In short: Its CEO said Urenco plans to add 4.6M SWU of enrichment capacity globally through 2036 and disclosed a €27.3bn order book in the first half alone — one of the front-end voices behind the conclusion that growth depends on "conversion, enrichment and fabrication arriving in the right quantities at the right time."
4:35The chief executive of Urenco said the company plans to add 4.6 million separative work units of enrichment capacity globally through 2036 and disclosed an order book of 27.3 billion euros in the first half of this year alone. The most pointed comments came from Kazatomprom's chief strategy officer who said the company is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain the traditional geographic balance of its uranium sales as demand from eastern buyers continues to strengthen.
In short: With Russia's Tenex excluded, Orano and Urenco are "the only options to respond" to KHNP's 1.2M SWU tender — and both "have limited capacity going out into the late 2020s," so Korea "is going to have to pay up" for SWU at all-time-high prices.
37:56This is about 25 million pounds of total uranium demand equivalent assuming a 0.25 tales assay. Korean swoo demand excludes Russia. So historically they've been pretty reliant on 10x which is Russia's enrichment company. They're excluding Russia. So that basically leaves Orano and Urano as the only options to respond to this tender.
In short: The only commercial-scale enrichment plant operating in the US (New Mexico), supplying ~⅓ of domestic needs — illustrating how thin US enrichment capacity is.
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