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Actionable insights — Buying 3 Stocks

Using Buffett's good/great/gruesome taxonomy as a live filter, testing "capital-light" with a single question, buying an insurer into a soft market, and specifying a purchase in three numbers instead of one.
2026-JUN-28 · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Pieter Slegers / Team Compounding Quality · read ↗ · full analysis · transcript
How to read this page: each insight is a method actually used in this issue, written so it can be rerun on other names. This is a transaction issue, so the reusable material is about acting — how an expensive market gets converted into a purchase rather than into cash, and how the purchase itself is specified. Written post, so no timestamps.

1. Sort every candidate into good / great / gruesome before you look at the price

The repeatable method
  1. Ask one question of the business: to earn another dollar of profit, how many dollars must the owner put in?
  2. Gruesome — grows fast, consumes large capital, earns little; no moat and price competition (airlines). Exclude regardless of price.
  3. Good — real moat and real customer value, but growth must be bought with reinvestment ("pay more to earn more"). Ownable, but the compounding is capped by the capital bill.
  4. Great — moat, high returns on capital, and growth that arrives without much new capital, so the cash is free to leave the business or fund the next one.
  5. Only after the sort do you argue about valuation. In a market where good and gruesome businesses are "priced for perfection," the sort is what protects you.
Here: FlightSafety is the "good" case — a clear moat that "had to constantly spend millions on new simulators." See's Candies is the "great" case with the arithmetic attached: $8m of capital earning ~$5m in 1972, $40m of capital earning $82m decades later, so nearly all the cash could be redeployed elsewhere. Airlines are the gruesome control.
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2. Test "capital-light" with the marginal-unit question, not with a ratio

The repeatable method
  1. Name the company's unit of output — a transaction, a policy, an advised dollar, a subscription.
  2. Ask what it costs to serve one more of them. If the honest answer is "essentially nothing," the business is capital-light in the way that matters.
  3. Confirm with the financial trace: high margins, low capex-to-sales, and free cash flow that exceeds accounting profit.
  4. Then look at where the surplus cash goes. A capital-light compounder with nothing to reinvest in should be visibly shrinking its share count.
Here: V — "It requires virtually zero extra capital to process an extra million transactions," and the consequence is a consistent buyback. AMP — fee revenue at high margin plus "very low capital intensity" produces "tons of Free Cash Flow" and a shareholder yield over 8%. KNSL is called "a very capital light insurer," with the combined ratio as the evidence.
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3. For an insurer, underwrite the combined ratio gap — and buy the cycle's soft leg

The repeatable method
  1. Take the combined ratio (claims + expenses as a percentage of premiums). Under 100 means the insurance itself is profitable before investment income.
  2. Compare it with a respected peer's, and insist on an explanation for the gap that is structural — niche focus, an own-built system, in-house claims — not a run of luck on losses.
  3. Establish where the underwriting cycle is. Prices falling because capital has flooded in is a soft market; that is when the shares de-rate.
  4. Ask whether the market is pricing the soft market as permanent. If the advantage is structural, the cycle's low is the entry point rather than the exit.
Here: KNSL at a ~77% combined ratio against Markel's ~95%, attributed to E&S-only focus and technology built from scratch — "lower costs than their competition… better data and can quote policies faster and more accurately." Then the timing: "The insurance market is currently going through a soft market. I think today's valuation levels provide amazing opportunities."
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4. Specify a purchase in three numbers: dollars, shares, and a limit

The repeatable method
  1. Decide the position increment in dollars first — that is the risk decision, and it forces a comparison across candidates.
  2. Convert to a share count at the price you are willing to pay, not at the last trade.
  3. Set a limit price and let the order go unfilled if the market moves away. A named limit is what stops conviction from becoming price-insensitivity.
  4. Publish or record the three numbers before executing, so the decision cannot be rewritten after the fact.
Here: V $20,000 / 60 shares / limit $337 · KNSL $20,000 / 65 shares / limit $330 · AMP $10,000 / 22 shares / limit $460, all executed "on Monday" after Partners were told. The unequal sizing (half-size for Ameriprise) is itself the ranking.
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5. In an expensive market, add to what you already rank highest rather than widening the book

The repeatable method
  1. When the opportunity set looks poor, resist the reflex to hunt for new names — a stretched market is exactly when new ideas are least well vetted.
  2. Go back to your own conviction ranking and ask which top-tier holdings are furthest below their own valuation history.
  3. Add there. You are buying more of something already underwritten, which is a lower-variance use of capital than a fresh position.
  4. Keep the number of holdings flat; let the weights do the work.
Here: all three adds — V, KNSL, AMP — were already disclosed Very Strong convictions in April. No new name is introduced; the issue converts an existing ranking into position size.
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6. Use consensus growth expectations as a market-level sanity check

The repeatable method
  1. Find the aggregate earnings growth rate embedded in analysts' index forecasts, and put it beside the long-run historical rate.
  2. If the forecast is a multiple of the norm, treat it as a statement about sentiment rather than about earnings.
  3. Pair it with a factor-spread reading — momentum versus low volatility, or quality versus momentum — to see which side of the market the optimism is concentrated in.
  4. Convert the reading into a filter tightening, not a market-timing call.
Here: "Analysts expect that the earnings of S&P500 will compound 24% annually for five years. That's double the historical norm and completely unrealistic," alongside a momentum-vs-low-volatility gap that "has never been wider" — and the response is "focus even more on buying the very best businesses," not a move to cash.
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Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.