In short: Signs Mbappé away from Nike, but Lebenthal (a former owner) won't buy back (36:25). Now "well below the market average, very much value territory," but only because estimates fell: "the earnings are not good enough… until those earnings estimates start going up, this is a no touch." Raskin: heavy competition and a stretched consumer (~18 months of negative real income).
On makes premium running shoes and just signed soccer star Kylian Mbappé away from Nike. The stock now looks cheap, but only because analysts cut their profit forecasts. Lebenthal won't buy until those forecasts start rising again, and Raskin adds that shoppers are squeezed by high gas prices and mortgage rates.
In short: Confirmed exited, and folded into the same no-touch verdict. Wapner: "And your On Holding?" — Lebenthal: "Done with, right? Look, something's going on with the space." Wapner supplies the date: "yes, you sold it in April." On the archive's own record this is a hardening: the desk's last substantive discussion of the name (2026-AUG-11, after a −19% day) still had a six-year owner defending the apparel and direct-to-consumer mix. Here it is grouped with Lululemon and Nike as a business in secular decline.
On Holding is the Swiss running-shoe brand. Lebenthal confirms he is out — sold in April — and folds it into the same verdict as Lululemon and Nike.
Against this archive's own record that is a hardening. The last substantive discussion of the name, after a 19% single-day fall, still had a long-term owner defending the shift toward apparel and direct-to-consumer sales as the higher-margin part of the business. Here the individual defence has been dropped in favour of the category one: the whole group has stopped behaving like the stable business it used to be.
In short: Premium discipline, at the cost of the top line. Q2 revenue +13% Y/Y (+22% cc) to CHF 850M, missing the CHF 878M consensus; adjusted EPS CHF 0.35 (CHF 0.01 beat). Shares fell nearly 20% as management lowered FY26 constant-currency sales growth from at least 23% to the low-20% range. The slowdown was "intentional in part": DTC rose 26% (+34% cc) and is now 46% of sales, while wholesale grew much more slowly because On held back Americas shipments rather than push inventory into an increasingly promotional retail environment — CFO Frank Sluis said the company "was willing to sacrifice volume to protect full-price selling and retailer inventory health." It is working on margin: a record 65% gross margin, adjusted EBITDA +24% to CHF 168M at a 20% margin, apparel +56% cc, and gross-margin guidance raised again to at least 65% with the 19.5%–20% EBITDA target held. Bottom Line: "The question is whether this is temporary inventory discipline or the beginning of a more durable growth slowdown."
On is the Swiss premium running-shoe brand. Its shares fell nearly 20% because revenue missed and management cut this year's growth guidance from "at least 23%" down to the low 20s — a real disappointment for a stock priced as a compounder.
But the reason behind the cut is unusual, and it's why this isn't simply negative. On's direct-to-consumer business (its own stores and website) grew 26% and is now 46% of sales. The weakness was wholesale — selling to retailers — and On deliberately held back shipments in the Americas rather than push shoes into stores that would only discount them. Its CFO said plainly that the company was "willing to sacrifice volume to protect full-price selling and retailer inventory health."
That discipline shows: a record 65% gross margin, EBITDA up 24%, apparel growing 56%, and gross-margin guidance raised again. The unresolved question is which story this is — a brand choosing short-term pain to protect its premium positioning, or the first visible crack in a growth story that was priced for perfection. App Economy leaves it open, and so does this rating.
In short: Down more than 19% — its worst day ever — to a new 52-week low on a revenue miss and a weak guide. Belsky owns it and defends: "net sales were off big because the wholesale segment was very light… apparel is up 48%, direct-to-consumer up 26% — that's where they need to really focus. The problem is on the wholesaling side: they've got an expensive shoe, their average shoe is $150 and $180. But we own it because of the great product they have in terms of the apparel side of things — that's where they're really going to make the money in the margins, and they have a better product than those other companies." He's owned it six years, bought just before COVID, "originally for the shoes, but we're holding it still for the [apparel]." Pressed that the sneakers are the bread and butter: "they are, but in terms of where they're going to get the margin… they're not getting the sales there. Where the margin is, is in their apparel." Terranova's structural objection: "consumer discretionary is incredibly difficult to see long-term sustainable momentum trends in, and apparel is really the highlight of that because of the fickle nature in the buying intention. And you have seen strength in off-price, and strength in off-price is generally equating to a negative growth environment for apparel — because now I'm going to off-price and I'm getting your products." Brown's dismissal is broader: "you just don't have to be here… 99% of our viewers have no [retail] mandate. Every one of these charts looks worse than the last one you showed. In a market environment like this, why are we even spending 10 seconds? Let's focus on what's working… let's come back to this group someday, not this day."
On Holding fell more than 19% to a 52-week low — its worst day ever — on a revenue miss and weak guidance. Brian Belsky, who has owned it for six years, argues the damage is concentrated in one channel: wholesale (selling through other retailers) was very light, while the parts he cares about grew strongly — apparel up 48% and direct-to-consumer up 26%. He thinks the margin is in clothing rather than shoes, and that On's product quality is superior to Nike's and Under Armour's.
Joe Terranova's objection is structural rather than company-specific, and it's the most useful part: apparel is where momentum investing fails, because buying intention is fickle. His leading indicator is off-price retail — TJ Maxx-style discounters. When off-price is strong, it means branded apparel is being discounted, which is bad for the brands themselves: "now I'm going to off-price and I am getting your products."
Josh Brown refuses the whole discussion: every chart in the group looks worse than the last, most investors have no obligation to own retail at all, and in a market this strong the opportunity cost of arguing about it is too high. "Let's come back to this group someday, not this day."
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.