| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 5 | $151.25 | $756 | 0.03% | $163.86 | $-63 | -7.7% | — |
In short: Stance change — capitulation. "Bottom line, I give up. Simply put, I made a mistake. I recommended the stock in January on a thesis that the stock was insanely cheap and fundamentals would get better." Instead 1Q26 broadband losses deteriorated and 2Q was worse again — "172,000 broadband losses, which was unfortunately much worse than expected." Management says the worst is over and debt was paid down, "however, at this point, I'm skeptical… Two really bad quarters in a row is enough for me. I'm selling… I hate thesis creep. And continuing to own the stock just because it's cheap, and it is cheap, would be thesis creep." The 15% bounce to $142 off a $123 52-week low is dismissed: "the rally in the stock in my view has nothing to do with Charter" — it's AI-rotation money. He has not sold yet: "I should not sell until I inform my viewers of my opinion change. I will be selling the stock next week."
Charter is the cable company behind Spectrum — home internet and TV. It was Eisman's January recommendation on two legs: the shares were extraordinarily cheap, and its heavy network spending was about to fall away, turning into free cash he expected the company to use buying back its own stock. That only works if the business itself stabilises.
It hasn't. Charter keeps losing broadband customers, and the losses are getting worse rather than better: after an encouraging fourth quarter, the first quarter deteriorated and the second lost another 172,000 subscribers, "much worse than expected." Management insists the worst is behind them; he no longer believes it. "Bottom line, I give up. Simply put, I made a mistake."
The important part is the rule he applies to himself. Owning it now would mean owning it only for the cheap price, since the fundamental leg of the argument has failed — and that is what he calls thesis creep: quietly swapping the reason you bought something for a different reason so you never have to sell. "I hate thesis creep." So he is selling, while explicitly leaving the door open — "if the fundamentals ever turn, I could come back."
Two details worth copying. First, he ignores the price action: the stock is up 15% in a week, but "the rally in the stock in my view has nothing to do with Charter" — it is money fleeing AI names and landing anywhere else, which tells you nothing about the business. Second, he hasn't sold yet, on principle: "I recommended the stock to my viewers and I strongly believe that I should not sell until I inform my viewers of my opinion change."
1:49Before we get started, let me discuss Charter. The company reported last week and bottom line, I give up. Simply put, I made a mistake. I recommended the stock in January on a thesis that the stock was insanely cheap and fundamentals would get better. When the company reported fourth quarter numbers, it looked like fundamentals would get better as the pace of broadband losses improved.
In short: His January recommendation at $223 (now −22% YTD after a 25% Friday drop). 1Q26 lost 120k broadband subs vs 100k est — "no way to sugarcoat it" — but thesis unchanged and he added on the dip: CapEx rolls 11B (2026)→9.5B (2027)→7.5–8B (2028–29) into FCF dollar-for-dollar, buy back up to 50% of shares over 4–5 yrs; mkt cap only $23B, 2026 PE ~4×, <2× FCF and ~70% FCF yield in outer years; low-cost converged cable+mobile ($100 vs $180–200). "I'm being paid to wait."
Charter is the cable company behind Spectrum — broadband internet plus a fast-growing mobile-phone service. Eisman recommended it in January at $223; it's since fallen to about −22% on the year, with a brutal 25% one-day drop after a bad quarter (it lost 120,000 broadband customers, worse than expected). He hasn't flinched — he actually bought more, and warns himself against "thesis creep," the trap of quietly abandoning your reasoning just because the stock fell.
The case is two-part. First, valuation: the company is shockingly cheap — about 4× this year's earnings, and in a few years less than 2× its free cash flow (the cash left after all spending), implying a roughly 70% "free-cash-flow yield" (cash generated per dollar of stock price). Second, the turnaround: Charter has been spending heavily upgrading its network, and that spending is about to fall sharply (from $11B to ~$7.5–8B). Every dollar it stops spending becomes free cash — which it plans to use to buy back as much as half its own shares over four to five years, a huge lift to per-share value given the company is worth only $23B. As cable and mobile bundle together, Charter is the cheap option ($100 vs $180–200 from rivals). His verdict: cheap alone isn't enough, "but I'm being paid to wait."
3:24Over the past few years, Charter has embarked on major CapEx to enhance its systems, and that CapEx is ending now. And as a result, total CapEx will decline from 11 billion in 2026 to 9 and 1/2 billion in 2027 and then 7 and 1/2 to 8 billion in 2028 and 2029. That decline in CapEx will enhance free cash flow dollar for dollar, and the company will use that cash flow to buy back stock with the possibility that the company will buy back literally 50% of its shares over the next four to five years. That is certainly doable given
Nothing matches this filter.
Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.