In short: Explicitly in the too-hard pile, on input-cost opacity rather than demand: "The chems are super hard because their input costs are distorted. It's so hard because things like naphtha are exploding because it all comes out of Hormuz." The general rule he draws: a commodity shock is only investable where you can see which side of the input/output split a company sits on.
A commodity chemical company buys an oil-derived feedstock, processes it, and sells the output. Its profit is the spread between the two, so the input price matters as much as the selling price.
His objection is that the input side is currently unreadable. Naphtha — a light petroleum fraction that is the primary feedstock for plastics and much of the chemical chain in Asia and Europe — has been distorted by the Strait of Hormuz disruption. When your feedstock price is being set by shipping risk rather than supply and demand, you cannot forecast a chemical producer's margin with any confidence: "the chems are super hard because their input costs are distorted."
The generalisable lesson is that a commodity shock is not automatically good for everyone touching that commodity. It splits the chain into winners (whoever owns the scarce input) and losers (whoever has to buy it), and if you cannot tell which side a company is on, it is not an investment, it is a coin flip.
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