| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 185 | $94.08 | $17,404 | 0.71% | $51.15 | $7,942 | +83.9% | — |
In short: SELLING — "Tidewater is another company that has performed for us in the past. However, it has not done much on the operation side and has stagnated. I am parting with the company and recycling capital into other opportunities."
Tidewater runs the world's largest fleet of supply vessels serving offshore rigs, and it made money for the portfolio in the past. But operations have gone sideways — "it has not done much on the operation side and has stagnated." Capital tied up in a name that isn't advancing is capital not working, so he's recycling it into ideas with more upside. Note he stays constructive on offshore generally (he keeps Saipem and Odfjell); this is a company-level decision.
In short: Holding; no major news this month (AIA Portfolio).
In short: Long-term hold — Q1 utilization came in higher than expected despite the war (costs up on insurance/crews); the Wilson Sons Ultratug 22-PSV Brazil deal closes by Q2-end. The offshore bull market predates Hormuz, and war-driven supply diversification "means more offshore exploration and development. I remain bullish."
Tidewater runs the world's largest fleet of offshore support vessels — the ships that ferry crews, supplies and equipment to offshore rigs. The war cut both ways: higher insurance and crew costs in the Gulf, but utilization actually beat expectations, and a 22-vessel Brazilian acquisition closes this quarter. The bigger idea: Hormuz scared the world into diversifying oil supply away from the Persian Gulf, and most non-Gulf supply means offshore work. The offshore bull market was underway before the war; the war extends it. A long-term hold.
In short: Owns ~6%, board member. "Industrial real estate that happens to float" — offshore supply vessels below replacement cost, supply destroyed, demand rising. Bought Swire's + 37 more vessels at cents on the dollar; the company bought back $90M of stock at $39. ~10% FCF yield, half the fleet servicing producing platforms (cash regardless of oil price).
Tidewater owns the boats that ferry crews and supplies out to offshore oil-and-gas platforms. Investors reflexively hate "offshore oil-service" stocks, so Robotti reframes it: think of the boats as scarce "industrial real estate." Nobody has built new vessels in years, lots were scrapped, and building a new one now costs far more than the old ones — so the existing fleet is worth far above its market price ("replacement cost").
With supply shrinking and demand rising, day-rates and cash flow climb fast. As a ~6% owner and board member, he had the company buy competitors' fleets at a fraction of build cost (Swire's 50 vessels for $200M that would cost ~$2B new) and buy back its own cheap stock. Half the fleet services producing platforms, which generate cash no matter where the oil price goes. He trimmed a little near $100 when an index-buying frenzy overshot, but the long thesis is intact (~10% free-cash-flow yield).
18:57So one that's in the process of unfolding today would be, so I do own almost 6% of and I'm a board member of Tidewater, which is an offshore boat oil service business. So the oil service business is an industry that's cyclical, and it's one that I've invested in since 1976. So I've got almost 50 years experience investing in an extremely cyclical business that probably has gone through, there have been two massive consolidations, bankruptcy liquidations there, or three
In short: His big position — pitched as "a real estate company… the real estate happens to float." Offshore supply boats below replacement cost: no new supply, 90% utilization, rents going through the roof. Bought for ~20 cents on the dollar of replacement cost; added at higher prices because a doubled stock is "a better buy" once the cash flows manifest. ~62% of Ravenswood is energy; notes he sold some stock in the last month.
Tidewater owns the boats that carry crews and supplies out to offshore oil-and-gas platforms. Investors reflexively hate "offshore oil-service" stocks, so Robotti reframes it as scarce "industrial real estate that happens to float": nobody's built new boats in years, many were scrapped, and a new one now costs far more than an old one — so the existing fleet is worth far above its market price (its "replacement cost").
His method is unusual but consistent: buy at roughly 20 cents on the dollar of replacement cost, and don't flinch when it falls further — a disappointing price just widens the gap between value and price, so he buys more. Counter-intuitively, he keeps buying even after the stock doubles, because once supply and demand tighten, the profits finally appear ("manifest") and the true value becomes obvious. He notes he sold some shares in the last month, but it remains a big position (energy is ~62% of his Ravenswood fund).
1:12:03have today, I'm going to talk to you about a real estate company. And the real estate company is one in which the real estate's been converted, shut down, ripped down, there's no new supply, the demand for that real estate has suddenly come into tight supply, you have 90% utilization, and therefore the rental rates going through the roof. As the rental rate goes through the roof, it all falls to the bottom line, and therefore the value of that is — well, when you get to the point where you need to build new real estate, what's the cost of
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.