How to rate what you already own: read the company's own buyback as a valuation opinion, match the metric to the business model, and score risk separately from cheapness.
How to read this page: the top nine positions on the same template as
Part I, so the reusable material here is what the
disagreements between entries teach — two names at the same multiple with opposite ratings, and three big winners split between Hold and Strong Buy. Written post, so no timestamps.
1. Read a company's own buyback behaviour as its valuation opinion
The repeatable method
- Track repurchases quarter by quarter rather than by the announced programme size.
- Note when buying accelerates into a fall — that is management saying the shares are cheap with its own balance sheet.
- Note when it stops without the cash position changing. That is the more valuable signal, and almost nobody publishes it.
- Treat a stopped buyback on a rising share price as a price ceiling set by the best-informed party.
Here, both halves on one name. MEDP: "the biotech industry went through a tough time at the beginning of 2025. The good news? Medpace heavily bought back shares during this period. This is a strong sign of great capital allocation skills." Then, after +69% in a year at 37.8x against a 29.7x average: "Management also stopped buying back shares because of this reason." Rating: Hold. Contrast AMP, where the repurchase is the entire return engine — "Ameriprise is a cannibal stock, so the most important thing is the buybacks… the trend is still steadily downward" — against a policy of returning ~85% of capital.
Watch for
- A programme authorised and not executed. KNSL's "$250 million buyback" is permission; check the shares actually retired.
- Buying that only offsets stock compensation. Share count, not dollars spent, is the measure.
2. Match the profit metric to the business model — then hold the multiple to that metric
The repeatable method
- Ask what accounting charge distorts this particular model: acquisition amortisation for a roll-up, consolidation for a holding company, growth capex for a scaling manufacturer.
- Choose the measure the owner actually receives, and use it consistently for both the multiple and the reverse DCF.
- Where you have no adjusted metric, do not pretend the raw multiple means the same thing.
- Say which metric you used, so two companies at "31x" can be compared honestly.
Here, the sharpest comparison in the archive. KPG.AX at 31.2x against a 29.4x five-year average is a Strong Buy; GAW.L at 31.3x against a 23.8x average is a Hold. The difference is the metric and the yardstick: Kelly Partners is underwritten on NPATA against a published FY31 plan ("Revenue: +24.4%; EBITDA: +31.4%; NPATA: +28.2%", reverse DCF "17.1% using NPATA" against management's 30%), while Games Workshop is on reported earnings with no growth plan and a modelled return of 9.4%, below the 10% bar.
Watch for
- An adjusted metric compared with an unadjusted five-year average of itself. Both sides of the ratio have to be built the same way.
- Management's own plan used as the growth input without a haircut, as it is here.
3. Score risk separately from cheapness, and let it cap the rating
The repeatable method
- Complete the valuation work and record what the models say.
- Then list the live risks — legal, regulatory, operational, criminal — as a separate item.
- Allow the risk list to cap the rating one notch below what the numbers alone would support, and say so explicitly.
- Do not net the two into a single adjusted number, because that hides which one moved.
Here: EVO.ST has the best numbers in the entire portfolio — 9.9x forward against a 22.5x average, a 15.3% modelled return, a reverse DCF implying −2.2% growth, and a 10% shareholder yield — and is capped: "It's a 'Buy' and not a 'Strong Buy' because there are also serious risks involved with the company." The risks are itemised: "regulatory risks; strikes in Malta; a short report; cybercrime in Asia," after a fall of "more than 60% from its all-time highs."
Watch for
- Risks that are permanent rather than temporary. Regulation and organised crime targeting the product are not a cycle.
- A shareholder yield funded from a shrinking earnings base — the yield falls with the earnings, so it is not a floor.
4. Being right about the business does not upgrade the rating
The repeatable method
- Separate three questions: was the drawdown temporary, was the business fine, and is the price attractive now.
- Answer the first two from evidence — the results, and what insiders did with their own money.
- Answer the third from the models, and let it set the rating regardless of how well the first two went.
- Record the vindication anyway, because the point is the process, not the outcome.
Here: LVMUY fell "more than 40% last year" on five named temporary causes, "But Bernard Arnault was buying shares the entire time, showing his conviction", and October proved him right on all three counts (Asian fashion demand, Wines & Spirits, organic growth). The lesson is drawn — Buffett's "the stock market is a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient" — and the rating is still Hold, on 25.7x against a 24.9x average and a modelled return of 9.2%: "the valuation looks quite 'luxury' today."
Watch for
- A vindication story used to justify adding. The recovery is the reason the price no longer qualifies.
- A long-term EPS estimate that collapses (2.5% here) while the reverse DCF demands 13.2%. That gap, not the multiple, is the real objection.
5. For a rollout, count openings; for a mature chain, count same-store sales
The repeatable method
- Establish where the business is in its expansion: filling the map, or finished.
- While it is filling, make unit openings the headline metric and treat like-for-like as secondary.
- Check the total revenue line to confirm the openings are actually covering the shortfall.
- Write down the milestone — market saturation — after which the metric must switch back, so the change is planned rather than forced.
Here: DNP.WA — "Like for like sales growth was low at
0.5% in Q1 of 2025, but has rebounded in the quarters since then.
But the most important metric for Dino Polska is the number of new stores opened. In 2025, they set a record, opening
345 new stores, almost 1 every day!" A ten-year FCF CAGR of
75.8% is what that has produced. The complementary version is in
8 January: total revenue +14.9% over nine months.
Watch for
- The switch never being made. When the map is full, openings stop and like-for-like becomes the only metric there is.
- A record opening year that also raises the capital intensity. Check the openings are still self-funded.
6. Test a cost advantage by what happens in the soft part of the cycle
The repeatable method
- Identify the industry's pricing cycle and where it currently sits.
- Ask whether the company grew through the weak leg, or only during the strong one.
- Locate the structural source of the advantage in a published ratio — a combined ratio, a cost per unit, an operating margin against peers.
- Treat the soft market as the opportunity: it removes competitors from a business that can survive it.
Here: KNSL — "The insurance market was quite tough in 2025, but Kinsale's business continued to grow. Operating earnings were up 20% for the first 9 months of 2025… and they continued to grow their premiums written," on "the best combined ratio in the industry (means low operating costs and great underwriting)," founder-led with Mike Kehoe owning 3.8%. The price gives the widest margin in the book: 4.6% required growth against 14.8% expected.
Watch for
- Growth through a soft market bought with looser underwriting. The combined ratio is the check, and it lags.
- Reserve releases flattering the operating figure. Twenty per cent growth needs a source.
7. Audit the published sheet for your own errors, including the ones in your favour
The repeatable method
- Re-check every pass/fail mark against the numbers printed beside it, not against the conclusion.
- Look specifically for marks that flatter a holding — those are the ones nobody queries.
- Correct them in the record rather than in the next issue.
- Where an entry disagrees with a sibling entry on identical evidence, say which one is the exception.
Here, two to catch. AMP is printed as "Forward PE: 12.2x (lower than its 5-year average? < 11.9x? ✅)" — 12.2 is above 11.9, so the mark should be ❌; and DNP.WA's required growth is printed "13,5%" with a comma. Neither changes a verdict, and both are the kind of thing that becomes load-bearing when a sheet is reused. The larger inconsistency is the KPG.AX/GAW.L pair at effectively the same multiple with opposite ratings — resolvable, but only because the metrics differ.
Watch for
- Errors that all point one way. One arithmetic slip is noise; a pattern of generous marks is a process problem.
- Thresholds quietly restated between issues. Compare the same name's bar across the January, April and August updates.
Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.