| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 100 | $28.74 | $2,874 | 0.12% | $25.05 | $370 | +14.8% | — |
In short: Owned by Belski, and Goldman is cautious on it while liking Merck and J&J. His own description is the least enthusiastic of the three: "Pfizer's just a bottomed out kind of turnaround value play. But in terms of where the fundamental growth is, it's J&J and Merck." It also sits on the wrong side of his flow-of-funds story — one of the traditional vaccine names whose market cap left for Amgen, Gilead and AbbVie.
In short: Harrington's evidence that healthcare's week is not just the Moderna/Merck headline: "yes, Moderna and Merck skewed it this week. But if I look at holdings in my portfolio — Pfizer, like crazy little Pfizer up 17% year to date, Bristol-Myers up 25%. So you can look across healthcare." The underlying claim is her rate construct: with long rates staying elevated on supply (AI-driven corporate issuance plus government debt), cash today is worth more than cash in the future, which favours the here-and-now cash generators — "that explains healthcare, not necessarily this week, but in a bigger picture."
Jenny Harrington uses Pfizer to make a point about the whole sector. Healthcare had its best week since late June, but that number is flattered by Moderna doubling on its cancer-vaccine result. Her evidence that the strength is real and broader is her own holdings: Pfizer up 17% this year, Bristol-Myers up 25%, Thermo Fisher up 6% in the week — none of which had anything to do with the vaccine news.
Her explanation for why these stocks work is the same framework she applies to pipelines. Investors normally assume falling interest rates help fast-growing companies, because profits far in the future become more valuable when discounted at a lower rate. She thinks rates stay high — not because of the Fed, but because of the sheer volume of new debt being issued by both governments and companies funding AI construction.
If that is right, the reverse holds: money received now is what is valuable, and companies producing large cash flows today get re-rated upward. Big pharmaceutical companies with established products are exactly that kind of business.
In short: Named with Merck in the same 1980s–90s anecdote — "all of them went up huge numbers" and then took over two decades to regain those prices. Context for the sell-pieces discipline, not a stance on the stock today.
34:35In other words, you need to take your cost out and take some profit out. But, I'll give an example. From the mid-80s till about from actually late '80s till about the late '90s, you had a 10-year run on all the drug companies. Merck, Pfizer, all of them went up huge numbers, okay? And we could not get people that had those positions to sell any, and the reason was every reason was this, I don't want to pay any tax.
In short: #4. Founded 1849, IPO 1942. "Its large portfolio keeps cash flowing even as patents expire" — the portfolio-of-patents argument rather than a single-drug one, which is the correct way to think about pharmaceutical durability. 9.8% a year since 1990, the second-weakest rate on the list and a long way behind Lilly's 17,000% total, despite the two businesses being described in almost identical terms. That gap is the strongest evidence in the series that survival and compounding are different things.
Pfizer discovers, makes and sells prescription drugs and vaccines. Every individual product it owns will eventually lose its patent and collapse in price, so what is actually being valued is the machine that keeps producing replacements, and the breadth of the range that keeps cash coming in while any one product fades.
That is the correct way to think about a pharmaceutical company, and the post says it clearly. What the post does not dwell on is the outcome: 9.8% a year since 1990, against the near-identical description given to Eli Lilly, which returned more than 17,000% over the same stretch. Same industry, same durability, radically different results — the clearest illustration in the whole series that surviving is a precondition for compounding, not a cause of it.
In short: Pipeline questions. Q2 revenue +3% Y/Y to $15.0B ($640M beat) and adjusted EPS $0.77 ($0.09 beat), with the non-COVID portfolio outperforming by roughly $1.5B against another sharp pandemic decline — Paxlovid fell 95% and Pfizer cut FY26 COVID revenue expectations to ~$4B from ~$5B. But the beat came from the old book: Eliquis +19%, Vyndaqel strong, Padcev +23% — against which Pfizer took a $3.8B impairment after an experimental Seagen lung-cancer drug failed a pivotal trial. The restructuring keeps growing: another $2.5B of productivity savings through 2029 takes the target to roughly $9.7B, protecting margins against an estimated $35B of revenue facing patent expiry by the end of the decade. FY26 revenue guidance raised $0.5B to $60.5–$62.5B with adjusted EPS maintained at $2.80–$3.00 despite ~$0.10 from the Innovent transaction ($650M upfront to the China-based biotech for 12 early-stage cancer programs). "Q2 reinforced the central problem: much of the upside still comes from older drugs, while expensive bets in oncology and obesity have yet to prove they can replace the looming patent cliff."
Pfizer beat expectations, and it still isn't the good news it looks like. Sales rose 3% to $15.0 billion, with the non-COVID business outperforming by roughly $1.5 billion — enough to absorb Paxlovid, the COVID antiviral, falling 95%.
The problem is where the strength came from: older drugs. Eliquis, a blood thinner launched over a decade ago, grew 19%. Meanwhile the newer bets stumbled — Pfizer wrote off $3.8 billion after an experimental lung-cancer drug from its Seagen acquisition failed a decisive trial.
That matters because roughly $35 billion of Pfizer's revenue loses patent protection by the end of this decade. When a patent expires, cheap copies arrive and the revenue largely evaporates. The company's response so far is mostly cost-cutting: another $2.5 billion of savings, taking the total programme to about $9.7 billion. Cost cuts protect profits; they don't replace lost sales.
Pfizer is buying options too — $650 million up front to a Chinese biotech, Innovent, for access to twelve early-stage cancer programmes. But early-stage means years away and mostly likely to fail. The newsletter's conclusion is blunt: the upside still comes from old drugs, while the expensive new bets have yet to prove they can fill the hole. Analysis, not a recommendation.
In short: Harrington owns it: "even my Pfizer stock is up 10% this year, which isn't bad." Part of her healthcare-rebound roster — names "under so much pressure for so long that let's hope what we've seen this year so far is just the beginning of that rebound and there's room to go."
In short: "A difficult value name for the past couple of years due to its backlog," reporting Tuesday pre-market.
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In short: Defensive value + income: intrinsic/probability-weighted DCF ~$32 (2% terminal, 7% WACC) vs ~$26 implying zero growth. Scenario tree bull $41 / base $28 / bear $20. A 6.6% dividend, ~0.7 beta hedge against tech overexposure (S&P is ~20% semis / ~40% tech). Model in the PDF (pp. 53–54).
Pfizer is the big pharmaceutical company behind well-known drugs and vaccines. Here it's the boring-but-safe pick: it pays a hefty 6.6% dividend (cash paid to shareholders each year) and its price barely moves with the wider market.
A valuation estimate pegs the stock's fair worth around $32 versus roughly $26 today — and today's price effectively assumes the company never grows again, which looks too pessimistic. The appeal is partly as a counterweight: with the broad market now heavily tilted toward tech and chip stocks, owning a steady, cheap, high-income name balances out that risk.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.