| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 407 | $130.96 | $53,301 | 2.18% | $45.71 | $34,696 | +186.5% | — |
| RLT | 1,038 | $130.96 | $135,936 | 8.09% | $48.89 | $85,194 | +167.9% | — |
| ROTH | 223 | $130.96 | $29,204 | 11.39% | $44.94 | $19,182 | +191.4% | — |
| Total | 1,668 | $218,441 | 4.86% | $139,073 | +175.2% | — |
In short: Last year's pick reviewed: +65%, still held. Conflicts first: "I'm a former employee of Sprott. I'm no longer an officer, director, or an employee. I'm a beneficiary. I own an eyelash below 10%. The only time I've ever sold stock is because I wanted to go below 10% for filing purposes." The retail case is the same own-the-manager argument, restated as arithmetic: "usually in a managed product you pay a fee. If you own Sprott, you have an interest in the management fee from 60 products and you get paid a dividend… would you rather pay fees or would you rather receive a dividend? I think the answer to that is fairly clear." He then endorses the host's takeover thesis — the big asset managers spent a decade exiting commodities, so if he is "correct about a nascent bull market in natural resources and precious metals," one of "the big financial supermarkets in the world, including Canada's own Manulife," may decide it needs a natural-resource silo, and building one "would likely take them 10 years and billions of dollars… perhaps they'd prefer to buy the best brand in the natural resources business." His own preference is against it — "I've watched big financial services companies mangle their acquisitions" — but "if somebody bid me enough, would I sell? Yeah, I guess I'd have to."
Sprott runs about sixty funds and trusts that hold gold, silver, uranium and mining shares. Rule's argument is the simplest in the episode and has nothing to do with any commodity forecast: if you buy one of those funds, you pay Sprott a management fee every year. If you buy the shares of Sprott itself, you own a slice of the fees paid by everybody else in all sixty products — and Sprott pays you a dividend out of them. "Would you rather pay fees or would you rather receive a dividend?"
The leverage is that fee income rises with assets under management, and assets under management rise both when commodity prices go up and when new money arrives chasing them. So the parent company captures the resource bull market twice over, without any single mine being able to flood, miss, or get expropriated.
He then agrees with a takeover thesis the host raises. Nearly every large asset manager spent the last decade shutting down its commodities business. If the resource bull market is real, at least one of them will want that capability back — and building one from scratch would take "10 years and billions of dollars," against simply buying "the best brand in the natural resources business." He owns just under 10% and has only ever sold to stay under the disclosure threshold. Characteristically, he hopes it does not happen — "I've watched big financial services companies mangle their acquisitions" — while admitting that at a high enough price he would take the money.
55:20— It should be noted I'm a former employee of Sprott. I'm no longer an officer, director, or an employee. I'm a beneficiary. I own an eyelash below 10%. The only time I've ever sold stock is because I wanted to go below 10% for filing purposes. I continue to own stock in Sprott. I continue to be very friendly with the company CEO and know them very well.
In short: Own the manager, not the product: "why would you buy four or five of our products and pay us a management fee when you could buy the parent company, own an indirect interest in all 60 of them and get paid a dividend? This is fairly simple arithmetic. Would you rather pay or be paid? I've decided I would rather be paid." Disclosed: his former firm, and "I'm still the largest shareholder." Between ETFs and trusts, ~50 exchange-traded products.
Sprott runs roughly 50 exchange-traded funds and trusts covering gold, silver, uranium and other resources. Rick's argument is a piece of arithmetic anyone can copy: if you were going to buy four or five of a manager's funds and pay it a fee on each, you could instead buy the manager, get indirect exposure to all sixty products, and be paid a dividend rather than paying a fee.
"Would you rather pay or be paid? I've decided I would rather be paid."
He is careful about the two catches. It is a different and higher risk — you now own an asset-management business whose revenue depends on fund inflows and asset values, not the metals themselves. And he discloses the conflict plainly: Sprott is his former firm and "I'm still the largest shareholder," adding that "I hate talking against my former firm in a sense."
18:35Now the answer to that for me when I do the math — and I hate talking against my former firm in a sense — why would you buy four or five of our products and pay us a management fee when you could buy the parent company, own an indirect interest in all 60 of them and get paid a dividend? Yeah. This is fairly simple arithmetic. Would you rather pay or be paid? I've decided I would rather be paid.
In short: Second pro pick — ~$65B precious-metals/real-asset manager (~$50B physical trusts). 30% AUM CAGR since 2021; adjusted-EBITDA margin 53%→72%; no leverage, ~13–15× fwd EBITDA. A high-margin flywheel "eloquent way to express this view longer term," with a uranium-trust call option; sticky physical holders insulate it from outflows.
Sprott is a money manager (~$65B) whose main business is physical-metal trusts: investors buy shares, Sprott uses the cash to buy and vault real gold, silver, copper and uranium, and clips a small annual fee on the pile.
It's a "flywheel" — when metal prices rise and money flows in, the asset pile grows, and because managing a bigger pile costs almost nothing extra, profit margins have jumped from 53% to 72%. There's no debt, and people who buy physical-metal trusts tend to hold for years, so the fee income is unusually steady. On top of that, its uranium trust is a free kicker if uranium keeps climbing.
1:02:13Um Eric Nourge, uh his co-founder or colleague Rick Rule hasn't been involved in the business for years. Now, it's run by a gentleman named Whitney George, who's actually a value investor who came up under Chuck Royce, and then um this is kind of the new very high-growth phase of his career. But, Sprott today is about a $65 billion asset manager focusing on precious metals, but any number of real-world assets.
In short: Update (full exit) — a "monster winner" (Sy Jacobs' idea), $32 (Dec-2023) → $138, a four-bagger in <2½ years. Now "quite spendy" (9× P/S, 29× P/E even after a 14% correction); Sy himself worries about further give-back. "One of our rare suggestions to exit it entirely" (mind the tax bill).
Sprott is a precious-metals-focused asset manager. It was a huge winner — recommended at $32 in December 2023, now $138, a "four-bagger" in under 2½ years. But it has become expensive (29× earnings, 9× sales) even after a recent dip, and the analyst who originally pitched it (Sy Jacobs) now worries it could give back gains. So Haymaker makes a rare call to sell the entire position and bank the profit rather than hope for new highs — though longtime holders should expect a sizable tax bill. The spirit is the Baruch quote: better to sell a bit too early than too late.
In short: Reference — Sy's other 12/15/23 name, "a phenomenally rewarding performer," cited as the foil to AMRK/GOLD (the divergence that prompted the Apr-2025 rotation toward GOLD). Backstory for the GOLD case, not a fresh call here. (Three weeks later, in the 2026-MAY-15 POW!, Haymaker called a full exit on SII.)
In short: His precious-metals expression inside a financials-only mandate — an asset manager, so it qualifies as financial services. He recommended it "way back when," and it became the multi-year-breakout-from-a-tight-range chart David Hay opened the webinar with (assets grew drastically, hugely accretive to margins as overhead barely rose). A doom-about-the-dollar / QE-era long.
Sprott is an asset manager specializing in precious metals and uranium. Because Sy's fund is only allowed to own financial-services companies, Sprott is how he expresses a bullish view on gold and silver without breaking that rule — an asset manager counts as a financial. He recommended it years ago out of a sense of doom about the US dollar and money-printing, and it became the textbook chart David Hay loves: a stock that traded sideways in a tight range for years and then "broke out" to much higher levels as its assets — and therefore its fee profits — grew sharply while costs barely rose. (Amusingly, its ticker SII can be read "Si," like Sy's name.)
In short: Track-record reference for the source, not a fresh call — Sy Jacobs' best Haymaker idea: SII (sponsor/manager of the Sprott hard-assets funds) was ~$34 at the December-2023 maiden presentation, "today it's near $120" — 350% gains in a bit over two years. Cited to credential the QNST recommendation; Haymaker later (2026-MAY-15) suggested fully exiting SII as "quite spendy."
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.