Turning a factor-level dislocation into three specific adds: the price-vs-EPS arithmetic, the founder as the valuation witness, and picking the most inconvenient possible authority for the bear case.
1. Convert a factor-level dislocation into named positions, or leave it alone
The repeatable method
- Establish the dislocation at the style level and against its own long history — how far quality is lagging, and when it was last this wide.
- Find the precedent and state what happened next, with a number, so the claim is checkable rather than atmospheric.
- Then immediately narrow: which specific holdings does the dislocation make cheapest, ranked, with an expected return each.
- Act only where you already own the business. A factor view is not a reason to buy something you have not underwritten.
Here: "It's the largest irrationality in the market over the past 30 years. The last time this happened was in 1999… After that, quality outperformed massively (+18.5%)" — narrowed within two paragraphs to CSU.TO, KPG.AX and KNSL, each with a stated expected return (14.4%, 15.3%, 14.6%).
Watch for
- A single historical precedent doing the work of a base rate — n = 1 is an anecdote, and 1999 was a different market structure.
2. Measure "cheaper" as the price move against the earnings move, over the same window
The repeatable method
- Take a fixed window — a year works — and record two numbers: the share price change and the EPS change.
- Combine them into a single statement about the multiple: price −15% with EPS +15% is a stock roughly 30% cheaper.
- Do the same at portfolio level, over a longer window, to describe the whole opportunity set in one line.
- Use it as the buy trigger. This is a fact about the price paid, not a forecast, so it does not depend on your growth assumption being right.
Here: KNSL — "The stock is down 15% over the past year. Over the same time EPS grew by 15%. This means the stock became 30% (!) cheaper." Portfolio level, five years: "Average yearly growth in Owner's Earnings: +22.3%. Average change in valuation: -10.0%… a discount of almost 33%!"
Watch for
- EPS growth that came from buybacks or a one-off — the multiple genuinely fell, but the earnings base may not be repeatable.
3. Underwrite a new name by re-reading the original of the type
The repeatable method
- When a business resembles a famous historical winner, go back to the primary source on that winner rather than to the folklore.
- Extract the two or three structural features that actually produced the outcome, and test the new name against exactly those.
- Keep the list short and mechanical — segment growing faster than the market; company gaining share within it — so the analogy can fail.
- Then add the company-specific checks: underwriting quality, runway, moat source, capital allocator.
Here: KNSL — "when I first read about Kinsale Capital, I immediately re-opened the annual letters of Berkshire Hathaway." The shared features are named ("both active in an insurance segment that grows faster than the market… both gaining market share"), then four Kinsale-specific reasons follow.
Watch for
- Analogy as permission rather than as a test — the GEICO comparison only means something if you would have dropped the name when a feature failed.
4. Use the founder's own capital-allocation words as the valuation opinion
The repeatable method
- Read the AGM transcript and the latest results call for statements about buybacks — the cleanest signal management can give about its own view of the price.
- Prefer explanations of why not: a founder saying he would buy back stock but cannot afford to is more informative than one who simply does.
- Check the alignment behind it — here, over 46% insider ownership — so the statement carries personal cost.
- Note the price change since the statement was made; a cheaper stock strengthens the same testimony.
Here: Brett Kelly on KPG.AX — "we haven't undertaken any buybacks… the company is trading at a share price today, that if we had excess capital, we would certainly be buying our shares back, and we would do that with a great deal of enthusiasm and at large scale." Slegers adds: "Since Brett Kelly said this, the stock became even cheaper."
Watch for
- The financing behind the constraint — this company raised debt because opportunities exceeded capital, and leverage against pledged founder stock is exactly the exposure that surfaces as a governance problem in April.
5. Recruit the most inconvenient available authority against the bear case
The repeatable method
- Identify who would be expected to benefit from the disruption narrative you are arguing against.
- Find whether they have said anything that contradicts it, and quote the mechanism rather than the verdict.
- Restate the mechanism in your own words so the reader can check it — here, that AI is being built to operate existing software, making software the toolbox rather than the target.
- Pair the outside authority with a structural argument of your own, so the case does not rest on borrowed conviction.
Here: Nvidia's Jensen Huang on CSU.TO — the idea that AI replaces software is "illogical"; "AI will operate like a smart helper that knows how to use your existing programs, instead of replacing them." Slegers' own structural point follows: "Constellation owns thousands of Vertical Market Software companies… It would be very hard (probably even impossible) for AI to disrupt all of them."
Watch for
- The witness's own incentive — the chip vendor benefits from AI being additive to software, so his interest and your thesis are aligned rather than independent.
6. Choose a strategy you can hold, not the one with the best backtest
The repeatable method
- Write your strategy in three lines. If it does not fit, it is not simple enough to hold through a drawdown.
- Test it for temperament fit rather than optimality — the return you actually get is the strategy's return minus your abandonment of it.
- Accept that a great investor's record is evidence that a coherent strategy works, not evidence that his strategy is yours to run.
Here: Joel Greenblatt's "+40% (!) per year for over 20 years" is cited, and the lesson drawn from it is not to copy him — "You don't need the optimal strategy. You need a sensible strategy that works for you." The house version: "Buy quality companies / Led by excellent managers / Trading at fair valuation levels."
Watch for
- Simplicity used to avoid scrutiny — a three-line strategy still needs a written rule for when a holding leaves the portfolio.
7. Check what an "undervaluation" percentage is measured against
The repeatable method
- Whenever a discount is quoted, work out the denominator: a discount from fair value can never exceed 100%; an uplift to fair value can.
- Convert it into a price multiple you can sanity-check — 118.7% "undervalued" means fair value is about 2.2x the current price.
- Compare it against the expected return from the same model. Three names with near-identical expected returns (14.4%, 15.3%, 14.6%) but wildly different stated undervaluations (118.7%, 94.9%, 69.0%) tells you the exit-multiple and time assumptions are doing most of the work.
Here: the closing summary — "Kinsale Capital ($KNSL): undervalued by 69.0%; Kelly Partners Group ($KPG): undervalued by 94.9%; Constellation Software ($CSU): undervalued by 118.7%" — alongside expected returns within one percentage point of each other.
Watch for
- Headline discounts quoted without the horizon over which the gap is expected to close — the same gap over three years or ten years is a completely different investment.
Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.