In short: The second leg of the trade: "they're also investing in offshore oil-services companies, which have struggled in recent years as demand fell. Some went bankrupt and have restructured." The catalyst is the supply answer to shale's rollover — "more companies have been open to offshore drilling as they search for ways to grow production" — with Goehring saying companies like Seadrill "should benefit." A post-restructuring, capacity-constrained services cycle levered to a capex turn.
Offshore drilling contractors own the rigs that drill wells out at sea. When oil crashed and everyone drilled cheap shale onshore instead, the offshore business collapsed — demand fell, several companies went bankrupt, and the survivors emerged from restructuring with far fewer rigs and much less debt.
The managers' argument is what happens next. If shale can no longer grow, oil companies wanting more production have to go back offshore, and there is far less capacity waiting for them than there was a decade ago. Prices for rig time rise sharply when a shrunken supply meets returning demand. Seadrill is a direct way to own that: it does one thing, and its earnings swing hard with the day rate.
The risk in the same sentence: it did once go bankrupt. This is a cyclical business with heavy fixed assets, and the thesis needs operators actually to commit capital to offshore projects, which the article describes as beginning ("more companies have been open to offshore drilling") rather than as under way.
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