π The Company Keeping American Aluminum Home
The U.S. imports most of the primary aluminum its defense industry and power grid depend on. This month's recommendation is one of the few companies still operating domestically.
One-line take: the formal August Pulse Premium recommendation teased the day before β Century Aluminum (NASDAQ: CENX), "Action to Take: Consider buying sharesβ¦ up to $52." The framing is a deliberate move up the value chain: July's Semi-Annual Update closed Constellium (CSTM), the aluminum fabricator, "at a more than double returnβ¦ in just eight months," and this month rotates to a smelter, "because where a company sits on the aluminum value chain determines how it makes money." The mechanism: aluminum trades on one global benchmark (LME ~$3,225/t), but delivery inside the U.S. costs LME plus the US Midwest Transaction Premium, now close to $2,000/t β so an American buyer pays about $5,200/t, roughly 60% above the world price. Imported metal owes the 50% Section 232 tariff; a domestic smelter does not, "so the premium is theirs to keep on all they sell," and because energy β a smelter's largest cost β does not rise with the aluminum price, "most of that premium becomes margin, far more than a fabricator or a diversified miner keeps." The asset base: Century runs two of only four smelters still producing primary aluminum on American soil β Sebree (KY, ~220kt) and Mt. Holly (SC, ~220kt, at full nameplate since end-June 2026) β plus Grundartangi (Iceland, ~320kt) on 100% hydro/geothermal power, branded Natur-Al at <4t CO2 per tonne (~a quarter of the industry average, ASI-certified/ISO 14064-verified) β ~760kt of capacity with all three running at or near capacity for the first time in over a decade; plus 55% of Jamalco (Jamaica, ~1.4Mt/yr of alumina) for captive feedstock. In February 2026 it sold its oldest plant, Hawesville, to a TeraWulf affiliate for $200M cash for redevelopment as an AI/HPC data-center campus. The numbers: Q2-2026 net sales $752.1M, adjusted EBITDA $326.9M (from $231M in Q1), adjusted EPS $2.46 (vs $2.35 consensus), shipments 130,632t (+6% q/q); cash $343.4M, liquidity $784.9M, $66M of debt repaid in Q2 and cash exceeding total debt by late July; next-quarter guidance $325–345M EBITDA. The growth option: the Inola, Oklahoma JV with Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA 60% / Century 40%) β 750kt/yr, ~$4B, up to $500M DOE funding plus >$275M Oklahoma incentives and discounted power; a July 2026 White House proclamation lets Century import up to 300kt/yr at a reduced 25% tariff from 2027, with the savings earmarked to fund its share. The risks: the tariff itself (an Aug 19 Bloomberg report of a 50%β25% Canada deal knocked the stock ~6% in a session β "even a partial tariff reduction doesn't destroy the thesis"), Glencore owning 30% of the shares and taking ~44% of Q2 sales, execution (Mt. Holly cast-house/carbon issues to be resolved by Q4; a Grundartangi Line 2 failure in Oct 2025), and the Oklahoma AG's federal lawsuit to block Inola. The entry: the stock ran ~$21 β ~$70 then pulled back to ~$44, β36% from the highs, "largely tariff-sentiment-driven" while "the operating business has only gotten stronger" β "the stock is trading as if that premium disappears entirely. We don't think it will."
1. Stocks & names mentioned
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What she said | At |
| CENX | Century Aluminum | QT Β· SA Β· STK · FA | Positive | The August Pulse Premium recommendation β "Action to Take: Consider buying shares of Century Aluminum (NASDAQ: CENX) up to $52." It "operates two of only four smelters still producing primary aluminum on American soil, and it collects the record domestic premium on everything it sells" β imported metal owes the 50% Section 232 tariff, Century's domestic smelters don't, so "they sell into the same U.S. market at the same inflated price, but they keep the premium as margin," and because energy doesn't rise with the aluminum price "most of that premium becomes margin, far more than a fabricator or a diversified miner keeps." ~760kt of capacity across Sebree (KY ~220kt), Mt. Holly (SC ~220kt, full nameplate since end-June 2026) and Grundartangi (Iceland ~320kt, 100% hydro/geothermal, Natur-Al at <4t CO2/t vs ~4Γ that industry-wide, ASI-certified and ISO 14064-verified β an edge as EU carbon border adjustments tighten), with Q2-2026 "the first time in over a decade that all three were running at (or near full) capacity simultaneously"; plus 55% of Jamalco (~1.4Mt/yr alumina) for captive feedstock and "some insulation from the spot market." Q2 was "its strongest quarter in years": net sales $752.1M, adjusted EBITDA $326.9M (up from $231M in Q1), adjusted EPS $2.46 (beat $2.35), shipments 130,632t (+6% q/q), on top of a strong Q1 ($649.2M revenue, $170.7M adjusted net income). Balance sheet "improved dramatically" β $343.4M cash, $784.9M liquidity, $66M of debt repaid in Q2 and cash exceeding total debt by late July: "A year ago, Century was a leveraged, sub-scale producer running below capacity. Today, it's net cash positive with all plants at full utilization." Guidance $325–345M EBITDA. Growth option: the Inola, Oklahoma JV with Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA 60% / CENX 40%), 750kt/yr for ~$4B β the first new U.S. smelter in almost 50 years, which "would more than double current U.S. primary aluminum output" β backed by up to $500M DOE funding, >$275M of Oklahoma incentives and discounted power, plus a July 2026 proclamation letting Century import 300kt/yr at a 25% tariff from 2027 with the savings earmarked for its share; construction targeted to begin by end-2026, production by end of decade. Risks, in her order: the tariff (an Aug 19 report of a 50%β25% Canada deal cut the stock ~6% in a session β "even a partial tariff reduction doesn't destroy the thesisβ¦ at 25%, the tariff still generates a substantial domestic premium"), Glencore at 30% of shares and ~44% of Q2 sales, execution (Mt. Holly cast-house/carbon issues due to clear by Q4; the Oct-2025 Grundartangi Line 2 failure), and the Oklahoma AG's federal suit to block Inola. Entry: from ~$21 to a ~$70 peak and back to ~$44, "about 36% from its highsβ¦ largely tariff-sentiment-driven" while EBITDA is at records and the balance sheet is net cash β "The stock is trading as if that premium disappears entirely. We don't think it will." | read β |
| Aluminum | Aluminum (commodity) | β | Positive | The structural case behind the pick. LME ~$3,225/t plus a US Midwest Transaction Premium near $2,000/t means an American buyer pays about $5,200/t, "roughly 60% above the world price"; the premium hit a record near $2,180/t in February, "more than triple its level just 2 years earlier." Supply: "the structural deficit is also widening" β Gulf smelter outages this spring cut an annualized 2 million tonnes and Mercuria called it "a black swan," putting this year's global deficit at "a minimum of 2 million tonnes"; LME warehouse stock "has roughly halved this year to about 250,000 tonnes, the lowest since 1990"; and China, "the source of roughly 60% of the world's aluminum, cannot lift its output past the 45-million-tonne cap the government imposedβ¦ a ceiling its smelters have now reached." Demand: aluminum "is the conductor for the high-voltage lines that carry power across the grid, and nearly every new AI data center requires vast new transmission systems"; EV production alone is projected to lift demand to 31.7Mt from 19.9Mt in 2020. U.S. supply has fallen from ~30 smelters and 4.65Mt in 1980 β then the world's largest producer β to about 680,000 tonnes, less than 2% of world supply, because smelting takes ~15 MWh per tonne ("roughly what a home uses in a year and a half") and American energy "became too costly to compete." Washington classifies aluminum a critical mineral and tariffs it under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, a 1962 law letting the president restrict imports that threaten national security; the rate reached 50% in June 2025 and in April was widened "to include the full value of each shipment, metal plus fabrication and freight." "If the supply picture stays this tight, the LME price has room to rise." | read β |
| CSTM | Constellium SE | QT Β· SA Β· STK · FA | Neutral | Position closed β the prior aluminum winner, exited rather than re-recommended. In July's Semi-Annual Portfolio Update "we closed Constellium (CSTM), the aluminum fabricator, at a more than double return in our model portfolio in just eight months, as the physical supply squeeze we forecast set in." It is now used as the value-chain contrast: "Constellium was selected because it buys aluminum and fabricates it into aircraft parts, car panels, and cans," whereas the new recommendation "is one of the few companies that still smelt primary aluminum on American soil" β and a fabricator keeps less of the domestic premium than a smelter does, since it pays the inflated U.S. price on its own input. | read β |
| GLEN | Glencore | SA Β· STK | Neutral | Named only as the concentration risk inside the CENX thesis: "Glencore owns 30% of Century's shares, and accounted for roughly 44% of its Q2 2026 consolidated net sales. Glencore has been a supportive shareholder and partner, but that high concentration is worth noting." No view expressed on Glencore itself. | read β |
| WULF | TeraWulf | QT Β· SA Β· STK · FA | Neutral | Passing mention as the buyer on the other side of Century's February 2026 divestment: an affiliate of TeraWulf paid $200 million in cash for the Hawesville, Kentucky smelter, "being redeveloped as an AI and high-performance computing data center campus." Prins frames it from Century's side β "an unusual exit, but one that makes sense. Century got $200 million for its oldest and least efficient plant" β with no view on TeraWulf. (Note the theme rhyme: a defunct smelter's power interconnection becoming AI compute.) | read β |
| Emirates Global | Emirates Global Aluminium (private, UAE) | β | Neutral | Century's joint-venture partner on the Inola, Oklahoma smelter, announced January 2026: EGA holds 60%, Century 40% of a ~$4 billion, 750,000 t/yr project that "would be the first new aluminum smelter built in the United States in almost 50 years." Mentioned as the partner and majority owner of the growth option, not as a rated name. | read β |
| Mercuria | Mercuria Energy Group (private) | β | Neutral | Cited as a research/market source: "one of the world's largest commodity traders" called the spring Gulf smelter outages β an annualized 2 million tonnes of lost output β "a black swan" and estimated this year's global aluminum deficit at "a minimum of 2 million tonnes." A supply data point, not a rated company. | read β |
| Novelis | Novelis (private β Hindalco subsidiary) | β | Neutral | Cited as the demand-forecast source: "According to research by Novelis, a leading provider of sustainable aluminum solutions, EV production alone is projected to increase aluminum demand to 31.7 million tonnes, up from 19.9 million tonnes in 2020." A forecast reference, not a rated company. | read β |
Written post β no video timestamps; the read β link in the "At" column opens the source article. Model-portfolio chart and closed-track-record images from the issue are not captured.
2. Talking points
The January call, cashed once already
- "In our January 2026 forecast, we highlighted aluminum first on our list of dark horse commodities for upside this year, and events have borne that out."
- "This July, in our Semi-Annual Portfolio Update with Pulse Premium, we closed Constellium (CSTM), the aluminum fabricator, at a more than double return in our model portfolio in just eight months, as the physical supply squeeze we forecast set in."
Same commodity, different rung on the ladder
- "This month we return to aluminum with a very different company on the value chain. While Constellium was selected because it buys aluminum and fabricates it into aircraft parts, car panels, and cans, our new recommendation is one of the few companies that still smelt primary aluminum on American soil."
- Why the rung matters: "because that is its primary business, its profits rise and fall with the aluminum price, the domestic premium, and U.S. trade policy more directly than a diversified miner or a downstream fabricator would. Those catalysts are all converging now."
The tariff turns into a transfer to the surviving smelters
- "The 50% tariff that the White House has imposed on imported metal means American buyers pay a steep premium for anything made abroad. The logic is that they will then buy domestic supply instead, and that premium goes straight to the handful of U.S. smelters still operating."
- "Those smelters now earn more per tonne than they have in years, and with aluminum around $3,200 a tonne, that means the premium those smelters collect over the world price is close to $2,000 a tonne."
From 30 smelters to a handful β an electricity story
- "In 1980 the U.S. operated about 30 smelters and produced 4.65 million tonnes of primary aluminum, more than any country on earth. Over the decades since, one smelter after another has shut down."
- "Turning alumina into aluminum takes about 15 megawatt-hours of electricity per tonne, roughly what a home uses in a year and a half." American energy "became too costly to compete with industry leaders across Canada, China and the Middle East, where hydro, gas, and coal energy all cost far less."
- "Today, with only a few smelters left, output has fallen to about 680,000 tonnes, less than 2% of world supply."
The world is short too β and the buffer is gone
- Gulf smelter outages this spring cut "an annualized 2 million tonnes of output"; Mercuria called the shock "a black swan" and put this year's global deficit at "a minimum of 2 million tonnes."
- "The aluminum sitting in London Metal Exchange warehouses, the open pool the whole world buys from, has roughly halved this year to about 250,000 tonnes, the lowest since 1990."
Demand keeps climbing β grid, AI and EVs
- "Aluminum is the conductor for the high-voltage lines that carry power across the grid, and nearly every new AI data center requires vast new transmission systems that use aluminum."
- Per Novelis research, "EV production alone is projected to increase aluminum demand to 31.7 million tonnes, up from 19.9 million tonnes in 2020."
- The supply answer can't come from the usual place: "China, the source of roughly 60% of the world's aluminum, cannot lift its output past the 45-million-tonne cap the government imposed to curb overbuilding, a ceiling its smelters have now reached."
Section 232 β the legal machinery behind the premium
- "The U.S. government classifies aluminum as a critical mineral, one of the materials it judges vital to national security and exposed to supply disruption" β airframes of fighter jets, armor of light combat vehicles, casings of missiles and ammunition.
- Washington's response is a tariff "under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, a 1962 law that lets the president restrict imports that threaten national security. That tariff reached 50% in June 2025." In April its scope widened "to include the full value of each shipment, metal plus fabrication and freight, not just the metal itself."
- The live complication: as of end-August "the White House is also ratcheting up tensions with Canada regarding that tariff⦠all while Canada is the largest foreign supplier of a metal for which the U.S. is running a supply deficit."
The premium, not the price, is the variable
- "To take delivery inside the U.S., a buyer pays that price plus a surcharge, the US Midwest Transaction Premium, now close to $2,000 a tonne. So, an American manufacturer⦠will have to pay about $5,200 for the same tonne, roughly 60% above the world price."
- "The premium reached a record near $2,180 a tonne in February, more than triple its level just 2 years earlier. Domestic smelters sell into that same U.S. price but owe no import tariff, so the premium is theirs to keep on all they sell."
- The margin punchline: "Because energy, a smelter's largest cost, does not rise with the aluminum price, most of that premium becomes margin, far more than a fabricator or a diversified miner keeps."
The recommendation β Century Aluminum (NASDAQ: CENX)
- "Century is one of only a handful of companies that still smelt primary aluminum in the United States, and right now, that distinction is worth more than it has been in decades."
- "The company also just posted its strongest quarter in years, all three of its smelters are running at or near full capacity for the first time in over a decade, and it's partnered with Emirates Global Aluminium to build the first new American smelter in almost 50 years."
What a smelter actually is β the value chain, spelled out
- "Upstream, you have bauxite miners digging ore out of the ground. That ore gets refined into alumina (aluminum oxide), a white powder. The alumina then goes into a smelter, where it's dissolved in a bath of molten cryolite and hit with enormous amounts of electricity."
- "It's the most energy-intensive step in the chain, which is why smelters are always built near cheap power" β the reason a smelter's economics are a power contract plus a premium, not an ore body.
The three plants β and the Icelandic carbon edge
- Sebree (Robards, KY) ~220,000 t/yr; Mt. Holly (Goose Creek, SC) ~220,000 t/yr, "just reached full nameplate capacity at the end of June 2026"; Grundartangi (Iceland) ~320,000 t/yr, "powered entirely by renewable hydro and geothermal energy." Combined ~760,000 t/yr.
- Grundartangi's metal is branded Natur-Al: "less than 4 metric tons of CO2 per metric ton of metal, roughly one-quarter of the industry average⦠ASI-certified with emissions verified under ISO 14064, and as carbon border adjustments tighten in Europe, a verified low-carbon product line is a competitive advantage most smelters can't replicate without rebuilding their entire power supply."
- "Q2 2026 marked the first time in over a decade that all three were running at (or near full) capacity simultaneously."
Captive alumina, and the plant it sold to an AI data-center developer
- Century owns "a 55% interest in the Jamalco alumina refinery and bauxite mining operation in Jamaica" (the Jamaican government holds 45%), producing ~1.4 million t/yr of alumina β "giving the company significant captive alumina supply and some insulation from the spot market."
- In February 2026 it sold the fourth smelter, Hawesville, Kentucky, "to an affiliate of TeraWulf for $200 million in cash," to be redeveloped as an AI/HPC data-center campus. "Century got $200 million for its oldest and least efficient plant, and now has three modern, fully utilized facilities instead of four operating below capacity."
Why the premium matters more than the price β and why it's stickier than assumed
- "Imported aluminum has to pay the tariff. Century's domestic smelters don't⦠The LME price is what it is, but the premium is pure upside for domestic producers, and Century is the largest one."
- "Even if the headline tariff drops⦠the structural case for domestic aluminum won't disappear. Washington has classified aluminum as a critical mineral. The defense industrial base depends on it. And the U.S. currently produces less than 2% of the world's primary aluminum with just a few smelters left."
The numbers β a balance sheet that flipped in a year
- Q2-2026: net sales $752.1M; adjusted EBITDA $326.9M (from $231M in Q1); adjusted EPS $2.46 (consensus $2.35); shipments 130,632t, +6% q/q β on top of Q1's $649.2M revenue and $170.7M adjusted net income.
- Cash $343.4M at end-June, total liquidity $784.9M, $66M of debt repaid in Q2, and "by late July, cash on hand exceeded total debt." Her summary: "A year ago, Century was a leveraged, sub-scale producer running below capacity. Today, it's net cash positive with all plants at full utilization."
- Guidance: adjusted EBITDA of $325 to $345 million next quarter, "with management citing higher volume and favorable mix."
Inola, Oklahoma β the growth option, and who is paying for it
- January 2026 JV with EGA: target capacity 750,000 t/yr β "which would more than double current U.S. primary aluminum output" β at an estimated ~$4 billion, EGA 60% / Century 40%. The DOE has committed up to $500M; Oklahoma has pledged >$275M in state incentives "plus discounted power rates."
- The July 2026 White House proclamation created "a novel funding mechanism for companies investing in domestic aluminum production": Century expects to import up to 300,000 t/yr at a reduced 25% tariff (versus 50%), "with the tariff savings earmarked to help fund its share of the Oklahoma build." The program starts in 2027.
- Construction targeted to begin by end-2026, production by end of the decade; ~1,000 permanent jobs and 4,000 during construction. If built, "it transforms Century from a mid-size smelter into one of the largest primary aluminum producers in the Western Hemisphere."
Risks β in her stated order
- The tariff itself is "the single most important driver of Century's current profitability." On August 19 Bloomberg reported a Canada deal cutting steel/aluminum tariffs from 50% to 25%; "Century's stock dropped roughly 6% in a single session. The Midwest premium fell too." Her view: "even a partial tariff reduction doesn't destroy the thesis. At 25%, the tariff still generates a substantial domestic premium, well above pre-tariff historical levels. But the stock will move with the headlines."
- Customer concentration: "Glencore owns 30% of Century's shares, and accounted for roughly 44% of its Q2 2026 consolidated net sales."
- Execution: the Mt. Holly ramp "just happened in June," with "some cast house and carbon operations issues" management expects to resolve by Q4; Grundartangi had "an unplanned Line 2 electrical failure in October 2025 that took months to resolve."
- Inola: "Oklahoma's Attorney General has filed a federal lawsuit seeking to block the project, and it has become entangled in the state's gubernatorial race"; plus a $4B price tag, a power-supply agreement still being negotiated, and the complexity of a first-in-50-years build. "If Inola stalls or fails, it doesn't hurt the current business, but it removes the biggest long-term growth catalyst."
What moves the stock β the risks read forward
- "Several of the drivers ahead are the flip side of the risks⦠the same variables that could hurt it are the ones most likely to move it higher." On Canada: "A deal that preserves a meaningful tariff (even at 25%) could actually stabilize the stock by removing uncertainty. A deal that eliminates the tariff entirely would be materially negative. We think the former is more likely."
- Q3 earnings (likely early November) "should reflect the first full quarter with all three smelters at full capacity and the Mt. Holly expansion fully contributing." The Inola FID depends on the AG lawsuit, the power agreement and detailed engineering β "progress on any of these could drive the stock price upward." The 300kt reduced-tariff import program from 2027 "gives Century a direct cost advantageβ¦ and partially funds the Oklahoma build."
- And the metal: LME inventories halved to ~250,000t (lowest since 1990), Gulf outages of 2Mt annualized, China at its 45Mt cap β "If the supply picture stays this tight, the LME price has room to rise, and Century captures that appreciation on every metric ton it ships."
Price and the action to take
- "The stock climbed from around $21 to a peak near $70 over the past year, tracking the tariff escalation, the premium expansion, and the Mt. Holly restart. It has since pulled back to around $44, with the sharpest move coming earlier this month after the Canada tariff headlines."
- "That pullback has been largely tariff-sentiment-driven. The operating business has only gotten stronger: EBITDA is at record levels, the balance sheet is net cash positive, and all plants are at full capacity." Bottom line: "We view Century as a buy after this 36% pullback from the highs."
- "Our analysis shows that the current price already reflects a meaningful discount to the tariff risk⦠The stock is trading as if that premium disappears entirely. We don't think it will."
- Action to Take: "Consider buying shares of Century Aluminum (NASDAQ: CENX) up to $52."
3. In plain English
CENX β Century Aluminum Positive
Century melts a white powder called alumina into raw aluminum metal, using colossal amounts of electricity. That's the whole business β it doesn't dig the ore and it doesn't bend the metal into car panels; it does the one step in the middle that turns rock into metal. Two of its three plants are in the United States, and there are only four such plants left in the entire country.
Why that matters right now comes down to one quirk of pricing. Aluminum has a world price set in London β about $3,225 a tonne. But if you want the metal physically delivered inside the U.S., you pay that world price plus a surcharge, currently around $2,000 a tonne, because a 50% import tax makes every foreign tonne that expensive. So an American can-maker or carmaker pays roughly $5,200 for a tonne that costs $3,225 anywhere else. Here's the trick: Century's American plants sell at that inflated $5,200 U.S. price but never pay the import tax, because they never import anything. That extra ~$2,000 is simply extra revenue. And since a smelter's biggest cost is electricity β which doesn't go up just because aluminum does β almost all of that extra revenue drops through to profit. A fabricator like Constellium, by contrast, has to buy aluminum at that inflated price, so it keeps far less of it.
The business is also in the best shape it has been in years. All three plants (two in the U.S., one in Iceland running entirely on hydro and geothermal power) are running flat out for the first time in over a decade. Last quarter's operating cash profit was a record $326.9 million, the company paid down debt, and it now has more cash than total debt β a year ago it was over-leveraged and running half-empty. It also sold its oldest, worst plant to an AI data-center developer for $200 million cash, which cleaned up the fleet. On top of that sits a lottery ticket: a 40% stake in a $4 billion new smelter in Oklahoma β the first built in America in nearly 50 years β with $500 million of federal money and $275 million of state money behind it.
The catch is that the whole premium exists because of a tax the President can change with a signature. When a Bloomberg story on August 19 suggested the tariff might be halved to 25%, the stock fell 6% in a day. Prins' argument is that even a 25% tariff leaves a domestic premium far above anything seen before 2025, that Washington has too much invested in domestic aluminum to abandon it, and that after falling from $70 to $44 the stock is priced as though the premium vanishes completely. Two other things to keep in mind: Glencore owns 30% of the company and buys 44% of what it sells, so one relationship carries a lot of weight; and Oklahoma's Attorney General is suing to stop the new smelter. Her instruction: buy up to $52.
Aluminum β the commodity Positive
Aluminum is having a genuine shortage, and for once the reason is simple arithmetic rather than speculation. The metal the whole world can freely buy sits in London Metal Exchange warehouses; that pool has roughly halved this year to about 250,000 tonnes, the smallest it has been since 1990. Outages at Gulf smelters this spring knocked out the equivalent of two million tonnes a year, which one of the world's biggest commodity traders called a "black swan." And the country that makes 60% of the world's aluminum β China β has capped itself at 45 million tonnes and has already hit that ceiling, so it cannot simply make more.
Demand, meanwhile, keeps growing for unglamorous reasons. Aluminum is what long-distance power lines are made of, and every new AI data center needs a lot of new power lines. Electric cars use far more of it than ordinary cars; one industry forecast has EV-driven demand rising from about 20 million tonnes in 2020 to nearly 32 million.
The U.S. sits on the wrong side of all this. In 1980 it had about 30 smelters and made 4.65 million tonnes β more than anyone. Today it makes about 680,000 tonnes, under 2% of world supply, because turning alumina into aluminum takes roughly 15 megawatt-hours of electricity per tonne (about what a house uses in eighteen months) and American power got too expensive versus Canada, China and the Gulf. That is why Washington now treats aluminum as a "critical mineral" and taxes imports at 50% under a 1962 national-security law, and why the shortage looks structural rather than cyclical.
CSTM β Constellium SE Neutral
Constellium is the position Prinsights just sold, not one it is recommending. It sits downstream of Century in the aluminum chain: it buys finished aluminum and shapes it into aircraft parts, car body panels and drink cans. Prinsights bought it in late 2025 on the view that aluminum would get physically scarce, and closed it in July 2026 for more than double the money in about eight months.
It appears in this issue as the contrast that explains the new pick. A fabricator has to pay the inflated American aluminum price for its raw material and then try to pass it on to customers, so it keeps only a slice of the tariff-driven premium. A smelter is on the other side of that same transaction β it collects the inflated price and pays no import tax. When the premium itself is the opportunity, you want to own the seller, not the buyer. That is the entire logic of moving from Constellium to Century within the same commodity.
Summary derived from the Prinsights Pulse Premium paid post for personal study. Not investment advice. © Nomi Prins / Prinsights for source material.