Sixty-eight names (59 Positive, 9 Neutral). The stance is the published rating: BUY and STRONG BUY → Positive, HOLD → Neutral; names cited only as illustrations (the AI-panic software names, Rollins) and the watchlist addition with no stated rating are Neutral. Figures are read from the published spreadsheet images (transcribed in full in transcript.txt): ER = expected return from the earnings-growth model, fwd PE = current forward PE against the five-year average, RDCF = growth the price requires versus growth expected. Names that appear only in the top-ten screen lists and not on the Buy sheet (Goosehead, Paycom, EPAM, Paylocity, CoStar, CorVel, Marimekko, FactSet, Enghouse, Ares, Nexstar, InfraCom, Equasens) are summarised in the talking points rather than given rows. Research legend: QT Qualtrim · SA Seeking Alpha · STK Stock Analysis. Written post with no timestamps — the At link opens the article.
| Ticker | Name | Research | View | What he said | At |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KPG.AX | Kelly Partners Group Holdings | STK | Positive | STRONG BUY (portfolio). Fair value A$8.4 vs A$4.89 — 42.1% undervalued; ER 15.8%; fwd PE 18.1 vs a 29.3 five-year average; the price implies −9.5% growth against 12.0% expected (+21.5pp), fifth on the universe's reverse-DCF list. Also the seventh-worst performer YTD at −41.8%. | read ↗ |
| BRO | Brown & Brown | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | STRONG BUY (portfolio). Fair value $76.3 vs $65.75 — only 13.9% under; ER 11.9%; fwd PE 14.6 vs 24.7 (40.9% under). The sheet's reverse DCF now dissents sharply: 42.1% required vs 7.2% expected (−34.9pp) — in August the same model showed 5.1% required. The Strong Buy rests on the multiple alone. | read ↗ |
| KNSL | Kinsale Capital Group | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | STRONG BUY (portfolio), and tenth on the universe's reverse-DCF list — the price implies −5.8% growth against 11.0% expected (+16.8pp). Fair value $478.9 vs $358.34 (25.2% under); fwd PE 17.2 vs 28.6 (39.9% under). YTD −8.7%. | read ↗ |
| TOI.V | Topicus.com | QT · SA · STK | Positive | STRONG BUY (portfolio). Fair value 183.3 vs 93.83 — 48.8% undervalued; fwd PE 25.6 vs a 49.2 five-year average (48.0% under); RDCF 8.3% required vs 15.0% expected. YTD −25.0%, down from −19.1% a month earlier. | read ↗ |
| CSU.TO | Constellation Software | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | STRONG BUY (portfolio) — still the largest stated discount in the book. Fair value 7,415.1 vs 2,811.82 — 62.1% undervalued; ER 17.9%; fwd PE 15.8 vs 31.5 (49.8% under); RDCF 8.1% vs 15.0%. | read ↗ |
| BN | Brookfield Corporation | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | STRONG BUY (portfolio), resting on one model of three. Earnings-growth model: fair value $107.6 vs $53.14 (50.6% under), ER 17.5% on a 68× exit multiple. But fwd PE 46.0 is above its 45.0 average (−2.2%), and the reverse DCF shows 90.6% required vs 12.0% expected (−78.6pp) — the worst reading on the whole sheet. | read ↗ |
| SPGI | S&P Global | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | STRONG BUY (portfolio). Fair value $607.4 vs $411.76 (32.2% under); fwd PE 22.3 vs 29.5 (24.4% under); RDCF 10.4% vs 11.5% (+1.1pp) — the thinnest reverse-DCF margin of the seven Strong Buys that pass it. YTD −19.7%. | read ↗ |
| THEP.PA | Thermador Groupe | STK | Positive | UPGRADED HOLD → BUY, and the Reverse-DCF spotlight. "A French distributor of specialized plumbing, heating, valves, and fluid-control equipment." The market "is only pricing in 2.4% FCF growth for the next 10 years" on pessimism about European construction and slowing renovation subsidies — "This might be too pessimistic": organic growth has turned positive again and analysts expect FCF to grow from 2027. ER 15.92% (11.7% EPS growth + 2.9% yield); fair value €149.4 vs €71.30. YTD −9.5%. | read ↗ |
| EVD.DE | CTS Eventim | STK | Positive | UPGRADED HOLD → BUY — "Ticketing services and live entertainment management company." No argument beyond the one-liner; the sheet shows ER 12.06%, fwd PE 17.0 vs a 27.1 five-year average (37.3% under), and a price implying −3.4% growth against 7.7% expected (+11.1pp). YTD −26.9%. | read ↗ |
| IT | Gartner | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY — the Forward-P/E spotlight, "trading near its lowest valuation level in a decade." Forward P/E "compressed to 11.3x, representing a 65% discount compared to its 5-year average of 33x." The bear case — IT budget cuts and AI making research less valuable — is answered with "Gartner helps companies choose the right AI models," plus management guiding to higher FCF and heavy buybacks. On all three top-ten screens except the reverse DCF; ER 19.93%. YTD −26.4%. | read ↗ |
| TRU | TransUnion | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | The Earnings-Growth-Model spotlight — ninth on that list at a 19.33% expected return (13.9% EPS growth, 14.7× forward vs a 21.8 exit multiple). Risks named: a weaker economy cutting borrowing and mortgage activity, and FHFA chairman Bill Pulte studying "a single credit report and bi-merge credit reporting." Answer: "TransUnion is still active in an oligopoly together with Equifax and Experian. This is very attractive," and guidance was just raised. Not on the 56-row Buy sheet image. | read ↗ |
| MEDP | Medpace Holdings | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY (portfolio), and the essay's case study of "Mr. Market overreacting." In April 2025 higher rates, few IPOs, VC flowing to AI and regulatory uncertainty squeezed customers' funding and took the stock from ~$450 to below $300 — "a temporary issue" because drug makers must always test, and FDA rules require it. EPS kept growing; the stock is near $600 and the position is "+140% since we bought it in October 2023." On the sheet it is now barely a Buy: fair value $623.3 vs $592.41 (5.0% under), ER 10.4%, fwd PE 29.7 vs 29.4 (−1.0%), RDCF −1.3pp. | read ↗ |
| EVO.ST | Evolution AB | QT · SA · STK | Positive | BUY (portfolio). ER 14.3% incl. a 5.0% yield; fwd PE 11 vs 15 (26.7% under); fair value SEK 1,283.3 vs 875.2. The reverse DCF shows 74.6% required vs 5.7% expected (−68.9pp) — a figure that looks mechanically broken against August's 1.5%. YTD +40.2%, tenth-best in the universe. | read ↗ |
| IPAR | Inter Parfums | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY (portfolio). ER 13.65%; fwd PE 18.6 vs 26.3 (29.3% under); RDCF 3.3% vs 10.0%. Fair value $168.1 vs $111.02. YTD +29.9%. | read ↗ |
| AMP | Ameriprise Financial | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY (portfolio). ER 11.64%; fwd PE 11.0 vs 11.7 (6.0% under); RDCF 3.8% vs 9.8%. Fair value $653.4 vs $552.88. YTD +12.0%. | read ↗ |
| V | Visa | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY (portfolio). ER 14.88%; fair value $680.5 vs $369.42 (45.7% under); fwd PE 23.4 vs 28.3 (17.3% under); the price implies 0.0% growth against 13.5% expected. YTD +6.6%. | read ↗ |
| HGT.L | HgCapital Trust | STK | Positive | BUY (portfolio), valued on NAV: 3.88 share price vs 5.6 NAV per share — a 31.0% discount; ER 16.2%. Listed among the owned Buys in the text but absent from the 56-row Buy sheet image. | read ↗ |
| ZTS | Zoetis | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY (portfolio) — and the fifth-worst performer in the universe YTD at −42.7%. ER 15.3%; fair value $109.7 vs $72.1 (34.2% under); fwd PE 16.2 vs 31.7 (48.9% under); RDCF −0.5% vs 7.0%. Like HGT, named among the owned Buys but missing from the Buy sheet image. | read ↗ |
| III.L | 3i Group plc | QT · SA · STK | Positive | BUY (portfolio). ER 15.89%; fair value 53.40 vs 26.51 (50.4% under); fwd PE 25.66 vs 30.20 (14.9% under); RDCF 9.0% vs 11.0%. YTD −17.4%. | read ↗ |
| KKR | KKR & Co. | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY (portfolio). ER 11.60%; fair value $119.5 vs $102.22 (14.5% under); fwd PE 16.2 vs 17.9; RDCF 3.6% vs 9.8%. YTD −20.7%. | read ↗ |
| FFH.TO | Fairfax Financial Holdings | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY (portfolio). Now weak on every model: fair value CA$2,427.2 vs CA$2,236.39 (7.9% under), fwd PE 9.1 vs 8.0 (13.8% over), and the reverse DCF flips from August's +14.2pp to 18.3% required vs 11.0% expected (−7.3pp). ER 10.69%. YTD −14.2%. | read ↗ |
| ADBE | Adobe | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY — on both the Forward-PE and Earnings-Growth top tens. Fwd PE 8.5 vs 24.0 (64.6% under); ER 19.95%; RDCF −0.1% vs 12.3% (+12.4pp). Fair value $758.3 vs $248.16. YTD −25.5%. | read ↗ |
| ADYEN.AS | Adyen N.V. | QT · SA · STK | Positive | BUY — tenth on the Forward-PE list: 24.9 vs a 64.3 average (61.3% under); ER 15.04%; RDCF 2.5% vs 15.0%. Fair value €1,864.9 vs €928.70. YTD −33.5%. | read ↗ |
| ALRM | Alarm.com Holdings | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 12.62%; fwd PE 15.9 vs 33.3 (52.3% under); RDCF 3.5% vs 6.9%. Fair value $66.3 vs $55.22. YTD +7.8%. | read ↗ |
| GOOGL | Alphabet | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY (the August upgrade holds). ER 13.66%; but fwd PE 29.9 vs 22.4 (33.5% over) and RDCF 22.3% vs 15.0% (−7.3pp). YTD +7.6%. | read ↗ |
| ADP | Automatic Data Processing | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 13.08%; fwd PE 17.3 vs 27.9 (38.0% under); RDCF 6.7% vs 6.0% (−0.7pp). YTD +5.5%. | read ↗ |
| BRK.B | Berkshire Hathaway | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY — priced as the A share. Still the weakest arithmetic on the sheet: ER 7.08%, fair value $567,171.5 vs $759,868 (34.0% over), RDCF 22.1% vs 8.5% (−13.6pp). | read ↗ |
| COLM | Columbia Sportswear | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 11.25%; fwd PE 17.4 vs 19.4 (10.3% under); RDCF 1.5% vs 8.0%. Fair value $64.0 vs $56.85. | read ↗ |
| CMG.TO | Computer Modelling Group | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 10.81%; fwd PE 13.6 vs 25.4 (46.5% under); fair value 4.00 vs 3.80 (5.5% under). YTD −28.0%. | read ↗ |
| CPRT | Copart | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 13.86%; fwd PE 20.9 vs 30.7 (31.9% under); RDCF 7.9% vs 11.9%. Fair value $45.6 vs $30.90. YTD −18.2%. | read ↗ |
| DECK | Deckers Outdoor | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 12.21%; fwd PE 14.0 vs 21.3 (34.3% under); the price implies −1.6% growth vs 7.0% expected. YTD −23.6%. | read ↗ |
| DPZ | Domino's Pizza | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 14.99%; fwd PE 19.1 vs 27.5 (30.5% under); RDCF 4.8% vs 9.4%. Fair value $508.3 vs $314.54. YTD −26.0%. | read ↗ |
| ESQ | Esquire Financial Holdings | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 13.48%; fwd PE 16.0 vs an 11.9 average (34.5% over); RDCF 5.3% vs 13.5% (+8.2pp). YTD +18.2%; five-year CAGR 35.7%. | read ↗ |
| FICO | Fair Isaac | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY — ninth-worst performer YTD at −41.0% (from −34.2% a month earlier). ER 11.01%; fwd PE 22.7 vs 40.9 (44.5% under); RDCF 11.6% vs 10.0%. The same FHFA credit-report review cited for TransUnion bears on it. | read ↗ |
| FTNT | Fortinet | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY — best performer in the universe YTD at +100.1%. ER 10.65%; fwd PE 28.9 vs 42.7 (32.3% under); RDCF 18.3% vs 12.0% (−6.3pp); fair value $168.5 vs $155.83. | read ↗ |
| HLNE | Hamilton Lane | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 12.46% on 3.4% EPS growth; fwd PE 15.1 vs 25.5 (40.8% under); RDCF 4.9% vs 3.4%. YTD −28.8%. | read ↗ |
| RMS.PA | Hermès International | QT · SA · STK | Positive | BUY. ER 10.20%; fwd PE 35.7 vs 48.3 (26.1% under); fair value €1,441.2 vs €1,399.50 (only 2.9% under); RDCF 17.3% vs 11.9%. YTD −32.9%. | read ↗ |
| ICE | Intercontinental Exchange | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 14.53%; fwd PE 19.5 vs 21.9 (11.0% under); RDCF 8.1% vs 12.0%. Fair value $263.3 vs $157.10. | read ↗ |
| KNOS.L | Kainos Group plc | STK | Positive | BUY — tenth on the Earnings-Growth list at 19.02%. Fwd PE 17.1 vs 28.7 (40.4% under); fair value 31.00 vs 11.86; RDCF 14.6% vs 11.9% (−2.7pp). YTD +19.5%. | read ↗ |
| KARO | Karooooo Ltd. | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY — second on the Reverse-DCF list (−33.2% required vs 9.6% expected, +42.8pp) and ninth-best performer YTD at +42.3%. The reverse DCF swung from August's −9.2pp to +42.8pp in a month in which the stock rose. ER 12.50%. | read ↗ |
| LULU | lululemon athletica | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY — second-worst performer YTD at −53.7%, and on both the Forward-PE (11.2 vs 33.1, 66.2% under) and Earnings-Growth (19.72%) top tens. RDCF −2.5% vs 7.4%. | read ↗ |
| MKL | Markel Group | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY — seventh on the Reverse-DCF list (−5.5% required vs 12.0%, +17.5pp). ER 11.41%; fwd PE 18.7 vs 17.6 (6.2% over). YTD −16.5%. | read ↗ |
| MA | Mastercard | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 14.93%; fwd PE 26.8 vs 32.6 (17.8% under); RDCF 13.8% vs 15.0%. Fair value $1,201.9 vs $566.89. | read ↗ |
| MELI | MercadoLibre | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 11.89%; fwd PE 36.3 vs 48.4 (25.0% under); RDCF −0.9% vs 15.0% (+15.9pp). | read ↗ |
| MSFT | Microsoft | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 15.90%; fwd PE 24.5 vs 30.1 (18.6% under); RDCF 18.0% vs 15.0% (−3.0pp). Fair value $1,173.8 vs $494.65. | read ↗ |
| MIPS.ST | Mips AB | STK | Positive | BUY. ER 13.90%; fwd PE 30.5 vs 59.6 (48.8% under); RDCF 24.8% vs 15.0% (−9.8pp). YTD +8.8%. | read ↗ |
| MCO | Moody's | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 11.46%; fwd PE 27.6 vs 32.7 (15.6% under); RDCF 12.9% vs 11.5% (−1.4pp). | read ↗ |
| MSCI | MSCI Inc. | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 12.56%; fwd PE 29.2 vs 39.6 (26.3% under); RDCF 13.1% vs 12.5%. | read ↗ |
| NSSC | Napco Security Technologies | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 13.00%; fwd PE 30.5 vs 29.0 (5.2% over); RDCF 11.0% vs 12.9%. Fair value $57.0 vs $36.16. | read ↗ |
| POOL | Pool Corporation | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 12.91%; fwd PE 21.2 vs 27.3 (22.3% under); RDCF 5.5% vs 8.1%. YTD −23.8%. | read ↗ |
| QLYS | Qualys | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 15.07% on 4.4% EPS growth; fwd PE 12.1 vs 30.1 (59.8% under); RDCF 10.7% vs 4.4% (−6.3pp). YTD +14.9%. | read ↗ |
| RH | RH (Restoration Hardware) | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 11.00%; fwd PE 25.0 vs 25.8 (3.1% under); RDCF 3.2% vs 11.0%. YTD −30.9%. | read ↗ |
| SL.MI | Sanlorenzo S.p.A. | STK | Positive | BUY. ER 11.73%; fwd PE 10.9 vs 14.2 (23.2% under); RDCF 2.4% vs 6.0%. YTD +26.1%. | read ↗ |
| SOON.SW | Sonova Holding | QT · SA · STK | Positive | BUY. ER 10.16%; fwd PE 19.6 vs 25.6 (23.4% under); fair value 229.0 vs 226.2 (1.2% under); RDCF 9.5% vs 5.4%. | read ↗ |
| SSNC | SS&C Technologies | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 14.52%; fwd PE 10.3 vs 13.0 (20.8% under); RDCF 2.2% vs 10.5%. Fair value $124.4 vs $79.85. | read ↗ |
| TAM.L | Tatton Asset Management | STK | Positive | BUY. ER 16.70% incl. a 4.5% yield; fwd PE 16.4 vs 22.5 (27% under); fair value 14.90 vs 6.72. | read ↗ |
| TEQ.ST | Teqnion AB | STK | Positive | BUY. ER 10.46% (up from 5.96% in August on a higher 12.5% growth input); fwd PE 31.4 vs 45.3 (30.7% under); RDCF 12.0% vs 12.5%. | read ↗ |
| TDG | TransDigm Group | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 16.82% (an 8.0% yield input — special dividends); fwd PE 30.8 vs 34.7 (11.2% under); RDCF 13.7% vs 10.7% (−3.0pp). | read ↗ |
| XPEL | XPEL, Inc. | QT · SA · STK · FA | Positive | BUY. ER 14.09%; fwd PE 22.0 vs 32.6 (32.5% under); RDCF 3.8% vs 15.0%. Fair value $87.9 vs $48.35. | read ↗ |
| ISRG | Intuitive Surgical | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | ADDED to the investable universe — "We added another amazing company: Intuitive Surgical ($ISRG): Robotic-assisted surgical systems manufacturer." No rating is stated and it is not on the Buy sheet, so it enters the watchlist below Buy. | read ↗ |
| DNP.WA | Dino Polska | SA · STK | Neutral | HOLD (portfolio) — the portfolio sheet now agrees with August's competition downgrade (last month the sheet still said BUY). ER 13.3%; fair value 50.0 vs 35.4 (29.2% under); fwd PE 17.7 vs 24.9. The numbers still read as a Buy; the rating is a judgement on competition in Poland. | read ↗ |
| LVMUY | LVMH (ADR) | QT · SA | Neutral | HOLD (portfolio). ER 15.3%; fair value €721.7 vs €415.3 (42.5% under); fwd PE 19.9 vs 24.9 (20.1% under); RDCF 4.6% vs 9.6% — Buy-grade numbers on every model, with the rating unexplained as in prior issues. | read ↗ |
| GAW.L | Games Workshop | QT · SA · STK | Neutral | HOLD (portfolio) — the only holding overvalued on all three models: 176.5 vs 120.2 fair value (46.8% over), fwd PE 33.1 vs 23.0 (43.9% over), RDCF 15.5% vs 7.0%. ER 6.7%, the lowest in the book. | read ↗ |
| ROL | Rollins | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | The essay's example of the multiple swinging while the business does not: EPS growth of "around 12% a year for a long time," yet "Over the past 10 years, Rollins has traded at multiples ranging from 31x to 89x earnings" and "In the past year alone, it's gone from 60x earnings to 31x. That's a 50% valuation drop." Eighth-worst performer YTD at −41.2%. Not on the Buy sheet. | read ↗ |
| NOW | ServiceNow | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Illustration of the 2026 AI-disruption panic: sold off −33.3%, then "+31% from its lows" — "Did these businesses reinvent themselves in 90 days?… No. The fundamentals didn't change. The narrative did." No rating. | read ↗ |
| CRM | Salesforce | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Same illustration (−37.6%, then +57% off the lows — the biggest rebound of the four), plus the chart of Salesforce's price against analysts' targets: "When the stock price starts moving up, analysts increase their price targets. When the stock moves down, the price targets follow it." No rating. | read ↗ |
| WDAY | Workday | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Same illustration: −39.6% in the AI panic, then +50% from its lows with no change in fundamentals. No rating. | read ↗ |
| ACN | Accenture | QT · SA · STK · FA | Neutral | Same illustration, the deepest drawdown of the four: −50.4% on "Why pay a consultant when you can just ask AI?", then +44% from its lows. No rating. | read ↗ |
Three documented inconsistencies inside this issue. (1) Count: the text says 57 stocks are on Buy; the Buy-sheet image shows 56 rows, and omits two holdings the text lists among its 17 owned Buys (Zoetis, HgCapital Trust). (2) Thermador's reverse DCF: 2.4% required in the prose and the top-ten list, −165.5% on the Buy sheet — the 177.2pp "difference" that tops the list is computed from the latter, so the ranking is an artefact. Several other reverse-DCF readings move implausibly month on month (Evolution 1.5% → 74.6%, Brown & Brown 5.1% → 42.1%, Brookfield 8.3% → 90.6%, Karooooo −9.2pp → +42.8pp), which suggests an input change in the model rather than in the businesses. (3) Holdings: the portfolio sheet has 20 names against 21 in August — Novo Nordisk is gone, consistent with the 1 September plan to cut it, but the sale itself is not announced in this issue.
A jargon-free summary of the thesis behind each name where the issue makes a real argument or a real change. (Renders on each name's consolidated page.)
Thermador is a French wholesaler: it stocks the valves, pumps, heating parts and plumbing fittings that installers need and gets them to the job quickly. It is a quiet, cash-generating middleman whose sales rise and fall with European building and renovation work.
The upgrade to buy rests on a simple calculation run backwards. Take today's share price and ask how fast the company's cash flow would have to grow over the next ten years to justify it — the answer is only about 2.4% a year, which is what you would price in for a business that barely grows. The letter thinks that is too gloomy: organic sales (growth without acquisitions) have turned positive again, and analysts expect free cash flow to start rising in 2027. If growth merely returns to normal, the price looks cheap.
A caution: the same spreadsheet prints a different, nonsensical figure for this calculation on its main Buy sheet, and the headline "177% difference" that puts Thermador top of the list comes from that figure. The 2.4% in the text is the one to trust.
CTS Eventim sells concert and event tickets across Europe and also promotes the events themselves — a ticketing platform plus a live-entertainment business, similar in shape to Live Nation in the US.
It moves from hold to buy this month with no written argument. The spreadsheet shows why: the shares are down about 27% this year, the price now implies the business will shrink slightly, while the letter expects it to grow almost 8% a year. That gap — cheap relative to both its own history and its expected growth — is the whole case.
Gartner sells yearly research subscriptions to executives: reports, data, rankings like its "Magic Quadrant" of vendors, and calls with analysts who help them decide what technology to buy.
The shares are at about 11 times next year's earnings against an average of 33 over five years — the cheapest in a decade — because investors fear two things: companies cutting technology budgets, and AI chatbots making paid research less necessary. The letter's answer is that AI is itself a buying decision companies need help with, so Gartner's advice becomes more relevant, not less. Management is also guiding to more free cash flow and plans to spend much of it buying back its own shares, which lifts earnings per share even if the business grows slowly.
TransUnion is one of the three credit bureaus that keep the records lenders use to decide who gets a loan and at what rate. When you apply for a mortgage or a credit card, one or more of the three is almost always paid for a report.
Two worries have pushed the shares down: a weaker economy means fewer loans and mortgages, and the head of the US housing-finance regulator has said he is studying requiring only one or two credit reports for mortgages instead of three — which would directly cut how many reports get sold. The letter's view is that the structure still wins: an industry with only three players, all essential, is hard to disrupt, and the company has just raised its guidance. Its model expects roughly a 19% yearly return from here.
Medpace runs clinical trials for drug and medical-device companies — the lengthy, regulated testing that must happen before anything can be sold. Many of its customers are small biotech firms that live on investor funding.
In spring 2025 that funding dried up at once — higher interest rates, few stock-market listings, venture money chasing AI — and the shares fell from about $450 to under $300. The letter uses it as the model case of a temporary scare: new drugs still have to be tested, the law still requires it, and earnings kept growing. The stock is back near $600, and the position is up about 140% since October 2023.
The flip side is on this month's sheet: after that recovery, Medpace is only about 5% below the letter's estimate of fair value — a Buy on paper, but the cheap part is behind it.
Intuitive Surgical makes the da Vinci robotic surgery system. Hospitals buy the robot once, then keep paying for the single-use instruments consumed in every operation and for service contracts — so most revenue recurs, and it grows with every surgeon trained on the machine.
This month it is added to the list of companies the letter considers good enough to own. It does not appear on the buy sheet, so the implication is that the quality is there but the price is not yet.
Dino Polska runs small supermarkets in Polish towns and has grown by opening hundreds of new stores a year. Last month the letter cut it to hold because competition is increasing; this month the portfolio sheet itself finally says hold too.
The numbers on the sheet still look like a buy — about 29% below estimated fair value and cheaper than its usual multiple. The rating is a judgement that rivals will slow the store-opening engine that made the business special, and the 1 September letter already named it as a position to cut.
Rollins owns Orkin and other pest-control businesses — dull, recurring, contract-based work that has let it grow earnings about 12% a year for a very long time.
It is used here to show the essay's main point. Over ten years investors have paid anywhere from 31 to 89 times earnings for exactly the same steady business; in the past year alone the multiple halved from 60 to 31. The company did not get worse — the mood about it did. That is why the letter separates the two halves of a share price: earnings (the business) and the multiple (the mood). No rating is given.
Summary derived from the archived Compounding Quality post (text and transcribed spreadsheets in transcript.txt) for personal study. Not investment advice. © Compounding Quality / Pieter Slegers for source material.