| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 1,003 | $4.53 | $4,544 | 0.19% | $4.98 | $-448 | -9.0% | — |
| HSA | 204 | $4.49 | $916 | 0.85% | $4.89 | $-81 | -8.1% | — |
| ROTH | 427 | $4.53 | $1,934 | 0.75% | $7.02 | $-1,062 | -35.4% | — |
| Total | 1,634 | $7,394 | 0.16% | $-1,590 | -17.7% | — |
In short: Still adding — common and the baby bonds — as part of a six-name income sleeve. "There are a lot of prefs that have sold off. We've also been adding to RWT and RWTQ. Those are also double-digit yields… there's six names we've been adding to just on the income side already and we're going to try to find more baby bonds to buy." The sign-off names "RWTS, RWTQ" among the actionable income names. (The baby bonds stay inside this row, as on SEP-13; the report lists RWTQ as "Redwood Trust 7.75% Senior Notes due 2027," which sits awkwardly with last week's remark that Redwood "just repaid its '27 bonds at par" — not resolved here.)
Redwood Trust is a mortgage company structured as a real estate investment trust, and it also has small exchange-traded bonds ("baby bonds") that trade like shares. Last week Singh bought both after the shares were knocked down by hedge funds hedging a new convertible bond. This week he confirms he is still adding to the shares and the baby bond RWTQ, which pay double-digit yields.
His view is that the fall was caused by market mechanics rather than any real deterioration in the company, whose borrowers have strong credit. The risk he keeps naming is interest rates — higher rates reduce the value of mortgage assets — which is why he keeps the position modest and adds gradually.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Adding into a mechanical flush — common and baby bonds. "We added to Redwood equity and baby bonds on a stock overreaction to the convert issue last week. They issued a 150 million convert… to refi a 2027 bond… at a 35% premium, which is close to their book value… and they offered a 7% coupon, which is much lower than their other bonds, which had over 9%." The mechanism: "convertible arbitrage funds… had to short equity to hedge this 150 million convert. Assuming an initial delta between 50 and 65%, hedge fund arbitragers had to short between 75 million and 100 million worth of common stock… with a company with about a $500 million market cap, dumping 75 million of short selling into the open market in a single trading session creates an immediate downward pressure. So the stock was down like 22%." Plus a 2% book hit from selling $190M of legacy bridge loans and a concurrent $20M buyback. His fills (deck p. 12): "Added 5 bps RWT at 3.41-3.45; 20% yield, 45% discount to June book · Added another 10 bps RWT at 3.21 · Got my average down below $3.60 · Added 5 bps RWTQ and RWTS baby bonds at 11%+ yields" — bonds that "will likely be repaid at par just like it just repaid its 27 bonds at par." UBS concurs: the sell-off reflects "convertible arbitrage hedging, dilution concerns, and uncertainty… rather than a materially deteriorating credit profile." Sizing discipline stated: "you can't have too big of a position here because interest rates continue to be a risk… if it sells off further, we will continue to add… this company survived COVID… still one of the least levered," with borrowers at "around 750" FICO — "not a default risk… a mark-to-market risk."
Redwood Trust is a mortgage company structured as a real estate investment trust. It needed to refinance a bond due in 2027, so it sold $150 million of convertible bonds — bonds that pay interest but can be swapped for shares if the share price rises enough. They paid 7%, cheaper than Redwood's existing 9%-plus debt.
The trouble was who buys convertibles. Hedge funds that specialise in them usually "hedge" by selling the company's shares short at the same moment — betting against the stock to offset the share-price exposure hidden inside the bond. For a $150 million convertible, that meant selling roughly $75-100 million of shares, in a company worth only about $500 million, in a single day. There were nowhere near enough natural buyers, so the stock fell about 22%. At the same time Redwood sold $190 million of its weakest loans at a small loss, which spooked people further.
Singh's view is that the fall was plumbing, not a change in the business — UBS said the same. He bought shares at $3.41-3.45 and again at $3.21, bringing his average cost under $3.60, and bought Redwood's exchange-traded "baby bonds" (small-denomination bonds that trade like shares) yielding about 11%, which he expects to be repaid in full just as the company repaid its last bonds. He likes the management, and its borrowers have strong credit scores (around 750), so the risk is not defaults. The risk is interest rates: rising rates push down the value of mortgage assets, which is why he keeps the position small and adds only in steps.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: The forced-selling buy of the quarter: "because of the index rebalancing, we were able to buy that at a three handle and now it's rallied almost to $5" — bought into small-cap-index selling at a ~17% yield, still 15% at $4.77 "which we think is sustainable." He has spoken with Redwood Trust management: high-quality jumbo origination and securitization for non-W2 borrowers (doctors, dentists) with 750+ FICOs.
Redwood makes large "jumbo" mortgages to creditworthy people who don't have a regular paycheck — doctors, dentists, business owners with 750-plus credit scores — then bundles those loans and sells them on. It is a real, well-run business, and Singh has spoken with management directly.
The opportunity was mechanical rather than fundamental. When an index is rebalanced, funds that track it must sell whatever is being removed regardless of price, and rate fear added to the selling. He bought at "a three handle" — roughly $3 — on a 17% dividend. The stock has since gone to about $4.77, still a 15% yield he believes is sustainable. Buying what index funds are forced to dump is one of his standing methods.
4:47It was paying like a 17% dividend at that point. We've spoken with Redwood Trust management. It's a well-run business. They do high-quality mortgage origination and securitization for individuals in the US that are non-W2. It's a dentist, doctors that want to buy a million-dollar home, need a jumbo loan.
In short: Added again in the mid-$4s (first added in the $3s, it rallied above $5, and it ended the week in the high-$4s). "We think it's still a compelling name trading at a discount to book, 15% dividend yield" — the rate-peak income position he keeps scaling alongside the other mortgage REITs.
Redwood is a mortgage company whose share price moves opposite to interest rates. He first bought in the $3s, watched it rally above $5, and has now added again in the mid-$4s — it ended the week in the high $4s.
The appeal is arithmetic: it trades below the accounting value of the assets it owns, and it pays a dividend equal to about 15% of the share price each year. So you get paid a large income while you wait for rates to come down, which is the same bet as the TLT position expressed through a stock.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Added +10 bps on July 29 and "we'll probably add more to Redwood." It gave back some of the gains on the 10-year spike — "but it's a name to add to if you think rates have peaked."
Redwood is a mortgage company whose share price moves inversely with interest rates. Singh added another 10 bps on July 29 and says he will probably add more. It gave back some of that gain when the 10-year yield spiked after the Fed meeting — but that is precisely the mechanism: "it's a name to add to if you think rates have peaked."
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Still scaling the common: "we've been adding to Redwood common below five — it was a great add from a three handle." One of the agency/mortgage-REIT adds that all work if rates have peaked.
Redwood is the mortgage-finance company he's been buying in stages — first around $3, and he's still adding to the ordinary shares below $5. It's the same rate-peak bet as Dynex and Annaly: a high-dividend housing-finance name that re-rates when the bond market stops falling. He calls the earlier purchase "a great add from a three handle," and he isn't finished.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: "A great trade" — bought at $4.23 (a 42% discount to book / 17% yield) after the stock was mechanically dumped on S&P 600 index exclusion; rallied ~10% to $5.10 in a week. Trimmed 35bp → ~25bp to harvest gains but keeping two-thirds for the 15-16% yield.
Redwood is a mortgage company that pays a big dividend. It got mechanically dumped when it was kicked out of a small-cap index — index funds are forced to sell no matter the price, so it fell to a 42% discount to book value and a 17% dividend yield. Singh bought that forced-selling dislocation at $4.23; it snapped back ~10% to $5.10 in a week. He's taken some profit (trimming from a 35bp to ~25bp position) but is holding two-thirds to keep collecting the 15-16% yield. In hindsight he says he should have sized it bigger.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Added 25 bps to the RWT common at $4.23 — now a 42% discount to book value and a 17% dividend yield. The larger second tranche of the position started 2026-JUL-02 (10 bps at $4.61 / 35% discount): stepping up the add as the discount to book widened.
Redwood Trust is a mortgage REIT — a company that owns home loans and mortgage bonds and passes most of its income out as dividends. Right now its shares trade at about $4.23, roughly 42% below the stated value of what it owns (its "book value"), and it pays a 17% dividend. In other words you can buy a dollar of its assets for about 58 cents and get paid a very fat yield while you wait for that gap to close.
Singh is adding to it carefully rather than piling in. He first bought a tiny slice (a tenth of one percent of the portfolio) at $4.61; here he adds a bigger slice (a quarter of one percent) at the lower $4.23 as the discount widened. That's conviction expressed with position sizing — start small, add more as it gets cheaper, and let the big dividend pay you to be patient.
In short: Bought a 10 bps starter position in the RWT common at $4.61 — a 35% discount to NAV and a 16% dividend yield. First tranche of a scaled build (added a larger 25 bps at $4.23 / 42% discount on 2026-JUL-06 as it fell).
Redwood Trust is a mortgage REIT — it owns home loans and mortgage bonds and pays most of its income out as dividends. At $4.61 the shares trade about 35% below the value of what the company owns (its net asset value) and pay a 16% dividend, so you're buying a dollar of assets for roughly 65 cents and collecting a big yield while you wait for that gap to narrow.
Singh is starting small — just a tenth of one percent of the portfolio — deliberately leaving room to buy more if it gets cheaper. It did: four days later he added a bigger slice at a lower price and wider discount. Starting with a small "toe in the water" and adding as the bargain improves is his way of building a value position without betting on catching the exact low.
In short: Q&A: owns it, took profits above ~$6 and has been re-adding in the 4s/high-4s on rate volatility. ~$4.81 vs ~$7.12 book = ~33% discount; the 21¢ Q1 EPS covers the 18¢ (~$0.72 annualized) dividend → a ~15% covered yield; ~$200M cash. Just needs rates to fall for the story to play out.
Redwood is a mortgage company that buys and packages jumbo home loans. It fell to about $4.81 on rate swings and a weak quarter, but that's roughly a 33% discount to its $7.12 book value, and its earnings still cover the dividend — a ~15% yield. Singh owns it, sold higher, and has been buying it back; he just needs interest rates to fall for the value to be realized.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: High-dividend mortgage-REIT add (~14%) — third of the real-estate dividend basket (with DX, NLY) bought on the rate-peak thesis; a core position vs the small/risky FPH torque play.
Redwood is the third high-dividend mortgage REIT (about 14%) in the basket with Dynex and Annaly. Singh is adding all three on the same idea — rates are near their high, so these beaten-down, income-heavy names should do well as the rate fear eases — and these are meant to be much bigger positions than his speculative land bet, FPH.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
Nothing matches this filter.
Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.