How to run a quality worksheet on a bank without the non-bank metrics lying to you: which tests to drop and what replaces them, how to read a lender's moat and margins, and how to keep a reverse DCF honest when earnings rather than free cash flow are the input.
1. Before scoring a bank, strike the metrics that invert — and name the replacement for each
The repeatable method
- Go through the standard worksheet line by line and ask whether the item is a cost or a revenue for this business. For a bank, interest is income and deposits are raw material.
- Drop the tests that invert: interest coverage (interest is revenue), net debt / FCF (deposits are "debt" you want more of), ROIC (the invested-capital base is mostly customer money). Downgrade goodwill/assets if growth is organic.
- Substitute a bank-native metric for each: loan-to-deposit for liquidity, CET1 for solvency, 90+ day NPLs for credit quality, the efficiency ratio for capital intensity, ROE for capital allocation.
- Keep the thresholds that still make sense (ROE >20%, SBC <10% of net income, net margin >10%) and write down the regulatory minimum next to each capital ratio so it is judged as a multiple of the floor.
- Record the swap in the write-up, so a later reader does not compare a bank's scores against a software company's.
Here, on NU: "For Nubank, we don't use regular quality metrics like Interest Coverage or Net Debt/FCF… Using Net Debt to analyze a bank would make every bank in the world look like a terrible investment." Replacements: LDR 58%, CET1 20% (vs ~8.75% required), 90+ NPLs 6.8%, efficiency ratio 27%, ROE 31.6% — "We don't look at ROIC for a bank."
Watch for
- Fintechs that are not deposit-funded (marketplace lenders, BNPL) — the bank metrics don't fit them either; funding cost and warehouse lines matter instead.
- A score that stays comparable across the archive only if the worksheet shows which rows were substituted.
2. Read a lender's safety through three numbers — and check each against its own chart
The repeatable method
- Liquidity — loan-to-deposit ratio. Loans ÷ deposits. Lower means more room for a run; above ~100% the bank is funding loans with something other than deposits.
- Solvency — CET1. Common equity and retained earnings ÷ risk-weighted assets. Express it as a multiple of the local minimum, not as a raw percentage.
- Credit — 90+ NPLs. Loans more than 90 days overdue ÷ total loans. Judge the trend and compare with the customer segment served: a sub-prime-leaning book will run higher than a prime bank and still be healthy if it is flat.
- Pull the quarterly series, not a single print, and note the last period each chart covers.
- Reconcile the number in the text with the latest point on the chart. A mismatch means one of them is stale.
Here: the text and score table say LDR 58%; the Deep Dive chart printed right under it ends at 43% in Q2 2025 (from 25% in 2022). NPLs 4.7% (Q3'22) → 7.2% (Q3'24) → 6.8% (Q3'25) — "healthy for a bank that focuses on people who are often ignored by traditional banks." CET1 20% against "about 8.75%" — more than double the floor.
Watch for
- A rising LDR is the natural consequence of a lender growing its book faster than deposits — the post itself says Nu "will need to retain more and more capital." Track it quarterly.
- NPLs that are flat only because the loan book is growing fast (the denominator effect). Compare with loan growth; if growth slows, the ratio rises mechanically.
3. Test a branchless moat with cost-to-serve, referral share and the efficiency-ratio trend
The repeatable method
- Find the monthly cost to serve one customer and compare it with incumbents'. A multiple (not a percentage) gap is the moat claim.
- Find the share of new customers acquired organically (referral / word of mouth). High organic share means acquisition cost stays low as the base scales.
- Confirm both in the reported numbers: the efficiency ratio (operating expenses ÷ revenue) should fall while revenue compounds, and the customer count should keep growing without a matching rise in costs.
- Benchmark the efficiency ratio against local incumbents, not against global banks.
- Look for the flattening point — where the ratio stops improving tells you when operating leverage is used up.
Here: "less than $1 per month to serve a customer, while traditional banks spend over $4"; "80-90% of new customers join through free word-of-mouth referrals"; NPS "near 90." The IR slide: efficiency 58.2% (Q2'22) → 35.4% (Q2'23) → 29.9% (Q4'24) → 27.7% (Q3'25) against "40% to 50%" at traditional banks, with customers 93.9m → 138.9m.
Watch for
- The flattening already visible: 29.9% → 24.7% (one-off) → 28.3% → 27.7% across 2025. The easy leverage is done; the next leg needs revenue per customer.
- Cost-to-serve advantages erode when a well-funded rival copies the model — the post's named risk is exactly that (Mercado Pago in Mexico).
4. Put the company's own multiple history next to the incumbents' — the premium is the thesis
The repeatable method
- Chart the forward P/E against its own average. Check the start date of that average — a short listing history makes "below average" a weak signal.
- On the same chart, add the two or three largest domestic incumbents.
- State the premium explicitly (company multiple ÷ incumbent multiple).
- Ask what has to stay true to keep that premium: growth rate, efficiency gap, credit quality. Each is a trigger to re-rate toward the incumbents.
- Price the downside: what the stock is worth at a blended incumbent multiple on today's earnings.
Here: NU 16.2x forward against ITUB (Itaú, 8.7x) and BBD (Bradesco, 6.3x) — roughly a 2x premium to Itaú and 2.6x to Bradesco. Nu's own "10-year average" of 22.7x is computed from December 2023 only. The post's condition: fair "as long as it keeps growing at high rates, and the multiple doesn't come down significantly."
Watch for
- The direction of the gap: since December 2022 Nu's multiple fell 63% while Itaú's rose 29%. The premium has been compressing for four years.
- At Itaú's 8.7x, today's forward earnings would support roughly half the current price — that is the size of the bet on continued growth.
The repeatable method
- For a bank, use net income (less SBC) as the cash-flow proxy — FCF is distorted by loan growth and deposit flows.
- Cross-check the year-1 input: market cap ÷ forward P/E should approximately equal the NTM net income you entered.
- Also check it against LTM net income. An NTM figure below LTM for a company growing 30%+ is almost certainly a stale estimate.
- Re-run the reverse DCF with the reconciled input and report both implied growth rates.
- Note what share of value sits in the terminal value; above ~60%, the answer is mostly a statement about year 11 onwards.
Here: NTM net income $2,776m less $353.8m SBC → $2,442.2m → 14.8%/yr implied. But $72.5bn ÷ 16.4x ≈ $4.4bn of forward earnings, and the post's own chart shows $3,607.1m LTM. At $2,776m the stock would trade at ~27x NTM, not 16.4x. The implied-growth hurdle is overstated, which makes the ❓ harsher than the post's own numbers justify. Terminal value: $47.9bn of $75.0bn (~64%).
Watch for
- Refreshed write-ups: when price and multiple charts are updated but the model inputs are not, the three valuation methods stop describing the same company.
- A worksheet row labelled "FCF" fed with net income — harmless if intended, but it should say so.
6. Choose the margin denominator for a lender on purpose
The repeatable method
- Identify which revenue line the data vendor uses: gross interest and fee income, net interest income plus fees, or revenue after credit-loss provisions.
- Compute net margin on at least two of them.
- Use revenue after provisions only when comparing lenders with similar credit risk — it quietly nets bad-debt costs out of the denominator.
- Label margin charts precisely: net interest margin (interest spread ÷ earning assets) and net income margin are different quantities.
- Apply the same >10% threshold to the most conservative version before calling the test passed.
Here: "Net Profit Margin: 42.8%" = $3,607.1m ÷ $8,442.1m of revenue after provisions. On gross interest and fee income of $19,339.8m it is ~18.7% — still a pass, but a different story. And "The NIM around 20%" sits beside a chart of Adjusted Net Income Margin (18.8%), not net interest margin.
Watch for
- A high-yield consumer lender's margin after provisions will look best exactly when provisions are low — i.e. late in a credit cycle.
7. Under "skin in the game", read the votes as well as the equity
The repeatable method
- Record the founder's economic stake and voting stake separately.
- Compute the gap (votes ÷ economics). Above ~2x, minority shareholders cannot remove management or block a transaction.
- Check the domicile of the listed holding company and what shareholder protections it carries.
- Treat high alignment (a large economic stake) and low accountability (super-voting shares) as two separate scores rather than one.
- Look for sunset clauses on the dual-class structure.
Here: "David Vélez (CEO) founded the company in 2013 and is the largest shareholder. He holds 75% of the voting rights, and 19% of the company" — a ~4x gap — scored 9/10 with "We love to see a founder still leading the company." The ISIN (KYG…) marks a Cayman Islands holding company.
Watch for
- The combination this archive has already flagged once — founder governance as a single-cause conviction downgrade (KPG.AX, April 2026) — can arrive without warning when control is uncontestable.
Methods distilled from the archived Compounding Quality post (text and transcribed charts and tables in transcript.txt). Not investment advice.