Luke Gromen & Lyn Alden — The Global Bond Market Is Starting To Break
"Whatever your allocation is to everything — bonds, stocks, gold, Bitcoin — that's going to be your allocation. You're not going to be able to move." (Gromen)
One-line take: a two-guest, macro-only conversation on the one question that now sits under everything — who is left to buy US Treasuries — with the two speakers arriving at the same destination from opposite ends. Alden works the plumbing: foreigners "aren't buying nearly enough" on a percentage-of-issuance basis, a self-described balance-sheet hawk runs the Fed, banks can only absorb more with further SLR relief, and insurers and pensions are "fairly honest balance sheets" that must sell something to buy something — while being stuck in private credit, where she carefully separates liquidity from solvency ("you can have two problems at the same time in different magnitudes"). Her tell for the endgame is not a crash but an embarrassment: "the end of the world is not that things break — it's that the central bank has to come in and start buying bonds and has trouble explaining why," as in 2019 repo and the Bank of England's cancelled 2022 QT speech during the gilt crisis. The soft version is already running: Treasury operation twist — buy back long duration, fund it with bills and a TGA drawdown, "until the midterms." Gromen works the arithmetic: true interest expense — gross interest + Social Security + Medicare + Medicaid + Veterans Affairs — is 105% of receipts and growing 7–12% against receipts at 4%, and those entitlements are owed "in a hard currency" ("we didn't owe my dad a payment for Medicare. We owed him a knee"). So Warsh "isn't going to hike rates. He's not. He can't" — the man who co-wrote "The Fed Tightening? Not Now" with Druckenmiller in December 2018 is no hawk. Where they differ: Gromen says a hike is arithmetically impossible; Alden's base case is zero-to-one hike, and "if we get the one, it'd be kind of symbolic," because "when you get this far in fiscal dominance, rate hikes don't solve the problem" — a Volcker cure works on lending-driven inflation, not on inflexible fiscal spending, and hiking now hands money-market boomers a raise. Her attention is elsewhere entirely: crack spreads, not the crude price ("record high crack spreads… diesel priced as though oil itself is over 100"), and a deliberate tolerance band — "7% of GDP deficits is a much bigger topic than if he's going to toggle interest rates." The close is Gromen's pre-positioning argument, built on a Jim Rickards anecdote (Treasury's direct line into BlackRock: one call, $5 trillion locked, "no sales") and the 1980 COMEX silver precedent: when trillion-dollar balance sheets finally agree, "they're going to go to hit the sell button and it's not going to work" — markets shut for two or three weeks, and "you will own what you own at the new allocation." The United States, he says, has "a Weimar gold reparations problem" — not hyperinflation, but obligations owed in a hard currency that inflation-adjusts. His Ukrainian friends' 1998 bank holiday is the ending: five cars' worth of savings bought a month of groceries; the people who owned gold and silver "were fine. Nothing changed for them."
1. Stocks & names mentioned
This is a macro-only appearance — no equity was picked by either guest. Only one company is named at all (BlackRock, and only as the exhibit in a Jim Rickards anecdote about Treasury's crisis phone line), so the table below is asset-class positioning expressed through the usual proxies, consistent with the rest of this archive. Stance reflects how each is framed in this conversation; the speaker is named in every cell because two guests are talking. Research legend: QT Qualtrim · SA Seeking Alpha · STK Stock Analysis. Excluded: the host's sponsor reads (Abundant Mines, Seedor, Chroma, Bitcoin Well, Bitcoin Mentor) are advertising, not commentary, and are deliberately not rows.
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he/she said | At |
|---|
| GLD | SPDR Gold Shares | QT · SA · STK | Positive | Gromen. The position is framed as insurance you cannot buy late: when trillion-dollar balance sheets finally agree, "they're going to go to hit the sell button and it's not going to work," markets shut for two or three weeks, and "when they reopen, you will own what you own at the new allocation… Gold will be where it is." The historical check is his Ukrainian friends' 1998 bank holiday: "how did people that own gold and silver do? … Oh, they were fine. Nothing changed for them." | 27:24 |
| IBIT | iShares Bitcoin Trust | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Gromen. Grouped with gold as the destination nobody will be able to reach in time: "there isn't going to be a shift, an orderly shift or even a one month shift of trillion dollar balance sheets into gold and Bitcoin. They'll shut the markets and then they'll reopen them two weeks later and Bitcoin will be where it is." No fresh price view — the argument is entirely about pre-positioning, and it is the reason the allocation has to exist before the event. | 25:32 |
| SLV | iShares Silver Trust (silver) | QT · SA · STK | Positive | Gromen. Carried alongside gold in the survival test, not as a separate thesis: the Ukrainians who came through the 1998 bank closure intact were the ones holding "gold and silver." Silver also supplies the cautionary half of the argument — "the buy button stopped working at COMEX at silver in 1980 with the Hunt brothers" is his template for a market that is simply switched off when the crowd arrives at once. | 27:24 |
| BLK | BlackRock | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Gromen — a historical exhibit, not a company view. Retelling a Jim Rickards book anecdote: "Treasury's got a direct line into BlackRock, per the consigliere of one of the top execs… in a crisis, Treasury can pick up the phone, make one call and lock down 5 trillion of capital. That's it. No sales. And the rest of the market would follow." He dates the arrangement to "20 years ago nearly." Nothing is implied about the stock — it is cited as evidence that the exit can be closed administratively. | 23:13 |
| Private credit | Private credit (asset class) | — | Negative | Alden (with Gromen). Alden separates the two failures precisely: redemption gates are a liquidity feature written into the contract ("you're signing up upfront saying that there's no guarantee of liquidity"), closer to full-reserve banking than to a bank run — but "underneath that, especially on the margins, we do see solvency issues… it's still unclear how big some of those solvency areas could be." Gromen supplies the consequence: insurers and pensions are "jammed up in private credit… there's no price of long-term treasuries where they can take the mark of selling down private credit," which removes the Treasury market's last patient buyer. | 0:58 |
| TLT | iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | Both, from different directions. Alden: "a pretty orderly degradation of the global bond market" — foreigners aren't buying nearly enough as a share of issuance, the Fed is run by a balance-sheet hawk, banks need more SLR relief, and insurers/pensions can't lever, "so I do think that they're getting squeezed." Gromen: every patient buyer is gated at once, so "he's got a nonlinearity facing him at the long end," and in the shutdown scenario "Treasuries will have lost immense amounts of value relative to those assets." | 25:56 |
Stance = how each is framed in this interview, not a price rating. Discussed at the macro level and carried on the macro viewpoints table rather than as rows: the US net international investment position ($65trn gross / $22–23trn net foreign-owned dollar assets) as the transmission channel from a broken JGB market to US asset sales; Japan's GPIF repatriation "nuclear option" and why a debtor nation has no equivalent lever; the absence of a yuan carry trade (strict capital controls); true interest expense at 105% of receipts, growing 7–12% against receipts at 4%, with entitlements owed "in a hard currency"; the Warsh & Druckenmiller December 2018 op-ed and Bessent's "Druckenmiller's offsides" jab; Treasury operation twist — buybacks funded by bills and a TGA drawdown "until the midterms"; the 2019 repo episode and the Bank of England's cancelled QT speech in the 2022 gilt crisis as the balance-sheet-expansion-with-an-excuse tell; fiscal dominance vs monetary dominance and why a Volcker cure doesn't fit a fiscal-driven inflation; record crack spreads and the refining bottleneck (diesel priced as though crude were over $100); the Weimar gold reparations analogy; and the 1980 Hunt-brothers COMEX silver and 1998 Ukrainian bank-holiday precedents for an exit that closes.
2. Talking points
0:58 Alden Liquidity and solvency are two different problems — and the media conflates them
- "There's liquidity and solvency which often get conflated in the media, and you can have two problems at the same time in different magnitudes." The gated-redemption headline ("X billions want to withdraw… they have to say no to most redemptions") is the liquidity story and gets reported as the solvency story.
- Her contrarian read of the structure: private credit's no-guarantee-of-liquidity terms are "actually closer to full reserve banking" than a demand deposit is — lenders are pensions, insurers, family offices, signing up front for quarterly liquidity at best. "It's not a business's payroll. It's not a person's checking account. It's these entities' kind of savings."
- But she does not wave the solvency question away: "underneath that, especially on the margins, we do see solvency issues in some of these troubled areas. It's still unclear how big some of those solvency areas could be."
2:24 Alden Honest balance sheets vs leverable ones — who can actually be made to buy Treasuries
- Banks and the central bank are the flexible tier: "if you want banks to buy more treasuries there are mechanisms that they can pull to make that happen" — regulation, not preference, sets the limit.
- Insurers and pensions are the inflexible tier: "fairly kind of honest balance sheets… if they want to buy something they have to sell something else. They can't just lever indefinitely." An insurer invests its float; a pension invests contributions.
- The framework matters because it tells you which buyer can be conscripted and which cannot — and the conscriptable ones are the ones that leave a policy fingerprint.
3:02 Alden The marginal-buyer squeeze, buyer by buyer
- Foreigners: the nominal number inches up, mostly non-government entities, "but on a percentage of total treasuries kind of being issued, foreigners just aren't buying nearly enough — which means more of it has to be funded domestically."
- The Fed: "a central bank balance sheet hawk ostensibly in charge… who would prefer not to just blow out the Fed balance sheet and say no, I'm a dove now."
- Banks: buying, "but their balance sheets don't have endless capacity unless you do some degree of supplemental leverage ratio reductions further than they already have done." Insurers: stuck in private credit. Conclusion: "I do think that they're getting squeezed" — though with no MOVE-index blowout and no major liquidity stress, "I don't know how acute it is."
4:35 Alden Japan's nuclear option — and why the US has no equivalent
- Japan is "a really big creditor nation" whose giant government pension funds now hold a huge swath of foreign assets. "If the yen gets disorderly, if the Japanese bond market gets disorderly, they can say, well, we're going to pull some of that foreign capital back."
- Scale plus reflexivity: "the marginal dollar coming out… has a disproportionate effect on market capitalization" — repatriation hits US asset prices harder than the headline flow suggests.
- The mirror image: "the US is a debtor nation. We're sending out our money in trade deficits, then the rest of the world is buying our assets with those trade deficits. So we don't have this gigantic pot of money that we can just pull in."
5:38 Alden The end of the world is a central bank buying bonds and struggling to explain why
- The line that reframes the whole "will it break?" question: "the end of the world is not that things break. It's just that the central bank has to come in and start buying bonds and has trouble explaining why."
- Two precedents she names: the 2019 repo episode ("really a fun time on social media watching people work through that"), and the Bank of England in 2022 — "they did a speech on balance sheet reduction that they had to cancel due to the gilt crisis and then temporarily increase their balance sheet instead… the optics of having to do that were awful."
- The implication for a balance-sheet hawk: "if the market does get illiquid, they're not going to let it stay illiquid" — so the realistic middle case is the balance sheet expanding with inflation still above target, explained away as "only for technical reasons."
6:45 Alden The soft version is already running — Treasury operation twist "until the midterms"
- What exists today, short of a crisis: "basically Treasury operation twist, which is that they're willing to buy back longer duration securities by issuing T-bills and/or drawing down the Treasury General Account to a certain extent."
- What makes it notable is the absence of a trigger — "without really a particular crisis to point to, and just saying this is kind of what we're doing right now until the midterms."
- That framing also sets up her later point about why Bessent is "acting so early here before any signs of trouble."
7:37 Gromen No yuan carry trade — the NIIP is the actual transmission channel
- On the host's question about a China-funded carry trade competing for JGB demand: "No, the yuan has got strict capital controls on it." The channel that does matter runs through the US net international investment position.
- "Foreigners own $65 trillion gross, $22, $23 trillion net in dollar assets. And so ultimately if Japan has a problem and Bessent doesn't fix the problem, then Japan will start pulling their money out of the US dollar asset piggy bank — sell dollar assets, buy yen assets."
- He credits Bessent with having said as much publicly, which is why the swap-line and yen interventions are read as pre-emption rather than reaction.
8:33 Gromen "Kevin Warsh is not a hawk" — the December 2018 op-ed
- The documentary evidence: Warsh's December 2018 op-ed with Stan Druckenmiller, "The Fed Tightening? Not Now" — "they were begging, begging in all caps, begging for the Fed not to hike rates anymore because bank stocks were 15% off the highs," with employment (a lagging indicator, as they conceded) still fine.
- His reconstruction of the motive: "Druckenmiller was offsides and Warsh was, I believe at the time, close with Druckenmiller if not working with him… I think they were trying to get Stan back onsides."
- The live rhyme: Bessent's own op-ed the previous week said Druckenmiller is offsides again. "Now here we have a second instance of it according to Bessent."
10:04 Gromen True interest expense at 105% of receipts — the arithmetic that says he can't hike
- The core calculation: "US true interest expense — gross interest plus entitlements plus veterans affairs — are 105% of US receipts through fiscal third quarter of 2026, and they are growing 7, 12% while receipts are growing 4%."
- He runs the ladder forward: one hike takes it to "107% of receipts growing 8 to 9 while receipts grow three," a second to "110% of receipts growing 10 while receipts are growing two." Hence "Warsh isn't going to hike rates. He's not. He can't."
- Why the "we owe it in our own currency" defence fails: entitlements are owed in a hard currency. "We didn't owe my dad a payment for Medicare. We owed him a knee… Hips, knees, doctor's time, it's all a hard currency. The more we print, the more the price of those things go up." Roughly 60% of receipts already goes to Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and the VA, all of it inflation-adjusting.
12:21 Gromen The nonlinearity at the long end — and the plane to Asheville
- Buyer by buyer, at 120% debt/GDP: foreign private buyers are hedge funds who "will only buy as long as volatility is low"; foreign central banks "haven't bought a treasury net at any duration… in 12 years going on 13 years"; and the last patient domestic buyers, life insurers and pensions, "are jammed up in private credit because the Fed hiked rates."
- The gate is the mark, not the yield: "there's no price of long-term treasuries where they can take the mark of selling down private credit. And so he's got a nonlinearity facing him at the long end."
- His read of the Warsh–Bessent trip to Asheville: "they weren't talking about the freaking Yankees." He imagines a sales-desk conversation — "Hey, you aren't gonna raise rates in September. You aren't gonna raise rates ever" — and cites credible rumblings that Bessent took a swing at Elon Musk during DOGE as evidence of the man's style. Presented as inference and colour, not reporting.
16:19 Alden Base case zero-to-one hike — and why hikes don't work in fiscal dominance
- Her call, explicitly softer than Gromen's: "my base case is for zero to one hikes. Basically that if we get the one, it'd be kind of symbolic to say he did it" — and she declines to take a stand on 25 basis points either way.
- The 1970s model doesn't transfer. Then, inflation was lending-driven (fractional-reserve banking, boomers at peak credit formation) with low public debt/GDP, so a Volcker hike "tackled the core issues" — at the cost of bankrupting Latin America, "the brutal realpolitik of it." Now bank lending is "pretty benign" and the inflation is fiscal.
- Two perverse effects at over 100% debt/GDP: "Congress doesn't make decisions because interest rates are 5% instead of 4%," and raising rates blows out interest expense, "which ironically for some entities is spendable money" — money-market boomers "get a raise if you raise interest rates." So the real question is "whether or not rate hikes are even a tool at this point."
18:23 Alden Watch crack spreads, not the crude price — and set a tolerance band
- "We're not in monetary dominance, we're in fiscal dominance. I think a much bigger question is what do crack spreads look like three months from now or six months from now."
- The oil bear case that was wrong for the right reason: "oil never went up to $150 or $200 a barrel like people feared. But we do have record high crack spreads because… the bottleneck ended up being in refineries." Gasoline and especially diesel "are priced as though oil itself is over 100."
- The discipline she draws from it, in engineering terms: "you'll put a barrier around it and say here's a tolerance that we don't really have to devote too much attention to… 7% of GDP deficits is a much bigger topic than if he's going to toggle interest rates."
20:01 Alden Fiscal dominance goes mainstream — and perception is the load-bearing wall
- "Luke and I were talking about this for many years. It used to be fringe" — now big research firms, pension funds and investment banks publish on it, "and part of what holds this together is perception and sentiment."
- The cope she names: a credibility loop — once Iran resolves, once the Fed regains credibility, long-end yields fall. The plausible escape hatches ("AI is going to be so productive… a big deflationary sink," stablecoins saving the day) work precisely because "the best ones always have a grain of truth to them."
- The cascade risk is a belief cascade, not a market one: "if you've got people that manage a trillion dollars that… suddenly wake up and agree with me one day, whether I'm right or wrong… then you got a problem. And so they don't really want that cascade to happen." That, she suggests, is why Bessent is acting before any visible trouble.
22:54 Gromen The Rickards anecdote — one phone call, $5 trillion, no sales
- From a Jim Rickards book he can't place ("I can't remember which of his books it was"), opening on a meeting Rickards attended around the financial crisis: "Treasury's got a direct line into BlackRock, per the consigliere of one of the top execs."
- "In a crisis, Treasury can pick up the phone, make one call and lock down 5 trillion of capital now, which is BlackRock. That's it. No sales. And the rest of the market would follow." He dates the arrangement to "20 years ago nearly."
- The point is about timing, not BlackRock: "people think they have more time than they do on this." He won't put a date on it — "it could be 5 years, 10 years" — only a direction.
23:57 Gromen "A Weimar gold reparations problem" — carefully not a hyperinflation call
- The analogy, stated with its own disclaimer: "I'm not saying we're going to go Weimar. I'm not saying we're going to hyperinflate, but I am saying the United States has a Weimar gold reparations" problem — obligations "in a hard currency that inflation adjusts," larger than receipts, today.
- Weimar's bind was that reparations were owed in gold, so printing didn't reduce the burden; Gromen's claim is that inflation-adjusting entitlements do the same job to the US budget.
- The trigger is cognitive: "it's only a matter of time, to Lyn's point, until people running trillion dollar balance sheets get that" — explicitly picking up Alden's perception-cascade argument.
24:20 Gromen You won't get out — "your allocation is going to be your allocation"
- The mechanism: "when they do, they're going to go to hit the sell button and it's not going to work. Like the buy button stopped working at COMEX at silver in 1980 with the Hunt brothers."
- The consequence for positioning: "whatever your allocation is to everything — bonds, stocks, gold, Bitcoin — that's going to be your allocation. You're not going to be able to move… they're going to close things down for two weeks, 3 weeks. And when they reopen, you will own what you own at the new allocation."
- His guess at the reopening tape: "Stocks will probably reopen, gap higher. Treasuries will have lost immense amounts of value relative to those assets, and life will go on." Debt/GDP falls from 120% to 20% — the reset is done through the holders. He connects it to Alden's private-credit gate: "'We want three billion.' 'You can't have it.' They'll do it to everything… for two weeks."
26:41 Gromen The Ukrainian bank holiday — what actually survived
- Two friends who emigrated from Ukraine, on 1998: "we had enough money in the bank to buy five cars. We were wealthy. My dad was a doctor. They closed the bank on a Friday. They reopened it two weeks later. And the money we had in the bank — we got it all back and it bought us a month's worth of groceries."
- The follow-up question is the whole investment case: "how did people that own gold and silver do? … Oh, they were fine. Nothing changed for them."
- Why he thinks Americans discount it: "we're the most ethnocentric, hubristic people in the world because it's never happened to us. We're sure it won't happen. And yet, look, I don't know when it's going to happen, but the math is telling you it's going to happen."
3. In plain English
A jargon-free summary of the thesis behind each asset — what it is and why the stance. Speakers are named because this is a two-guest conversation. (Renders on each ticker's consolidated page.)
GLD — SPDR Gold Shares Positive
GLD is the largest gold ETF — shares that track the gold price, so you get the metal's exposure without storing bars. In this conversation Gromen doesn't argue about where gold is going; he argues about when you can still buy it.
His claim is that the shift out of government bonds and into hard assets will not happen gradually. The people who matter run trillion-dollar balance sheets, and when enough of them accept that the debt arithmetic doesn't work, they will all try to leave at once — "they're going to go to hit the sell button and it's not going to work." His precedent is the silver market in 1980, when the exchange changed the rules on the Hunt brothers and effectively switched the buy side off. His second exhibit is a Jim Rickards story in which the US Treasury can telephone BlackRock and freeze roughly $5 trillion of capital with a single call. If that is even approximately true, then in a genuine crisis the exits are administrative, not economic.
So the position has to exist beforehand: "when they reopen, you will own what you own at the new allocation." The evidence he offers is personal rather than statistical — two friends whose Ukrainian family lost a fortune to a two-week 1998 bank closure, while "people that own gold and silver… were fine. Nothing changed for them." This is a pre-positioning argument, not a price forecast, and he is explicit that the timing is unknowable: "could it be next week? Sure. Could it be 20 years? Sure."
IBIT — iShares Bitcoin Trust Positive
IBIT is the largest US spot-Bitcoin ETF — a share that holds bitcoin for you. On a Bitcoin-focused show, notably, Gromen makes no new price argument for it at all. He puts it in exactly the same sentence as gold, and for exactly the same reason.
The reason is capacity. There is no orderly path from trillion-dollar bond portfolios into an asset class this small: "there isn't going to be a shift, an orderly shift or even a one month shift of trillion dollar balance sheets into gold and Bitcoin." If the migration is ever attempted at scale, he expects markets to close for two or three weeks and to reopen with Bitcoin already repriced — "Bitcoin will be where it is." You cannot buy it during the gap; you either held it going in or you didn't.
That is a different case from the usual one. It doesn't rest on adoption curves or halving cycles; it rests on the observation that the assets which sit outside the banking system are the ones whose owners come through a freeze intact. It is also the weaker half of his pair — elsewhere in this archive he prefers gold at sovereign scale, because gold needs no on-ramp and no one's permission.
SLV — iShares Silver Trust Positive
SLV holds physical silver. Here silver plays two roles at once, and they point in the same direction.
It is half of the survival evidence: asked how his friends' countrymen fared through Ukraine's 1998 bank closure, Gromen's answer is that the ones holding "gold and silver" were untouched while cash savings were destroyed. And it is the cautionary precedent: the 1980 Hunt brothers episode, when COMEX changed the rules and "the buy button stopped working," is his template for what happens to any market that everyone tries to enter simultaneously.
Note what this is not. There is no supply-deficit argument, no industrial-demand argument, no price target — silver appears only inside the pre-positioning case. Treat it as a continuation of the mild preference he stated in August ("I like silver"), reinforced by a historical anecdote rather than by fresh analysis.
TLT — iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF Negative
TLT holds long-dated US government bonds, so its price falls when long-term interest rates rise. Both guests are negative on it, and the interesting part is that they get there by different routes that don't depend on each other.
Alden's route is a headcount of who is left to buy. Foreigners are still buying in dollar terms but not nearly fast enough to keep up with how much is being issued. The Fed is run by a self-described balance-sheet hawk who does not want to expand it. Banks can buy more only if regulators relax the leverage rules again. Insurance companies and pension funds — the traditional patient buyers of long bonds — cannot simply borrow to buy; they have to sell something first, and what they own is illiquid private credit. Her verdict is deliberately measured: no crisis signal is flashing yet, but "I do think that they're getting squeezed," and what we have had so far is "a pretty orderly degradation of the global bond market."
Gromen's route is arithmetic. Interest plus entitlements plus veterans' benefits already consume 105% of federal tax receipts and are growing at roughly twice the rate of receipts, so higher long-term rates compound the problem rather than solving it. And because every category of patient buyer is blocked at the same moment, he expects the failure to be sudden rather than gradual — "a nonlinearity at the long end." In his shutdown scenario, government bonds are the asset that pays for the reset: "Treasuries will have lost immense amounts of value relative to those assets."
Private credit Negative
Private credit means loans made directly by investment funds instead of by banks or public bond markets. Because the loans never trade, their reported value is an estimate rather than a market price — and that is where the trouble hides.
Alden's contribution is a distinction most commentary skips: liquidity is not solvency. When a fund tells investors it can't meet redemptions, that is usually the contract working as written — investors in these funds agreed up front to quarterly liquidity at best, which she points out is arguably safer than a bank deposit, because the fund never promised money on demand in the first place. "It's not a business's payroll. It's not a person's checking account. It's these entities' savings." What worries her is the separate question underneath: "on the margins we do see solvency issues… it's still unclear how big some of those solvency areas could be."
Gromen supplies the consequence for everyone else. Insurers and pensions sold their long government bonds to buy these floating-rate loans; now they are stuck, because selling would force them to admit the loans are worth less than they carry them at — "there's no price of long-term treasuries where they can take the mark of selling down private credit." So the government's most reliable long-term lender has been quietly removed from the auction at the exact moment it is needed most. And in his end-game the same gate slams on everybody: "'We want three billion.' 'You can't have it.' They'll do it to everything… for two weeks."
Summary & timestamps derived from the public YouTube video (transcript in transcript.txt) for personal study. Not investment advice. © BTC Sessions / Luke Gromen (FFTT) / Lyn Alden Investment Strategy for source material.