Title: Haymaker March Webinar: Featuring Sy Jacobs Show: Haymaker (David Hay's Substack) — webinar Guest: Sy Jacobs (financials-focused private partnership; 30+ yrs managing money, ex-Salomon Brothers analyst) Host: David Hay (Haymaker / Evergreen Gavekal) Date: 2026-03-11 (published; webinar recorded 2026-03-03) URL: https://haymaker.substack.com/p/haymaker-daily-891 Length: webinar (audio) — no video; no timestamps Note: written/webinar source — no (mm:ss) cues, so per-name "At" cells link to the post (read↗), not a video. Transcript is the recorded webinar dialogue; light cleanup only.
[David Hay] So this is the chart of SII from the time, basically right when it was coming alive, actually a little bit before it was coming alive — it was stirring in late 2023 and then into 2024. So for those people that follow us closely, you know we're always harping on these multi-year breakouts, particularly from a tight trading range like this. This is our dream scenario, and particularly when there is a strong fundamental story, which there was. So I really nailed that — that their assets were going to really grow drastically, which would be hugely accretive to their profit margins as their overhead would not go up very much, which is exactly what happened.
So anyway, that's just to show that this is a gentleman who's really had some great ideas. He's also given me other fine ideas like A-Mark and Banco Popular, the big bank down in Puerto Rico, and Allstate, and on and on. He's just really one of the best investors. So when I say super investor, it's not being hyperbolic. Ironically, SII, which is the ticker symbol for Sprott, could be pronounced "Si." So I'm sure that's a coincidence — I'm sure that didn't have anything to do with why he recommended it way back when, but just one of those happy parallels.
The main theme of this webinar — and actually Si is going to give you a bit of background on his experience with individual securities, particularly in the financial sector — but it's really to examine the bull case for what are called lead generation companies. It's a pretty esoteric part of the market, small part of the market, but as we're going to see here in a moment, they are extremely cheap. But before we do that, I think I should let Cy interject here and talk about his career a bit. So, Cy, take it away, please.
[Sy Jacobs] Sure. Thanks, David. Try to live up to some of what you just said, but suddenly the bar feels high. So I just wanted to give everybody some context of my sort of path to being a stock picker in an ETF and index market and still be able to smile about it and be of sound mind and health after having been through, you know, like the gale-force wind against stock picking.
So my background: I've been managing money for 30 years in a private partnership, but I was an equity research analyst for a dozen years before then. I started at Salomon Brothers in the mid-'80s. I really got randomly assigned the financials group — got a job as a research assistant to the bank analyst at Salomon Brothers. And it was an amazing time to be on Wall Street, amazing time to be at Salomon Brothers. So I went through the training program with Michael Lewis by chance that summer of 1985, which is how I ended up being mentioned in the book The Big Short, because I kept in touch with him all these years, but got left on the cutting room floor of the movie. But I'm right there in the book, in chapter one, in fact.
And that was because in the mid-80s I started studying the mortgage banking business, which was, again, a great time to be at Salomon Brothers learning about banks and mortgage companies, because that was where Lou Ranieri was basically kind of birthing the mortgage-backed securities market. And it occurred to me that mortgage-backed securities were a game changer — that it was going to completely change the way mortgages were made, away from savings and loans and portfolio lenders and towards securitization. And that it was almost like a technology. It was like a massive technological shift in the way money was lent. It started with mortgages and then it rippled through every lending market, basically.
And I just started championing some mortgage-oriented companies that were going to benefit from this and started suggesting short ideas in companies that were in harm's way of this complete change in the way mortgage credit was generated. And it was really my first taste — I was in my 20s — with the idea that, gee, I don't really need to know which direction the stock market's going to go, or whether financials are going to be popular or unpopular this year or next year. If I just get this right about this change in fundamentals and recommend longs and recommend shorts accordingly, I don't even need to have very many macro thoughts or have any expertise in that area. And lo and behold, 40 years later, that's still what I'm doing.
So I made a career of that as a research-writing analyst covering banks and financials. And then I started a private partnership in 1995 to do exactly that. Like, the only thing I knew how to do was follow financials, form opinions about which ones were undervalued and underappreciated and which ones were overvalued and overappreciated. Pay attention to themes and cycles within the group. Be contrarian — be suspicious when everybody loves something, be suspicious when everybody hates something, and just see how well the popular cycles match up to the fundamentals.
So I got involved — I was sort of on the right side of the big short trade in mortgage. And yet at the same time, I was on the board of a subprime auto finance company that I thought was the highest quality, best underwriter and would survive the crisis. And we attracted some capital after the crisis to grow. We ended up taking that company private. We sold it to private equity. I bought it back from private equity during COVID, sold it to Fiat Chrysler at the time, which became Stellantis. So I've had this ability to kind of play both sides and do contrarian things as a stock-picker investor, and not as a, you know, making macro calls.
So you fast forward to maybe five years ago, sort of COVID time. On the long side, post-COVID, I became interested in — David mentioned my interest in precious metals — and the way I express that, coming out of COVID with all the stimulus and money printing and QE, I became more interested than I had been already in precious metals and expressed that the only way I'm allowed to in my fund, which is a financials-only fund, which was Sprott and what was then known as A-Mark — it's now gold.com. Because I can't go outside — at least I promise not to go outside — the financial services industry to my clients and my private partnership. So those were longs that came out of a sense of doom about the US dollar and interest rates going up and social and political polarity in the United States. So it was longs that came out of sort of macro skepticism.
The other thing that really interests me — and I promise I'm heading towards auto lead gen here — was that the auto carriers, the auto underwriters — Progressive, Allstate, State Farm and the like — made a massive cyclical error coming out of COVID. So during COVID and lockdown, they were incredibly profitable, because people were driving less, getting into less accidents. And they just made like a huge blunder. They're kind of sheep in a way. In some ways that banks are — actually I think insurers, the good ones at least, are usually smarter than that. But they really stepped on the accelerator and grew like mad, got involved in the price war, and then really got slammed hard by the revenge spending and traveling that came out of post-COVID and the inflation that resulted from the fiscal policies. So in '21, '22, I was witnessing a really sharp down cycle of profitability for the carriers.
And I got interested maybe a beat or two too early in Allstate and Progressive, as the one thing these guys are really good at is making up for their mistakes. When they have bad underwriting cycles, they spend less and they raise prices and they get their prices. Consumers beef about it, politicians beef about it, but the regulatory insurance system works in America — they grouse about granting price increases, but they get price increases and they restore profitability and they start spending again. And that's what happened in basically '22, '23. It really showed up as big price increases in '23, '24. And my first instinct was actually just to play the carriers, play the underwriters. And Allstate and Progressive were big positions for me on the long side, as well as a couple others.
And then I kind of discovered these lead generation companies. And felt like they were kind of the operating-leveraged way to play the coming bull cycle in auto insurance underwriting that had just greater return potentials than the big carriers. They're kind of cyclical companies, but they have this really big growth tailwind behind them as well. And the growth tailwind is that they basically run online pricing and binding marketplaces for auto insurance. So they are some of the earliest businesses — the mortgage business was one of the early businesses where people felt comfortable at least getting prices and getting in contact with a mortgage broker that was online, that was not like a person sitting in front of you filling out forms. And I saw that happen in the mortgage business and that became commoditized pretty quickly. And the auto insurance business was sort of like a cycle behind the mortgage business, but was really growing rapidly its online presence.
And these lead generation companies basically harvest leads from people doing Google searches and other searches — we'll get to the role of LLMs in that going forward. And they basically either sell them to auto insurance companies, brokers, agents, or in more recent times, they've actually built the technology that allows you to actually just click through the price comparison site and get real quotes from an underwriter. You think of this as a commoditized business, but it's actually — no two people's driving records are exactly the same, no two people's cars are exactly the same, there's 50 different sets of regulatory pricing around the 50 states. It's a pretty specific thing. And the insurance companies control the pricing algorithm very closely. They don't just make it available to websites or to large language models. But they do make it available to these exchanges — a handful of trusted exchanges that bring customers right to their door. And they divulge pricing once you fill out a form. And then if you like the price, you could actually go straight through to the Progressive mainframe and close your insurance policy with them.
So I like to say: every time one of us takes the keys away from their father or grandfather or mother or grandmother, it is one less customer out there that gets their insurance through a live human being — an insurance agent or broker sitting in an office that you drive to. And every time one of our kids turns 16 or 17 or 18, this is like a baby boom generation fading away and turning into generations X, Y, and Z. And generations X, Y, and Z are comfortable and increasingly comfortable getting their auto insurance online, never talking to a live human being. That is the demographic tailwind behind these lead generation marketplaces, that is not at all cyclical. We're in a super cycle that's been going on for five or ten years and it's going to last another 20, if all you were measuring is the amount of people who get their auto insurance without interacting face to face or even on the telephone with a live human being.
So that's the growth part of the business. The cyclical part is that every five to 10 years, the insurance companies make mistakes or get into price wars, and they don't have enough pricing to make up for the rising costs of insurance repair. So they tap on the brakes and they grow less. And that puts downward pressure on the amount of leads that they buy. A few years ago, two-three years ago, I felt that we were at the cyclical trough of the insurance cycle. And the tailwind of technological change was really starting to pick up speed. And these stocks were depressed. And I played it through both owning the carriers and starting to invest in these lead generation companies.
And my thesis has played out well — not as well as I had hoped or as I expect it will play out over the next couple of years. Because the insurance cycle turned. Prices went up. They restored their margins. Progressive is the best of them — they were ahead of the curve, accelerated their growth a year ago already. And now the rest of them have kind of achieved the pricing needed to have their threshold margins and have now become interested in growing again. Progressive was a year or two ago; the rest of them really achieved this in the last three to nine months. And I think we've got a two-, three-year sort of growth cycle ahead of us, that is going to be blowing at the same time as the demographic and technological cycle is blowing at their backs. And the really good times are upon us now at the beginning of 2026, and I think it's going to last a year or two.
What blew us off course — and this gets to technology and AI issues — is these stocks were working. The insurance carriers worked. I have doubles or more in my Allstate and Progressive that I bought three years ago and have actually scaled back those positions as something close to a mission-accomplished situation. But the lead gen companies, which I expected to have returns significantly better than the carriers, have actually lagged the carriers. I see the operating leverage resulting for the companies, but in the stock market, the carriers and the lead gen companies have diverged, with the carriers outperforming significantly in the past six to 12 months, and especially the last few months.
And at first it was a tariffs-victim story last spring. The fear was tariffs were going to increase the cost of automobiles, especially foreign-made parts. The cost of repairing cars was going to accelerate again and eat into margins. And it ends up in the second half of the year that that just didn't play out — the carriers stayed really profitable. They actually did hit the pause button on their marketing when the tariff tantrum first happened, and now have restored their budgets to the benefit of these lead generation companies. So that was a scare. And now we're having the AI large language model scare over the last few months, where the companies are doing great and the stocks are doing poorly.
These are sub-billion-dollar market caps, so they're not well covered. When they are covered, they each have three, four, or five analysts — typically the underwriter that brought them public, plus a couple other random analysts — but they're typically covered by business services analysts, technology analysts. These were considered, when they were taken public, internet services plays, and they were taken public at really big multiples. I believe they've lived up to their mission since then. I think some of the technology and internet analysts who invested in them originally were dismayed to learn that there's an insurance cycle — and it just happened to be a really bad insurance cycle in 2021 and '22. And these became kind of orphan stocks. They're not covered by insurance analysts, not covered by financial services analysts. I'm coming at this much differently than most. And I'm a really big believer in the insurance cycle and the demographic cycle of online insurance buyers being very early cycle.
[David Hay] It's an interjection because my readers, at least those that have been with us for a while, are kind of indoctrinated into the appeal of looking at price-to-sales in cyclical industries, because the earnings can be very volatile. And sometimes when the PE is very high and the price-to-sales ratio is very low, that's your perfect buying opportunity. In this case — and sometimes we see this — it's like a double win where you have a very low price-to-sales and a very low PE, quite unusual. So it just illustrates your point that these things are really orphan stocks. They're really out of favor at a time where I'm getting excited. Forget about the valuation — that's almost like a cherry on top. I'm excited about the fundamentals of the business. And it's bizarre to me that the market has kind of walked away from them when everything's kind of coming together. I'm not a believer in the efficient market hypothesis, but this is ridiculous. Multiples are not supposed to go in the opposite direction of fundamentals, but I feel like they have in this case this past year.
We talked about this before we started recording. Our subscribers are aware that I believe this is a great time to be pivoting out of US stocks. But if you're in US stocks, I think it's a great time to be pivoting into the value stocks that are still value stocks. And as I've been writing lately, a number of former low-PE stocks — the kind you'd expect to get on a bargain basis — are trading at very high valuations. Walmart used to be a cheap stock, Eli Lilly used to be a cheap stock, Caterpillar, Deere — these things are all priced for perfection. So it's getting harder to find these value stocks. But what has happened recently — and these guys are a classic example — is because of fears of AI, you've got a long list of fine companies that have been absolutely crushed. So one of the best ways to make money this year, and I think a lot of money, is to correctly identify those companies and sectors where they're not AI victims — they're at least neutral, AI doesn't help them or hurt them — but better yet, they're actually AI winners.
[Sy Jacobs] David, let me speak to that, because I saw a question pop up in the chat from Jeff Harbaugh. So just a few minutes on AI and LLMs and the current witch hunt and scare. The reason why I think LLMs are not a threat to these companies — and I actually think they're a bit of a tailwind — goes back to what I said earlier. The underwriters have no interest, and would have great fear, of their own pricing and underwriting algorithms and models being a public utility. That's their life's work — how to price an insurance policy — and they have hundreds of thousands of employees working for decades to perfect those models, and it's their secret sauce. They have no interest in that being in the hands of a large language model. And I don't think state regulators would want that either. They're actually protected by state regulations in that regard. It's a state-regulated business, which I think is actually better protection for these companies.
So what's going to happen is the LLMs are going to be useful, as is Google search, to consumers — even more useful. But in the end, the LLMs are going to end up delivering leads to these lead generation companies. They're going to be an ally. Because these LLMs are not insurance agents or brokers — they don't want to be in the cyclical insurance underwriting or brokerage business. They're technology apps. And while they may displace Google in a way, and may displace a low-tech price comparison website someday, the carriers or the lead generation companies have the power to bind insurance policies — granted to them by the underwriters once they deliver a very highly qualified lead. All these companies reported earnings in the past two or three weeks, and they responded to question after question about the AI LLM threat. And I thought they very eloquently made the case that LLMs are helping them right now. First of all, AI is helping them with their own efficiency. They got lumped in with the software and SaaS scare, but it's so different. And they're actively being helped on the lead generation front by people using ChatGPT to do price comparisons, because eventually those get dumped into their lap. It's just another new media source of leads for them. I believe that's going to continue. Except it's been hurting the stocks.
So to go on to some specific names. In my friendly investor conversations with David over the last year, he became interested in a company called QuinStreet that I own — it's actually my largest position of this basket of lead generation companies. But I'm actually going to start with a different one. The three or four companies are QuinStreet (QNST), Media Alpha (symbol MAX), EverQuote (EVER), and then LendingTree (TREE) — which is probably the most well-known, but the least pure play. LendingTree really started as a mortgage marketplace and got into insurance and all sorts of other verticals — a lead generation financial supermarket across financial products. So it's a way to play insurance, but it's the least pure play.
The one I want to focus on, because it's so pure play and so inexplicably cheap because it's so simple, is EverQuote. EverQuote does nothing but insurance lead generation, almost entirely auto — they do a little bit of home, but it's more or less an auto lead gen pure play. As of an hour ago when I took these notes, EverQuote had an equity market cap of $585 million. They had, as reported last week, at December 31st, $171 million of cash and no long-term debt. So if you back out the cash, this business was selling for about $410 million enterprise value. Analyst estimates for this year's EBITDA is $112 million. I think that's low, but let's use it. This is a growth company that doesn't have much capital spending needs at all. Last year EBITDA, free cash flow, and GAAP earnings were very similar — within a couple million dollars of each other in the fourth quarter. So it's trading at 3.7 times cash flow. It is a growth company with really good demographic trends behind it, and a beneficiary of AI and LLM, not a threat. They've started buying back stock. I've got a meeting with their headquarters in Cambridge, Mass — I'm traveling up to see them this Friday to push them to buy back more stock. They bought back about $30 million worth of stock, way less than their free cash flow this year, and just let cash build, which I can't really imagine why they'd continue to do. If they don't buy back stock this year, they're going to end the year with $280 million of cash, if I'm right about their cash flow. So that's the simplest, most compelling of the three.
Media Alpha is a little less pure play — they're also in the healthcare lead gen business for Medicare and Medicaid supplements, but it's almost entirely insurance lead gen. They have a normal amount of debt — something like $132 million of debt, $47 million of cash. So their adjusted enterprise value is about $740 million. I think they're going to have about $130 million of cash flow, so it trades at a slightly higher EV/EBITDA, but a very low one. What's super interesting about MAX, and the reason I own more of it than EverQuote however ridiculously cheap EverQuote is, is that the insurance company White Mountains owns 30% of MAX and sits on their board. White Mountains used to be a client of mine, and I used to be an investor of theirs. They're a legendary insurance holding company — the founder, Jack Byrne, was very close friends with Warren Buffett. There was a while where Berkshire and White Mountains had cross-ownership; Buffett financed White Mountains' purchase of Fireman's Fund. And White Mountains has been, even more so than Buffett, a serial buyer-backer of its own shares — over the last three decades they've bought back something like 90% of their shares outstanding. The stock's gone from double digits to triple digits over that time. They own a non-controlled but great-influence position in MAX. And MAX has been much more aggressive buying its stock than EverQuote and the others. When they reported earnings last week, they more than doubled their buyback — they bought back more stock than EverQuote did — and more than doubled their buyback authorization to $86 million, even though they only have $46 million of cash. So they basically signaled they're going to use most of this year's cash flow to buy back stock at five, six times EBITDA. They're much more aggressive capital managers than EverQuote, who seems to be building up cash for a rainy day or an acquisition or to go private — I can't explain it, that's why I'm going to Cambridge on Friday. But MAX is the real deal when it comes to capital management.
QuinStreet is my favorite, because they also have a pristine balance sheet and a history of buying back stock, but they also have a second business which I love — maybe even more than the insurance lead gen business — which is the home services lead gen business: basically matching home improvement customers to purveyors of window replacements, roof replacements, hot tubs, walk-in bathtubs, flooring, and all that. The mortgage business went online two decades ago, the insurance business went online this past decade, and now the home improvement business is going online — and it's just very much earlier in that cycle, such that there is no cycle; it's very early in the adoption. And QuinStreet has made a couple of acquisitions, including most recently HomeBuddy.com — such a great name, HomeBuddy, B-U-D-D-Y — which is a leading lead gen site. If you know Angie's List and some of these others that were early movers but stumbled and lost market share to QuinStreet and HomeBuddy — they've been growing that business 15%, 20% or more year in, year out, as has HomeBuddy. Now they're combining. They'll get tremendous economies of scale. It was actually a difficult decision not to buy back stock and to buy HomeBuddy, but I applaud it because I think the returns on the acquisition are going to be even better than a share buyback. They used about half cash, half debt to buy HomeBuddy. I think they'll pay the debt back in a year or two and then be in a position to buy back a lot of stock. So it's got a small amount of debt — like $45 million — and a hundred million dollars of cash. Its cash- and debt-adjusted market cap is $666 million today. The street estimate for EBITDA this year is $134 million, so it's trading at five times street estimates. But I know for certain some of the street estimates haven't factored in the HomeBuddy acquisition yet, which is highly accretive. QuinStreet just reported — its last quarter, without HomeBuddy (the acquisition closed January 1st) — and it beat and raised for the rest of the year. I think they're going to earn something more like $150, $160 million of EBITDA in the coming year, so the stock's really trading at four-and-change times EV/EBITDA. I think it's got the best growth profile of all of them because of this great acquisition, and the least insurance-cycle dependency because of the home services business. So if I could only own one of them for the next five years, I think this one's going to have the most sustainable growth — and it's inexplicably inexpensive. That's my walkthrough of the names.
[David Hay] I just want to interject, because we've got some pretty sophisticated people on here that are aware that Buffett is very critical of EBITDA — Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization. But as you point out, these guys really don't have any interest or depreciation — not really applicable, because they're an asset-light model. Amortization is a non-cash expense; maybe they'll have some with the HomeBuddy acquisition. But the point is, unlike the typical case where there's a big gap between EBITDA and free cash flow or actual earnings, in this case they're very similar. The simplest one is EverQuote — I'd invite everybody to look at the quarter they just reported: free cash flow, adjusted EBITDA, and GAAP were very similar last quarter.
Those are great stories, Si. I want to be respectful of your time — he's headed to Thailand for a pleasure trip on Saturday, and having to reroute because of all the trouble in the Middle East. Is there anything you want to add, or take a question or two?
[Sy Jacobs] I'll field a lead-gen-specific question or two for a few minutes.
[Jeff] Sy, this is fascinating. It sounds like you're a long-term investor — could you speak in general about what is long-term to you, and how do your sell decisions come about?
[Sy Jacobs] I'll use the lead gen companies as an example. I've owned these for two years. I'm really excited to own them through this cycle and until the market realizes these aren't fully cyclicals — that there's a really strong growth wind here that's demographic and secular. And I'll know that when they trade at double-digit multiples of EBITDA, like most companies. Then I'll have to sell into that, because I can no longer steal them. That's how I tend to work on the long side. It's easier to be a multi-year cyclical investor on the long side when you also have a short portfolio. We haven't talked about this, but I run long-short. Approximately 50% of my business is short. So I own a bunch of things I think are undervalued and underappreciated, and I'm short some things that are overvalued and overappreciated. And it actually allows you to live with your longs and shorts more easily, knowing there's this other portfolio of the opposite. So I'd make the case that being ambidextrous on the long-short side allows you to be a more patient investor.
[David Hay] I don't believe you are short Carvana, but I know you follow it from a distance, and you've heard some of the bear cases. Do you think it has the potential to be this cycle's Enron slash WorldCom?
[Sy Jacobs] Unfortunately, I have thought so for five to 10 years. I had put it on the permanent do-not-short list after having my fingers burned a couple of times. But I took it off about six months ago. It's the nice thing about being both the portfolio manager and the risk manager here — I don't have a boss, I can capriciously break my own rules. So I shorted it about six months ago and covered it when the big short report came out a couple of weeks ago — I guess too soon. It was such a distinct experience making money on a Carvana short that I couldn't stick to my timelines. But I have deep, deep suspicions. Having been on the inside of a subprime auto finance company, I just don't get how they do it. I really don't. Well, I do, but the market doesn't agree with me. Gotham does, and before that the Hindenburg. But I don't want to go down that rabbit hole, because this is not a short-selling group.
[David Hay] So let me hop off here. Thanks, David, for giving me the opportunity to be passionate about this. I've gotten fed up lately hearing the bear case for this, which I just don't see. We're going to distribute this out to all of our paying subscribers and maybe even non-paying subscribers — we'll get it out to about 17,000 people. I will say that I did average into QuinStreet here recently, and I'm planning to buy more of the other two personally as well.
[Sy Jacobs] Thanks, David, and thanks to everybody else. We'll talk soon.
[David Hay] Okay, everybody. Anybody that's got questions for me, it's definitely the second string here, but I'll do my best.
[Jim, via host] Any insight into the private equity investments into the life insurance companies?
[David Hay] Private equity versus private credit — I would think private equity is less of a threat to the insurance companies than private credit. I'm sure they've got exposure, but I think it's much more on the private credit side. Insurance companies are basically carry-trade, float plays — that's why Warren Buffett loved them. They get money and hold onto it for years and invest at a higher rate than they pay policyholders. And that's where private credit has been a big win for them, and that's really coming under a lot of pressure. Ironically, AI is part of the reason, because a lot of these private credit loans have been to software companies, and software is perceived to be one of the big victims of LLMs. I'm sure there's some overly aggressive insurance companies loaded up, but I don't think it's pervasive. I do know that Lincoln (LNC), which is one of my personal holdings — maybe my only personal life-insurance holding, I guess I have AIG too but that's more diversified — LNC is a very cheap stock. It's been quite weak, and I suspect it's because of private credit fears, which I think are overblown.
The one little footnote: I've been trying — some of you know from my Adam Taggart podcast back on January 30th — to get a more systematized method to identify companies that are making multi-year new highs. I hired an IT person to work with Bloomberg, because Bloomberg is a tremendous trove of information but extremely difficult to work with for a non-IT person, which is me. So we've come up with approximately 280 stocks that meet the criteria, and I'm in the process of going through all 280 looking at their charts. It's been amazing — but not totally surprising for me, because I've proven this over the years, particularly with a number of my short ideas that have just blown me up by breaking through at high valuations and going much higher. It's remarkable how many of these companies that broke out in 2023 and 2024 have gone up enormously. It's also interesting how many utilities are relatively fresh breakout candidates — and you could make the AI bull story for those pretty easily; they are kind of pricey. What's maybe more interesting: there's a whole bunch of financial stocks on that list as well, and when Cy gets back from Thailand, I'm going to narrow my list and shoot him the names and have him identify the ones he likes the most. So I'll probably be sharing that with all of you in the not-too-distant future.
We may be doing another webinar later in the month — we've got Robert Mullen, a very good portfolio manager (Marathon Resources). I guess Cy gave him a great stock pick. He'll be a really interesting discussion as well, so be alert for that notice. Thank you again, everyone. Thanks for joining us.