Has gold bottomed? Yield curve control as the engine for higher gold
The AIA weekly: $40 trillion of federal debt is closing in, and the only politically available exit is yield curve control — "price fixing for government debt" — which is why he owns things a central bank cannot print. A 20%+ one-week surge in gold stocks off a deep low is the historical bottom signal; copper's scarcity keeps being manufactured by policy (DRC concentrate-export ban, a $400→$1,300/ton sulfuric-acid squeeze, Codelco suspending its biggest mine's life extension); Aramco quantifies the oil supply shock at 11 Mbpd and 2.6 billion barrels lost; and the AI capex cycle is building at twice the pace of the housing boom — which ended in a bust.
In one line: the through-line is scarcity vs. the printing press. With federal debt about to cross $40 trillion and deficits at 6–7% of GDP, he argues the US repeats its post-WWII exit — yield curve control and financial repression — quoting Doug Casey's definition ("the central bank decides what interest rate the government should pay… in other words, yield curve control is price fixing for government debt") and the line he calls profound: "the Fed has only two tools in its toolkit, currency debasement and gaslighting." The mechanism is Cantillon: bondholders sell to the New York Fed, the cash gets reinvested, and the flood eventually reaches "the average slob living paycheck to paycheck" — ergo the cost-of-living crisis, and ergo "he who is closest to the money printer wins." Foreign central banks are already swapping Treasuries — 1980s "certificates of confiscation" — for gold, and on Jordan Roy-Byrne's read (a 20%+ week in gold stocks after a deep decline; historically 15%+ weeks "suggest the bottom is likely in"), he thinks the low is probably in — with the caution "never say definitely." On copper the scarcity is being manufactured by policy and geology at once: the DRC banning copper/cobalt concentrate exports to force domestic processing, sulfuric acid (needed for >15% of global primary copper) going from $400 to $1,300/ton on the Gulf war, and Codelco suspending life-extension work at its biggest mine after a fatal rock burst — as Chilean output "rolls over and heads south." On energy he reads Saudi Aramco's Q2: 11 Mbpd of liquid supply removed, 2.6 billion barrels lost, inventories at critically low levels, and 18 months at 2.1 Mbpd to refill even if Hormuz opened today. So he's bullish oil and refining, backs the Canadian oil sands (Cenovus, Suncor) and has just bought Athabasca Oil — "the cash machine": debt repaid, long-life asset, stable jurisdiction, excess cash flow going to buybacks ("cannibalization of shares"). Latin America is being repriced (Petrobras; Colombia's government change reopens Ecopetrol, Parex, GeoPark; Vaca Muerta and YPF, where Howard Marks and Stanley Druckenmiller have taken large positions). He owns Glencore personally and loves it for value-chain capture — Q2 trading profits "were tremendous" — the same thing he admires in Total. And the warning: per Apollo, data-center capex adds 1.7pp of GDP in two years, "close to twice the pace of the housing boom at its fastest" — housing and telecom both ended in bust, so "'27, '28, whenever it blows up," the unwind runs the same arithmetic in reverse. Discipline throughout: look out 18–24 months, expect multi-baggers to take ~5 years, and recycle capital after a 5–10×.
1. Stocks & names mentioned
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he said | At |
| GLNCY | Glencore | QT · SA · STK | Positive | Owned in his personal portfolio — "I love that company." On the Q2 result: mineral production "isn't necessarily expanding," but the trading profits "were tremendous… a really good result." What he likes is the whole-value-chain capture — mining plus marketing/trading — which he's seeing more mining and oil companies move into. "Something to take a look at." | 36:33 |
| ATH | Athabasca Oil (TSX) | SA · STK · FA | Positive | Recently bought after a conference made the case: "This is the cash machine." He's owned it off and on; the model is the one he backs — repaying debt, excess cash flow now, a long-life asset in a relatively stable jurisdiction — and the excess cash flow goes to buying back shares: "This is what I like, okay? Cannibalization of shares." | 41:17 |
| CVE | Cenovus Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Off the Aramco supply-shock numbers: "I'm bullish on oil companies… I'm bullish on companies that have refining capability. I've said I'm backing the companies like Cenovus, Suncor. I like the Canadian oil sands." Long-life, integrated barrels in a stable jurisdiction — the insulated-from-geopolitics asset he wants a higher risk premium to reward. | 40:16 |
| SU | Suncor Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Named with Cenovus as the Canadian oil-sands names he's "backing" — bullish oil, and specifically bullish on companies with refining capability, which is exactly the integrated oil-sands profile. Same reasoning: long-life reserves outside the Persian Gulf risk premium. | 40:16 |
| PBR | Petrobras | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Leading the Latin-American answer: "Well, I like Petrobras." Part of the set he says is already being repriced as the region's politics turn — and the geographic point behind it: with the Gulf carrying a higher risk premium, "you want to own assets in areas that are going to be insulated from that geopolitical conflict. They have a larger value in my view." | 41:39 |
| EC | Ecopetrol | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Upgraded from a watch item on the political catalyst: "I like the fact that we have a changing government in Colombia. So, it's probably worth taking another look at Ecopetrol." His stated method is exactly this — "changes in government and changes in policy that are economically positive can lead to tremendous knock-on effects for individual companies." | 41:39 |
| PXT | Parex Resources (TSX) | SA · STK · FA | Positive | Named with Ecopetrol and GeoPark as the Colombia names worth another look on the government change — "these type of companies" — and grouped into "these are all opportunities and they're being repriced already." | 41:39 |
| GPRK | GeoPark | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | The third Colombia independent on the same regime-change rerating list ("Ecopetrol, Parex… GeoPark, these type of companies"), inside his broader call that the Latin-American oil complex is an opportunity set being repriced right now. | 41:39 |
| TTE | TotalEnergies | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | The energy-sector version of what he admires in Glencore: "I'm seeing like Total in the energy sector is very good at this… They try to capture as much of the value down through not only production of energy… but also trading of these." Value-chain capture, not just barrels. | 36:53 |
| YPF | YPF S.A. (NYSE ADR) | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Cited, not owned: "I know that Howard Marks and Stanley Druckenmiller have taken large positions in YPF, which is the largest oil producer in Argentina" — his evidence for the Vaca Muerta / policy-change thesis ("Argentina is becoming an increasingly larger and larger oil exporter"), consistent with his standing view that the argued call is on the basin and the country, not the security. | 42:05 |
| 2222.SR | Saudi Aramco (Tadawul) | STK | Neutral | Informational — he reads Aramco's Q2 report as the authoritative supply-shock tally, not as a stock call: the US-Iran conflict "continues to aggravate the biggest ever energy supply shock in history, removing an average of 11 million barrels per day," inventories "need to be rebuilt from critically low levels," the world "lost over 2.6 billion barrels" (net ~1.8 billion after bypasses and SPR releases), and "if the Strait of Hormuz was to open today, it would take up to 18 months at 2.1 million barrels per day to replenish depleted inventories on top of demand." | 38:39 |
| Codelco | Codelco (Chile, state-owned) | — | Negative | The supply-side casualty in his copper case: the Chilean state miner "is suspending work on a project designed to extend the life of its biggest copper mine after identifying a new source of seismic risk a year after a rock burst killed six workers." His read: "mining's hard. You can't just flip a switch and increase copper production" — and Chilean output, from the world's largest producing country, "is rolling over and heading south." | 34:15 |
Stances are this conversation's framing only. Much of the episode is macro (US debt / yield curve control / the Cantillon effect, gold's bottom, the DRC concentrate ban and the sulfuric-acid squeeze, the Apollo AI-capex report) and carries no ticker — those are in the talking points. He also describes three unnamed portfolio holdings (a copper-and-molybdenum waste-stream processor in the Dividend Portfolio, a multi-metal copper producer recovering from a mine issue, and a smelter earning windfall byproduct sulfuric acid); no tickers are given in this video, so none are inferred here. Doug Casey, Jordan Roy-Byrne, Tavi Costa, Howard Marks, Stanley Druckenmiller, Ron Paul and Bastiat are people/attributions, not securities; Apollo, Reuters, Bloomberg and US Global Investors are data sources.
2. Talking points
00:24 · $40 trillion — "not a problem until it becomes a problem"
- Federal debt closes in on $40 trillion within weeks. "I joke about this, but it's not a laughing matter… it's insidious… it's not a problem until it becomes a problem and then it will be the only problem that matters."
- Deficits still 6–7% of GDP — the World War II arsenal-of-democracy scale — which took "a couple decades to get straightened out after the fact." The mechanism that keeps upward pressure on rates is simply that the debt keeps growing.
02:04 · How the last debt overhang was cleared — YCC and financial repression
- "One of the ways that was used to get that situation corrected… was yield curve control and financial repression" — and "we're heading towards that."
- The end of the 1980→2020s bond bull is structural, not cyclical: debt growth is the reason the generational rally is over.
03:24 · Why hard assets — scarcity is what a central bank can't print
- "They can create money, they can create regulations… but they can't create real things that we need. As a matter of fact, what they do in many cases is make decisions that cause even more scarcity."
- His refined definition: scarcity doesn't mean running out. "There's plenty of minerals… in the Earth's crust. It's just getting more difficult and being made more difficult" — deeper, more dangerous, more complex, more expensive, needing a higher incentive price. Layer currency debasement on top and "you have a perfect recipe for higher prices."
05:34 · The Treasury holder chart — banks marked at par, insolvent at market
- Foreign entities are the largest holders; the Fed is second and "going to be becoming an even larger holder." Banks hold ~$2 trillion and "many of them are now underwater."
- They aren't required to mark to market — "if they did they would be insolvent" — because regulators say the paper is held to duration. "But what's that money going to be worth in 10, 20, 30 years?"
06:59 · "Certificates of confiscation" — the late-'70s label is back
- Treasuries were "slandered, as rightly so in my view, as certificates of confiscation." Recall the 50- and 100-year bonds issued at ~0.1% — "these things are probably at least cut in half or worse."
- People do act rationally; regulation is what keeps insurers, pensions and banks holding paper that yields less than inflation.
09:01 · Foreign central banks swap Treasuries for gold
- Confidence is eroding on the debt and the behavior — "running around the world attacking everybody… throwing sanctions on everybody." So reserves rotate back to gold, "the reserve asset for these central banks" before the '80s and '90s.
- The China logic stated plainly: why fund a country whose officials say war is coming? "Stop buying them and let what we have run off… We'll just buy gold and other things" — and China is also building its oil SPR to "well over a billion barrels." Surpluses recycled into hard assets rather than the adversary's debt market.
11:20 · Doug Casey's thread — "yield curve control coming to a theater near you"
- The setup: the market chokes on ever more issuance and demands higher rates; the state must keep selling to fund commitments voters expect. Bastiat's "desire… to live off their neighbor through the ballot box."
- "I don't know what the breaking point is in the bond markets… but I can give you examples after examples where countries have got themselves into these situations and it eventually ends badly."
13:29 · What YCC actually is — "price fixing for government debt"
- Casey, read verbatim: "the central bank decides what interest rate the government should pay on its debt and then uses its money printing power to enforce that rate… In other words, yield curve control is price fixing for government debt" — with the usual "distortions, misallocations, and unintended consequences."
- Expect a euphemism, not the label: "financial stability policy, emergency asset purchases, market functioning support, temporary intervention… But the label does not matter. The result is the same."
- The line he calls profound: "the Fed has only two tools in its toolkit, currency debasement and gaslighting." "That's the reason why I like gold and why I like hard assets."
16:06 · Why it will be popular at first
- Lower rates support house prices for the large older cohort liquidating housing stock to heirs — and make entry cheaper for the young priced out of housing. Two big voting blocs both like it initially.
- Where the Fed gets the money: "It just creates it out of thin air." This is why it already owns $4 trillion of debt.
17:33 · The Cantillon effect — the Mississippi analogy
- The chain: a rational bondholder front-runs YCC, sells to the New York Fed, receives created cash — and reinvests it. "The created money… we never know where the created money's going to go."
- Double the water at the headwaters in Minnesota and Memphis doesn't flood immediately — but the flood arrives downstream. "Ultimately ends up in higher prices for the average slob that's living paycheck to paycheck. Ergo, the cost of living crisis."
- "There's probably not one person in 100,000 in the US that understands how this works" — the evidence being that everyone screams about prices while "no one talks about the engine of all of this, which is the central bank."
21:36 · The price level resets — it does not come back down
- "When you have inflation, the price level resets, it never comes back down. You'd have to have deflation or disinflation" — unacceptable to a debt-based, inflation-dependent financial system. Grocery prices up 40% "won't come back down to where they were before COVID."
- Nobody addresses the root cause: "If you go out in your yard and mow the dandelions down, don't get mad when they pop back up… the root cause is the monetary system itself." Even Bessent's talk of resetting it is at the margins — "I don't think they can pull it off."
23:39 · Play the game as it is — "closest to the money printer wins"
- "You have to understand the game that you're in, the rules, how they're set up. And you're not here to change the rules. You're here to play the game and take care of your people."
- Cantillon updated: "He who is closest to the king and the gold wins… in modern definition, he who is closest to the money printer wins."
24:09 · Has gold bottomed? The 15%-week signal
- Gold stocks surged more than 20% in a week. Jordan Roy-Byrne's history: "one-week gains of 15% or more after a deep decline have been a strong bullish signal and suggests the bottom is likely in" — bearish only after a major advance. 2008, 2016 and (less oversold) 2020 all saw explosive one-week rallies start powerful recoveries.
- Polomny's amendment: "I would caution… never say definitely or for sure or will, because financial markets have a way of surprising people." Probabilities, not certainties.
25:26 · Why the gold stocks live in his personal account, not the portfolio
- "A lot of the gold stocks I hold in my personal portfolio — we don't hold a lot in the AIA portfolio," which carries only one small gold-in-the-ground name likely to be acquired.
- The reason is mandate, not view: "I don't want to turn the portfolio into a junior gold mining newsletter… we're looking for companies that can do three, five, 10 bag and with less volatility." Gold miners are "more speculative"; he'd rather buy them with "enough of a value cushion there to protect yourself." Personal-account names get discussed in the paid Discord.
26:50 · Recycle after the multi-bagger
- "We just recently cashed out a seven or eight bagger in an oil field services company." The standing rule: "after something moves five times, six, 10 times… we're looking to recycle capital at that point into the next something we can find that can compound."
- Tavi Costa's chart of gold-miner free cash flow per share is at a high level on the gold price, and reported miner results "have been pretty good" — the earnings backdrop under a bottom.
28:42 · Copper — the three unnamed holdings
- Dividend Portfolio: a waste-stream processor, not a miner, recovering residual copper and molybdenum from other miners' tailings — "a fixed cost business," so cash flows rise directly with the copper price. "It's done very well."
- AIA Portfolio: a multi-metal copper producer that "had a recent issue with one of their mines. They've recovered that… I think make the company a tremendous opportunity over the next three to five years."
- (No tickers are given for either in this video.)
30:05 · DRC bans copper & cobalt concentrate exports
- Congo — the world's largest cobalt supplier and a major copper source — bans concentrate exports "to force domestic processing and retain more value from its mineral resources" (Reuters). Governments want the value add captured at home.
- The investment consequence: "if I can't export copper concentrate, then I have to build a processing facility… that could possibly change the dynamic of a mine I was contemplating building" — so supply is held back and price forced up. "Again, there's plenty of copper in the DRC," but new mines get slower.
32:56 · Sulfuric acid: $400 → $1,300 a ton
- More than 15% of global primary copper — about 3.6 million tons a year — depends on sulfuric acid to process ore into metal, and Gulf sulfur/acid supply is disrupted.
- The second-order winner: one portfolio holding runs a copper smelter in a country now short of acid, and its byproduct acid has gone from $400 to $1,300/ton, sold to other local miners. "A waste stream or byproduct value has exploded because of the distortion caused by the war in the Middle East. This is a perfect example of what I'm talking about."
34:15 · Codelco suspends life extension at its biggest mine
- A new source of seismic risk, a year after a rock burst killed six workers, halts the life-extension project at the Chilean state miner's largest mine.
- "Mining's hard. You can't just flip a switch and increase copper production." Chilean output — from the world's largest producing country — "is rolling over and heading south" into demand forecast to expand exponentially for 20 years. Whoever can actually mine at cost "is going to make a tremendous amount of money."
36:33 · Glencore (and Total) — own the value chain, not just the tonnes
- "One of the things I've talked about publicly is Glencore. I love that company." Q2 production isn't expanding, but the trading profits "were tremendous… a really good result."
- The pattern he's watching spread: miners and oil companies capturing more of the chain. "I'm seeing like Total in the energy sector is very good at this." He owns Glencore personally.
38:39 · Aramco quantifies the supply shock
- From Aramco's Q2: the prolonged US-Iran conflict "continues to aggravate the biggest ever energy supply shock in history, removing an average of 11 million barrels per day"; released inventories "now need to be rebuilt from critically low levels"; investment has been insufficient and must be addressed.
- Demand held up only because the shock was masked by ~9 Mbpd of SPR/commercial withdrawals and ~2 Mbpd of demand management. The world "lost over 2.6 billion barrels" destined for food, semiconductors, mobility and petrochemicals — net ~1.8 billion after bypasses.
- The kicker: "if the Strait of Hormuz was to open today, it would take up to 18 months at an average rate of 2.1 million barrels per day to replenish depleted inventories on top of demand." Meanwhile the US looks likely to be pushed out of the Middle East, raising Iran's stature over the Strait.
40:16 · Bullish oil, refining, the oil sands — and Athabasca "the cash machine"
- "I'm bullish on oil companies… on companies that have refining capability… I'm backing the companies like Cenovus, Suncor. I like the Canadian oil sands."
- New buy: Athabasca Oil — owned off and on before, re-bought after a conference. "This is the cash machine": debt repaid, excess cash flow now, long-life asset, relatively stable jurisdiction — and the free cash goes to buybacks. "Cannibalization of shares."
41:39 · Latin America is repricing — Colombia, Brazil, Vaca Muerta
- "I like Petrobras. I like the fact that we have a changing government in Colombia. So, it's probably worth taking another look at Ecopetrol, Parex… GeoPark."
- Argentina's Vaca Muerta "is exploding" and the country is becoming a steadily larger oil exporter; Howard Marks and Stanley Druckenmiller have taken large positions in YPF. "These are all opportunities and they're being repriced already."
- The general rule: "changes in government and changes in policy that are economically positive can lead to tremendous knock-on effects for individual companies" — and with the Gulf carrying a higher risk premium, insulated assets "have a larger value in my view."
42:59 · ISM says manufacturing is booming — on AI's capital
- The ISM manufacturing index is above 50: reshoring plus the AI build-out — "all the gas turbines you need, all the electrical components, transformers."
- He won't call it healthy: "a lot of it is due to… the misallocation of capital into AI data centers." And it won't lift everyone — "you have to pick your right spot of what industry you work in."
43:58 · Apollo's number — AI is building at twice the pace of the housing boom
- Data-center capex adds 1.7 percentage points of GDP in two years (1.4% in 2025 → 3.1% in 2027, ~0.85pp/yr). Housing's fastest phase ran at half a point a year; telecom ~0.15. "The AI cycle is building at close to twice the pace of the housing boom at its fastest."
- His own commentary on top: "housing and telecom ended up being bust… And so you saw what happened to the economy after that happened."
45:26 · "The same arithmetic runs in reverse"
- Housing's unwind from 6.2% of GDP in early 2006 to 3% by end-2008 "is what made that recession severe"; telecom's smaller reversal produced the mildest one. "A cycle that builds at 0.85 percentage points a year can unwind at a similar pace… that is the macro risk if AI demand disappoints."
- His answer to whether it disappoints: "I see no path to recovering the capital that's being invested. And so it's eventually going to bust" — '27, '28, whenever. The charts show hyperscaler capex already above the telecom peak (1.2% of GDP) with consensus forecasting a housing-boom-shaped ramp. "It's a sword of Damocles… I don't want anything to do with this."
48:31 · Multi-baggers take about five years
- From the US Global Investors data and the August AIA issue: "the portfolio that I have is structured for outcomes to be 3 to 5 years." For his five-baggers and up, "the average time it seems to take is around 5 years" — whether a bombed-out industry turning or a capital compounder.
- "This is not a trading service… I look for themes. I look for ideas that are going to play out over several years or decades."
50:17 · Look out 18–24 months — the rule the AI trade breaks
- Druckenmiller's discipline: "you need to look out as an investor speculator out 18 months, 24 months… The market's looking backwards or looking at today. That's not how you invest your capital."
- Applied to copper: "we're having a hard time getting more copper… the supply-demand dynamic gets worse over time. It's the same thing with like uranium. Now, the question is how do you put together a position to take advantage of it? That's the trick."
51:00 · Political scarcity — Europe's self-inflicted energy costs
- "Energy is scarce, not necessarily because of geological constraints, but because of political constraints." Europe's high prices exist "because they desire to have them" — no fracking in the UK, North Sea taxes and royalties raised "to confiscatory levels, so who would invest?"
- The control case is Norway, which "continues to invest, continues to extract." Germany's refusal of Russian pipeline gas sent energy costs up and industry is shrinking. "You can make the moral judgments… That's not what we're here to do. We're here to invest."
53:38 · Time in the market, and the whole world to shop in
- "There's no way out. They're going to eventually end up with yield curve control… print a lot of currency units and cover up this mess. That's going to put a bias on hard assets, notwithstanding the volatility."
- "The shorter term trader has more difficulty making money than the long-term investor" — and you're not confined to the S&P: markets cycle in and out of relative value, so go where it's undervalued. "Compound wealth consistently. That's what we're here to do."
3. In plain English
GLNCY — Glencore Positive
Glencore does two things: it digs up metals and coal, and it runs one of the world's biggest commodity trading desks — buying, shipping, blending and selling other people's material as well as its own. Polomny owns it in his personal account and says plainly, "I love that company."
What he singles out in the Q2 result is that mine production isn't really growing, yet the profits were excellent because the trading arm did so well. That's the point of the business: when commodity markets get dislocated — wars, export bans, shortages — a trader with ships, storage and contracts gets paid on the chaos, whether or not it produces one extra tonne. He calls this capturing the whole "value chain," and it's the same quality he admires in TotalEnergies on the energy side. In a world where he expects more supply disruptions, that's a business that profits from the disruption rather than merely surviving it.
ATH — Athabasca Oil Positive
Athabasca is a Canadian oil producer with heavy-oil and oil-sands assets in Alberta. Polomny says he just bought it again after a conference convinced him — "this is the cash machine."
The appeal is the financial shape rather than any drilling story. The debt has been paid down, the assets last decades rather than years (an oil-sands project doesn't decline the way a shale well does), and Canada is a jurisdiction unlikely to seize your barrels. That leaves a company producing more cash than it needs — and management is spending it buying back its own shares. Polomny calls that "cannibalization of shares": with fewer shares outstanding each year, every remaining share owns a bigger slice of the same oil and the same cash flow, so the value per share compounds without the company having to grow at all. It's the same "cannibal" template he wrote up in the July issue.
CVE — Cenovus Energy Positive
Cenovus is a large Canadian integrated: it produces oil-sands crude and also owns refineries that turn crude into diesel and gasoline. Polomny says he is "backing the companies like Cenovus, Suncor" and likes the Canadian oil sands generally.
Two reasons, both from the Aramco numbers he had just read. First, he's specifically bullish on companies that can refine, because the shortage is showing up in finished fuels, not only in crude. Second — and this is the geographic argument he keeps making — the Persian Gulf now carries a war premium, so barrels that sit safely in Alberta are worth more than the same barrels sitting where a strait can be closed. "You want to own assets in areas that are going to be insulated from that geopolitical conflict."
SU — Suncor Energy Positive
Suncor is the other big Canadian integrated named in the same breath — oil-sands production plus its own refineries and retail fuel network. Polomny's case is identical to Cenovus's: he wants oil exposure, he particularly wants refining exposure, and he wants the reserves located somewhere that isn't hostage to the Strait of Hormuz. Long-life Canadian barrels tick all three.
PBR — Petrobras Positive
Petrobras is Brazil's state-controlled oil major, with large deep-water fields off the Brazilian coast. When asked where he'd look in Latin America, Polomny leads with it: "I like Petrobras."
The reasoning is regional rather than company-specific. The world is short oil and the Gulf is unreliable, so producing assets in politically calmer places should be worth more than the market currently pays. He thinks that revaluation has already begun across Latin America — "these are all opportunities and they're being repriced already" — and Brazil's scale makes Petrobras the obvious first stop.
EC — Ecopetrol Positive
Ecopetrol is Colombia's state-controlled oil company. Under the previous left-wing government it was effectively told to stop looking for new oil, and reserves fell. Colombia has now changed government, and Polomny's rule is that a policy reversal is a real, datable catalyst: "changes in government and changes in policy that are economically positive can lead to tremendous knock-on effects for individual companies."
So the name comes back onto the list — "it's probably worth taking another look at Ecopetrol." Note this is a step up from his earlier framing (in July he said of it, "Is it a buy? I don't know"); here he groups it with the Latin American names he says are already being repriced. It remains a state-controlled company, so politics is both the reason to look and the standing risk.
PXT — Parex Resources Positive
Parex is a Canadian-listed oil producer whose fields are in Colombia — a private-sector way to own the same country turn as Ecopetrol, without the state as your controlling shareholder. Polomny names it alongside Ecopetrol and GeoPark as "these type of companies" worth another look now that Colombia's government has changed. Smaller and independent, it should feel a friendlier licensing and tax regime faster than the state major would.
GPRK — GeoPark Positive
GeoPark is an independent Latin American oil producer, historically partnered with Ecopetrol on Colombian blocks. It's the third name on the same list, and for the same single reason: a government that discouraged drilling has been replaced by one that doesn't, and companies whose entire value depends on being allowed to drill are the most leveraged to that change. Polomny's framing is that the market is already starting to pay for it.
TTE — TotalEnergies Positive
TotalEnergies is the French oil and gas major, and Polomny cites it as the energy-sector example of the thing he most admires in Glencore: capturing value all the way along the chain instead of just selling raw barrels. Total produces oil and gas, but it also ships, stores, refines and — crucially — trades it, running one of the largest energy trading operations in the world.
In a disrupted market, that trading layer is where dislocation turns into profit: someone has to move the barrels that are suddenly in the wrong place. "They try to capture as much of the value down through not only production of energy… but also trading of these." It's a structural preference, not a valuation call — he isn't quoting a price here.
YPF — YPF S.A. Neutral
YPF is Argentina's largest oil producer and the main developer of Vaca Muerta, the giant shale field that has turned Argentina into a fast-growing oil exporter. Polomny brings it up as evidence rather than as a recommendation: "Howard Marks and Stanley Druckenmiller have taken large positions in YPF" — two investors whose presence tells you serious money believes the Argentine policy turn is real.
His actual argument stays where it has been: the interesting thing is the country and the basin, not this particular share certificate. Argentina's reforms plus a world-class shale field is the setup; YPF is one way people are expressing it, and he notes the repricing is already under way.
2222.SR — Saudi Aramco Neutral
Aramco is the Saudi state oil company, listed in Riyadh since 2019 — which, as Polomny notes, means it now has to publish results like any public company. He isn't taking a view on the stock; he's using its quarterly report as the most credible tally of how much oil the war has actually removed.
The numbers are stark. Roughly 11 million barrels a day of supply gone — over a tenth of world consumption. The gap was papered over by draining about 9 million barrels a day from strategic and commercial storage and by roughly 2 million barrels a day of demand being rationed. Cumulatively, more than 2.6 billion barrels never reached the food, semiconductor, transport and chemical industries that needed them; bypass pipelines and reserve releases cut the net loss to about 1.8 billion. And the restocking arithmetic is the part that matters for prices: even if the Strait of Hormuz reopened today, it would take roughly 18 months of pumping an extra 2.1 million barrels a day just to refill the tanks — on top of normal demand. That is why he is bullish oil companies rather than waiting for a ceasefire headline.
Codelco — Codelco (Chile, state-owned) Negative
Codelco is Chile's state copper miner and, historically, the largest copper producer on earth. It has just suspended the project meant to extend the life of its biggest mine, after finding a new source of seismic (earthquake and rock-collapse) risk — a year after a rock burst killed six workers underground.
Polomny uses it as proof of a thesis rather than as a stock view (it isn't investable — the Chilean state owns all of it). Copper demand is forecast to grow for decades, but "mining's hard. You can't just flip a switch and increase copper production." The easy ore has been mined; what's left is deeper, more dangerous and slower to permit, and even the world's biggest producer can't push through it. Chilean output "is rolling over and heading south" — which is bullish for the copper price and for whoever can actually produce the metal safely and cheaply.
Built from the public YouTube video (timestamps deep-link into the video; cleaned transcript in transcript.html) — stances and quotes are Polomny's own wording. For personal study — not investment advice.