| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 885 | $0.39 | $346 | 0.01% | $1.80 | $-1,251 | -78.3% | — |
In short: "Both encouraging and sobering news in the same week": the US DFC approved a loan package of up to $414M for its high-grade Dasa project in Niger, then capex rose to ~$777M (direct construction +74% vs the 2024 feasibility study) and commercial production slipped to H2 2028. The $97 term price it cites beats the study's $75, but ~$153M of its own equity must be spent before drawing the loan, plus an export route, a permit extension and a direct agreement with Niger's government — "now a 2028 story at a much higher cost."
Global Atomic is a Canadian-listed company building the Dasa uranium mine in Niger, a high-grade underground deposit it calls the most advanced new-from-scratch ("greenfield") uranium project in the world. This week brought good news and bad. The good: a US government development lender, the DFC, approved a loan of up to $414 million — a sign of how seriously Washington now treats secure nuclear fuel.
The bad: two days later the company said the mine will cost about $777 million to build, with the core construction bill up 74% from its 2024 plan, and full production pushed back to the second half of 2028 — mainly because Niger's change of government held up the financing. Higher uranium prices help (it now assumes $97 a pound versus $75 in its plan), but the loan isn't money in the bank yet: the company must first spend about $153 million of its own shareholders' money, find a workable route to export its uranium out of landlocked Niger, get its mining permit extended, and sign a direct agreement with Niger's government, which owns 20% of the project.
Frostad treats it as the Red Book's warning in a single case: Dasa was listed as one of only six committed new mines due in 2026, and it is now a 2028 project at a much higher cost. That is why the show frames it neither as a buy nor a sell — encouraging support, sobering execution risk.
8:102 days later, the company updated its cost estimates. Total capital costs now stand at about $777 million with direct construction up 74% from the 2024 feasibility study. The reasons will sound familiar. That study assumed construction would be finished by the end of 2025. Then the change in government in Niger delayed project funding and commercial production has slipped to the second half of 2028.
In short: "There was arguably some news to report on regarding the political uncertainty in Niger, but there is no clear information available to make for a good discussion, so let's see what the coming weeks bring." Cost basis C$1.86, 100% allocated.
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In short: Sold. "I have lost patience with this stock… It was a major mistake not to sell after the first disappointment on financing." Dasa is "a real uranium mine that will likely get built. However, if they keep issuing stock, how much meat will be left on the bone? Selling and moving on. … I am selling Global Atomic." The lesson: "when a resource company misses a goal or projection, sell first and ask questions later."
This is the one outright sale in the issue, and the reason is dilution rather than geology. Global Atomic is developing a genuine uranium mine in Niger that Polomny still expects will get built. The problem is how it is being paid for: every time the promised bank debt or joint-venture partner failed to materialize, the company issued more shares to raise cash. Each issue hands existing shareholders a smaller share of the same mine — "if they keep issuing stock, how much meat will be left on the bone?"
He is unusually blunt that the mistake was his own process, not the company's disclosure: he had a rule for exactly this situation and ignored it. The rule, restated for readers to reuse: "when a resource company misses a goal or projection, sell first and ask questions later." A missed financing deadline in a pre-revenue miner is almost never a one-off; it is a signal about the funding path.
Note what he is not doing: he is not turning bearish on uranium. In the same issue the uranium miners' basket (URNM) gets "the bull market continues." He is exiting one company's balance-sheet problem, not the commodity.
In short: Grouped with Boss Energy as a developer whose troubles are common knowledge: "everybody knows about global atomic" — cited in the same breath as the brownfield-recycling problem and the disappointment that has set in across the uranium juniors. No thesis offered beyond that; the mention is part of the case for buying the metal.
1:08:33And most of these projects suck. They're brownfield projects that just keep getting recycled and they're hard like boss energy in Australia. The — resources pocketed and its cost went up and everybody knows about global atomic and nir and — Paladin finally got their act together bringing Langer Heinrich on board.
In short: Held at 3.5% but openly defended: "The story of Global's quest to secure funding continues to drag on"; after two-plus years the market "understandably has become quite skeptical" the DFC loan will ever land, and "another capital infusion will be necessary in the near-term… clearly the ongoing inability to secure DFC financing will lead to additional shareholder dilution." He still rates it more likely than not that DFC funding arrives and Dasa — "one of the few greenfield uranium mines in development in the world" — gets built, and the thawing Niger–Benin border talks would restore the efficient Cotonou transit route. Shares −18.0% in June to C$0.62; production planned 1H 2028.
Global Atomic is building the Dasa mine in Niger — a genuinely good deposit and one of very few new uranium mines actually under construction anywhere. The problem is money. For more than two years the company has been trying to close a loan from the US Development Finance Corporation, and it still hasn't; in the meantime it has funded construction through one dilutive equity raise after another, meaning each existing shareholder owns a steadily smaller slice.
Huhn is unusually candid that this is a contested call: "some would debate our wisdom of even maintaining an ongoing 3.5% allocation." He keeps it because he thinks the mine ultimately gets built and the DFC loan is more likely than not to arrive — but he also states flatly that another raise is needed in the near term and that it will dilute shareholders further. That combination — a good asset, a broken financing process — is why this reads as a held-but-flagged position rather than a recommendation to buy.
One genuine positive: Niger and neighbouring Benin have concluded border talks ahead of schedule, and reopening that border would restore the cheapest, most efficient export route to the port of Cotonou — a real cost item for a landlocked mine.
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In short: Political-support and Niger border updates only — "a financing update would be more welcome." The Dasa funding gap is still the swing factor; held.
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In short: Holding; no major news this month (still "highly speculative"; AIA Portfolio).
In short: Political situation in Niger continues to evolve — one of the more difficult geopolitical overlays in the uranium portfolio; held at cost basis C$1.86, 100% allocated.
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In short: Political support update only — a financing update would be more welcome; no substantive new news beyond what was covered last issue.
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In short: Announced an ATM equity facility — "more possible dilution" — while still waiting on debt financing or a JV partner for Dasa. "This is highly speculative" and only for those who can tolerate the risk.
A uranium developer whose Dasa mine in Niger still needs the big money (debt or a partner) to finish construction. While waiting, the company set up an "ATM" — permission to quietly sell new shares into the market for cash — which dilutes existing holders. Polomny holds it but is blunt: highly speculative, only for money you can afford to lose.
In short: High-profile Niger government visit secured presidential endorsement and a potential Algeria trade corridor for Dasa logistics, but no financing update — cash runway narrows to Q3–Q4 2026 at current spend with ~US$265m still needed to reach first yellowcake.
Global Atomic is building the Dasa uranium mine in Niger — one of the higher-grade undeveloped uranium projects in Africa, in a country that has historically been a significant producer. The investment case is simple: a quality uranium project in an environment where uranium prices are rising and new mine supply is badly needed. This issue they scored a genuinely positive development: a high-profile visit to Niamey produced a formal written endorsement of Dasa from Niger's president, and a new cooperation agreement with Algeria opens a potential export corridor for the finished uranium all the way to the Mediterranean — a useful alternative to the southern route through Benin that has been on and off since the 2023 coup.
The honest catch is that political support does not pay for the mine. The company ended Q1 with roughly C$59m in cash and is spending C$25–28m per quarter, which puts cash exhaustion roughly 2–2.5 quarters away if nothing changes. They still need about US$265m to actually finish the plant, and there is still no financing announcement — no debt facility, no JV partner, no concrete deal. Mart holds the position and sees the political de-risking as a genuine positive, but the clock is ticking loudly and a financing announcement before the summer ends is now the single most important event for this stock.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.