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Actionable insights — Adding To Our Portfolio

Three different metrics for three different business types, sizing a top-up off the position weight, and buying a broker deliberately into a soft pricing cycle.
2026-APR-30 · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Pieter Slegers / Team Compounding Quality · read ↗ · full analysis · transcript
How to read this page: a transaction issue, so the methods are about execution and sizing rather than discovery — but with an unusual feature worth studying: three purchases valued on three different metrics, each chosen because the business type demands it. The last insight is a criticism of the archive's own consistency on Fairfax. Written post, so no timestamps.

1. Pick the profitability metric from the ownership structure, not from habit

The repeatable method
  1. Before valuing anything, ask what distorts reported earnings for this particular structure — minority interests, amortisation of acquired intangibles, manager marks, insurance reserving.
  2. Choose the measure that removes the distortion, and define it explicitly for the reader.
  3. Apply it consistently to the company and to its closest comparable, so the two are on the same footing.
  4. Publish the growth rate of that measure, not just its level — the trajectory is what you are buying.
Here: three purchases, three metrics. TOI.V on Free Cash Flow Attributable to Shareholders — defined in the text as cash "after the company has paid all its costs (operating bills, replaced necessary equipment, and accounted for money owed to minority partners)… very similar to Warren Buffett's idea of Owner's Earnings" — because Topicus's subsidiaries have minority co-owners. HGT.L on NAV, with the calculation spelled out. BRO on the insurance pricing cycle plus EPS. Nothing is priced on a headline P/E.
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2. When two companies run the same model, prefer the one small enough for the deals to matter

The repeatable method
  1. Establish the typical acquisition size the model relies on.
  2. Express it as a percentage of each candidate's own earnings or enterprise value.
  3. If the deal moves the smaller company's numbers and not the larger one's, the smaller has the higher reinvestment runway from an identical opportunity set.
  4. Check that the smaller one has the same capital access, discipline and people — the model, not just the size, has to transfer.
Here: "Scale works against you in M&A. Constellation has grown so large that small acquisitions barely move the needle, while Topicus remains small enough to achieve rapid growth from the same deals." Confirmed in the numbers: FCFA2S +23% at TOI.V against +14% at CSU.TO. The same argument appears in the April portfolio review: "the larger you are, the harder it is to grow."
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3. Look for regulation that strengthens the assets you are about to buy, not just the buyer

The repeatable method
  1. For an acquirer, ask what is happening to the competitive position of its targets, not only its own.
  2. Identify rules that raise switching costs or favour local incumbents — data residency, sovereignty requirements, certification.
  3. If those rules make the targets stickier, the acquirer is buying better assets at unchanged prices, which improves returns without any operational effort.
  4. Check whether the acquirer is actually paying up for that improved quality; if not, it is free.
Here: "European sovereignty concerns and stricter data regulation act as moats for local software companies, a tailwind that directly benefits Topicus's acquisition targets." Note the direction: the benefit is described as accruing to the things being acquired, which is where a roll-up's returns are actually made.
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4. Let existing position weight decide where a top-up goes

The repeatable method
  1. List holdings by current weight alongside current conviction.
  2. Look for the mismatches: high conviction, low weight.
  3. Direct incremental capital there first, and say so — it converts a vague "we like it" into an explicit sizing decision.
  4. Check whether the discount or valuation gap has widened since the position was set, which is what makes the top-up more than a rebalance.
Here: HGT.L — "It's also one of the smaller positions in Our Portfolio. That's exactly why we'll be adding to it." And the gap had widened: 560p NAV against 350p is a 37.5% discount, against roughly 30% on the same NAV a fortnight earlier in the 16 April review. Allocation: $20,000 / $15,000 / $15,000 across the three, not equal weights.
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5. Buy a cycle-exposed business when its pricing cycle is against it, and name the offsetting mechanism

The repeatable method
  1. Identify where the industry pricing cycle is, with a number.
  2. Accept that reported growth will be poor for as long as it lasts — that is the entry.
  3. Find the mechanism that limits the damage, and check it is genuinely counter-cyclical rather than merely a cost cut.
  4. Establish when the comparison base normalises, so you know roughly when the reported numbers turn.
  5. Size it as an addition to an existing position rather than a new one, since the timing is unknowable.
Here: BRO — "the majority of insurance markets Brown & Brown is involved in are currently softening and slowing. While this does slow down organic growth in the short-term, it gives us an opportunity to buy more at an attractive price." The offset is genuinely counter-cyclical: "E&S CAT property rates have declined 15-35%, but there is an inverse correlation where lower rates often lead to higher contingent commissions, keeping margins from falling too far." And the base normalises on a known date — "management expects organic growth to improve throughout 2026 as the Accession business enters the organic comparison."
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6. Read a weak organic growth number for the acquisition sitting inside it

The repeatable method
  1. When organic growth disappoints at a serial acquirer, check whether a large recent deal is excluded from the organic base.
  2. Find the date the acquisition anniversaries and enters the comparison.
  3. Until then, organic growth understates the business; afterwards it may flatter it.
  4. Look at total revenue and EPS alongside, to see what the acquired business is actually contributing.
Here: "The market didn't seem to like the low organic growth in the most recent earnings report" — while Accession contributed $445m in Q1 revenue and Q1 EPS grew 8% to $1.39. The conclusion: "Mr. Market is focused on short-term headwinds and missing the massive earnings power of the integrated Accession business."
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7. Publish the order — amount, quantity, limit — before execution, and in the right currency

The repeatable method
  1. State the size in your accounting currency, the quantity in shares, and the limit in the listing currency.
  2. Sanity-check the three against each other before publishing; the arithmetic should reconcile at prevailing rates.
  3. Publish before you trade, so the record cannot be edited after the fact.
  4. Consider liquidity: for thin listings, an announced order is a signal others will act on first.
Here: TOI.V $20,000 / 285 shares / limit CAD 97 (285 × 97 = CAD 27,645 ≈ US$20,000); HGT.L $15,000 / "Q 3.075" — European notation for 3,075 shares — / limit 365p (£11,224 ≈ US$15,000); BRO $15,000 / 160 shares / limit $63. All three reconcile.
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8. Use one valuation basis per company, and flag it loudly if you change

The repeatable method
  1. Record the basis you chose for each name and the number it produced, with a date.
  2. If you later switch basis, publish both, explain why the first was wrong, and reconcile them.
  3. Never let a change of basis be the thing that turns a "too expensive" into a "buy".
  4. Before executing, check the price against the most recent published target on the original basis.
Here: FFH.TO — "I estimate the intrinsic value of Fairfax equals 3,000 CAD. As the current stock price equals 2,340, this implies a discount of 22%." One week earlier, on 23 April, the published entry was 1.2x book value = CAD 1,777.5, i.e. the stock was ~28% too expensive at almost the same price. The switch is not mentioned. The 16 August purchase at CAD 2,300 publishes no valuation at all.
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Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.