| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 86 | $43.58 | $3,748 | 0.15% | $34.32 | $796 | +27.0% | — |
In short: Named as one of the "European players" making energy deals in Venezuela while no other large U.S. company produces there. Cited as evidence the re-opening is drawing real Western operators, not as a stance on BP itself.
BP is named only in passing, as one of the "European players" that has been signing energy deals in Venezuela while no other big U.S. company operates there. The article offers no view on BP as a stock — it uses the name as evidence that the re-opening is attracting real, capitalized Western operators rather than only politically-driven announcements.
Read it as a datapoint about the country, not the company: when established majors start doing licence-level deals, the "small, realistic deals" path to higher Venezuelan output becomes more believable.
In short: Asked by a listener whether Tenaz is interested in BP's announced formal sale process for its UK North Sea business. A carefully non-committal yes-and-no: "we'd be remiss not to take a look at it," but "we're not in the UK today," the UK is "a different industry in a number of ways" — different labour rules, "a way different fiscal regime," and an advantage to incumbents through "historic tax pools and the ring fencing of them," which Tenaz does not have. He closes by pointing the questioner at the odds: "you can make your own judgments about the relative probability of us having a deal there versus what we have already in our backyard."
BP appears only because a listener asked whether Tenaz would bid for the UK North Sea business BP has formally put up for sale. The answer is a courteous "we would look, but don't hold your breath."
His reasoning is a useful checklist for judging any cross-border acquisition. The geology is similar, but the UK is a different business: different labour rules, a very different tax regime, and — the decisive point — incumbents there carry large historical tax losses ("tax pools") that shelter future profits, which a newcomer like Tenaz does not have. That means an established UK producer can rationally pay more for the same barrels than Tenaz can, which is exactly the crowded-auction situation his whole method is built to avoid.
No view is offered on BP shares; the transaction is treated as a market event, not an investment idea.
1:20:27Next one is an account titled M and M. Any interest in the announced BP formal sale process for its UK North Sea oil and gas business? We're not in the UK today. We have evaluated in the UK previously. It's a different industry in a number of ways even though geologically it's not, for the most part it's not so different.
In short: The lead beneficiary of the Venezuelan re-opening he is positioned for — "BP joins Big Oil return to post-Maduro Venezuela… Major development — Venezuela's energy opening is accelerating. On August 14, BP secured a license to explore and develop Phase 2 of Venezuela's offshore Loran gas field, partnering with the UAE's XRG/ADNOC and Qatar-linked UCC. The project contains roughly 4 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas." He rates the read-through above the project itself: "The geopolitical implication is more important than the individual BP project" — the offshore gas is "particularly significant because Venezuelan gas could ultimately be exported through Trinidad's existing LNG infrastructure rather than requiring Venezuela to build an entirely new LNG system." No valuation, target or sizing on the shares; the stance is that BP is transacting on the thesis he owns.
BP is one of the handful of giant integrated oil and gas companies — it finds and produces hydrocarbons, refines them, and sells the fuel. The reason it appears here has nothing to do with its valuation, which Polomny never discusses. It appears because on 14 August it signed a license to develop the second phase of the Loran field — an offshore natural-gas deposit on the Venezuela–Trinidad maritime border holding roughly 4 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas — partnering with the UAE state oil company's investment arm (XRG/ADNOC) and a Qatar-linked group (UCC).
Why that is news rather than a routine deal: Venezuela's oil and gas industry was effectively closed to Western companies for two decades, first by nationalization and then by sanctions. Chevron kept a toe in; Shell had been working the Trinidad-side gas. BP signing a new license — four days after a US Treasury delegation flew to Caracas specifically to talk about reviving Venezuelan production — is the third major arriving, and Polomny reads three arrivals as a genuine re-opening rather than a political gesture. The gas is especially attractive because it can be piped to Trinidad's existing LNG plants and exported from there, so the project does not have to wait for Venezuela to build billions of dollars of new liquefaction capacity first.
What he actually wants you to take from it is the pattern, not the stock: "the geopolitical implication is more important than the individual BP project." His stated sequence is U.S. political leverage → Western capital and technology → rapidly rising Venezuelan energy production, and BP's license is the visible middle step. He gives BP no price target, no earnings view and no sizing — the honest reading of the stance is "confirming evidence for a thesis I own," not "buy BP." His own money went somewhere else: an unnamed speculative small-cap in the AIA Portfolio that plans to buy an already-producing Venezuelan field and raise its output with capital and ordinary oilfield technique — no drilling for something that might not be there. The risks are the obvious ones for this kind of trade: Venezuelan politics can reverse, licenses can be re-nationalized, and offshore gas projects take years to produce a single molecule.
In short: Jain: named among the major-oil buys — best assets, capital discipline, the worst oil crisis he's seen (everyone must replenish supply) and broad underinvestment in energy.
In short: Cited for prior British-state interference — political risk exists "in all languages," not just emerging markets (look at California and Alberta too).
BP appears as another example of government meddling in a developed economy (the British state's past interference). Rule's broader message: before criticizing political risk in places like Kuwait or Angola, investors should look at California shutting down drilling and Alberta's tax grabs. Risk is everywhere; discount it everywhere.
17:35I know that's not the political risk you're thinking about. Uh you're thinking about small — geopolitical things, but yeah, — nationalization, stuff like that. — You know, we don't like to admit it in the United States, but in the oil and gas business, the United States is a politically risky jurisdiction.
In short: Named with Shell/Total/Repsol/Eni as a European integrated that cut its dividend in COVID — the factual marker of being less well-run than Exxon/Chevron/Conoco.
BP is another European oil major he lists (alongside Shell, Total, Repsol, and Eni) as having cut its dividend during COVID.
That dividend cut is his factual marker that these European companies are simply less robustly run than the American majors like Exxon and Chevron. Named as an example, not a pick.
59:40If you go to COVID, the price of oil went negative. Exxon, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and even the high-quality large-cap E&Ps paid that dividend. The Europeans integrateds, they weren't built for it. — What do you mean? So, think about Shell, BP, Total, Repsol, Eni. They cut dividends during COVID. — not as well-run as the Americans.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.