All 21 holdings, each with its current weight, next-twelve-month P/E, 3-5 year EPS CAGR estimate, year-to-date and twelve-month share performance, position free cash flow and modelled three-year return — all read from the published tables (transcribed in transcript.txt). Stance follows the post's own stated intention: the three names to be upweighted and the fifteen held unchanged are Positive; the three named for reduction are Neutral. The S&P 500 is the comparator throughout and is not a row. Research legend: QT Qualtrim · SA Seeking Alpha · STK Stock Analysis. Written post with no timestamps — the At link opens the article.
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he said | At |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BN | Brookfield Corporation | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | TO BE UPWEIGHTED — named as one of "some of the highest quality names in Our Portfolio", with "a clearer path to future growth" than LVMH, Novo and Dino. Currently only ~5.0% of the book, explained as recency: "companies like Brookfield, S&P Global and Fairfax Financial were fairly new additions. That's why they still have a lower weight." The numbers support it: 14x NTM P/E on a 20% 3-5yr EPS CAGR — one of only three names above 20% growth — +34% YTD, the best in the book, 2,280 shares throwing off $5,928 a year. Used as the worked example of the owner's-earnings method: "20% + 0.6% + 0.2*(15x-14x/14x) = 22.0%… Brookfield would compound by 22% per year over the next 5 years", though the accompanying table uses the analyst figure of 15% growth and a 15.80% three-year return. | read ↗ |
| SPGI | S&P Global | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | TO BE UPWEIGHTED. The second-smallest position in the book at ~2.8%, bought only five weeks earlier at a $425 limit. 19x NTM P/E on a 15% EPS CAGR; −11% YTD and −15% over twelve months; 120 shares producing $3,363.60 of look-through free cash flow; modelled three-year return 9.80%. Also one of the seven STRONG BUYs a week earlier. Cited in the sector note as an example of how broad the "Financials" label is — "from a payment network provider like Visa to an insurance company like Kinsale Capital and a credit rating agency like S&P Global." | read ↗ |
| FFH.TO | Fairfax Financial Holdings | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | TO BE UPWEIGHTED — and the cheapest name in the book. Bought two weeks earlier; only 30 shares, ~2.6% of the portfolio, yet producing $5,757 a year of look-through free cash flow — $191.90 per share, by far the highest in the portfolio. 10x NTM P/E, the lowest of the 21, on a 15% EPS CAGR, and the best modelled three-year return of any holding at 18.57% (the sheet notes revenue was used in place of EPS for Fairfax). Explicitly named among "the valuation of companies like Fairfax, Ameriprise Financial, Evolution AB and Zoetis look the most attractive today." −13% YTD. | read ↗ |
| MEDP | Medpace Holdings | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | The largest position at ~8.3%, and named as one of the two most expensive. "Games Workshop and Medpace are the two most expensive companies in Our Portfolio" — 30x NTM P/E on a 15% EPS CAGR. The best performer of the book year-to-date at +21% (though −11% over twelve months); 260 shares yielding $6,380.40, and a modelled three-year return of 10.84%. Not named for reduction — the price has never been the reason it is held. | read ↗ |
| EVO.ST | Evolution AB | QT · SA · STK | Positive | The second-largest position at ~7.7%, and the single biggest cash generator in the book: 1,670 shares producing $12,000.44 a year — more than 11% of the portfolio's entire look-through free cash flow. 11x NTM P/E on a 12% EPS CAGR, and one of the four names called out as most attractively valued. The only holding positive on both measures: +15% YTD and +13% over twelve months. Modelled three-year return 8.59%. | read ↗ |
| TOI.V | Topicus.com | QT · SA · STK | Positive | ~6.1% of the book. One of the three names with an expected EPS CAGR above 20% — "Topicus, Kelly Partners Group and Brookfield are the 3 companies with an expected growth rate of over 20%" — at a 22x NTM P/E. 1,515 shares yielding $5,269.26; modelled three-year return 17.00%, third-best in the book. −9% YTD, −26% over twelve months. A STRONG BUY the week before. | read ↗ |
| V | Visa | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | ~6.1% of the book, and the highest EPS CAGR estimate among the mega-caps at 16% on a 23x NTM P/E. A painful year — −21% YTD and −33% over twelve months, the second-worst twelve-month figure in the portfolio after 3i and LVMH — with no comment offered. 300 shares yielding $3,279; modelled three-year return 14.38%. Cited as the breadth of the "Financials" label. | read ↗ |
| CSU.TO | Constellation Software | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | ~6.1% of the book on just 50 shares — the smallest share count and the highest per-share cash flow after Fairfax ($79.80). 17x NTM P/E on a 15% EPS CAGR, and one of only two holdings positive over twelve months (+25%, the best in the book) as well as YTD (+1%). Modelled three-year return 15.20%. The recovery from the first-ever >25% drawdown that anchored the early-2026 thesis. | read ↗ |
| AMP | Ameriprise Financial | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | ~6.0% of the book and the second-biggest cash generator: 202 shares producing $9,170.80 a year ($45.40 per share). Named among the four most attractively valued at 11x NTM P/E on a 13% EPS CAGR. One of only three holdings up over twelve months (+21%) and up 4% YTD. Modelled three-year return 13.33%. | read ↗ |
| KNSL | Kinsale Capital Group | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | ~5.9% of the book. 17x NTM P/E on a 15% EPS CAGR; 289 shares yielding $6,019.87; modelled three-year return 13.00% on EPS rising from 19.51 to 28 by 2028. Down 29% YTD but only 4% over twelve months — the soft-market de-rating the June transaction issue added into. A STRONG BUY the week before. | read ↗ |
| KPG.AX | Kelly Partners Group Holdings | STK | Positive | ~5.5% of the book, and the highest expected return in the entire portfolio at 30.50% a year on NPATA rising from 9 to 20 by 2028 — one of the three names growing above 20%. 14x NTM P/E on a 20% EPS CAGR; 29,900 shares (the largest share count) yielding $5,202.47. Down 30% over twelve months. The governance flag raised in April — Brett Kelly margin-called on pledged shares — is not revisited here. | read ↗ |
| GAW.L | Games Workshop | QT · SA · STK | Positive | The most expensive holding in the book at 33x NTM P/E on only a 12% EPS CAGR — "Games Workshop and Medpace are the two most expensive companies in Our Portfolio" — and the lowest modelled three-year return at 6.68%. ~5.3% of the portfolio, 400 shares yielding $4,088.66; −13% YTD, −31% over twelve months. Rated HOLD and shown 51.1% overvalued a week earlier. Conspicuously not named among the three to be reduced, even though it is the clearest failure of the new "stricter selection criteria" on the letter's own numbers. | read ↗ |
| BRO | Brown & Brown | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | ~4.4% of the book. 15x NTM P/E on a 13% EPS CAGR; 1,120 shares yielding $4,905.60; modelled three-year return 8.04% including a 0.96% dividend. One of the three holdings up over twelve months (+2%), −5% YTD. A STRONG BUY the week before. | read ↗ |
| HGT.L | HgCapital Trust | STK | Positive | ~3.9% of the book. 24x NTM P/E on a 15% EPS CAGR — the third-highest multiple in the portfolio, for a private-equity trust that elsewhere is valued on its 31% discount to NAV rather than on earnings. 11,975 shares yielding $3,428.62; modelled three-year return 13.30%. −15% YTD, −16% over twelve months. | read ↗ |
| IPAR | Inter Parfums | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | ~3.7% of the book. 19x NTM P/E on a 12% EPS CAGR; 595 shares yielding $3,671.15; modelled three-year return 9.99% including a 2.6% dividend. −3% YTD, −15% over twelve months — much steadier than the LVMH position beside it, in the same end market. | read ↗ |
| III.L | 3i Group plc | QT · SA · STK | Positive | ~3.5% of the book, and the worst performer in the portfolio: −48% year-to-date and −56% over twelve months. Yet 18x NTM P/E on a 15% EPS CAGR and the second-highest modelled three-year return at 18.10%, helped by a 3.1% dividend. 1,700 shares yielding $2,793.19. A halving in a year passes without a single line of comment — the most conspicuous silence in an issue about raising the bar. | read ↗ |
| KKR | KKR & Co. | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | ~3.0% of the book. 17x NTM P/E on a 15% EPS CAGR; 520 shares yielding $3,177.20; modelled three-year return 15.80%. One of only three holdings positive on both measures — +5% YTD and +6% over twelve months. Bought in June 2026, so like the three upweight candidates it is still building its weight. | read ↗ |
| ZTS | Zoetis | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | The smallest position at ~1.8%, and named among the four whose "valuation… look the most attractive today" at 12x NTM P/E on a 12% EPS CAGR. 440 shares yielding $2,248.40; modelled three-year return 9.96% including a 2.7% dividend. −19% YTD and −40% over twelve months. Notably, a name called attractively valued and not named for an increase — the upweighting is explicitly about quality, not price. | read ↗ |
| LVMUY | LVMH (ADR) | QT · SA | Neutral | TO BE REDUCED — the first explicit statement of the LVMH view in this archive. Named alongside Novo and Dino as having a less clear "path to future growth" than Brookfield, S&P Global and Fairfax, and separately as one of "the least satisfactory growth rates" — a 10% 3-5yr EPS CAGR, third-lowest in the book, on a 20x NTM P/E. The performance is the worst twelve-month figure of any holding after 3i: −41% YTD and −51% over twelve months. Still ~4.9% of the portfolio and the third-largest cash generator (173 shares, $35.93 each, $6,215.60), with a modelled three-year return of 11.09% including a 2.9% dividend. The unexplained HOLD carried through 2 August and 23 August finally gets its reason. | read ↗ |
| NVO | Novo Nordisk | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | TO BE REDUCED, and the weakest set of numbers in the portfolio. The lowest EPS CAGR at 7%, and the owner's-earnings sheet is worse still: EPS falling from 23.03 (2025) to 22.98 (2028) — −0.22% total, −0.07% a year — leaving a modelled three-year return of 3.43%, almost all of it the 3.5% dividend. ~3.5% of the book, 1,410 shares yielding $3,002.40; −18% YTD, −24% over twelve months. Consistent with the BUY → HOLD downgrade "due to increasing competition" nine days earlier, and it settles that issue's contradiction in favour of the downgrade. | read ↗ |
| DNP.WA | Dino Polska | SA · STK | Neutral | TO BE REDUCED — named with LVMH and Novo as lacking a clear path to future growth, and among "the least satisfactory growth rates" at a 10% 3-5yr EPS CAGR on an 18x NTM P/E. ~3.7% of the book; 14,550 shares yielding $6,227.97, the fourth-largest cash contribution; −12% YTD, −19% over twelve months; modelled three-year return 13.26%. Note the tension: the archive's canonical example of the "golden goose" reinvestor is being cut on growth expectations — and it is also the only holding outside developed markets, in a portfolio whose new rule is "developed countries only." | read ↗ |
Four observations the letter does not make about its own tables. (1) The upweighting is not a valuation decision. Zoetis, Evolution and Ameriprise are named as the most attractively valued holdings and none is marked for an increase; Brookfield at 14x and S&P Global at 19x are. The stated criterion is "a clearer path to future growth", which is a quality judgement — exactly what the issue says it is raising the bar on. (2) The three to be reduced are already small. LVMH ~4.9%, Dino ~3.7%, Novo ~3.5% together are about 12% of the book; the three to be increased are ~5.0%, ~2.8% and ~2.6%. This is a rebalancing of the bottom half, not a restructuring. (3) Games Workshop and 3i are the omissions. GAW carries the highest multiple (33x), the lowest expected return (6.68%) and a HOLD rating; III.L is down 56% in a year. Neither is mentioned in the section about skewed weights. (4) The "developed countries only" rule conflicts with a holding. Dino Polska is Polish — an emerging market on most classifications — and is on the reduce list; the rule and the reduction are stated in different sections and never connected. Separately, the fundamentals table contains the issue's most uncomfortable number: the portfolio beats the S&P 500 on interest coverage, leverage, capital intensity, ROE, ROIC, gross and net margin, cash conversion, historical growth, forward growth and forward P/E — and loses on realised return, 1.3% against 20.1% over three years and 5.9% against 13.1% over five.
A jargon-free summary of the thesis behind each name the issue actually argues. (Renders on each name's consolidated page.)
Brookfield owns and manages infrastructure, property, renewable energy and private-credit assets on behalf of pension funds and insurers, keeping a large stake in each of them for itself. It earns fees on the money it manages and a share of the profits on the assets it owns.
It is one of three names singled out to get a bigger slice of the portfolio, and the reason given is quality rather than price: it has "a clearer path to future growth" than the names being cut. The numbers back the growth part — analysts expect earnings to compound about 20% a year for the next three to five years, one of only three holdings above that level, and it trades at 14 times next year's earnings, among the cheapest in the book. It is also the best performer this year, up 34%.
It only occupies about 5% of the portfolio because it was bought late in 2025. That is the honest explanation for most of the "skew" being confessed to: a recent purchase has had less time to grow into a full position.
S&P Global rates corporate debt, runs the index business behind the S&P 500, and sells market data. Companies wanting to borrow effectively must be rated, and funds tracking its indices must pay to use them — so it charges a toll on activity it does not have to generate.
It is the second-smallest position in the portfolio at under 3%, and it is being increased. Again, the reason is recency rather than a change of view: it was only bought five weeks earlier, at a $425 limit price. On 19 times next year's earnings with growth expected around 15%, it sits in the middle of the book on valuation, and it was rated a Strong Buy on the firm's own scale a week before this letter.
Fairfax is the Canadian insurer that invests its float — the premiums it holds before claims are paid — the way Berkshire Hathaway does. It was bought two weeks before this letter and is already marked for a bigger position.
The tables show why. It is the cheapest holding in the portfolio at 10 times next year's earnings, and it has the highest modelled three-year return of any position at about 18.6%. Most striking is the cash: just 30 shares throw off $5,757 a year of look-through free cash flow — $191.90 per share, more than double the next highest — so a 2.6% position contributes over 5% of the portfolio's total cash generation.
That is the practical case for raising the weight: a name this cheap, this cash-generative and this new is under-represented purely because the money has not been put in yet.
After months of being rated hold with no explanation, LVMH finally gets one: it is on the list of three positions to be reduced, because it has a less clear path to future growth than the businesses being added to. Analysts expect its earnings to grow about 10% a year, third-lowest in the portfolio, and the shares are down 41% this year and 51% over twelve months.
None of that says the luxury group is a bad business — it owns Louis Vuitton, Dior and dozens of other brands, and it still produces the third-largest cash contribution in the portfolio from a 4.9% position. The judgement is comparative: the same money is expected to work harder in Brookfield, S&P Global or Fairfax.
It is worth noticing how differently the firm treats luxury depending on which company it is. In the same fortnight it upgraded Hermès to a buy and made it a Best Buy on the argument that slowing luxury growth is a currency effect — while cutting LVMH for slow growth. Both can be right, but the contrast is not addressed.
Novo Nordisk is the second name marked for reduction, and its numbers here are the weakest in the portfolio by some distance. Analysts expect earnings per share to be essentially flat between 2025 and 2028 — 23.03 falling to 22.98 — which after adding a 3.5% dividend leaves a modelled return of about 3.4% a year. Expected growth over three to five years is 7%, the lowest of the 21 holdings.
This settles a contradiction from nine days earlier. The Buy-Hold-Sell issue cut Novo from buy to hold "due to increasing competition", while its own spreadsheet still showed the shares 54% below fair value and rated them BUY. Here the direction is unambiguous: the position gets smaller.
The general lesson is the useful part. A stock can be genuinely cheap — Novo trades at 12 times earnings against a five-year average of 28 — and still be the wrong place for money, if the earnings it is cheap against are not going to grow. That is exactly the mistake the letter says it has learned to stop making.
Dino Polska builds and runs small supermarkets across Polish towns, funding new stores from its own cash flow. For years this archive used it as the model of the perfect business — high returns on capital, and somewhere to reinvest every zloty it earns.
It is now the third name marked for reduction, on expected growth of about 10% a year, described as among "the least satisfactory" in the portfolio. Nine days earlier it had also been cut from buy to hold on increasing competition. Both changes point at the same thing: the reinvestment runway that made it special is narrowing, and a compounding machine without a runway is just a retailer.
There is a second, quieter reason it may not survive the new rules. The letter states that the portfolio will invest in "developed countries only", and Poland is classified as an emerging market by most index providers. Dino is the only holding that clearly falls outside the new boundary, and the two facts are stated in different sections without ever being connected.
Games Workshop makes Warhammer miniatures and owns the fictional world they live in — a genuinely rare asset, and a business with pricing power over a devoted customer base.
It is nonetheless the awkward holding in an issue about raising standards. It carries the highest valuation in the portfolio at 33 times next year's earnings, on expected growth of only 12%, giving the lowest modelled three-year return of any position: 6.68% a year. A week earlier the firm's own sheet had it rated hold and 51% above its estimated fair value.
And yet it is not on the list of positions to be reduced, while three cheaper names with better modelled returns are. If the new rule is a stricter quality-and-value bar, this is the holding that most obviously fails it, and the letter does not say why it stays.
Medpace runs clinical trials for small and mid-sized biotech companies. It is paid for running the trial whether or not the drug works, so it is a services business rather than a bet on any one medicine — the reason it has been the archive's highest-conviction holding since 2024.
At 8.3% it is the largest position, and at 30 times next year's earnings it is named as one of the two most expensive. That does not put it on the reduction list, which tells you something about how this framework works: the price has never been the reason it is held, and the tiers rank the business rather than the entry point.
It is also the best performer of the year within the portfolio, up 21%, though still down 11% over twelve months.
Evolution runs live-dealer casino games — real croupiers, streamed from studios, licensed to online gambling operators. It supplies the technology and takes a share of the revenue, which makes it a picks-and-shovels business rather than a gambling operator.
Two things stand out in this letter's tables. It is the single biggest cash contributor in the portfolio: 1,670 shares producing $12,000 a year of look-through free cash flow, more than a ninth of the total from a 7.7% position. And it is the only holding that is up on both measures shown — 15% this year and 13% over twelve months — after being one of the market's most disliked names.
At 11 times next year's earnings it is also named as one of the four most attractively valued holdings. Notably, being cheap does not earn it an increased weight — the upweighting this month is explicitly about quality, not price.
Kelly Partners buys Australian accountancy practices and runs them in partnership with the accountants who founded them, a model deliberately copied from Constellation Software's approach to small software firms.
It carries the highest expected return of any holding here: profits (measured on a cash basis that adds back acquisition accounting) are forecast to rise from 9 to 20 by 2028, implying about 30% a year. It is also one of only three names in the book expected to grow earnings above 20%, at 14 times next year's earnings — an unusually cheap price for that rate of growth.
One caution the letter does not repeat. In April this position was demoted a conviction tier for a governance reason: the founder had been margin-called on $64m of shares he had pledged. That risk has not been revisited, and it is precisely the kind of thing "integer management with skin in the game" is supposed to screen for.
3i is a listed British private-equity firm whose value has for years been dominated by one holding, the European discount retailer Action. Its shares are down 48% this year and 56% over twelve months — by a wide margin the worst performance in the portfolio.
Despite that, it shows the second-highest modelled three-year return of any holding, about 18%, helped by a 3.1% dividend and expected earnings growth of 15%, at 18 times next year's earnings.
The thing to notice is the silence. In a letter whose stated purpose is to ask "what is not going well", a position that has more than halved in a year is not mentioned once outside the tables. Whether the fall reflects the value of the underlying businesses or only the market's mood is exactly the question a skeptical review should have answered.
Ameriprise is a large American wealth manager — advisers looking after client portfolios, earning fees on the assets. It is one of the four holdings named as most attractively valued, at 11 times next year's earnings against expected growth of 13%.
It is also the second-largest cash generator in the portfolio: 202 shares producing $9,170 a year, or $45.40 each. And it is one of only three positions that are up over the past twelve months, by 21%, in a book where most things have fallen.
Like Evolution and Zoetis, it is cheap and performing and not marked for an increase — which is the clearest evidence that this month's rebalancing is being driven by a judgement about business quality rather than by the valuation tables printed alongside it.
Summary derived from the archived Compounding Quality post (text and transcribed tables in transcript.txt) for personal study. Not investment advice. © Compounding Quality / Pieter Slegers for source material.