens, holds and sells it — written so the process can be rerun later on different names.
2026-SEP-02 · Kitco NEWS · John Feneck (Feneck Consulting Group) · ▶ Watch · full analysis · transcript
How to read this page: each insight is a method — the structure that decides position size, the checklist that decides ownership, the diagnostic that decides whether a losing position is broken or just cheap, and the rule that decides when to sell. The boxed line shows how it played out in this interview. This is a concentrated resource-equity process run by someone who can get CEOs on the phone; where a step assumes that access, the version available to an ordinary investor is noted. Timestamps deep-link into the video.

20:38 1. Hub and spoke — let two questions decide every position size

The repeatable method
  1. Split the book into a hub and spokes before picking any name. The hub is a small number of large, boring, diversified core holdings; the spokes are the individual bets arranged around it.
  2. Build the hub from instruments that cannot go to zero on a single management decision — for a metals book, the physical metal plus a broad producer ETF and a junior ETF.
  3. Define the spoke buckets explicitly rather than letting them accumulate. His are three: critical minerals, gold equities, silver equities.
  4. Decide hub-versus-spoke with two questions, in this order: (a) how much conviction do I have in the name, and (b) do I have any relationship with the company at all? No relationship caps the position at spoke size regardless of how cheap it looks.
  5. Reject equal weighting as a default. His own partner runs ~180 names roughly equal weighted; he calls that a legitimate strategy and declines it — "I don't like equal weighting. I like taking bets."
  6. Put a floor under the whole thing before sizing anything: no margin, nothing you cannot afford to lose, nothing that touches retirement savings. "You can't live on margin and cross your fingers. That's not a strategy."
Here: the hub is a huge silver position plus GDX and GDXJ; the spokes are named and disclosed — DNRSF and GO each over 2% of the book (19:51) — and tungsten equities in aggregate are 17%+ (34:24).
Watch for

13:29 2. The four-part junior checklist — people, project, share structure, jurisdiction

The repeatable method
  1. Management first. Not the deposit, not the metal — the people. "The project can be great. If you have a terrible person running it, it's not going to work." He concedes this ordering is unusual and defends it anyway.
  2. Project second. Grade, metal, stage, mine life — assessed only once the people have passed.
  3. Share structure and jurisdiction, tied third. Neither is a veto on its own; both are disqualifiers when bad.
  4. For share structure, do not screen on the raw count. A large count is acceptable if you know "where the bodies are buried" — see insight 4.
  5. For jurisdiction, work top-down from the politics: identify countries whose government has just turned more mining-friendly, then ask "if I like Colombia, who do I like in Colombia?" and research into it. He flags Peru (new, more conservative, more pro-mining elections) and Colombia (a new regime a month old) as the current examples.
  6. Accept the cost: "it's a lot of work" — and he runs the full four every single time he makes an investment.
Here: the checklist is applied out loud to DNRSF (Serafino Iacono, 40 years, Giustra and Friedland alongside him) and PNPNF (Terry Lynch, plus a register full of billionaires); jurisdiction is why he is looking at Colombia at all (15:08).
Watch for

13:57 3. The two-strike honesty rule — and the permanent blacklist that follows

The repeatable method
  1. Treat honesty as the single screening variable that cannot be modelled or diversified away: "you can't guard against lying. When someone lies to you, they lie to you and then you have to make an adjustment."
  2. Give one strike. A first misstatement can be error, optimism or bad timing.
  3. On the second, exit permanently — no re-underwriting, no "the new project is different."
  4. Extend the ban to the person, not the company. He never again owned anything that CEO, that investor-relations person or that board member did, at any other company.
  5. Write the rule down in advance and be binary about it. "I'm cut and dried. I'm not a gray guy. It's either black or white with me. And that's how I'm successful."
  6. The retail-investor version: you cannot phone the CEO, but you can keep a dated file of what management said would happen and check it against what did — guidance, timelines, financing promises, resource targets. Two clean misses on things they controlled is the same signal.
Here: the rule is derived on air from ANV Allied Nevada, the worst stock he ever owned — and it is why he never bought Hycroft, the successor to the same Nevada asset, despite its later run (25:48). He says the first topic of his Beaver Creek talk is honesty (13:29).
Watch for

14:39 4. Interrogate the share count — "where are the bodies buried?"

The repeatable method
  1. Do not reject a company on share count alone. "If it does have a large share count, that's okay. But I want to know where the bodies are buried in that share count."
  2. Ask what proportion is locked up and by whom: "if you have 400 million shares out, I need to do a phone call with you as a CEO to understand: do you have 30% of this company locked up so that we're not going to see it taken under as an investor."
  3. Check for institutional anchors by name and percentage — "Does Franklin Templeton have 3%? Does VanEck have 5%?" Their presence is evidence the company will not "do something weird."
  4. Reframe a big register as a positive when the holders are structurally non-sellers: 250 million shares is a lot until roughly half of it sits with people who will never sell at this price.
  5. Use it as a pre-catalyst risk test, not a valuation input: the question is who dumps into good news, and who does not sell into bad news.
  6. Retail version: the same information is in the filings and the register disclosures — insider ownership percentage, above-5% holders, warrant and option overhang, and the last financing's terms.
Here: PNPNF passes precisely on this test — "they have 17 billionaires in the cap structure. It's insane. None of those people are selling on a bad MRE" (25:05).
Watch for

10:50 5. The leverage diagnostic — miners should move 2–3× the metal, and if not, ask why

The repeatable method
  1. Set the expectation numerically before you own anything: "if you buy gold at 4,000 an ounce and it goes to 4,400, you're going to make 10%. But the miners during that period should go up two or 3x to that move in gold."
  2. Measure your own holdings against that on up days, not down days. Under-performance on a rally is diagnostic; under-performance in a general liquidation is not.
  3. When a name lags the metal on a green tape, ask the specific question rather than a vague one: is the company hedging production? A hedge locks in a selling price, which protects the downside and caps exactly the upside you bought the stock for.
  4. Do not treat hedging as fraud — "airlines hedge, it's a normal process" — treat it as a mismatch with the reason you own the stock. He wants "companies that are going for it, that are unhedged."
  5. Rule out the alternatives before concluding: dilution since your entry, a jurisdiction event, a cost problem, or a permitting delay will all produce the same lag.
  6. Use the sector-wide version as a bull-market confirmation: juniors rising ~3× gold was his evidence through August that the framework was intact.
Here: DNRSF is introduced as the example of the unhedged company "going for it", immediately after the leverage rule is stated (11:30). The inverse also gets used: GDX and the HUI fell ~40% March–August while juniors fell 50–65%, which he read as the same leverage working in reverse and bought into (6:50).
Watch for

12:19 6. Buy artificial dislocations — the price fell for a non-fundamental reason

The repeatable method
  1. Separate two causes of a large drop: something changed at the company, or something changed in the plumbing. Only the second is an opportunity.
  2. Screen the plumbing events specifically — index additions and deletions, forced fund selling, merger-driven reconstitution, tax-loss selling, a delisting or listing-venue change.
  3. Verify the fundamentals are literally unchanged over the window. In an index deletion, the ounces in the ground on the day after are identical to the day before.
  4. Do the work to confirm the mechanism rather than assuming it — he brought the CEO onto his own show to have him explain what had happened. The retail equivalent is the index provider's own reconstitution notices and the company's press releases.
  5. Only buy the dislocation inside a bull framework. He is explicit that the rule is conditional: "you look for these artificial things happening in the market within a bull framework and just say, 'Hey, I'm going to buy these dips.'"
  6. Size it as a real position, not a token. This is one of the two names he holds at over 2%.
Here: GO was added to the Russell 2000 on June 30th and removed July 16–17 because of the GoldMining/Gold Resource merger, cratering the stock over 50% in two weeks — "I've never seen anything like that in my entire career where the Russell 2000, a large index, made a mistake like that."
Watch for

24:06 7. Trade the milestone calendar — MRE, PEA, PFS

The repeatable method
  1. Know the sequence a development company walks through, because each step converts a story into a number: MRE (mineral resource estimate — how much metal is actually there), PEA (preliminary economic assessment — a first pass at whether it can be mined profitably), PFS (pre-feasibility study — the engineered version with capex and payback).
  2. Maintain a dated calendar of upcoming milestones across the names you follow. "I look for catalysts like MREs, PEAs, PFSs. These are milestones for a company. They're really important to look for."
  3. Position ahead of an announced milestone in names where the register will not sell into a disappointment (insight 4) — that is what converts a binary event into an asymmetric one.
  4. Read the market's reaction as separate from the result. A strong MRE that spikes and fully retraces on unrelated macro news is a fact that has not been paid for, not a rejected result.
  5. On a PFS, go straight to payback period and capex, not the headline NPV: "outstanding numbers, payback in less than a year" is the sentence he leads with.
  6. Check volume around the event — a milestone that draws massive volume has produced the liquidity that lets a larger holder build.
Here: PGEZF's MRE ("lights out", 29 cents to 37 cents in two days, then straight back on Iran headlines) at 23:02; PNPNF's MRE announced as coming; GMTL's June 30th PFS with sub-one-year payback (26:42).
Watch for

33:48 8. "No ETF, no futures market" — the metals where the equity is the only vehicle

The repeatable method
  1. Screen commodities by how they can be owned, not just by their supply-and-demand story. Gold, silver and copper have futures, ETFs and physical markets; tungsten, antimony and rhenium have none.
  2. Recognise what that does to the flow. When generalist money decides it wants exposure and there is no fund and no contract, the only available buy is a handful of small equities — a very large demand curve meeting a very small float.
  3. Verify the physical tightness independently of the price move, because the price move alone will always look like it has gone too far. He answers the "$920 to $2,800 is a big move" objection with a sourced deficit rather than a chart.
  4. Source it from people who have to know: three 2026 Zoom calls with the US government's SAFE division and four staff, all giving the same answer — a year-and-a-half to two-year deficit.
  5. Test the irreplaceability. Tungsten is used in tanks and Tomahawk missiles and heavily in technology; there is no substitute. A metal with a substitute has a ceiling; one without does not.
  6. Then size it as a theme rather than a stock: 17%+ of the portfolio spread across producers, developers and explorers rather than concentrated in one.
Here: the tungsten book — GMTL (near-term producer), KAZR (developer) and WSRIF (explorer), the three-stage spread he offers when asked for one producer, one developer and one critical-minerals name (26:20).
Watch for

34:46 9. Follow the money, not the mine — funding and offtakes as the real de-risking

The repeatable method
  1. For any pre-production company, ask the two questions that actually decide the outcome: is the construction funded, and is the output sold? Geology rarely kills a junior; financing does.
  2. Compare committed capital against expected capex as a ratio. Committed money exceeding capex means dilution risk is off the table — a rarity worth paying for.
  3. Weight the identity of the funder. A development bank or a sovereign entity is a different signal from a retail placing: it implies a strategic buyer of the output as well as a source of money.
  4. Track offtake agreements — contracts to buy future production — as a proxy for demand certainty. "It's tying up future production. It gives you as an investor much more comfort that there is a buyer on the other end."
  5. Distinguish a conversation from a contract, out loud, the way he does: "those are considered to be like offtake conversations. They're not definitive. Nothing's been done yet."
  6. Use funding as the sanity check on a hot sector: "show me a gold stock that has $1.6 billion lined up right now… You're not seeing this in other parts of the mining area, but you are seeing it in critical."
Here: KAZR — $1.6bn committed by US EXIM Bank and the DRC against $1.1bn of expected capex, cash cost of $100–150/ton against a $2,800+/ton tungsten price, and a 50-year mine life (27:39).
Watch for

21:22 10. The relationship sell rule — up 100% with no relationship, sell half or all

The repeatable method
  1. Classify every holding by whether you have real access to management. He owns cheap names in tungsten, antimony and rhenium where "I don't have a relationship with the company, but the stock looks so cheap I can't help myself."
  2. Attach a pre-committed exit to the no-relationship bucket: up 100%, sell half or all. The rule is set before the gain exists, so it is not a judgement call in the moment.
  3. State the actual reason, which is information rather than valuation: "I don't know what's next for the company… are they going to do a financing out of left field? I don't want to get caught like that."
  4. Note the asymmetry a surprise financing creates for a small holder: dilution at a discount, usually announced after the stock has run — precisely when you are most exposed.
  5. For names where you do have the relationship — "we've talked to these CEOs 30 or 40 times" — the rule does not apply, and those are the ones that earn hub-size weight.
  6. Build the relationship deliberately if you want the bigger position: he cold-called the Stillwater CEO with no prior connection, and it became both a friendship and a multi-year holding. Retail version: attend the calls, ask questions, read every release, and demand more evidence in lieu of access.
Here: the rule is stated as the thing that separates a hub from a spoke; PGEZF is the counter-example — a cold call that became a relationship and then a position held through a drawdown (22:44).
Watch for

22:04 11. Triage a losing position — was it the thesis or was it you?

The repeatable method
  1. Ask the honest first question, which is about your own entry rather than the company: "was that me getting caught up in a euphoric moment… and then the rug got pulled because of the war?"
  2. If the answer is yes, the position was never underwritten — "take a loss, or reduce your position." Acknowledging that the entry was emotional is the whole test.
  3. If the entry was sound, switch to the catalyst question: is the company still going into production, still getting its permits, still delivering "some positive catalyst"? If yes, "then you have to stick with it."
  4. Separate the two causes of the drawdown explicitly. He attributes this summer's selling to the Fed and the war — external, temporary, and not information about any individual deposit.
  5. Add on dips only in names where you already had conviction, never to rescue an average: the discipline is "we start a position in something we have conviction in and then we add to it on dips", which presumes the conviction preceded the loss.
  6. Fold in the tax calendar before acting — hold past a year where possible so the outcome is a long-term gain or a long-term loss, with an advisor.
Here: the whole summer is the case study — cash spent from 12–14% down to 8–10% buying juniors down 50–65% while the HUI and GDX were down ~40% (6:30), and PGEZF held through the round trip because the MRE catalyst landed regardless of the tape.
Watch for

4:09 12. State a macro call with its falsifying condition attached

The repeatable method
  1. When you make a directional call, name in advance the one thing that would break it. Three weeks earlier his bottom call carried exactly one condition: Trump doubling down on Iran before November.
  2. When that condition appears to trigger, re-examine the reasoning rather than reflexively honouring the rule — the US struck Iran twice in three days and he still concluded the timing had changed, not the thesis.
  3. Anchor the re-examination on a constraint rather than an intention. His is electoral: Republicans need a better midterm result, so sustained escalation is against the actor's own interest until November.
  4. Pair the call with price levels that make it checkable — gold holding 3,900 (a double test would not surprise him; a break would change things), silver testing but not breaking 50.
  5. Read the central bank the same way: not by its stated first priority but by the full list. "Warsh at the Fed is not just worried about inflation… number two on the list is the labor market. And the labor market is crap right now."
  6. Convert that into a falsifiable consequence: with payrolls at −23,000 against a +80,000 estimate, "I don't think they have the ability to raise rates at the pace that they're talking about." The next print is the test.
Here: the sector-rotation call is given the same treatment — a 15–20% S&P drawdown by Q1 2027 and a rotation out of AI/tech/momentum into value "between now and March. That's my call", with NEM and B named as recipients (37:38).
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Methods distilled from the public YouTube video for personal study. John Feneck discloses positions in several names discussed — Denarius and Gold Group each over 2% of the book, silver plus GDX and GDXJ as core holdings, tungsten equities 17%+ in aggregate. Not investment advice.