In short: Referenced, not a pick — named beside BYD and solar as the goods base that raises global acceptance of the yuan, letting China buy commodities in its own currency without opening the capital account.
43:12Well, now it's good for Chinese AI. It's good for Huawei equipment. It's good for BYD cars. It's good for solar pads. It's good for a whole lot of stuff that most of the world buys anyway and or would like to buy. So, number one, China's trade, China's factory base increases the acceptance of yuan for the imports that China can buy in yuan, the commodity imports.
In short: Ives' measure of the US lead: "a third-rate Nvidia chip is a year and a half to two years ahead of Huawei in China… any big Chinese tech company would want an Nvidia chip over Huawei." He extends it to policy — "for the first time in 30 years, the US is ahead of China," and the only way that reverses is domestic data-center moratoriums.
36:45It just speaks to the reality of you could talk to anyone in the supply chain, the reality is that any big Chinese tech company would wants an Nvidia chip over Huawei. And I think as that plays out globally, especially when it comes to physical AI and how Jensen's building it, it's really like their world, everyone else paying rent when it comes to the chip perspective.
In short: China's chips "are not competitive right now" — partly because the semicap sanctions have been successful (no ASML access). Huawei's weekend announcements aren't unknown tech, just pursued earlier than the rest of the world "because they have no choice."
Huawei is China's flagship chip effort, and Rasgon's point is geopolitical: China's AI chips "are not competitive right now," largely because Western export controls work — China cannot buy ASML's advanced lithography machines or the best US chip-making equipment. Huawei's much-hyped announcements involve techniques that aren't unknown; it's just forced to attempt them years early "because they have no choice."
The flip side of his memorable line — "the US has chips but no power, China has power but no chips" — is that China's constraint is solvable only by cracking chipmaking, while America's constraint (electricity) is at least a known engineering problem. If China ever gets the chips, it can power them instantly with coal plants.
55:48And actually, it's partially because I think the semicap sanctions have been um successful like they can't make fact I know there was some announcements from Huawei over the weekend. They're they're they're you know in general we're forcing China to be creative by the way on on how they make semiconductors because they can't pursue the options.
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