In short: #5. Founded 1850, IPO 1977 — and the list's second reinvention story. "They control the entire transaction from the merchant to the consumer" — the closed-loop structure that distinguishes it from the Visa/Mastercard model argued elsewhere in this archive. Lindy case is a network effect: "More cardholders attract more merchants, and vice versa… it becomes even stronger as it grows." More than 7,000% since 1990. It began as an express-delivery freight company in Buffalo before moving into finance — like 3M, it survived by abandoning its original business.
American Express both issues the cards and runs the network they operate on, which is different from Visa and Mastercard — they only run the network and leave the lending to banks. Owning both ends means Amex earns more per transaction, and also carries the credit risk when cardholders do not pay.
The durability argument is the classic two-sided network: more cardholders make the card more attractive to shops, more shops make it more attractive to cardholders, and the loop tightens as it grows. More than 7,000% since 1990. Its origin is worth noting — it began in 1850 as a freight-delivery company and only later became a financial one, which makes it one of three names on the Lindy list that survived by leaving the industry it was founded in.
In short: The third Berkshire holding Brown names as working in this tape (with Apple and Coca-Cola). No individual stance.
In short: Q2 revenue +10% Y/Y to $19.6B ($60M miss), EPS +11% to $4.53 ($0.13 beat) — a small miss, but the stock dropped on deceleration signals: network volume growth 11% → 9%, billed business 10% → 9%, new card acquisitions 3.0M vs 3.1M in both Q1 and a year ago. The premium engine still works: net card fees +15% to $2.9B with the refreshed Platinum portfolio the fastest-growing US consumer line; card-member spending +9% FX-adjusted (best in three years), restaurants +10%, travel bookings +22%; 65% of new consumer accounts from Millennials and Gen Z. The revenue miss traces to net interest income of $4.7B slipping sequentially even as card balances grew to $218.1B; consolidated expenses +12% to $14.5B (Platinum refresh costs, heavier benefit usage) outpaced revenue; provisions fell to $1.1B from $1.4B but net write-offs were higher. FY26 revenue-growth guide raised to 10% (from 9%–10%, ≈$79.5B, exactly on consensus); EPS held at $17.30–$17.90 (vs $17.69) as CEO Stephen Squeri reinvests into technology, acquisition costs and the proposed TheFork purchase (a European booking platform adding 50,000 restaurants). Card-fee growth guided to accelerate into the high teens in 2H — it ran 15% this quarter, so that's the Q3 number to check. (Recap, not a stance call.)
American Express both issues premium credit cards and runs its own payments network, so it earns from annual card fees, from a slice of what members spend, and from interest on balances. The premium engine is clearly working: annual card fees grew 15%, the newly refreshed Platinum card is the fastest-growing product in its US consumer business, spending grew at the best rate in three years, and 65% of new consumer accounts came from Millennials and Gen Z — the generational handover Amex has been engineering for years.
What spooked investors was the direction of travel rather than the level. Every growth rate ticked down a notch — spending volume from 11% to 9%, new cards slightly fewer than last year — and revenue came in a touch light because interest income slipped even as balances grew. Costs rose faster than revenue, largely from the Platinum relaunch and members actually using the perks. Management says the shortfall is temporary, nudged full-year revenue growth up to 10%, and is spending the upside on technology and on buying TheFork, a European restaurant-booking site that adds 50,000 restaurants to its dining perks. The specific promise to check next quarter: card fees accelerating from 15% into the high teens. A recap, not a call.
In short: Terranova owns it — modest underperformance means expectations aren't stretched, and it "continues to work" in a strong economy with the affluent consumer spending. Upgraded to overweight at JPMorgan today. A name he says you can focus on.
American Express is the credit-card company that skews toward wealthier customers. Joe Terranova owns it and likes that it has slightly lagged the sector — meaning expectations aren't stretched — while the affluent consumer keeps spending in a strong economy, so it "continues to work." It was upgraded by JPMorgan analysts today.
In short: Referenced inside the Delta read — the co-brand card economics that help premium absorb fuel: American Express remuneration to Delta hit $2.4B in Q2 (+16% Y/Y), tracking to ~$9B for the full year, a large and fast-growing high-margin revenue stream tied to the loyalty/premium flywheel. (Recap, not a stance call.)
In short: Tracked, not stated as a holding — the distinction matters. Amex is the third name in his payments dashboard: "I have a dashboard where it's payments, which stacks up total transaction volume for Visa, AXP and Mastercard… as well as total cards in force across those three companies." He says "these three companies" when describing what he monitors but "them both" when describing what he owns, and he never claims a position in Amex.
49:30I have a dashboard where it's payments, which stacks up total transaction volume for Visa, AXP and Mastercard. And I really track that as my dashboard on the industry, as well as total cards in force across those three companies. — Mhm. — And if that is playing out at those margins, I think I can pay a reasonable price, which I think they are, I think it's going to work out, right? I think that long term is going to really work out just because of how great these businesses are from a unit economics perspective. So, there's
In short: Named as the high-end-only specialist that "does even the same thing to a greater extent because they specialize in just the high-end consumer" — i.e. runs the merchant-fee / rewards-hostage dynamic more intensely. A passing comparison alongside Visa and Mastercard as the three entrenched card networks.
11:56And Visa does the same thing. American Express does even the same thing to a greater extent because they specialize in just the high-end consumer. But Mastercard has built a business off of this double-sided chicken and egg network effect. Then they hold the high-end consumer and say you really have to pay these fees in order to get access to them.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.