Clone the operators, not the company: how to find the next vehicle a proven capital allocator moved to, test its pricing power on three conditions, and normalise earnings when compensation destroys the income statement.
1. Source ideas by following proven operators to their next, smaller vehicle
The repeatable method
- Identify people with a completed, verifiable compounding record at a company you already understand.
- Find where they went next, and how much of the old team came with them — one person is a name, a group is a system.
- Check the new business rhymes structurally with the old one, so the playbook actually transfers.
- Verify their alignment: ownership, open-market buying, and the terms on which they are paid.
- Size the new vehicle against the old to see how much runway the model has left.
Here: TDG is +4,800% since 2006; Nick Howley founded it in 1993 with $25m and it is now worth $70bn. He is co-chairman of PRM, and "5 of the 9 Perimeter directors have a link with TransDigm", including a former COO and a former VP of M&A. Alongside him, Will Thorndike (author of The Outsiders), who "has been buying more shares recently on the open market", and Tracy Britt Cool, 11 years at Berkshire. The conclusion: "a smaller version of TransDigm that isn't limited to the aviation market."
Watch for
- Reputation substituting for analysis. The unrelated acquisitions here — medical machinery, circuit boards, an oil additive — are excused explicitly "because of the exceptional track record of management", which is a judgement, not a fact.
- Terms that differ from the original vehicle. The people are the same; the compensation is not.
2. Test pricing power on three conditions, and insist on the third
The repeatable method
- Is the product mission-critical — does the customer's operation fail without it?
- Is supply concentrated, ideally a monopoly or a tight oligopoly?
- Is it a small share of the customer's total cost? This is the condition most screens omit and the one that makes price rises unopposed.
- Verify with the realised price-increase history rather than the theory.
- Then check whether the pricing power is being used — modest increases against a monopoly position may mean regulatory or reputational limits.
Here: "Three things give Perimeter enormous pricing power: their product is crucial; they have a monopoly; and they represent only a small share of total costs." The number: fire retardants are "only 3% of overall fire suppression costs". The same structure is what made TDG work — "essential aircraft parts that represent only a small share of an aircraft's total cost". Realised: 3–4% price rises a year.
Watch for
- A monopoly whose only customer is a government agency. Pricing power against the US Forest Service has a political ceiling, and 3–4% annual increases suggest it is being felt.
- The "small share of cost" argument used for products that are actually substitutable.
3. For a physical business, enumerate the assets a competitor would have to duplicate
The repeatable method
- List the tangible infrastructure required to serve the customer at the required speed — plants, depots, fleet, inventory.
- Attach a cost to each so the replication bill is a number rather than an adjective.
- Identify the time barrier separately: approvals, testing, certification, permitting.
- Look for a technical constraint that prevents gradual switching, which is worth more than any cost barrier.
- State the resulting market position and check it against a verifiable customer relationship.
Here: 9 manufacturing units, owned airbase infrastructure, a mobile fleet where "the average mobile base costs $2 million", and "over $100 million in fire retardant inventory" held because "you can't tell a customer fighting a major wildfire that you'll start production tomorrow". Time barrier: "years of expensive lab testing, safety checks, and field trials". And the switching constraint: "due to the chemistry, you also can't mix retardants" — so customers cannot transition gradually. Result: the only supplier to the US Forest Service.
Watch for
- The honest calibration the post itself makes: "With $100 billion, I think Perimeter could be disrupted" — the moat is expensive, not impossible.
- Inventory-heavy moats in a demand downturn. $100m of stock is a barrier in a busy season and a cost in a quiet one.
4. Check whether a diversifying segment actually broke the cycle correlation
The repeatable method
- Identify the external variable the core business is correlated to, and find the historical chart of results against it.
- Look for a period where the variable was weak and results were not — that is the test.
- Decompose the outperformance: how much came from the new segment, how much from acquisitions, how much from price.
- Repeat over more than one cycle before accepting the diversification claim.
Here: "there has historically been a strong correlation between the number of acres burned and the results of Perimeter. But in 2025, Perimeter's results were up 18%, while it was a weak fire season. This is partly because of the Specialty Segment." One observation, honestly qualified with "partly" — the same year also carried the IMS acquisition, California's investment in larger aircraft, and structural demand from insurers withdrawing cover.
Watch for
- Acquisitions masquerading as diversification. IMS was bought in December 2024, so 2025 growth is partly inorganic by construction.
- Segments that are unrelated to the core and to each other. Diversification of revenue is not diversification of management attention.
5. When compensation distorts the income statement, rebuild earnings from the bottom and show every assumption
The repeatable method
- Identify the distorting item and its size relative to revenue, not just to profit.
- Add it back to get an operating result, then rebuild forward: organic growth, acquisitions, financing and tax, each stated.
- Deduct a normalised estimate of the distorting item rather than pretending it is zero.
- Publish every input so a reader can re-run it with different assumptions.
- Cross-check against an undistortable measure — gross margin — to confirm the underlying business quality.
Here: the full chain. Reported -$206.4m; add back the founders' fee +$435.1m = $229.3m; grow 10% → $252.2m; add MMT at $29.5m (from $50m EBITDA, depreciation at 5% of revenue, $10m interest, 20% tax, 10% growth) → $281.7m; deduct a normal-year fee "close to $100 million" → normalised earnings $181.7m = 18.5x forward. Cross-checked on gross margin, "very high" against a 40% hurdle "and rising. A rising Gross Margin often indicates strong pricing power."
Watch for
- The single soft assumption carrying the answer. The $100m normal-year fee is an estimate that "depends on how well Perimeter's stock performs" — and it is 55% of the final earnings figure.
- The other method disagreeing. Forward price-to-sales says the shares trade "significantly above" their historical multiple; only the normalised-earnings route produces "fair".
6. Judge capital allocation on what was done in the drawdown, not on the policy statement
The repeatable method
- Find the worst drawdown in the company's listed history and look at what management did with capital during it.
- Compare the average repurchase price then with the price now — that comparison is the entire evidence.
- Read the stated buyback policy: systematic programmes are neutral, discretionary ones tied to intrinsic value are informative.
- Check whether an explicit return hurdle governs all uses of capital, not just buybacks.
Here: the IPO was at about $14 in 2021; by 2023 the shares were near $3.30, down over 75%; management bought back 12% of the company across four transactions at an average of $6, against roughly $22 today. The stated policy is discretionary: "repurchase shares when we believe our equity trades at a meaningful discount below our intrinsic value and when repurchases would not preclude higher potential IRR investments." And a hurdle governs everything: "we won't deploy capital without seeing at least a 15% long-term IRR into any form of capital allocation."
Watch for
- Buying back stock while issuing 1.5% of it a year to the founders. The two flows must be netted before calling the company a cannibal.
- Product-line acquisitions, which are harder to verify than whole-company deals — there is no separate set of accounts to check.
7. Price management compensation as a permanent claim on the equity, and compare it to a benchmark
The repeatable method
- Read the actual terms: fixed share issuance as a percentage of shares outstanding, and any share of appreciation, with their end dates.
- Express the cost as a percentage of revenue in a good year, not as a percentage of profit — profit can be small or negative.
- Note that a fee on market-cap appreciation makes management's incentive the share price, not the business, and pays out in the years you do best.
- Compare against a reference point you respect, so the number has a scale.
- Decide whether the quality of the people is worth the claim — and say so either way.
Here: the terms are set out exactly — "Until 2027, the Founders receive 2,357,061 shares annually (1.5% of Total Shares Outstanding)" plus "every year, they receive 18% of the Market Cap appreciation" until 2031. The consequence: "Because Perimeter's share price more than doubled in 2025, the Founder's Advisory Fee came in at a massive $435 million expense while revenue in 2025 was 'only' $653 million." The benchmark used is Buffett's own pay from the Berkshire 2025 proxy, with the verdict: "a bit disappointing to see someone who worked alongside Buffett for five years engage in this kind of compensation." Summarised as "an orange/red flag".
Watch for
- A fee that rewards multiple expansion. 18% of market-cap appreciation pays for a re-rating you did not receive as a shareholder until you sell.
- The end dates. The fixed component runs to 2027 and the variable to 2031 — both are inside a long-term holding period.
Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.