Kevin Warsh is not the new Paul Volcker
The AIA weekly: Warsh's Jackson Hole debut is read as "gaslighting and gamesmanship" — a hawk who will have no choice once long rates touch 5.5–6% — so the framework is unchanged, "all roads lead to money printing." The measurement he wants you to use is net worth in ounces of gold (1,430 in 2000, 295 in 2026); the lie he dismantles is Bessent's "we can grow our way out of it" (debt compounding 6–7.5% against 1.5–2.9% GDP); the caution he attaches is Adam Smith's "a great deal of ruin in a nation" — the seven currency-collapse indicators are all lit, but certain is not imminent, so this sets the allocation, not Monday's trade. Then the practical half: spot uranium at a seven-month high bought the way he actually buys it (SPUT at a 10–15% discount to NAV), a venture-capital rule for anyone who insists on juniors, the farm-crisis inputs behind an 11-day run in DBA, and Venezuela's 65-billion-barrel deal — where "reserves don't equal production."
In one line: the episode is a measurement lesson wrapped around one unchanged conclusion. Warsh's first Jackson Hole is dismissed on arrival — "this is all gaslighting and gamesmanship… what do you expect him to say?" — because the arithmetic overrules the rhetoric: "do you think that if long rates get to five and a half or 6% that he's not going to use QE? He's not going to have a choice," and "if rates go to 5 and a half, 6%… that could destroy the US economy. That's how leveraged the US economy is." Tactically that leaves a September 25 basis point hike as "the narrow base case but not a certainty" with bills and short duration out to two-year notes attractive — and a schism forming between the Treasury and the Fed, since Bessent is selling bills and buying back orphaned long bonds while Warsh insists investors "should not assume the Fed will use QE… to suppress long-term yields." Polomny's answer: "the die is cast… all roads lead to money printing. It won't be linear." The centrepiece is the yardstick: US household net worth went $400,000 → $1.35 million since 2000 (3.4× in dollars) but 1,430 ounces of gold → 295 — "you're 80% poorer in real terms… it's the boiling frog." Against that he demolishes Bessent's "we can grow our way out of it" with the two series side by side — GDP 2.9 / 2.8 / 2.1 / 1.5% for 2023–26 against debt growth of 7.2 / 6.9 / 6.1 / 7.5%: "debt is growing two to three times faster than the economy. So the man is lying again." Then the seven-indicator currency-collapse checklist (own-bond buying, debt/GDP >100%, interest >15% of revenue, foreign holders retreating, reserve share declining, oversight gutted, political interference) — the US meets all seven, with one caveat that changes the timing but not the direction: the dollar is still the reserve currency, "70 or 80% of the world's commerce," so per Adam Smith, "there's a lot of ruin in a country" — "just because something is certain… doesn't mean it's imminent," and this belongs in financial planning, not in a Monday trade. Confirmations pile up: $650 billion added to the debt since July 1 ("$12 billion a day"), Druckenmiller's WSJ op-ed (interest at 4.5% of GDP by 2033, 144% of discretionary spending by 2043, "anyone who tells you entitlements won't be cut is lying"), Tavi Costa's global money supply now over $122 trillion (+$22T in under three years) with gold set to "reattach itself," and China buying gold harder every time the price dips. On Bitcoin he is measured rather than hostile — "an asset class that can probably be used to protect purchasing power," but he's "more partial to gold… a 5,000-year history"; what matters is the category: "you want to own scarcity" — land, royalties, things that make you go "owie" if you drop them on your foot — in a fourth turning he expects to stay volatile. Europe's 8× gas premium is filed as manufactured scarcity ("not a geological problem. This is a political choice" — an intact Nord Stream line nobody will restart), and the US monetizes it: $3/mcf here, $20–30 in Europe, hence every new export train from Corpus Christi to Sabine Pass. The uranium block is the most actionable: spot at a seven-month high, and rather than juniors he tracks NAV and buys the Sprott physical trust at −10% to −15% — "buy something that's probably going to go up over time at a discount. That's how real wealth is created"; anyone who wants the tenbagger should run it "as a private equity investor… a portfolio of 8 to 10 names with the understanding that 80% of them are going to fail." The supply case comes off a NexGen chart (a 335 Mlb/yr primary deficit by 2040, demand 530 Mlb, mine supply needing to more than triple) against a ~15-year discovery-to-production clock — "you're already in the window" — which is why he still expects $200–250/lb: nobody commits $3–5bn for fifteen years of permitting, First Nations, financing and political risk without an extraordinary payoff. Kazatomprom's troubles he reads as deliberate ("a lot of this is managed to have the price go higher"), Sweden's 8 GW of new applications as ~4 Mlb/yr of fresh demand. On food, farmers face their "worst crisis in 40 years" on diesel ($5.70/gal in low-tax South Texas) and fertilizer, sulfuric acid still unresolved, the cattle herd at generational lows with imported beef undercutting the very price signal that would rebuild it — and DBA up eleven straight sessions as grain finally prices it in ("how do you establish a position? That's the trick"). Finally Venezuela: Trump's announced agreement gives the US majority control over 65 billion barrels with $100 billion of investment aimed at the Orinoco Belt and Lake Maracaibo — the "Donroe doctrine," which he does not endorse but will trade — tempered by the discipline of the week: "resources and reserves don't equal production" (former holding MEG Energy, acquired by Cenovus, had 4bn barrels behind 100,000 b/d), and export capacity so degraded that tankers sit on demurrage 30 days. His own money went to an unnamed, "highly speculative" junior with legacy Venezuelan and Colombian deals, identified in last month's paid issue. Housekeeping: alongside the AIA and Dividend portfolios he is "introducing now a more permanent portfolio."
1. Stocks & names mentioned
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he said | At |
| SRUUF | Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (SPUT / U.UN) | SA · STK | Positive | His stated method for expressing the uranium call, restated with the trigger: "what I do is I just track the net asset value of these — well in my case the Sprott trust, SPUT — and when it gets down to -10%, -13, -15% I buy some… because I'm able to buy something that's probably going to go up over time at a discount. That's how real wealth is created." Spot uranium just made a seven-month high; "bullish on uranium. Continue to be bullish." | 38:03 |
| DBA | Invesco DB Agriculture Fund | QT · SA · STK | Positive | The tape confirming the farm-cost squeeze: "if you looked at the DBA ETF, which is an agricultural ETF, it's been up at least the last 11 trading days straight… people are starting to price in that we're going to have some issues here." Bullish on the direction, candid on the vehicle problem: agriculture is "easy to see that you're going to have an upward bias in prices, but hard to establish a position." | 48:14 |
| BTC | Bitcoin | QT · STK | Neutral | Asked in an interview what he thinks of it: "I'm not partial to a lot of the other cryptocurrencies but I think Bitcoin has established itself as an asset class that can be probably used to protect purchasing power. I'm more partial to gold just because it has a 5,000-year history… However, I'm not going to sit here and be antagonistic towards Bitcoin." Admitted to the scarcity bucket, ranked below gold. | 25:22 |
| NXE | NexGen Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Used twice, both times as illustration rather than as a pick. Its supply-gap chart supplies the demand case — "by 2040 primary uranium deficit is projected to reach 335 million pounds per year… meeting forecasted 2040 demand of 530 million pounds will require mine supply to more than triple" — and then it becomes the risk thought-experiment: "if you had 5 billion would you want to go partner with NexGen on a project that's uncertain?… What's your permitting risk? What's the First Nations risk? What's financing?" No stance on the shares. | 40:10 |
| KAP | Kazatomprom (LSE/AIX GDR) | STK | Neutral | Bullish for the commodity, sceptical of the disclosure: "you saw the problems that cause Kazatomprom allegedly has run into. I suggest that a lot of this is managed to have the price go higher. Why should we produce cheap uranium for the world when… we have this uranium so we can make excuses about sulfuric acid and dinosaur bones?" Old contracts roll off, new ones price higher — "that's my view." | 44:40 |
| MEG | MEG Energy (TSX) | SA · STK | Neutral | A former AIA Portfolio holding, since acquired by Cenovus, resurrected as the teaching case against the Venezuela reserve headline: per FinTwit's Razer Oil, MEG's Christina Lake had "4 billion barrels in reserves, but that doesn't mean anything because they're only producing 100,000 barrels a day" — a level reached "after many years of investment and tweaking." Historical reference, no live stance. | 53:28 |
| CVE | Cenovus Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Named only as the acquirer in the reserves-versus-production example — MEG Energy "was acquired by Cenovus" — so Christina Lake's 4bn barrels and 100,000 b/d now sit inside CVE. No view offered on the shares in this episode (he backed the Canadian oil sands including Cenovus three weeks earlier). | 53:28 |
| SLB | SLB (Schlumberger) | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Cited as the observable evidence that the Venezuelan re-opening is already physical rather than rhetorical: "Schlumberger and Halliburton and these guys are already moving back in there. They're bringing rigs back in. This is going to happen." A confirmation datapoint, not a recommendation. | 54:32 |
| HAL | Halliburton | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Named with Schlumberger as the oilfield-service majors already moving rigs back into Venezuela ahead of the announced deal — the on-the-ground tell behind the headline. No stance on the equity. | 54:32 |
Stances are this conversation's framing only. Most of the hour is macro and carries no ticker — Warsh's Jackson Hole debut, the net-worth-in-gold-ounces yardstick, the debt-growth-versus-GDP-growth arithmetic, the seven currency-collapse indicators, the EU gas premium and Nord Stream, the farm-cost squeeze, and the Venezuela agreement — all of which live in the talking points. He discloses a new, unnamed "highly speculative" junior oil & gas position in the AIA Portfolio with legacy Venezuelan and Colombian deals ("identified in last month's newsletter"); no ticker is given in this video, so none is inferred here. Gold, physical uranium, T-bills/short-duration Treasuries and the Swedish nuclear programme are themes rather than named securities. Kevin Warsh, Scott Bessent, Newt Gingrich, Stanley Druckenmiller, Peter Mallouk, Tavi Costa, Rick Rule, John Adams, Adam Smith, Bastiat, Mark Carney, Ursula von der Leyen, Olaf Scholz, Gordon Brown and "Razer Oil" are people/attributions, not securities.
2. Talking points
00:28 · Warsh's first Jackson Hole — "all gaslighting and gamesmanship"
- "Warsh's first time there. I don't put a lot of stock into what these people say. Of course they're going to try to manage expectations. This guy is coming in trying to be this inflation hawk."
- What he actually took from the speech is institutional, not monetary: "you have a schism here starting to form between the Treasury and the Fed" — Warsh telling investors not to expect QE while Bessent sells bills and buys back orphaned long bonds.
01:41 · All roads lead to money printing — the constraint is leverage, not resolve
- "The die is cast… these people will in the end go to money printing. All roads lead to money printing. It won't be linear. It won't be a straight line" — and that non-linearity is the volatility (gold sold off on the comments).
- The falsifier he offers: "do you think that if long rates get to five and a half or 6% that he's not going to use QE? He's not going to have a choice"; at those levels "that could destroy the US economy. That's how leveraged the US economy is. You think housing's bad now? Just wait."
02:26 · The near-term policy path — and where it pays
- "A September 25 basis point rate hike is now the narrow base case but not a certainty. Rate cuts are unlikely without either convincing disinflation or meaningful labor market deterioration. This is part of the tough guy act that he's playing."
- Consequence: "front-end yields should remain high, making treasury bills and short duration instruments attractive… out to two-year notes." Whether they hike or hold, the front end is paid.
- The Fed put "has moved further out of the money" — ordinary equity weakness won't move policy while inflation runs 3.5–4%.
05:19 · Why gold is being remonetized — creditor strike, not chart pattern
- The upward pressure on rates is "the undisciplined nature of our federal government" rolling zero-rate-era debt into today's yields while still expanding the pile.
- The behavioural half: the US "is just running rogue… this is turning people off. This is why gold is continuing to be remonetized. People are not buying the same amounts of Treasury securities because who wants to be a creditor to the United States when there's out of control spending?"
- Calm-weather promises are worthless: "we'll see when the next crisis comes and inevitably a crisis will come because there's nobody talking about cutting spending."
06:20 · The inflation is a war of choice — and the midterm lull
- "A large part of this inflation was caused by an unnecessary war in Iran that forced energy prices up. Fertilizer prices, food prices, sulfur prices, aluminum prices… unnecessary war of choice is the main culprit."
- His political timing call: "you're going to see things calm down as we coast into the midterm elections. Then when the political pressure is off, reignite the war with Iran" — it ends only when there is "a final victor… someone will be the hegemon in the Middle East."
08:42 · The yardstick: net worth in ounces of gold, 1,430 → 295
- US average household net worth went from $400,000 in 2000 to $1.35 million in 2026 — "that's 3.4 times in dollars." Measured in gold it went from 1,430 ounces to 295.
- "You're 80% poorer in real terms because of the expansion of the currency… It's the boiling frog. You don't see it week to week… it's insidious quarter after quarter, year after year."
- The framing behind it: debasement is how "bankers and the central bank and your government steal your life force… the sweat of your brow" — and the political indictment covers both parties.
10:34 · "We can grow our way out of it" — the arithmetic that kills it
- The claim is old ("Newt Gingrich used to say this") and conditionally true: "as long as the economy is expanding faster than the debt, that's fine… That actually is true. However, that's not what happens."
- The two series, side by side. Real GDP growth: 2023 2.9% · 2024 2.8% · 2025 2.1% · 2026 1.5% annualized. Debt growth: 7.2% · 6.9% · 6.1% · 7.5%. "Debt is growing two to three times faster than the economy. So the man is lying again."
- Why it works as rhetoric: "he's counting on the fact that you're so busy struggling to survive… that you don't understand this. You're not going to check into it. It's why I'm here."
14:35 · Seven currency-collapse indicators — and the reserve-currency caveat
- The checklist, all seven of which the US now meets: government buying its own bonds · debt/GDP over 100% · interest above 15% of revenue · foreign holders reducing holdings · reserve share declining · financial oversight gutted · political interference (peers: Turkey 2018, Venezuela 2017, Argentina 2001, Sri Lanka 2022).
- The brake he puts on it, quoting Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations: "there's a lot of ruin in a country… just because something is certain doesn't mean it's imminent." Empires carry enormous built-up inertia before they "give up the ghost."
- The differentiator is the dollar: still "70 or 80% of the world's commerce… and will continue to be for a long time. However, it's getting chipped away at and we're doing everything we can to undermine it." So dollar-collapse content is "big clickbait" — "is it investable, actionable? When's it going to happen? No one can know."
- The rule that follows: this "is adopted into our long-term financial planning. It doesn't mean it's a tradable situation on Monday morning" — it is the north star behind the permanent portfolio.
19:20 · $12 billion a day — and Druckenmiller on who decides the entitlement cut
- Peter Mallouk's running tally: "it's only been a week since I posted on this last and the US has added over a hundred billion in debt" — and the bigger figure, "$650 billion to the national debt since July 1st… in 59 days. That's 12 billion a day." John Adams, quoted alongside: "there are two ways to enslave a country. One is by the sword. The other is by debt."
- On entitlements: "a hundred trillion dollars in off-balance liabilities… you can't show me how you're going to pay that out of revenue." The trade-off is explicit — a trillion-dollar-plus defence budget "or you can have a solvent entitlement system. You can't have both."
- Druckenmiller's WSJ op-ed this week, read out: interest expense reaches 4.5% of GDP by 2033 and 144% of all discretionary spending by 2043. "Anyone who tells you entitlements won't be cut is lying. Not about the outcome, but about who decides it — either we restructure the promises deliberately… or the bond market restructures them for us all at once." Polomny: "Yes, I agree."
23:33 · $122 trillion of global money supply — and China buying every dip in gold
- Tavi Costa's chart: global money supply "now over $122 trillion. That's up from a hundred trillion approximately 3 years ago" — +$22 trillion in two years, nine months. Either money supply contracts "or the gold price is going to reattach itself and track it more closely." He expects the latter.
- China's pattern is the tell of a price-disciplined buyer: "as the gold price goes up, they cut back their purchases. And when the gold price contracts, they ramp up."
- The reversal of a generation: central banks sold at the lows (Gordon Brown "selling the Bank of England's gold I think at 275… it's a rock, it's a doorstop, it doesn't produce income") and now gold climbs as a share of reserves while financial assets fall. "That's been totally reversed."
24:45 · Bitcoin, gold, and "you want to own scarcity"
- On Bitcoin: "I'm not partial to a lot of the other cryptocurrencies but I think Bitcoin has established itself as an asset class that can be probably used to protect purchasing power. I'm more partial to gold… a 5,000-year history. However, I'm not going to be antagonistic towards Bitcoin."
- The category, which is the actual instruction: "you want to own scarcity. You want to own things that are scarce and can't be reproduced by governments by fiat… from land to income-producing businesses involved in royalties" — glibly, "things that if you drop them on your foot they'll make you go owie."
- The regime: "we're in a fourth turning… I expect a tremendous amount of political, social, economic and financial volatility. And I've not been disappointed." Not a prepper conclusion — "I don't suggest that either. I think it's being prudent and understanding the times that you live in."
29:08 · Europe pays 8× for gas — a political choice, not geology
- "Europeans now pay eight times more for natural gas than Americans… this is not a geological problem. This is a political choice." One Nord Stream line is intact and could be running "in a couple months" after refurbishment — nobody is trying.
- His institutional-survival explanation for why nothing changes: bureaucracies exist to continue, "all organisms… have as their primary directive survival. Not to benefit you, not to make the European people's lives better" — hence a threat narrative and half-trillion defence budgets rather than cheaper energy via nuclear buildouts or restored pipeline gas.
- Europe also has hydrocarbons it forbids itself: "not because they're geologically inaccessible, but because it's a political choice." He expects the union to fracture within a generation (Le Pen, the AfD polling 43% in eastern Germany).
36:55 · The arbitrage the US is monetizing — every new LNG train
- "The United States benefits because there's an arbitrage between the price of gas here in the US… This is why they're building all these LNG facilities along the coast" — Corpus Christi, Brownsville, Sabine Pass, "all trying to put more export trains online."
- The spread in his own numbers: "we can get gas here in the US for cheap, three bucks an mcf, and sell it in Europe for 20 or 30."
37:30 · Uranium at a seven-month high — and how he actually buys it
- "Spot uranium just made a seven-month high. Bullish on uranium. Continue to be bullish. How you express a position to take advantage is the challenging part."
- Rick Rule's frame, endorsed: "the easy money has been made, but the certain money is now to be made" — so be selective; "you can't just go out and buy the recycled brownfield projects from previous uranium cycles. That doesn't work."
- The method, stated as a rule with a trigger: "I just track the net asset value… in my case the Sprott trust, SPUT — and when it gets down to -10%, -13, -15% I buy some… I'm able to buy something that's probably going to go up over time at a discount. That's how real wealth is created." His acknowledged downside: "the problem is that's not sexy."
39:00 · If you insist on juniors, run a venture-capital book
- "You have to approach it as a private equity investor… like a venture capital firm would. And you need to put a portfolio together of 8 to 10 names with the understanding that 80% of them are going to fail. Maybe one out of the 10 does okay and one out of the 10 goes nuts and gives you a market-beating return."
- The failure mode he keeps seeing: "people get wedded to one story and they go all in. And if that isn't the one company that actually makes it, then they get turned off."
- The two acceptable answers: a researched basket of "legit companies," or "just buy the metal on discount and sit back."
40:10 · The supply gap, the 15-year clock, and the incentive price
- From a NexGen chart: by 2040 the primary uranium deficit reaches 335 million pounds per year, and meeting 2040 demand of 530 million pounds "will require mine supply to more than triple from today's levels" — counting projects already in development or announced.
- Why 2040 is not far away: "what's the average time frame to find and develop and bring online a uranium project? About 15 years. You're already in the window."
- The risk ledger a $3–5bn sponsor must accept over that horizon — permitting, First Nations, financing, operational, people, machinery, budget contingency, and the political situation fifteen years out — "so you need an extraordinary potential for a payoff to incentivize you to take that risk. We're still not there."
- Hence the number he keeps repeating: "you're going to see $200, $250 a pound at some point. Again, I don't know when." Scarcity here is economic, not geological — "it's not that there's not enough uranium in the Earth's crust. There's plenty."
- Demand keeps arriving: Sweden taking applications for up to 8 gigawatts of new nuclear — roughly 4 million pounds a year of annual demand on his ~500,000 lb per 1,000 MW rule of thumb, plus ~1.5 million pounds for each initial core load.
44:40 · Kazatomprom's problems, read as managed
- "You saw the problems that cause Kazatomprom allegedly has run into. I suggest that a lot of this is managed to have the price go higher."
- The incentive he ascribes: "why should we produce cheap uranium for the world… we can make excuses about sulfuric acid and dinosaur bones… because the price just keeps going up. Old contracts roll off, new contracts come online at higher prices."
45:24 · Farmers' worst crisis in 40 years — diesel, fertilizer, sulfuric acid
- The headline he reads: corn-belt farmers "say they are facing their worst crisis in 40 years as an explosion in diesel and fertilizer costs triggered by Donald Trump's Iran war pushes grain producers to the brink." A super El Niño sits on top.
- Diesel is a refining problem, not a crude problem: refineries destroyed in the Middle East, curtailed in the US by regulation, Russian refineries hit until Russia suspended diesel exports. Even in low-tax South Texas beside the Corpus Christi–Beaumont refining complex, "diesel was still $5.70 a gallon." And "diesel runs commerce. Diesel runs agriculture. Diesel runs your Amazon packages."
- Fertilizer has two broken legs — Middle Eastern nitrogen capacity (30% of world use) suspended, and "the sulfuric acid problem has not been alleviated," which is how phosphate fertilizer is made.
48:14 · DBA's eleven-day run — and the populist policy that undoes the cattle fix
- "DBA… has been up at least the last 11 trading days straight… people are starting to price in that we're going to have some issues here." The honest caveat: "how do you establish a position? That's the trick. I don't necessarily have an answer for that."
- Fewer producers is the second-order effect: taking farmers and ranchers out "probably leads to higher prices or more cartelization like we have in the meat processing industry."
- The cattle case study: the screwworm and other shocks have the US herd at generational lows, so meat prices are up — and a populist president importing 300,000 tons of beef suppresses exactly the price signal ranchers need to hold heifers back rather than send them to slaughter. Rebuilding takes "a couple years" of gestation and feeding, so the intervention is "exacerbating the situation."
50:39 · Venezuela: 65 billion barrels, $100 billion, and the "Donroe doctrine"
- He was early and systematic: "I have a bot set up that's sending me news feeds on this" — and had already "added a speculative, highly speculative… junior oil and gas name that had deals in Venezuela in the past and is now trying to resurrect those deals, not for exploration, but for production of already existing fields," also touching Colombia, where the new government is "more conducive to hydrocarbon exploitation." No ticker is given here; it was identified in last month's paid newsletter.
- The news itself: Trump says the US reached an agreement giving it "majority control over more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuela's proven oil reserves," channelling roughly $100 billion of private investment into the Orinoco Belt and Lake Maracaibo and directing production toward US needs — "a material step beyond the earlier 17-field discussions," an attempt "to establish a structural long-duration position in the country's oil resource base."
- "So this is the Donroe doctrine — control of the Western Hemisphere in effect. Do I agree with it? No. I don't think we should be sticking our nose in and doing this, but this is what's happening." The moral objection does not change the position — the same separation he applies to Europe's energy policy.
53:28 · "Resources and reserves don't equal production"
- The brake on the 65-billion-barrel headline: "I wouldn't get too crazy right now thinking that oil prices are going to massively drop. Billions of investment need to take place" — export capacity is so degraded that tankers "hang out on demurrage for 30 days waiting to be loaded."
- The worked example, credited to FinTwit's Razer Oil: former AIA holding MEG Energy (acquired by Cenovus) has "4 billion barrels in reserves, but that doesn't mean anything because they're only producing 100,000 barrels a day" at Christina Lake — a rate reached only "after many years of investment and tweaking." "This is what the market sometimes confuses."
- Meanwhile the physical evidence accumulates: "Schlumberger and Halliburton and these guys are already moving back in there. They're bringing rigs back in." On the fairness objection — "the terms aren't fair… Venezuelans are being ripped off" — his answer is that it happens anyway.
55:18 · Carney's Values and rule by technocrat
- He flags Mark Carney's 2020–21 book Values: Building a Better World for All from a circulating list of quotes — and is careful about provenance: "I don't know if these are paraphrased… I'm not going to go buy it and look it up. I put this headline up for our Canadian listeners to comment on."
- What he will assert: "he's a globalist… a WEF stooge… a climate-change aficionado" who used climate and the pandemic as "tools… to implement their technocratic ruling over society." The quoted lines that concern him most: "experts will replace democracy" and "all institutions must serve WEF ideals."
- He extends the same charge to the US: "let's do the same thing with Peter Thiel and Musk… let's get rid of — the hoi polloi doesn't know anything." And a note on Carney's 55–60% approval: it is Trump's trade war doing the work — "nobody likes being pushed around."
59:14 · A third book: the permanent portfolio
- The product line as he states it: the free weekly curation email; the paid Substack with the AIA Portfolio ("skewed towards capital appreciation") and the AIA Dividend Portfolio ("a unique spin on dividend income where we look for not only good dividends but also potential for capital gains").
- New: "I'm also introducing now a more permanent portfolio and I'll be talking about that more in upcoming issues as this world continues to get more volatile. How can we create a situation where we can create and maintain wealth and navigate through this ice field?" — the vehicle for the multi-decade empire-decline view he keeps saying is un-tradeable.
3. In plain English
SRUUF — Sprott Physical Uranium Trust Positive
The Sprott trust is a listed fund that does one thing: it buys physical uranium and stores it. Owning it is close to owning the metal itself, with none of the mine-building, permitting or management risk that comes with a uranium company.
Because it trades on an exchange, its share price can drift away from the value of the uranium it actually holds. When the shares sit below that value, you are buying a pound of uranium for less than a pound of uranium costs. Polomny's rule is exactly that: watch the discount, and "when it gets down to -10%, -13, -15% I buy some." Spot uranium has just made a seven-month high and he stays bullish, but his interest is in how you own the theme, not in predicting the next tick — "buy something that's probably going to go up over time at a discount. That's how real wealth is created."
He is candid that this is the boring answer. It will not go up 300% in a year the way a lucky junior explorer might. That is the trade-off he is willing to make: he says he is past the point of needing to "mess around with junior stocks," and the discount is his edge instead.
DBA — Invesco DB Agriculture Fund Positive
DBA is an exchange-traded fund that holds futures contracts on farm commodities — corn, wheat, soybeans, sugar, coffee and the rest — so it moves roughly with the price of food at the farm gate rather than with any company's profits.
Polomny points at it because it has risen eleven trading sessions in a row, which he reads as the market finally pricing in a cost squeeze he has been describing for months. American farmers are facing what the press calls their worst crisis in 40 years: diesel near $5.70 a gallon even in low-tax South Texas, nitrogen fertilizer curtailed because a large share of world capacity sits in the Middle East, and phosphate fertilizer constrained because the sulfuric acid used to make it is still scarce. When it costs far more to plant and harvest, either grain prices rise or farmers stop planting — and fewer farmers means higher prices later anyway.
His caveat is about execution, not direction. Agriculture, he says, is "easy to see" and hard to own: the natural instruments are futures and options on futures, which most people should not touch. An ETF like DBA is the accessible proxy, and he notes plainly that he does not have a perfect answer to the position-sizing problem — "how do you establish a position? That's the trick."
BTC — Bitcoin Neutral
Asked in an interview what he makes of Bitcoin, Polomny gives a deliberately even answer. He is not interested in cryptocurrencies generally, but he thinks Bitcoin "has established itself as an asset class that can probably be used to protect purchasing power" — meaning it belongs in the same conceptual bucket as gold: something a government cannot create more of by decree.
He still ranks gold above it, and the reason is time rather than technology: gold has "a 5,000-year history of doing exactly what it's doing now," while Bitcoin's track record is measured in years. That is a statement about evidence, not about design.
The wider point is the one he actually wants you to take away. As the debt spiral accelerates toward what he expects will be a currency crisis and a monetary reordering, "you want to own scarcity" — and scarcity is a broad category that includes land, royalty streams and businesses with assets that cannot be reproduced by fiat. Bitcoin qualifies for the bucket; it just isn't his first choice within it.
NXE — NexGen Energy Neutral
NexGen is a Canadian uranium developer with a very large undeveloped deposit in Saskatchewan. In this episode it appears twice, and neither time as a recommendation.
First, its published supply-gap chart supplies the numbers behind his bullish uranium case: a projected primary shortfall of 335 million pounds a year by 2040, against 2040 demand of 530 million pounds, which would need world mine supply to more than triple. Since a uranium project takes roughly fifteen years from discovery to production, 2040 is not a distant date — "you're already in the window," and the projects that would fill the gap largely do not exist yet.
Second, he uses NexGen as the subject of a thought experiment about why they don't exist. Imagine you have $5 billion: would you partner on a fifteen-year build whose permitting, First Nations agreements, financing, labour, equipment, cost overruns and host-government politics are all unknown that far out? His answer is that you would need an extraordinary payoff to say yes — which is why he expects uranium at $200–250 a pound eventually. The point is about the incentive price, not about NexGen's shares.
KAP — Kazatomprom Neutral
Kazatomprom is Kazakhstan's state uranium producer and the largest in the world. It has been reporting operational difficulties — sulfuric acid shortages and ground-condition problems at its in-situ recovery fields — which the market has taken at face value as bad luck.
Polomny doesn't. He reads the disclosures as commercial strategy: "I suggest that a lot of this is managed to have the price go higher." His reasoning is straightforward incentive logic — if you sit on a large share of the world's cheap uranium in a tightening market, producing flat out to keep prices low serves nobody but your customers. Withholding barrels while offering technical explanations does the opposite, and every year the old low-priced contracts roll off and get replaced at today's higher prices.
That makes his stance split. It is bullish for the uranium price, which is what he actually owns exposure to. It is not an endorsement of the company itself, where a state owner with an incentive to restrict output, plus the geopolitics of the jurisdiction, are exactly the risks a shareholder carries.
MEG — MEG Energy Neutral
MEG Energy was a Canadian heavy-oil producer and a former AIA Portfolio holding, since acquired by Cenovus. Polomny brings it back not as an investment idea but as the corrective to the week's biggest headline.
Venezuela's announced deal is framed around 65 billion barrels of proven reserves, a number large enough to make people assume a flood of oil and lower prices. MEG is the counter-example: its Christina Lake project holds roughly 4 billion barrels of reserves, yet produces only about 100,000 barrels a day — a rate it reached only after many years of capital and technical work. Reserves describe what is in the ground; production describes what actually reaches a tanker each morning, and the gap between them is measured in billions of dollars and years of construction.
Applied to Venezuela, where export terminals are so run down that tankers wait 30 days to load, the conclusion is that this is a genuine long-term opportunity and not a near-term supply shock. As he puts it, "resources and reserves don't equal production. This is what the market sometimes confuses."
Built from the public YouTube video (timestamps deep-link into the video; cleaned transcript in transcript.html) — stances and quotes are Polomny's own wording. For personal study — not investment advice.