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Actionable insights — HEICO: A 186-page Deep Dive

Reading a 15-metric scorecard without letting the average hide the one score that matters, using a reverse DCF as a veto, and recognising the businesses whose quality is already fully known.
2026-JUL-05 · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Pieter Slegers, investment case by Alexander (Slow Compounding) · read ↗ · full analysis · transcript
How to read this page: this is a published pass, which makes it more useful than a buy note — it shows where the decision separates from the analysis. Each insight is a step actually taken in the issue, written so it can be rerun on any high-quality, well-known compounder. Written post, so no timestamps.

1. Score a business on fixed metrics — then read the sub-scores, never the average

The repeatable method
  1. Run every candidate through the same fifteen headings — business model, management, competitive advantage, industry, risks, balance sheet, capital intensity, capital allocation, profitability, stock-based compensation, historical growth, outlook, valuation, owner's-earnings evolution, historical value creation — and score each out of ten with the evidence written beside it.
  2. Compute the total as the plain average, but treat it as a filing label rather than a verdict.
  3. Read the distribution. A respectable total can hide a catastrophic single score, because averaging is precisely what dilutes it.
  4. Nominate in advance which sub-scores are vetoes rather than contributors. Valuation and main risks are the natural candidates: no amount of business quality repairs an unpayable price or an unacceptable single point of failure.
  5. Keep the failing evidence in the sheet rather than arguing it away, so the next reader sees the same trade-off.
Here: HEI scores 7.8/10 overall — but thirteen of fifteen metrics are 7 or better (historical value creation 10/10, capability management 9.5, business model / capital intensity / capital allocation / historical growth / outlook all 9), while valuation is 2/10 and main risks 5/10. The decision follows the two low scores, not the 7.8.
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2. Use a reverse DCF as a veto: compare the implied growth with the delivered growth

The repeatable method
  1. Instead of forecasting cash flows, solve backwards: at today's price and a required return, what annual free-cash-flow growth rate is being assumed?
  2. Put that number beside the company's own realised growth over five and ten years.
  3. If the implied rate exceeds the best period the business has ever delivered, the price is not a forecast — it is a bet on an improvement nobody has demonstrated.
  4. Say so numerically in the write-up, so the pass is falsifiable and the level that would change it is implicit.
  5. Keep the name on a follow list with the yield as the tracking metric, and revisit when the price moves rather than when the story does.
Here: the reverse DCF requires 21.4% annual FCF growth, against owner's earnings that grew 14.3% over five years and 8.7% over ten. Forward PE 53.7x versus a 46.9x ten-year average (57.3x versus 50.3x on the Fiscal.ai onepager), FCF yield 1.8%. Verdict: "Valuation looks stretched… This leaves little margin of safety."
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3. Treat "quality everyone already knows about" as a structural obstacle, not a compliment

The repeatable method
  1. Ask whether your view of the business differs from consensus at all. If it does not, the only remaining source of return is the price.
  2. Check whether the shares have ever traded at a discount to their own history. A name that never de-rates offers no entry point, only a queue.
  3. Distinguish this from a de-rated compounder, where fear has created a gap between quality and price — that is the setup this source normally buys.
  4. Decide explicitly which of the two you are looking at before doing any more work, because the second half of the analysis differs completely.
Here: "HEICO's quality is well recognized, so the stock rarely trades at a discount." Contrast with the same publication's February-April 2026 buying — Constellation, Fortinet, MSCI, S&P Global, FICO — all excellent businesses that had de-rated 25-50% on AI fear.
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4. Look for moats made of certification, where the customer also saves money

The repeatable method
  1. Identify industries where a third party must approve a product before it can be sold, and where approval takes years and money rather than cleverness.
  2. Find the companies that have accumulated many approvals. Each one is a small permanent monopoly, and the stock of them compounds.
  3. Confirm the customer is also better off — an approval-based moat that raises the customer's cost invites regulatory or commercial attack; one that lowers it is stable.
  4. Check that demand is tied to usage rather than to new-unit sales, so revenue tracks the installed base's activity instead of the capital cycle.
  5. Verify the breadth of the catalogue, since a single approved part is a niche and twenty thousand is an infrastructure position.
Here: HEI — parts approved through the FAA's PMA route, "cheaper than the originals yet equally reliable," with "strict FAA rules creat[ing] a high barrier to entry," 20,000+ approved parts, and revenue driven by flight hours: "every time an aircraft flies, parts wear out and eventually need to be replaced."
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5. Judge a serial acquirer's ratios against its model, and know which thresholds it will always fail

The repeatable method
  1. Before applying your standard thresholds, ask which of them the business model mechanically violates.
  2. For an acquisitive company, goodwill as a share of assets will be high and reported ROIC will be depressed, because every purchase price sits in the denominator.
  3. Substitute measures that strip the acquisition accounting — return on tangible assets, return on capital employed, FCF versus net income — and judge on those.
  4. Then re-impose the thresholds that still bind: interest coverage, net debt versus free cash flow, and stock-based compensation.
  5. Record the failures rather than adjusting them away, so the scorecard remains comparable across business models.
Here: goodwill/assets 44.4% against this source's usual <20% guideline, and ROIC 11.2% against its usual >15% — yet return on tangible assets is 18.7%, ROE 16.6% and five-year FCF/net income 110.7%, with interest coverage 9.0x and net debt/FCF 2.7x. Balance sheet still only scores 7/10; the failures are logged, not explained away.
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6. Price key-person and single-event risk as its own score

The repeatable method
  1. Give risk a dedicated line on the scorecard rather than treating it as a discount to the other lines.
  2. Name the specific dependency — a family, a founder, a regulator, one customer — and ask what happens the day it is removed.
  3. Add the tail event the business model makes possible but rare: for a parts maker, a failure in service; for a lender, a credit event; for a data business, a breach.
  4. Score it honestly even when the score is embarrassing next to the rest, and let it constrain position size or the conviction tier rather than the buy/sell decision alone.
Here: main risks scored 5/10 — "too dependant on the Mendelsons" (the family has led the company since 1990 and owns ~16.6%) and "a failure of a part in a plane could cause massive reputation damage." The same instinct produced the governance cap on Kelly Partners in April.
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7. Take in outside research, but keep the verdict in-house

The repeatable method
  1. Accept long-form work from other analysts as raw material — it saves the fact-gathering, which is the expensive part.
  2. Re-run your own scorecard and your own valuation on it before forming a view, using the same headings you use for everything else.
  3. Publish the summary, the onepager and the score alongside the source document, so a reader can see what was adopted and what was assessed independently.
  4. State the decision in your own words, and make it possible for the decision to contradict the contributed case.
Here: the 186-page case is Alexander's (Slow Compounding), shared and credited; the 15-metric Quality Score and the "are we buying?" verdict are Compounding Quality's own — and the verdict is no. Same pattern as the Brookfield deep-dive by Jochen Vandenbergh and the TJ Terwilliger issue three days earlier.
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Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.