Turning a watchlist into a set of standing limit orders: one target multiple per name, the implied price published beside the market price, and two adjustments that change the answer.
1. End every research note with a target multiple and the price it implies
The repeatable method
- Do the quality work first and reach a verdict on the business independent of price.
- Then choose one multiple you would pay — and say why that one (a historical average, a peer, a required return).
- Convert it to a share price, and print it next to the current price. The gap is the output.
- Keep the list; when a name is later bought, check the price paid against the number you published.
Here: seven names, seven closing blocks. GOOGL 18x → $210 vs $336; ASML 25x → €745 vs €1,245; CTAS 25x → $132 vs $179; ADYEN.AS 20x → €765 vs €970; FICO 25x post-SBC → $901 vs $1,058; CPRT 18x → $28.7 vs $33.8. Only III.L (2,859p vs a 3,017p NAV) is inside its own limit.
Watch for
- Targets quietly revised upward when a name runs. The value of publishing is entirely in the later comparison.
- A list where none of the entries is reachable. That is a wish list, and it should be labelled as one.
2. Restate the multiple after stock-based compensation before you call anything cheap
The repeatable method
- Take stock-based compensation from the cash flow statement and express it as a percentage of net income.
- If it is material — anything above roughly 10% deserves the work — deduct it and recompute earnings.
- Recompute the forward multiple on the adjusted number, and treat that as the real one.
- Set the entry target on the adjusted basis too, so the two numbers are comparable.
- Check whether the "cheapest in a decade" claim survives the adjustment. Often it does not.
Here: FICO is introduced as trading "near its cheapest valuation level of the past 10 years (Forward PE: 23.8x)" — and that figure is then discarded.
SBC equals 25% of net income, so "the adjusted Forward PE equals 29.6x", and the target is 25.0x
after SBC. The same adjustment is applied to
FTNT two days later (
23 April: SBC 15% of net income, 29.2x reported → 33.6x adjusted).
Watch for
- Companies whose SBC ratio is rising — the adjustment gets worse each year and the reported multiple gets progressively less informative.
- Buyback programmes that merely offset dilution being counted as shareholder returns.
3. Value a cash-rich company both ways, then set the target on the stricter one
The repeatable method
- Measure net cash as a percentage of market capitalisation.
- Compute the forward multiple twice: on the market cap as quoted, and on enterprise value with the cash stripped out.
- Publish both, so the reader knows how much of the apparent cheapness is just idle cash.
- Set your entry target on the including-cash basis unless you have a reason to believe the cash will be deployed well.
Here: CPRT — "a Forward PE of 21.1x and they have a net cash position equal to 15% (!) of their current market capitalization. If we exclude the cash, Copart trades at a Forward PE of just 17.9x." The stated buy level: "18x earnings (including cash)", i.e. $28.7 against a $33.8 price. The stricter of the two definitions is chosen deliberately.
Watch for
- Net cash that never gets used. A permanent hoard is not worth face value to a minority holder.
- The temptation to switch bases mid-argument — cheap on EV, expensive on P/E, quote whichever suits.
4. Price a holding company against NAV, not against earnings
The repeatable method
- For a holding or investment company, find the published net asset value per share and its date.
- Compare it to the share price to get the discount or premium.
- Check how stale the NAV is and how much of it is unlisted (marked by the manager) rather than quoted.
- Look through to the dominant underlying asset and underwrite that — the wrapper only decides the price you pay for it.
- Set the entry as a discount level, and be explicit about what discount is normal for this vehicle.
Here: III.L at 2,859p against an end-2025 NAV of 3,017p — "a small discount", and "buying 3i Group at a discount compared to its NAV is never a bad idea if you ask me." The look-through is stated plainly:
~90% of 3i's private equity returns come from Action, so this is an Action decision. The same NAV test recurs on
HGT.L (
30 April: 560p NAV against a 350p price, a 37.5% discount) and on
INVE-B.ST (
26 April: entry at 0.9x book).
Watch for
- The NAV date. A year-end figure quoted in April is four months old, and unlisted marks move on a lag.
- Concentration masquerading as diversification: a "private equity portfolio" that is 90% one asset is a single-stock position.
5. Use unit payback period to decide whether growth needs outside money
The repeatable method
- Find the all-in cost of one new unit — a store, a site, a route, a machine.
- Find the annual cash it generates once open.
- Divide: that is the payback period, and it determines whether expansion is self-funding.
- Multiply the free cash flow by the payback to get the number of units the business can open per year without borrowing or issuing shares.
- Sanity-check it against the actual opening rate.
Here: Action "earns back the ~€500k it spends to open a store in less than a year. This helps them pay for new stores on its own, opening about one new store every day." That single ratio is what makes a 26% revenue CAGR since 2011 credible without a funding story attached.
Watch for
- Payback figures quoted on mature stores rather than new ones — the newest cohort is the one that matters.
- Saturation showing up first as a lengthening payback, before it shows up in the opening rate.
6. Look for one number that isolates pricing power from volume
The repeatable method
- Find a revenue line where the unit volume is separately observable.
- Compare revenue growth with unit growth. The difference is price.
- If revenue grew sharply while units were flat or falling, you have measured pricing power directly rather than inferred it from margins.
- Then ask what enforces it — regulation, embedded workflow, a certification, or just habit.
Here: FICO — "Mortgage score revenue jumped 52% last year. Not because more homes were sold, but because FICO just charged more. That's what real pricing power looks like." The enforcement mechanism is named separately: 95% share, plus regulators and internal bank risk models built around the score.
Watch for
- The regulatory foundation being the thing that breaks — two weeks later the FHFA approved VantageScore 4.0 for mortgage underwriting and the stock fell more than 55% from its peak.
- Pricing power measured over one year. Repeated increases without volume loss are the test, not a single hike.
7. Frame every candidate as a switch, with a required improvement in expected return
The repeatable method
- Estimate an expected annual return for each position you already hold.
- Estimate the same for each candidate, on the same method.
- Only consider a switch when the difference is large enough to survive tax, spread and the risk of being wrong about both.
- Run the sell review before the buy list, so the comparison has a specific loser rather than a vague one.
Here: "If you are invested in a company where you believe the future expected return equals 8% per year… and you find another one with an expected return of 13% per year…
you should consider making the switch." The sequencing is deliberate: the
conviction review came first and produced named candidates for sale, so this list is being measured against
JDG.L, not against cash. The resolution lands on
28 April.
Watch for
- Expected returns computed on different methods for the incumbent and the challenger — the comparison is only valid on a single model.
- The switch never happening. Nine days later the money went to three existing holdings instead, which is a legitimate answer but a different one.
Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.