In short: The archive's first mention, and used as the worked example of the whole thesis — not as a recommendation. "A perfect example to make this concept clear? Let's take the listed stock Security National Financial Corporation." A 1965-founded Salt Lake City company in life insurance, cemetery and mortuary services, and mortgages — "As you can see, it's a very boring business. And it's cheap: Price-to-book 0.6x, EV/Sales 0.6x, EV/EBITDA 3.3x, P/E 6.5x, P/FCF 3.1x." Fed into the published Excel model at 50% debt / 5% interest / 5% growth / 25% tax over 20 years, it produces EUR 4,219,897,217 versus EUR 606,080,470 from simply investing (6.96x edge, 21.2% CAGR, 30.3% earnings yield on EUR 90.09m of equity) on the EBITDA framing, and EUR 2,458,392,436 versus EUR 704,032,870 (3.49x, 17.1% CAGR, 15.4% earnings yield on EUR 104.65m of equity) on the P/E framing. Note what is absent by this archive's own standards: no moat, no ROIC, no Quality Score, no management assessment, no float-quality test — and the insurance business here is a life insurer whose float is long-dated and reserved, not the P&C float the article celebrates.
Security National is a small Salt Lake City company that sells life insurance, runs cemeteries and funeral homes, and originates mortgages. Slegers picks it because it is dull and statistically cheap: it trades below the accounting value of its own assets, at about six and a half times profits and about three times the cash it generates.
It is a demonstration, not a recommendation. He asks what would happen if you bought the whole thing rather than a few shares — paying half in cash and half with a loan at 5%, then using the company's own cash flow to pay down the debt and afterwards to buy more assets. Over twenty years his spreadsheet turns that into roughly seven times more money than simply owning stocks on one set of assumptions, and roughly three and a half times more on another. Both runs include a deliberate disaster in year seven, where profits halve and the loan is refinanced at 9%.
Two things are worth holding onto. Most of the advantage comes from the borrowed half of the purchase price, and the comparison it beats — "just investing" — uses no borrowing at all. And nothing in the analysis asks whether this is a good business, whether anyone could actually buy control of it, or what price a control buyer would have to pay above the market quote. By the standards this newsletter applied to itself a week earlier, that is the exact mistake it promised to stop making.
Nothing matches this filter.
Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.