| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 123 | $80.08 | $9,850 | 0.40% | $47.98 | $3,948 | +66.9% | — |
In short: Brown best-stocks energy name (subsea/offshore equipment). Named by ticker in the same list — "LNG, FTI, FANG" — among the 15 breaking-out energy names that are "not expensive" with outlooks "going higher."
In short: Position closed — the harvest, disclosed in passing. "Offshore Oil and Gas. Okay, there was a company, this is another one I just sold out of portfolio, was like an eight bagger. So, same thing over like four or five years. TechnipFMC." Why it worked: "they make subsea systems for offshore wells. It's like an oligopoly. There's only a couple companies that do what they do… very highly engineered blowout preventers… only a few people can do in the world." The catalyst was management: "they had got into some offshore wind and it got kind of discombobulated… so they spun that off… focus on our core competency. Well, that's what I zero in on… right at the cusp of a resumption of spending in offshore." The outcome: "it went from like eight bucks to 80 bucks, but it took five years — and you had several bites at the apple because nothing is linear." No view offered on the shares from here; the stance is simply that the trade is finished.
TechnipFMC builds the equipment that sits on the seabed at offshore oil wells — including blowout preventers, the safety hardware whose failure caused Deepwater Horizon. Only a handful of companies on earth can engineer this, which is what he means by "oligopoly."
This entry exists to record an exit. Polomny mentions almost in passing that he "just sold out of portfolio" — an eight-bagger, roughly eight bucks to eighty, over five years. He is not saying anything negative about the company; the trade simply reached its objective and the capital is being redeployed.
What made it a special situation in the first place is worth keeping: management got distracted by an offshore-wind business, spun it off, and refocused on what they were uniquely good at — right as offshore oil spending was about to restart. A cheap price plus a fixable distraction plus a cycle turning is the shape he hunts for. And, as with Georgia Capital, the path was not a straight line: bad headlines about offshore or a drop in the oil price gave him "several bites at the apple" along the way.
24:14Give you another example. Offshore Oil and Gas. Okay, there was a company, this is another one I just sold out of portfolio, was like an eight bagger. So, same thing over like four or five years. TechnipFMC. — They make subsea systems for offshore wells. It's like an oligopoly. There's only a couple companies that do what they do.
In short: SELLING after a 700%+ run since 2021 — "Nothing is necessarily wrong with the company, but at this point I don't see the potential for big upside." He books it as the archetype of his own method: "a great example of buying something that was out of favor as it was inflecting. We held it for five years, which shows that for my style to work, one needs patience for positions to mature."
This is a sale on valuation, not on the company. Bought in 2021 when subsea energy equipment was hated and the business was just turning up, it returned over 700% across five years. Nothing has broken — he simply doesn't see another large move from here, and the portfolio's mandate is 3x–10x candidates.
He uses the exit to teach his own method: "a great example of buying something that was out of favor as it was inflecting. We held it for five years, which shows that for my style to work, one needs patience for positions to mature." Buy at the inflection, wait years, and sell when the remaining upside — not the past return — no longer justifies the slot.
In short: Holding; no major news this month (AIA Portfolio).
In short: No major news this month (AIA Portfolio holding).
In short: Named by the host (with Tidewater and Subsea 7) as an example of Robotti's offshore-energy "picks-and-shovels" positioning; the offshore-services place "has finally come" to its underlying economics after the 2017 shale run he sat out.
1:09:16the '70s — you're putting your money where your mouth is. When you look at this huge structural trend in energy, can you explain why there's such a massive overweighting in energy in your portfolio, but also how companies like Tidewater or TechnipFMC or Subsea 7 — or whatever other big positions you choose to mention — illustrate your way of positioning yourself to take advantage of what you see happening in the world of energy over the coming years? It's individual stock selection. I'm not buying energy
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.