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Actionable insights — Haymaker Daily: Mean Reversion, Mean Indeed

The repeatable analysis behind the caution: not what was sold, but how to decompose a headline profit number into operating and non-operating income, how to cross-check that decomposition with an independent sector-strip, how to treat an extreme reading on a mean-reverting series as a base rate rather than a trend, and how to use the language people reach for at extremes as a dating device — written so each step can be rerun on the next quarter's earnings euphoria.
2026-AUG-06 · Haymaker (Substack newsletter, paid) · The Haymaker Team / David Hay · ↗ Read · full analysis · article text
How to read this page: each insight is a method — the reasoning chain that took Haymaker from "the strongest S&P earnings since 1955" to "at least some mean reversion is to be realistically expected." The boxed line shows how it played out in this post. (Written newsletter — the "read" link opens the source post, and there are no timestamps.)

1. Decompose the "E" before you use any multiple built on it

The repeatable method
  1. Take the reported profit and split it into cash generated by selling things versus gains recognised on holding things — investment mark-ups, warrant revaluations, fair-value adjustments, one-off legal/tax items.
  2. For every gain in the second bucket, ask three questions: was cash received? Is the asset publicly priced or marked to a private round? And who set that price — an arm's-length buyer, or a counterparty inside the same commercial loop?
  3. Compute the second bucket as a percentage of total profit. That single ratio is the earnings-quality score, and it is comparable across companies and across quarters.
  4. Track the ratio's direction over time, not just its level — a rising share of non-operating profit means the operating engine is doing proportionally less of the work each quarter.
  5. Re-strike the P/E on the operating bucket alone. If the multiple on that number is unrecognisable, the stock is not cheap; the accounting is.
  6. Remember the symmetry: a mark-up booked as income becomes a mark-down booked as loss at the next down-round. The line item is a two-way exposure to somebody else's valuation.
Here: "profits at the big hyperscalers like Alphabet/Google (GOOG) have been greatly flattered by gains on share ownership in their largest AI customers and partners. In GOOG's case, approximately 75% of its first-half 2026 profits have come from the mark-up of its stakes in, primarily, Anthropic and SpaceX" — up from "almost two-thirds" on Jul-26, and against a SpaceX valuation Haymaker showed collapsing from ~$2.5T to $1.4T on Aug-3.
Watch for

2. Cross-check an accounting decomposition with an independent sector strip

The repeatable method
  1. Having decomposed profit by type (operating vs mark-to-market), decompose the index's growth by sector — a completely different cut of the same data.
  2. Remove the two or three sectors carrying the theme and the commodity cycle, and compute what growth remains for everything else.
  3. Prefer a named outside analyst's calculation to your own here: it removes the suspicion that the strip was reverse-engineered to reach the conclusion.
  4. Compare the residual growth rate to the market's implied growth expectation. The gap between "4%" and what a 20× multiple assumes is the actual risk being run.
  5. Treat agreement between the two methods as conviction, and disagreement as a signal you have mis-specified one of them — not as a reason to pick the more convenient answer.
Here: "Canada's highest profile economist, David Rosenberg, calculates that the S&P profits increase this year exclusive of energy and AI-related sectors would be a much more pedestrian 4%." Two independent cuts — accounting and sectoral — land in the same place.
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3. Treat an extreme print on a mean-reverting series as a base rate, not a trend

The repeatable method
  1. Establish first that the series actually mean-reverts — profit margins, earnings growth, crack spreads, freight rates — because the same reasoning applied to a trending series (revenue, population, price levels) is wrong.
  2. Find the longest available history and locate the current print within it. "Strongest since 1955" is not a bullish datapoint; it is a position on a distribution.
  3. Look at what happened after every prior comparable print, and state the base rate plainly rather than forecasting a cause. "Spikes have been followed by equally dramatic declines" needs no theory of what breaks.
  4. Do not require a catalyst. Mean reversion is the null hypothesis; a catalyst is only needed to explain the timing, not the direction.
  5. Position for it as a probability weight on the payoff, not as a dated call — reducing exposure to the names most levered to the extreme reading rather than shorting the index.
Here: earnings are "the strongest since 1955," and "a close study of the above chart indicates that past times of earnings spikes have been followed by equally dramatic declines… at least some mean reversion is to be realistically expected." The historical analogue is chosen with care — 1955 also paired an earnings peak with a technology promising "cheap and nearly limitless power."
Watch for

4. Use the language people reach for at extremes as a dating device

The repeatable method
  1. Collect the specific phrases that recur at cycle peaks — "this time is different," "a permanently higher plateau," "a new paradigm," "the old valuation rules don't apply to this business model."
  2. When you catch yourself or a consensus write-up using one to dismiss a mean-reversion argument, treat it as evidence for the argument rather than against it.
  3. Anchor each phrase to its dated historical instance so the analogy carries a cost: Fisher's plateau was nine days before the 1929 crash, which is what makes it a warning rather than a witticism.
  4. Keep the rebuttal narrow. The claim is not that this time can't be different — it is that the burden of proof sits with the person asserting it, and that the assertion itself has a poor track record.
  5. Pair the rhetorical tell with a hard number (the earnings decomposition, the ex-sector growth rate) so the argument does not rest on tone alone.
Here: "Of course, this time could be different. However… JPMorgan's Jamie Dimon has said those are the most dangerous words in the English language. In our view, rivaling those would be those uttered by… Irving Fisher," who "publicly, and infamously, declared on October 15th, 1929, that 'Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently higher plateau.'"
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Methods distilled from the paid Haymaker newsletter (text in transcript.txt). For personal study. Not investment advice. © Haymaker / David Hay for source material.