| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he said | At |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEPL | Capstone Energy+ (fmr. Capstone Green Energy) | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Dean. The flagship bring-your-own-power holding, initiated 2025-AUG-05 and still up ~545% after halving from its May peak. Microturbines of 50 kW–3 MW at ~3× revenue against Bloom's 15–20×, with the same tailwind. The asset is time to market — 1–3 months versus 18–24 months for GE Vernova-scale turbines — and it runs at ~10% of a ~1 GW/yr three-shift capacity. "Multiple ways to win": hyperscaler data halls of 20–30 MW, thousands of 1–4 MW edge data centres still on CPUs, and manufacturers that can no longer lean on the grid. ~$300–350m fully diluted; out of prepackaged bankruptcy three years ago, first profitable year last year. | 15:33 |
| SLNG | Stabilis Solutions | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Dean. Just-initiated speculative-sleeve position (~$75m cap, so 1–3% sizing). The "virtual pipeline" for data centres with no pipeline access — liquefy the gas, truck it cryogenically, store and vaporise it on site. A consolidated niche with few remaining providers, and "the environment couldn't be better": a new data-centre contract he puts at a couple hundred million dollars over two years, plus SpaceX as a large LNG customer with launches going "from 50 or so to 20× that in 5 years." | 17:58 |
| SMOP.OL | Smartoptics Group ASA (Oslo Børs) | QT · SA · STK | Positive | Dean. The pure play on the second theme: as monolithic 1–3 GW sites top out, hyperscalers must bridge sites and "bandwidth needs are going to have to expand almost 15 times." Smartoptics makes the hardware that converts data into light for fibre between data centres plus best-in-class control software, modified to interoperate with Broadcom, Cisco and Arista. "Everyone in Silicon Valley knows them"; a smaller company, listed on Oslo for about four years, headquarters recently moved to Sweden. "Tailor made for the rise of scale-across." | 19:33 |
| VPG | Vishay Precision Group | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Dean. First flagged June 2025; tripled by June 2026, then cut in half in a month. The robotics leg of the AI thesis: the hardware for humanoids exists but "the brain isn't really there," and high-fidelity physics simulation is how AI supplies it — if that lands, "humanoid robotics might be the largest industry in 10 years." VPG makes the strain gauges and sensors that go into robot hands and already has three large customers in prototype — he names Tesla and Figure. The host stresses this is VPG, not Vishay Intertechnology (VSH), which makes passive components. | 21:34 |
| TENB | Tenable Holdings | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Deiya. The cyber pick, and the one where they were "ahead of this a little bit." Frontier models have collapsed the cost of finding vulnerabilities in code, so attacks shift back from identity (~80% of recent breaches) to traditional exploitation — CISOs "are losing their minds." Tenable leads exposure management (started 2022): find every asset, scan it, rank which vulnerabilities actually matter, then fix them — with an Anthropic partnership powering it. A huge installed base of vulnerability scanners to upsell, and it trades at 4× EV/sales versus CrowdStrike and Palo Alto north of 20×. They expect growth to accelerate. | 27:35 |
| UPWK | Upwork | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Deiya — his most contrarian call. "We've forgotten how special marketplace businesses are": Upwork is its own economy connecting businesses to high-value freelancers, with network effects that make it "impossible to replicate." The weakness is real but confined — Upwork's own data shows softness only in sub-$500 jobs (logo work, i.e. Fiverr's core) while higher-value consultative work holds, and a marketplace churns its own substrata by creative destruction. Valuation: a little over 1× EV/sales and a little over 6× EV/free cash flow even after SBC. "I don't know where you find a better bargain than that in this market." Pernas is itself a growing Upwork buyer. | 36:41 |
| SPT | Sprout Social | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Deiya. A holding, and the worked example of the SBC screen: growth has slowed but stock-based comp is still extraordinarily high, so it "screens quite poorly" on GAAP — which is exactly why it was mispriced. "It was so beaten up… everybody is pricing this thing for complete decapitation. It was very clear the market was wrong on the probabilities." Up 50–60% since he discussed it on the show in April. | 29:50 |
| WSE | Wise Group plc (Nasdaq primary; LSE: WISE) | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Deiya. A holding they are "very comfortable owning for a long period of time." Correspondent banking costs ~5% to move money across borders; the fintechs do it near 2%, and "nobody's done the work that Wise has done" plugging directly into national central banks. The distinctive point is that Wise cuts its own take rate aggressively and on purpose — "I'm going to be the loss leader… it's not due to competition, it's aggressiveness. It's not defense" — "they're the one causing the storm." Its target market is far bigger than Remitly's: businesses, banks and, ultimately, correspondent banking, Visa and Mastercard themselves. | 1:01:23 |
| RELY | Remitly | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Deiya. A holding — "a Western Union killer… a digitally native player, much more enhanced experience, cheaper fees." Purely migrant remittances, and the moat is mindshare rather than price: migrants "are not just going to try to find a lowcost solution — trust is a huge deal for them, branding is a huge deal for them," which is what defends the take rate as it drifts down "a bip here, a bip there." Send volume growing 30–40% a year with revenue up 25%, plus a long runway as cash remittances electronify. Rides Visa/Mastercard rails on 90%+ of transactions rather than owning its own infrastructure. | 59:53 |
| PSFE | Paysafe | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | Deiya — positive but explicitly "some hair on it." A conventional processor competing with PayPal, oriented to gaming and prediction markets, a segment "the Stripes of the world, the Adians of the world typically stay away from." The thesis is sum-of-the-parts: a very portable digital-wallet subsidiary worth 60–70% of the whole enterprise value at 9–10× earnings, so "not a lot has to go right for there to be a rerating." Against that: significantly overleveraged — the host puts it at $2.5bn of debt against $600m book — with high-single-digit organic growth (better than it screens, after asset sales) and a new-CEO turnaround paying debt down. | 1:04:38 |
| BE | Bloom Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Dean — the valuation foil, not a short. "You named the largest players. Bloom Energy is a massive one." Its fuel cells work at roughly the same scale as Capstone's microturbines and are "a bit more efficient," but Capstone's units are less costly and the tailwinds are "just as strong" — while Bloom trades at 15–20× revenue against Capstone's ~3×. Same theme, five to seven times the price. | 13:24 |
| GEV | GE Vernova | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Named twice as a reference point, not a view: one of the mainstream bring-your-own-power names, and the maker of the 200–300 MW turbines a microturbine is "essentially just a large turbine shrunken down" from. Its 18–24 month lead times are the gap Capstone's 1–3 month delivery fills. | 14:23 |
| CEG | Constellation Energy | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Named by the host as one of the behind-the-meter names "people hear all the time," setting up the question the brothers answer: why they own micro-caps nobody else has instead of the mainstream power complex. No view expressed on Constellation itself. | 12:43 |
| MSFT | Microsoft | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Dean. A beneficiary of open weights — enterprises running cheap open models still have to rent someone's cloud, and "the economics translates to whoever controls the GPU." Capital allocation is "a lot more measured and a lot more rational" than Meta's because Microsoft is actually in the cloud business. But it sits in the ~10× EV/sales hyperscaler cohort where "a lot is going to have to go right." | 54:00 |
| GOOGL | Alphabet / Google | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Dean. Grouped with Microsoft as a rational allocator — spending is disciplined because it monetises through the cloud — and as one of "the usual suspects" that will host enterprises' open-weight inference. Same 10× EV/sales caveat as the rest of the cohort; no separate view on the stock. | 54:00 |
| AMZN | Amazon / AWS | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Dean cites Amazon on both sides: as evidence frontier-model pricing had got too expensive ("companies like Uber and whatnot and Amazon pulling back on AI spending… people are blowing through their budgets in a span of a month"), and as one of the hyperscalers — AWS — that hosts the cheaper open-weight replacement and captures GPU rental economics instead. | 4:32 |
| ORCL | Oracle | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Named by the host at the head of the hyperscaler list. The only view attaching to it is the cohort view: ~10× EV/sales on average with a step-function capex funded out of all their free cash flow and more — "a lot is going to have to go right for that multiple to be roughly correct." | 3:44 |
| CRWD | CrowdStrike | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Deiya uses it twice as the incumbent benchmark: the reflex answer to identity-era threats ("let's hire Crowd Strike, let's get their Falcon agent"), and the valuation comparison — north of 20× EV/sales against Tenable's 4×, on a platform shift Tenable may be better positioned for. It does earn much more GAAP profit than Tenable today. | 28:28 |
| PANW | Palo Alto Networks | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Deiya. The other larger cyber rival at north of 20× EV/sales — cited to size the discount on Tenable rather than as a view on Palo Alto itself. | 28:28 |
| TOST | Toast | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Deiya, on a fintech-ETF holdings list. Positive-leaning but not a position: pure processing "is becoming commoditized and the value seems to be accruing to the application layer, to the Toasts of the world" — verticalised software that runs inventory and "the nervous system of your entire enterprise" with payments built in. The rule he draws: a payments investment has to do more than process. | 1:08:41 |
| V | Visa | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Deiya. The archetype of a payments compounder ("think about if you got into a Visa or Mastercard early"), and the rails almost every fintech ends up riding — 90%+ of Remitly's transactions move across them, which is why the recurring fintech-disruption bear case has kept failing. The one genuine threat he names is Wise, which built its own infrastructure instead: "Wise is bad for Visa and Mastercard." | 1:02:46 |
| MA | Mastercard | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Deiya. Paired with Visa throughout — "the king and queen of the space," the only payments names not to suffer huge multiple compression, and the rails Remitly settles over. Same qualification: Wise is the competitor genuinely building around them. | 1:02:46 |
| SNDK | SanDisk | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Dean opens with it as the market backdrop, not a pick: SanDisk, SK Hynix and "that entire memory complex and AI complex has been down 40, 50% over the last month and the market's really questioning if ROI is there anymore." Their answer is that the drawdown misreads open weights. | 1:28 |
| 000660.KS | SK Hynix (KRX) | QT · SA · STK | Neutral | Dean. Named alongside SanDisk as the memory complex that has fallen 40–50% in a month on ROI doubts — the setup for the whole conversation. He owns no semiconductors, and separately flags Chinese DRAM capacity as the reason. | 1:28 |
| PCOR | Procore Technologies | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Deiya's worked example of the software-defensibility test — not a position. Asked where a moat comes from now that production-ready code costs 90–95% less to write, he lists unique proprietary data, security/compliance and enterprise-grade features, integration depth, and "is there a real world component to it… helping the company with giant construction projects like a company like a Procore" — versus "purely a digital tool." | 31:49 |
| ASML | ASML Holding | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Dean, explaining why the portfolio owns no semis: China is "no longer just a producer of $1 widgets," already dominates EVs and drones, and is "going after ASML" as well as the memory makers. The ability to produce DRAM, CPUs and lithography machines far cheaper "definitely gives us pause regardless of how bullish the overall industry looks." A risk framing, not a call on ASML's stock. | 54:48 |
| CRCL | Circle Internet Group | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Deiya, in passing (auto-caption "circles"), as the market's own verdict on the stablecoin story: "I know Circle's come down significantly as a result of this narrative fading." His view is that stablecoins are overwhelmingly a crypto-trading instrument — outside a few broken banking systems in Africa, "there's absolutely zero cases of people actually using stable coins like they're using fiat" — so they are not yet a threat to Wise or Remitly. | 1:07:40 |
| — | Anthropic (private) | — | Neutral | Appears in three roles: a frontier lab whose pricing (~$10 per million input tokens) was blowing up enterprise budgets; the accuser that says open-weight models were built by distilling frontier models, citing ~4 million exchanged messages; and Tenable's partner, supplying the frontier model that reads a customer's code and assets for exposure management. The frontier layer is the one layer they think open weights are not bullish for. | 2:36 |
| — | OpenAI / ChatGPT (private) | — | Neutral | The other frontier lab in the framework — the layer whose unit economics compress when open weights arrive. Enterprises "don't have to pay $10 per million input tokens for anthropic or ChatGPT" any more, creating "an air pocket in demand for the frontier models because they make up such a large bulk," with that demand re-hosted on the hyperscalers instead. | 3:15 |
| — | Moonshot AI — Kimi (private, China) | — | Neutral | The catalyst for the whole conversation: Moonshot's open-weight Kimi model, described by the host as now number three in the world, is what triggered the fear that frontier-lab pricing power collapses. Dean thinks its gains are "not purely due to innovation, architectural improvements" but substantially distillation of frontier models — while still being bullish for the chip, cloud and application layers. | 3:15 |
| — | CXMT / ChangXin Memory (Shanghai STAR — 2026 IPO) | — | Neutral | Dean (auto-caption "CXML"): "CXML just IPOed. I think it has a half trillion dollar market cap now" — the concrete evidence for the China risk that keeps them out of semiconductors entirely. Not tickered here: a Shanghai STAR listing, no US line. | 55:10 |
| META | Meta Platforms | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | Dean. Once a large position — bought after the 2022 collapse near $90 from $300-something on ad-tracking, TikTok and metaverse fears ("throwing the baby out with the bath water") and sold above $700 last year. Now "we no longer have a position… at the moment we are more bearish on Meta for sure… the outlook for Meta is definitely negative going forward." The open-source content strategy was right; Llama underdelivered (he blames cultural mishaps, citing Yann LeCun's opposition to LLMs), and hundreds of millions spent poaching researchers "didn't really yield anything." Meta isn't in the cloud business, so its capital allocation is far less rational than Microsoft's or Google's — unless it turns into a cloud provider, "it's hard to see where they're going from here." | 52:38 |
| PYPL | PayPal | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | Deiya — a published pass, and the host congratulates them on it. They liked the Braintree processing segment, where volumes "are growing like crazy" with scale economics to come; what killed it was branded checkout — the high-margin engine of the company — where "there's just a lot of vulnerability… it's hard to see the future growth." Liking the small unprofitable half and not the large profitable half meant the whole didn't work. | 1:08:56 |
| FVRR | Fiverr | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | Deiya. The other side of the Upwork trade. Fiverr "has really productized a lot of these lower value jobs" — the sub-$500 tasks like "I need a logo created, I'm going to give you $300 for it" — which is precisely the band Upwork's own data shows AI is competing away. "I think they're going to have a much tougher time." | 38:26 |
| WU | Western Union | QT · SA · STK · FA | Negative | Deiya — the disrupted incumbent in the Remitly thesis, named only as the loser. Remitly is "a Western Union killer… much more enhanced experience, cheaper fees, and has really eroded Western Union's business model," and the migrant walking into a branch with cash to send to "grandma in Mexico" is the volume still being electronified away from it. | 59:21 |
"View" is the Pernas Research stance in this conversation (Positive / Neutral / Negative), not a price rating. Pernas Research is a two-person firm — Dean Pernas covers hardware and energy, Deiya Pernas covers software and payments — so each row names which brother made the argument where the transcript makes it clear. Several names are peer-set or valuation references rather than positions and are marked Neutral. Research: QT Qualtrim · SA Seeking Alpha · STK Stock Analysis (Smartoptics links to its Oslo Børs page; SK Hynix to its KRX page). Named but deliberately not tickered: Broadcom / Cisco / Arista (Smartoptics interoperability, no view), Stripe and Adyen (private/foreign, cited only as processors that avoid gaming), Braintree (a PayPal subsidiary), SpaceX, Tesla and Figure (customers of holdings), and the "Jagu" garble in the Meta poaching line, which could not be verified.
A data centre is useless without electricity, and in the US the grid can't supply it: the wires were built for demand that hasn't grown in twenty years, and the queue to plug a big new load into the grid runs 18 to 24 months. So the companies building AI capacity increasingly "bring their own power" — they park generators on site and burn natural gas from the pipelines that already criss-cross the country.
Capstone makes microturbines — jet-engine-style generators shrunk from the 200–300 megawatt machines GE Vernova sells down to units of 50 kilowatts to 3 megawatts. They're less efficient per unit than the giants, but they can be delivered in one to three months instead of two years, and when your alternative is having no power at all, speed beats efficiency. The factory is running at roughly a tenth of what it could make, so if orders come the profit leverage is enormous.
Dean's core argument is a price one. Bloom Energy sells a competing on-site power product into exactly the same boom and trades around 15–20 times its revenue; Capstone trades around 3 times. Same wave, a fraction of the ticket. The catch is that this is a ~$300m company that came out of a prepackaged bankruptcy three years ago and only turned its first annual profit last year — and the stock has already more than sextupled since they bought it, then halved again in a month, so the ride is violent in both directions.
Same problem as Capstone, one step further out. Bringing your own power works if a gas pipeline runs past the site. When one doesn't, somebody has to chill natural gas until it turns liquid, drive it there in refrigerated tankers, store it, and turn it back into gas at the door. That trucked-in supply chain is what the industry calls a "virtual pipeline," and it's what Stabilis does.
It's a small, consolidated niche — decades of shakeout left only a few operators — arriving at a moment when demand suddenly exists. Dean points to two contracts as evidence: a data-centre supply deal he sizes at a couple hundred million dollars over two years, and SpaceX, which burns liquefied natural gas as rocket fuel and expects its launch cadence to rise roughly twentyfold over five years.
At about a $75m market value this is the smallest thing they own, and they treat it accordingly: it sits in the "speculative" sleeve, sized at 1–3% of the portfolio, where the point is that a few multi-baggers pay for a lot of zeros. That sizing is the risk disclosure.
The bet here is on a change in shape, not just size. Today's biggest AI sites are single campuses of 1 to 3 gigawatts. Dean thinks that's near the ceiling — you physically can't get more power to one place, and towns are starting to ban them over water and emissions. So instead of one ten-gigawatt campus you get ten one-gigawatt campuses in different states, and they have to behave as though they were one machine.
That means enormous amounts of data moving between buildings that are hundreds of miles apart, over fibre-optic cable. Dean's estimate is that the bandwidth required goes up about fifteenfold. Smartoptics makes the equipment that turns data into pulses of light to send down that fibre, plus the software that keeps the signal accurate — and, importantly, its kit is designed to interoperate with the Broadcom, Cisco and Arista gear customers already run, rather than demanding they rip it out.
Practical note for a US investor: this is a Norwegian company listed in Oslo (its head office recently moved to Sweden), so you're buying a foreign small cap in kroner, not a US-listed stock.
A strain gauge is a small sensor that measures how much a material bends or squeezes, which is how a machine knows how hard it is gripping something. Put them in a robot's fingers and you get the difference between picking up an egg and crushing it. Vishay Precision Group makes those gauges and sensors, and Dean says it already supplies three large humanoid-robot programmes still at the prototype stage — he names Tesla and Figure among them.
The thesis is a conditional one, and he states it as such: the mechanical bodies for humanoid robots basically exist, but the "brain" doesn't, and he thinks AI trained in very realistic physics simulations is what supplies it. If that happens, humanoid robots could be one of the largest industries on earth within a decade, and the demand for parts that go in every hand is uncountable. If it doesn't, you own a small industrial sensor maker.
One caution the host insists on: this is VPG, not Vishay Intertechnology (VSH), a different and much larger company that makes ordinary electronic components. The names are nearly identical and he says he confused them himself.
For a decade most hacking has been social: trick an employee into handing over a password and walk in the front door. Companies bought tools like CrowdStrike's to watch for that. Deiya's argument is that AI has just reopened the older, harder attack route — a frontier model can read through thousands of lines of a company's code and find genuine flaws in it cheaply, so attackers no longer need to fool anyone.
That creates demand for a different product, called exposure management: tell me every system I own (most large companies genuinely don't know), scan all of it, list the hundreds of weaknesses, then rank the handful that an attacker could actually exploit to do real damage — and fix them. Tenable has been building this since 2022 on top of its older vulnerability-scanning business, and uses a partnership with Anthropic to run frontier models across a customer's assets and code. Its existing scanner customers are a ready-made upgrade base.
The valuation is the other half of the case: Tenable trades at about 4 times its annual revenue while CrowdStrike and Palo Alto trade above 20 times. You're paying a fifth of the price for the company Deiya thinks is best positioned for the next shift, and he expects its growth rate — currently around 10% — to speed up rather than keep fading.
Upwork is a marketplace where businesses hire freelancers. Investors have dumped it on the obvious fear that AI does freelance work now. Deiya's counter is that the fear is right about one slice and wrong about the rest — and Upwork publishes the data that shows which. Jobs worth under $500, the "make me a logo for $300" tier, are visibly weakening. Everything above that, where a client wants a person who understands their problem, is not.
His reasoning about why the top end survives: a small business often doesn't know what to ask an AI for. Talking to a human expert who does — and who is himself using AI, so he's faster and cheaper than before — beats writing prompts until something comes out right. And a marketplace isn't a fixed catalogue: when one category of work dies, freelancers move to whatever businesses need next, the way any economy does.
The reason he calls it easy to own is the price. "EV/sales" compares the whole company's value to its annual revenue, and Upwork trades a bit above 1× — roughly the value of one year's sales. On free cash flow (the actual cash the business throws off) it's a bit above 6×, even after counting the shares it hands to staff as a real cost. A genuine network-effect business, which is one of the hardest things in the world to rebuild from scratch, at close to a liquidation-style multiple.
Sprout Social sells software for managing a company's social-media presence, and its shares had been priced, in Deiya's words, "for complete decapitation" by AI. He thought the market had simply mis-set the odds, said so on this show in April, and the stock is up 50–60% since.
The transferable idea is why it was mispriced. Sprout pays a lot of its staff in stock. Accounting rules count that as an expense, so the reported profit looks terrible and the company fails most automated stock screens — which means the funds and quant models that buy on screens never even look at it. But stock-based pay behaves like any other variable cost: as a company matures, it usually shrinks as a share of revenue. When it does, reported profits jump sharply without the underlying business changing at all. Buying before that normalisation is the trade.
Sending money between countries through the traditional banking system is slow, opaque and costs roughly 5% of the amount, because banks were built nation by nation and international transfer was bolted on afterwards through a chain of intermediary ("correspondent") banks. Wise built its own plumbing instead — direct connections into a long list of national payment systems — and moves money at closer to 2%, with tracking so you can see it arrive.
What Deiya finds unusual is the posture. Most companies defend a fee against competitors; Wise cuts its own fee as fast as it can on purpose, to make itself the cheapest option and pull volume in. "It's not due to competition, it's aggressiveness. It's not defense." In the host's phrase, Wise is the one causing the storm rather than being caught in it — and the infrastructure nobody has replicated is what lets it survive its own price war.
Its ambition is also much larger than a consumer app: it sells its rails to businesses and to banks, which puts it in the way of correspondent banking and, eventually, of Visa and Mastercard. One housekeeping note: Wise moved its main stock market listing from London to Nasdaq in May 2026, so the primary line is now the US one (WSE), with London as secondary.
Remitly does one thing: it lets migrants send money home from a phone. That is the business Western Union built on physical storefronts, and Deiya's shorthand is that Remitly is "a Western Union killer" — cheaper, trackable, and native to the device the customer already carries.
The interesting part is why he thinks its fees hold up. In most commodity businesses the cheapest provider wins and margins collapse. But migrants sending money to family are not shopping purely on price — they're deciding whether they trust a company with cash their relatives are depending on, and they pick brands they recognise and hear about within their own community. That mindshare is why Remitly's take rate slips only a basis point at a time rather than falling off a cliff, while volume grows 30–40% a year and revenue 25%.
There's also a long runway that has nothing to do with taking share from rivals: an enormous amount of remittance money is still physical cash walked into a branch, and every year some of it moves onto a phone for the first time. The tradeoff versus Wise is that Remitly rides Visa and Mastercard's rails for over 90% of its transactions rather than owning the pipes — cheaper to build, but it pays a toll.
Paysafe is a payment processor — it handles card transactions for other companies — with an unusual specialisation in online gambling and prediction markets. Big, respectable processors like Stripe and Adyen generally won't touch that business because of the regulatory headache, which is exactly why a specialist can earn good economics in a segment that happens to be growing fast.
The value argument is a "sum of the parts" one: Paysafe also owns a digital-wallet business which, valued on its own at a normal 9–10 times earnings, would be worth 60–70% of what the entire company is currently valued at — and it's a clean, separable business that could be sold. In other words you're getting the rest of the company nearly free, so "not a lot has to go right for there to be a rerating."
Deiya is unusually explicit that this one has "hair on it." The company carries around $2.5 billion of debt against roughly $600 million of book value, which is a lot of leverage for a business growing revenue in the high single digits. Debt magnifies both outcomes: if the turnaround under the new CEO works and the wallet is monetised, the equity moves violently upward; if trading deteriorates, lenders get paid before shareholders do.
Bloom Energy is the well-known way to play on-site power for data centres. It sells fuel cells — boxes that convert natural gas into electricity chemically rather than by burning it in a turbine — which are somewhat more efficient than Capstone's microturbines at a broadly similar scale.
Dean isn't arguing against the business; he's arguing against the price. Bloom trades around 15–20 times its annual revenue while Capstone trades near 3 times, for exposure to the same shortage of electricity. That gap is the entire reason the portfolio holds the obscure name rather than the famous one — and it's also the honest risk: the market is paying up for Bloom because it is bigger, better financed and more efficient, all of which are real advantages if the boom lasts.
This is a closed position they now speak against, which makes it more informative than a fresh opinion. They bought Meta after its 2022 collapse — down about 70%, near $90 a share from over $300 — when the market feared Apple's privacy changes had broken its ad targeting, TikTok was taking the young audience, and Zuckerberg was burning $40–50bn a year on the metaverse. They judged that "throwing the baby out with the bath water," and sold above $700 last year.
Their reason for turning negative is specific and worth separating from general AI scepticism. Meta doesn't sell cloud computing, so unlike Microsoft, Google or Amazon it has no direct way to earn a return on the chips it buys — the payoff has to arrive indirectly, through better content and more engagement. That made its original open-source AI plan coherent: make AI cheap, people make more content, Meta's network captures it. That plan has stalled — Llama disappointed, and hundreds of millions spent hiring researchers away from rivals "didn't really yield anything."
So the concern is not that Meta spends a lot; it's that Meta spends a lot without the mechanism that makes the others' spending rational. Dean still rates Zuckerberg highly as an operator — he monetised mobile when that was thought impossible and cloned Snapchat successfully — but "the outlook for Meta is definitely negative going forward" unless it becomes a cloud provider or ships something remarkable.
PayPal is really two businesses. Braintree is the invisible plumbing that processes card payments for other companies' checkouts — huge and fast-growing, but low margin. Branded checkout is the familiar yellow PayPal button, which is small in volume terms but where nearly all the profit comes from.
Pernas looked hard and passed, and the shape of the pass is the lesson: they liked the half that wasn't making money and distrusted the half that was. Braintree's volumes are growing "like crazy" with real scale economics still ahead of it. But branded checkout is exposed — the reason people used to click the PayPal button is being eroded as one-click payment gets built into every phone, browser and platform, and "it's hard to see the future growth." When the profitable half is the vulnerable half, cheapness doesn't rescue the whole.
Fiverr is Upwork's competitor, but it made a different bet: it turned freelance work into off-the-shelf products at low fixed prices — a logo, a short video edit, a quick translation. That productisation was its strength for a decade and is now precisely its problem, because those small, well-specified tasks are the ones generative AI does adequately for nearly nothing.
Deiya draws the line explicitly using Upwork's own disclosure: jobs below $500 are where the weakness shows up, and that band is most of Fiverr's business but only a small part of Upwork's. Same industry, same technology, opposite exposure — "I think they're going to have a much tougher time."
Western Union is the incumbent in migrant remittances: a global network of physical agent locations where someone hands over cash and a relative collects it somewhere else. That network was the moat for a century, because there was no other way to do it.
It is also the thing being disintermediated. A phone app does the same job at lower cost with a tracking screen, and Deiya says Remitly "has really eroded Western Union's business model." He isn't making a detailed forecast about the stock — he's describing which side of a migration he wants to own. The cash still walked into branches today is the pool that keeps draining toward the apps.
Compiled from the public YouTube video for personal study. Stances are Dean and Deiya Pernas' own as stated on 2026-08-07; Pernas Research sells a paid subscription and the interview carries a discount offer, so read the picks as a promoted book, attributed and never endorsed. Not investment advice.