David Hay — Haymaker Daily: The Bull Market Almost No One Sees — the Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index has been in a bull market since the start of 2022 and its 2026 rebound is the next leg, not a double-top; commodities are near their cheapest-ever ratio to the S&P 500 (FactSet/Jefferies), so either stocks fall precipitously or commodities keep rising; palladium is the salient shortage and oil is where the reality check is arriving (Sep 3 2026)

A two-chart Daily arguing that the commodity bull market is already four and a half years old and that almost nobody is positioned for it. The first chart is read as a technical case. The Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index "clearly had a monumental upside range expansion in early 2022," just before "Russia's ill-fated invasion of Ukraine" — an event that "caused this index to go straight up, albeit in an unsustainable fashion," and whose "feared shortages from that geopolitical shock never fully materialized." What follows is the part Hay treats as the tell: "the sharp correction from that spike ended right at the prior upside resistance level. This often occurs after significant breakouts and when the price increase becomes excessive." The index "erupted again early this year," with "the catalyst, of course, the joint American/Israeli attack on Iran," overshot again, corrected "though less severe than in 2022," and has rebounded — so "one could make the case that there will soon be a double-top around 740 on this index." He states the bear reading and then rejects it: "the other interpretation is that this is the next stage in the bull market that began at the start of 2022. Given the lengthy list of critical commodities in extremely short supply, and factoring in rising demand, we would argue for the latter interpretation. Palladium is a salient example of this condition, as we described in our August 21st, Pick of the Week." The second chart is the valuation case, and it is the more arresting one: "despite this increasingly apparent bull market, commodities remain exceedingly undervalued compared to the S&P 500," per a ZeroHedge graphic "credited to FactSet and Jefferies" plotting the GSCI/S&P 500 ratio back to 1970. "Based on the below, it's highly probable that either stocks need to fall precipitously or commodities need to continue their ascent, or some combination of both." The positioning is a continuation, not a new call: "Haymaker readers who have followed our advice to have considerable hard-asset exposure have been extremely well rewarded over the past few years. We believe that will continue, though we anticipate ongoing volatility. We will try to take advantage of these fluctuations with timely profit-taking suggestions on spikes, and buy-up guidance on weakness, with both the underlying commodities and their producers." It closes on Jeff Currie — "Scarcity is in the physical world. The illusion of abundance is behind us" — and on where the proof arrives first: "the oil market might be where that reality check is in the process of dramatically manifesting as physical shortages become increasingly difficult to dismiss with social media posts."

One-line take: the mirror image of the previous day's note. Where Sep-02 argued that US equities are being held up by a flow that must eventually reverse, this one argues the opposite side of the same trade — that the asset class nobody owns has been rising for four and a half years and is still priced near the cheapest it has ever been against that index. The two notes are one allocation, read from both ends. The construction is unusually clean for a short Daily because it separates the technical question from the valuation question and answers them independently. The technical question is whether the 2026 high near 740 on the Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index is a double-top with the 2022 spike. Hay's answer rests on a pattern he identifies rather than asserts: the 2022 blow-off was event-driven (the Ukraine invasion), it overshot, and — the diagnostic detail — "the sharp correction from that spike ended right at the prior upside resistance level," the ~500 shelf that capped the index in 2008 and 2011. A breakout that retraces precisely to old resistance and holds it is the textbook signature of a range expansion that stuck, as opposed to a spike that failed; the 2026 sequence then repeats the pattern at a higher level after "the joint American/Israeli attack on Iran," with a milder correction. He concedes the bearish reading in one sentence before dismissing it, which is the same rhetorical discipline as Sep-02. But note what actually decides it for him — not the chart. "Given the lengthy list of critical commodities in extremely short supply, and factoring in rising demand, we would argue for the latter interpretation." The technical pattern is permissive; the physical shortage is the reason. Palladium is offered as the worked example, pointing back at the Aug-21 POW! reiteration of PALL — 14 straight deficit years, Lac des Iles closed, recycling collapsing, and a metal down a third from its January apex. The valuation question is separate and is where the note lands its punch. The FactSet/Jefferies ratio of the GSCI to the S&P 500 runs back to 1970 and has spent the last six years pinned near 0.7 — below the Tech Bubble trough, and roughly a tenth of the 1990 Gulf War peak near 10. That produces the note's only unconditional claim, and it is stated as an arithmetic identity rather than a forecast: "either stocks need to fall precipitously or commodities need to continue their ascent, or some combination of both." A ratio at a 56-year extreme resolves; the note declines to say which way, which is honest, and the previous day's flow argument is what supplies the directional lean. What is rowed: the two named instruments. SPY is rowed Negative as the denominator of the ratio and the explicit alternative to "commodities continue their ascent," continuing the Sep-02 stance. PALL is rowed Positive as an explicit back-reference to the Aug-21 Buy — Hay names palladium as the salient shortage and cites his own rated note — but no new call, price target or sizing is issued here. No producer, energy name or commodity ETF is named despite the closing promise of "buy-up guidance… with both the underlying commodities and their producers," so none is inferred; the Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index and the GSCI are indices cited as evidence, not investable rows, and Jeff Currie is a person, not a security.

1. Stocks & names mentioned

Ticker	Name	Research	View	What he said	At
PALL	abrdn Physical Palladium Shares ETF	QT · SA · STK	Positive	Cited by back-reference as the worked example of the shortage that decides the chart — the standing Buy is reaffirmed, but no new call is made here. The commodity index's 2026 high is read as continuation rather than a double-top for a physical reason, not a technical one: "given the lengthy list of critical commodities in extremely short supply, and factoring in rising demand, we would argue for the latter interpretation. Palladium is a salient example of this condition, as we described in our August 21st, Pick of the Week." That note (Aug-21 POW!) reiterated PALL as a Buy on a 14-consecutive-year supply deficit, the mid-2026 closure of Lac des Iles, recycling down ~700koz on a record-old US vehicle fleet, PHEV demand the consensus mis-modelled, and a metal ~⅓ below its January-2026 apex of just over $2,000/oz — with the physically-backed ETF chosen for having no counterparty risk. Here the name is used as evidence for the index-level thesis; no price target, sizing or fresh recommendation is issued in this post, and the general hard-asset guidance ("timely profit-taking suggestions on spikes, and buy-up guidance on weakness") is framed at the asset-class level, not at PALL.	read ↗
SPY	SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust	QT · SA · STK	Negative	The denominator of the note's central chart, and one of only two ways its imbalance can resolve. The FactSet/Jefferies exhibit relayed by ZeroHedge plots the GSCI Commodity Index against the S&P 500 from 1970 to 2026; on it, "commodities remain exceedingly undervalued compared to the S&P 500" — the ratio has sat near ~0.7 for six years, below the 1999 Tech Bubble trough and roughly a tenth of the ~10 Gulf War peak, against interim highs of ~7.6 (1970s oil embargo) and ~8.3 (2008). Hay converts that into the note's only unconditional statement, and it is put as an arithmetic identity rather than a forecast: "based on the below, it's highly probable that either stocks need to fall precipitously or commodities need to continue their ascent, or some combination of both." No timing, level or target is given, and he explicitly leaves open that the resolution comes from the commodity side — the directional lean comes from the standing house view restated the day before (Sep-02: US index funds "fully invested… highly concentrated in AI-related shares," vulnerable when record tech inflows reverse). Rowed Negative on that basis: the S&P is the asset the note is positioned away from, in favour of "considerable hard-asset exposure."	read ↗

Only two instruments are named. The Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index (BCOMSP) and the GSCI Commodity Index are indices cited as evidence, not investable rows; Jeff Currie (commodity strategist), FactSet, Jefferies and ZeroHedge are sources, not securities. The closing promise of "buy-up guidance on weakness… with both the underlying commodities and their producers" names no producer, so none is inferred. Palladium appears as a back-reference to the Aug-21 Pick of the Week rather than as a new recommendation.

2. Key points

The chart in question — a 2022 range expansion, and what happened after it

"The Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index clearly had a monumental upside range expansion in early 2022. This breakout was just prior to Russia's ill-fated invasion of Ukraine."
The move that followed is described as real but unearned: the invasion "caused this index to go straight up, albeit in an unsustainable fashion," and — stated plainly against his own side — "the feared shortages from that geopolitical shock never fully materialized."
On the chart, the index runs from roughly 100 in 1999 to a ~500 peak in 2008, back to ~250 in 2009, a second ~500 peak in 2011, a decade-long decline into the ~250 pandemic low, then the vertical 2022 move to ~740.

The diagnostic — the correction stopped exactly at old resistance

"Interestingly, the sharp correction from that spike ended right at the prior upside resistance level. This often occurs after significant breakouts and when the price increase becomes excessive."
That level is the ~500 shelf that capped the index at both the 2008 and 2011 highs — visible as the white horizontal line on the Bloomberg chart. Old resistance holding as new support is the signature of a breakout that stuck rather than one that failed.
This is the load-bearing technical observation in the note: it converts the 2022 spike from "a war blow-off that round-tripped" into "a regime change that overshot and then consolidated."

2026 repeats the pattern at a higher level

"That index, which was already in recovery mode, erupted again early this year. The catalyst, of course, was the joint American/Israeli attack on Iran."
"Once again, the price increase became excessive and another correction ensued, though less severe than in 2022. Another rebound has unfolded."
The index printed 739.56 on Sep 2, 2026 (prior close 740.07) — right back at the 2022 spike high.

The bear reading is stated, then rejected — and on non-technical grounds

The concession: "one could make the case that there will soon be a double-top around 740 on this index."
The alternative: "the other interpretation is that this is the next stage in the bull market that began at the start of 2022."
What decides it is not the chart: "given the lengthy list of critical commodities in extremely short supply, and factoring in rising demand, we would argue for the latter interpretation." The technical pattern is permissive; the physical deficit is the reason.
The worked example is supplied rather than asserted: "Palladium is a salient example of this condition, as we described in our August 21st, Pick of the Week" — the Aug-21 PALL reiteration (14 straight deficit years, Lac des Iles shut, recycling collapsing, price a third below its January apex).

The valuation chart — commodities vs the S&P 500 at a 56-year extreme

"Despite this increasingly apparent bull market, commodities remain exceedingly undervalued compared to the S&P 500, per the following graphic from ZeroHedge, credited to FactSet and Jefferies."
The exhibit plots the GSCI Commodity Index ÷ S&P 500 from 1970 to 2026. Labelled peaks: the 1970s "Oil Embargo & High Inflation" (~7.6), the ~1990 "Gulf War" high (~9.5, the series maximum) and the "2008 Oil Price Spike and GFC" (~8.3). Labelled troughs: the "Nifty Fifty Market Bubble" (~1.3) and the 1999 "Tech Bubble" (~1.5).
The current reading is the point of the chart: the ratio collapsed from ~4.3 in 2011 to below 1.0 by 2019 and has sat near ~0.7 ever since — lower than the Tech Bubble trough, and the low of the entire 56-year series.

The conclusion — stated as an identity, not a forecast

"Based on the below, it's highly probable that either stocks need to fall precipitously or commodities need to continue their ascent, or some combination of both."
This is the note's only unconditional claim, and it is deliberately non-directional: a ratio at a multi-decade extreme resolves, but the sentence declines to say from which side.
The directional lean comes from elsewhere in the week — Sep-02 argued the US index is being held up by record tech inflows that will eventually reverse into "fully invested" index funds with no cash buffer. Read together, the two notes are one allocation seen from both ends.

Positioning — a continuation, run with two-way discipline

Track record claimed, not promised: "Haymaker readers who have followed our advice to have considerable hard-asset exposure have been extremely well rewarded over the past few years."
The forward view carries an explicit caveat: "we believe that will continue, though we anticipate ongoing volatility."
The method is two-sided rather than buy-and-hold: "we will try to take advantage of these fluctuations with timely profit-taking suggestions on spikes, and buy-up guidance on weakness, with both the underlying commodities and their producers." Consistent with the Aug-21 template — sell strength, buy the third-off correction.
No producer is named here, so the "buy-up guidance" is a standing offer rather than an actionable list in this post.

Where the proof arrives — oil

The frame is borrowed from Jeff Currie, "the influential commodity strategist": "Scarcity is in the physical world. The illusion of abundance is behind us."
Hay endorses both halves — "we believe both the scarcity and the illusion aspects will soon manifest themselves" — with the illusion being the sentiment/narrative layer that has kept prices from reflecting the physical balance.
The location of the test: "the oil market might be where that reality check is in the process of dramatically manifesting as physical shortages become increasingly difficult to dismiss with social media posts."
That last clause is the argument in miniature — the claim is that the physical market and the narrative about it have decoupled, and only one of them can settle a barrel.

Housekeeping

Two images accompany the post, both described in the saved article text: the Bloomberg terminal chart of BCOMSP since 1998 (last 739.5644 on 02-Sep), and the FactSet/Jefferies "Exhibit 1 — Ratio of Commodity Prices to the S&P500".
Short even by Daily standards (~470 words of body text) and signed "The Haymaker Team."
Continuity: extends the standing hard-asset / energy-shortage leg of the thesis (the Aug-21 palladium POW!, the oil-shortage thread running through Jun-18 and Jun-11) and pairs with the previous day's international-rotation note.

3. In plain English

SPY — SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust Negative

SPY is the fund that owns the S&P 500 — America's 500 biggest listed companies, held in proportion to their size. In this note it is not really being analysed as a business; it is being used as a measuring stick. The question Hay is asking is not "is the stock market expensive in dollars" but "how much stuff — oil, copper, wheat, metals — does one unit of the stock market buy?"

The chart he shows answers that, and the answer is startling. It divides a broad commodity index by the S&P 500 and runs the result back to 1970. Over those 56 years the ratio has swung between roughly 1 and roughly 10. It hit about 10 during the 1990 Gulf War, about 8 in the 2008 oil spike, about 7½ during the 1970s oil embargo. It bottomed near 1½ at the peak of the dot-com bubble in 1999 — the moment everyone points to as the most extreme case of paper assets being loved and real assets being ignored.

Today it sits near 0.7. Lower than the dot-com bottom. The lowest in the whole series. In other words, relative to the stock market, physical commodities have never been cheaper in the entire period the data covers.

From that Hay draws a conclusion that is closer to arithmetic than to prediction: a ratio this far outside its historical range does not simply stay there forever. Either the numerator rises or the denominator falls. As he puts it, "either stocks need to fall precipitously or commodities need to continue their ascent, or some combination of both." Notice that he does not claim to know which. That is unusually restrained, and it is worth respecting rather than reading past.

Why this is rowed as a negative view on the index anyway: the choice of which side resolves is answered elsewhere in his work, and the day before this note he argued that the US index is being propped up by record inflows into technology funds — roughly $216 billion this year, about three times any prior year — while still losing to foreign markets. An asset that cannot outperform even while receiving the biggest inflow on record is being carried by the flow, and flows reverse. Combine the two notes and the position is clear: own less of the index, own more of the physical world.

The practical point for a reader is about relative exposure, not about calling a crash. Nothing here says the S&P falls next month. It says that if you own only the index, you are on the expensive side of the widest gap in half a century, and the cheap side is available.

PALL — abrdn Physical Palladium Shares ETF Positive

PALL is a fund that does one thing: it buys palladium bars and stores them in a vault. There is no mine, no management team, no debt, no earnings — a share of the fund is a claim on a specific quantity of metal. That structure is the reason Hay chose it in the first place. When you own the metal itself rather than a contract or a company, there is no counterparty who can fail to deliver.

In this note palladium is not a new recommendation. It appears as the example that settles an argument about a chart. Hay is looking at a broad commodity index that has just returned to the same high it made in 2022, and asking whether that is a ceiling — a "double top," where a market fails twice at the same level and rolls over — or the pause before the next leg up. He answers it, notably, without appealing to the chart at all: he says the shortages are real this time, and points at palladium as the clearest case, referring back to his detailed Buy note of August 21st.

What makes palladium that case is the gap between what the world assumed and what actually happened. Palladium goes almost entirely into catalytic converters — the device that cleans a petrol engine's exhaust. The market decided years ago that electric cars would kill that demand quickly, and priced the metal accordingly. Instead the growth came in plug-in hybrids, which still have a full petrol engine and a converter, and often use more palladium than a conventional car. Meanwhile supply has run short of demand for fourteen consecutive years, a major Canadian mine shut in mid-2026, and recycling — which supplies roughly a tenth of the market — fell sharply as Americans held onto ageing cars instead of scrapping them.

The price, meanwhile, is about a third below its January 2026 peak of just over $2,000 an ounce. That combination — a genuine, persistent physical deficit alongside a large price decline — is exactly the "critical commodity in extremely short supply" the note's argument needs, which is why it is cited here.

One caution on reading this page: no fresh call is made in this post. There is no new target, no sizing instruction, nothing to act on beyond the standing view. The general guidance he does give is at the asset-class level — take profits into spikes, add on weakness, across both commodities and the companies that produce them — and he names no producers at all.

Written Haymaker Daily — no video and no timestamps; the "read ↗" links open the source post. Only two instruments are named: SPY as the denominator of the FactSet/Jefferies commodity-to-S&P ratio, and PALL as a back-reference to the Aug-21 Pick of the Week (no new call is issued in this post). The Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index and the GSCI are cited as evidence, not as investable rows. Summary derived from the paid Haymaker Daily (text in transcript.txt) for personal study; the two charts referenced in the original are described rather than reproduced. Not investment advice. © Haymaker / David Hay for source material.