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Actionable insights — Our Shopping List (Part I)

Turning a watchlist into a set of standing limit orders: one target multiple per name, the implied price published beside the market price, and two adjustments that change the answer.
2026-APR-21 · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Pieter Slegers / Team Compounding Quality · read ↗ · full analysis · transcript
How to read this page: the transferable content of this issue is a template, applied seven times. Every candidate gets the same closing block — a target multiple, the price it implies, and the current price — so a reader can tell at a glance which names are actually in play. The two most useful insights are the adjustments: valuing FICO after stock-based compensation, and valuing Copart both with and without its net cash. Written post, so no timestamps.

1. End every research note with a target multiple and the price it implies

The repeatable method
  1. Do the quality work first and reach a verdict on the business independent of price.
  2. Then choose one multiple you would pay — and say why that one (a historical average, a peer, a required return).
  3. Convert it to a share price, and print it next to the current price. The gap is the output.
  4. Keep the list; when a name is later bought, check the price paid against the number you published.
Here: seven names, seven closing blocks. GOOGL 18x → $210 vs $336; ASML 25x → €745 vs €1,245; CTAS 25x → $132 vs $179; ADYEN.AS 20x → €765 vs €970; FICO 25x post-SBC → $901 vs $1,058; CPRT 18x → $28.7 vs $33.8. Only III.L (2,859p vs a 3,017p NAV) is inside its own limit.
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2. Restate the multiple after stock-based compensation before you call anything cheap

The repeatable method
  1. Take stock-based compensation from the cash flow statement and express it as a percentage of net income.
  2. If it is material — anything above roughly 10% deserves the work — deduct it and recompute earnings.
  3. Recompute the forward multiple on the adjusted number, and treat that as the real one.
  4. Set the entry target on the adjusted basis too, so the two numbers are comparable.
  5. Check whether the "cheapest in a decade" claim survives the adjustment. Often it does not.
Here: FICO is introduced as trading "near its cheapest valuation level of the past 10 years (Forward PE: 23.8x)" — and that figure is then discarded. SBC equals 25% of net income, so "the adjusted Forward PE equals 29.6x", and the target is 25.0x after SBC. The same adjustment is applied to FTNT two days later (23 April: SBC 15% of net income, 29.2x reported → 33.6x adjusted).
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3. Value a cash-rich company both ways, then set the target on the stricter one

The repeatable method
  1. Measure net cash as a percentage of market capitalisation.
  2. Compute the forward multiple twice: on the market cap as quoted, and on enterprise value with the cash stripped out.
  3. Publish both, so the reader knows how much of the apparent cheapness is just idle cash.
  4. Set your entry target on the including-cash basis unless you have a reason to believe the cash will be deployed well.
Here: CPRT — "a Forward PE of 21.1x and they have a net cash position equal to 15% (!) of their current market capitalization. If we exclude the cash, Copart trades at a Forward PE of just 17.9x." The stated buy level: "18x earnings (including cash)", i.e. $28.7 against a $33.8 price. The stricter of the two definitions is chosen deliberately.
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4. Price a holding company against NAV, not against earnings

The repeatable method
  1. For a holding or investment company, find the published net asset value per share and its date.
  2. Compare it to the share price to get the discount or premium.
  3. Check how stale the NAV is and how much of it is unlisted (marked by the manager) rather than quoted.
  4. Look through to the dominant underlying asset and underwrite that — the wrapper only decides the price you pay for it.
  5. Set the entry as a discount level, and be explicit about what discount is normal for this vehicle.
Here: III.L at 2,859p against an end-2025 NAV of 3,017p — "a small discount", and "buying 3i Group at a discount compared to its NAV is never a bad idea if you ask me." The look-through is stated plainly: ~90% of 3i's private equity returns come from Action, so this is an Action decision. The same NAV test recurs on HGT.L (30 April: 560p NAV against a 350p price, a 37.5% discount) and on INVE-B.ST (26 April: entry at 0.9x book).
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5. Use unit payback period to decide whether growth needs outside money

The repeatable method
  1. Find the all-in cost of one new unit — a store, a site, a route, a machine.
  2. Find the annual cash it generates once open.
  3. Divide: that is the payback period, and it determines whether expansion is self-funding.
  4. Multiply the free cash flow by the payback to get the number of units the business can open per year without borrowing or issuing shares.
  5. Sanity-check it against the actual opening rate.
Here: Action "earns back the ~€500k it spends to open a store in less than a year. This helps them pay for new stores on its own, opening about one new store every day." That single ratio is what makes a 26% revenue CAGR since 2011 credible without a funding story attached.
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6. Look for one number that isolates pricing power from volume

The repeatable method
  1. Find a revenue line where the unit volume is separately observable.
  2. Compare revenue growth with unit growth. The difference is price.
  3. If revenue grew sharply while units were flat or falling, you have measured pricing power directly rather than inferred it from margins.
  4. Then ask what enforces it — regulation, embedded workflow, a certification, or just habit.
Here: FICO — "Mortgage score revenue jumped 52% last year. Not because more homes were sold, but because FICO just charged more. That's what real pricing power looks like." The enforcement mechanism is named separately: 95% share, plus regulators and internal bank risk models built around the score.
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7. Frame every candidate as a switch, with a required improvement in expected return

The repeatable method
  1. Estimate an expected annual return for each position you already hold.
  2. Estimate the same for each candidate, on the same method.
  3. Only consider a switch when the difference is large enough to survive tax, spread and the risk of being wrong about both.
  4. Run the sell review before the buy list, so the comparison has a specific loser rather than a vague one.
Here: "If you are invested in a company where you believe the future expected return equals 8% per year… and you find another one with an expected return of 13% per year… you should consider making the switch." The sequencing is deliberate: the conviction review came first and produced named candidates for sale, so this list is being measured against JDG.L, not against cash. The resolution lands on 28 April.
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Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.