In short: Answering "do you think it's safe to buy," he opens with the line he says he always uses: "lending money is easy. Getting it back is a little harder." The diagnosis is segment-specific: "the traditional side of goeasy is still going well. It's when they went into the auto business, the used auto business, the problems came." And the valuation no longer compensates: "but it's now trading above book. It's not for me, it's complicated." The overriding reason is top-down: "I'm a little bearish on the economy so I don't want to own a lender." He also disclaims expertise — "I'm not a super expert on these two companies."
goeasy lends to Canadians the banks turn down. The question was whether it is safe to buy after a rough stretch, and his opening line is the general principle: "lending money is easy. Getting it back is a little harder." Any lender can grow fast by relaxing standards; the bill arrives later.
His diagnosis is specific. The traditional consumer-lending business is still working. The trouble came from expanding into used-vehicle lending — a different customer, a different collateral, a different risk — and that is where the losses appeared. Meanwhile the shares now trade above book value (above the accounting value of the company's net assets), so the price no longer compensates for the uncertainty. "It's not for me, it's complicated."
Above all sits a top-down veto that would apply even to a clean lender: "I'm a little bearish on the economy so I don't want to own a lender." Lenders are geared to the economy's worst outcomes, and if you expect a weak economy the sector is the wrong place to hunt for value. He is honest that he is "not a super expert" on the name.
33:19— So my understanding is the traditional side of goeasy is still going well. It's when they went into the auto business, the used auto business, the problems came. And so — but it's now trading above book. It's not for me, it's complicated. And then also I'm a little bearish on the economy so I don't want to own a lender. And in the case of Propel, I met the management actually for the first time. If you believe everything they say, they sound like extremely enthused by the business and
In short: His live Canadian example that credit trouble is real even if the banks are safe: "we've seen in Canada… goeasy and the subprime lending space has had some troubles — not as well diversified business models." Later, on Propel: risk management "was the problem at goeasy ultimately." The negative reference case, not a short pitch.
goeasy lends to Canadians with poor credit. It's in this conversation as the cautionary case, twice. First, when Morrison argues the Canadian banks are safe, he concedes credit trouble is real in Canada — "goeasy and the subprime lending space has had some troubles" — and pins it on business models that aren't diversified enough to absorb a bad cohort of loans. Second, when weighing Propel, he identifies risk management as "the problem at goeasy ultimately": in lending, the failure mode isn't the market, it's your own loan decisions plus leverage. Note this is a negative reference, not a pitch to short the stock.
22:13But there could there be could there be trouble like we've seen in Canada in the financial services sector go easy and the subprime lending space has had some troubles that not as well diversified business models but yeah the Canadian banks are not the banks that were around in the late 1980s early 90s during the real estate bubble that popped there right they have this these wealth management recurring revenue franchises are incredibly profitable incredibly powerful and they will enable them to weather storms that will come And
In short: REMOVED FROM THE WATCHLIST ENTIRELY — the only such action in the issue. "Goeasy provides loans to non-prime customers in Canada who have been turned down by big banks. We decided to remove the company from our watchlist for 2 main reasons: Both the CEO and CFO left the company in 2025. Governments are capping interest rates. This directly impacts the profitability of goeasy." Two independent problems — a management exodus and a regulatory cap on the product's price — neither of which cheapness can repair.
goeasy lends to Canadians the big banks have turned down. It is removed from the watchlist entirely — not downgraded, deleted — which is the strongest action this monthly sheet takes.
Two reasons are given, and they are independent of each other. Both the chief executive and the chief financial officer left during 2025, so the people who built the underwriting are gone. And governments are capping the interest rates that can be charged on this kind of loan, which attacks the price of the product directly. Neither problem is fixed by the shares getting cheaper: one is about who is running it, the other about what it is legally allowed to earn. That is the distinction this archive keeps returning to — a temporary problem is a discount, a permanent change to the economics is not.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.