Pricing an IPO against what it must become, running three valuation models that are allowed to disagree, and publishing your own underperformance in the table that argues you are right.
1. Price a hot listing by how long it needs, not by whether it is expensive
The repeatable method
- Take the market value and pick a multiple you would actually be willing to pay — separately on sales and on profits.
- Solve for the revenue or the profit the company must reach to make that multiple true.
- Divide by a generous growth rate to get the number of years the price already assumes. That number, not the multiple, is the thing to react to.
- Assume nothing goes wrong along the way, then note explicitly that you have assumed it.
- Compare against an independent fair value (an analyst house, an appraisal) purely as a sanity range.
Here: SpaceX at 90x revenue — "higher than Palantir (75x), higher than Nvidia (20x), higher than Tesla (16x)." To reach 20x sales it needs $88bn of revenue, "almost 5x its current revenue… still 6 years away" at 30% annual growth; on profits it needs "around $50 billion in net profit" for a 35x PE, against a $4.9bn loss in 2025. Morningstar's $780bn fair value is "less than 50% of the current market cap."
Watch for
- Conglomerate listings where one part is genuinely excellent — the article concedes SpaceX "is not exactly like Pets.com" and compares the pricing behaviour, not the business.
- Underwriting incentives: "they are making over $500 million just in fees." The seller chose the moment and the price.
2. Run three valuation models and let them disagree
The repeatable method
- Value every candidate three independent ways: an earnings-growth model (growth + dividend + an assumed exit multiple → expected return and fair value), a multiple-versus-own-history test, and a reverse DCF (what growth does today's price require?).
- Record all three, including the ones that disagree with your conclusion.
- Treat unanimity as a stronger signal than any single large discount — count the names that clear all three.
- When they conflict, name which model you are trusting and why the others fail for this business type.
Here: 69 companies are undervalued on all three methods, "this number has never been higher." The conflicts are visible: TDG is 75.4% under on the earnings model, 11.2% under on the multiple, and negative on the reverse DCF; FICO needs 17.0% growth against 10.0% expected while its multiple has nearly halved; BN's multiple sits above its own average while its fair value says half price. Asset-based holdings drop out of the framework entirely — HGT.L is priced at £3.81 against £5.60 NAV with the DCF columns marked "/".
Watch for
- The assumed "fair exit PE" doing the work: many fair values here rest on a 25x exit. Change that input and the discount changes with it.
- Models that are not independent — a forward PE and an earnings-growth model share the same estimate of next year's earnings.
3. Put the quality gate in front of the cheapness screen
The repeatable method
- Maintain a pre-vetted universe that has already passed a quality standard; run valuation screens only inside it.
- Publish the screen outputs anyway — they are candidates for research, not for purchase.
- Require a separate, explicit quality rating before anything on a cheapness screen can be bought.
- Track which screen names never get a rating; that residue is the discipline made visible.
Here: the three "most undervalued" tables surface Goosehead, Paycom, Paylocity, EPAM, CoStar, Insperity, FactSet, ATOSS, Marimekko, Ares, TransUnion, DiaSorin, Admicom, Enghouse, Equasens, Gildan, LEM, SDI, Nexstar, New Wave, InfraCom and Synektik — none of which is on the 53-name Buy list. The two that do get a write-up, MIPS.ST and EVD.DE, are argued on business quality first (a patented helmet-safety licence; live events as AI-proof) and price second.
Watch for
- A screen that is mostly the same de-rated sector — half these names are software and payroll, i.e. one bet with twenty tickers.
- Deep-value traps in the reverse-DCF list: a price implying negative growth is either an opportunity or the market's correct forecast.
4. Convert "do nothing" into a checklist you have to answer
The repeatable method
- Write four questions you must answer for every holding when its price falls: is the valuation reasonable, has anything structurally changed, are the fundamentals still strong, is the moat still durable?
- Answer them in writing, per name, on a fixed schedule — not when you feel anxious.
- If all four are yes, the required action is explicitly none.
- If one is no, that specific answer, not the price, is the trigger to act.
Here: the four questions, followed by "As long as the answers to those questions is 'yes', the right thing to do is usually nothing." The one name where the answer went the other way is
JDG.L — sold "because we see better opportunities elsewhere," the rating catching up with the
31 May transaction.
Watch for
- "Nothing" as a default rather than a conclusion — the checklist only works if a "no" is genuinely available.
- Opportunity cost as a legitimate sell reason (which is what was used on Judges Scientific), rather than as a rationalisation after a fall.
5. Mark the cases where your rating overrides your own models
The repeatable method
- After the models are run, list every name where the rating disagrees with all of them.
- For each, write the reason the models cannot see — asset backing, holding-company structure, an accounting artefact, a management judgement.
- If no such reason exists, change the rating or the model.
- Review those overrides specifically at the next revision; they are where discretion, and therefore error, concentrates.
Here: two clean cases in opposite directions.
BRK.B is
upgraded to Buy while every published model says overvalued (fair value roughly half the price, multiple above its own average, reverse DCF requiring 7.1% against 3.0% expected) — defensible for a holding company, but not stated. And
LVMUY is held at
Hold while all three models say cheap (38.5% under, multiple 20% below its average, DCF clearing) — the judgement that proved decisive, since the position is cut entirely in
September.
Watch for
- Overrides that always run in the direction of the existing position.
- A model applied to a business it does not fit (a forward PE on an insurer's holding company) producing a number that then has to be argued away.
6. Publish the comparison that includes your own scoreline
The repeatable method
- Build a like-for-like table of your portfolio against the index on quality, capital intensity, growth and valuation.
- Include realised return over several horizons in the same table, even when it is against you.
- Use the gap between the fundamental columns and the return columns as the explicit statement of your bet.
- Re-publish it on a schedule so the bet can be scored rather than re-argued.
Here: the portfolio is cheaper (forward PE 18.3x vs 31.8x, PEG 1.2 vs 2.1), better (ROIC 18.3% vs 14.5%, gross margin 63.4% vs 34.4%, FCF/net income 195.8% vs 70-90%) and far lighter on capital (CAPEX/revenue 3.5% vs 19.2%) — and the same table reports a three-year CAGR of 0.0% against the index's 23.6% and 4.6% against 14.0% over five years.
Watch for
- Portfolio aggregates flattered by one or two extreme constituents — an FCF/net income figure of 195.8% is not a normal steady-state number.
- The index's own capital intensity being the AI build-out; that column may be the most informative one in the table.
Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post for personal study. Not investment advice.