In short: BUY — tenth on the Forward-PE list: 24.9 vs a 64.3 average (61.3% under); ER 15.04%; RDCF 2.5% vs 15.0%. Fair value €1,864.9 vs €928.70. YTD −33.5%.
In short: BUY — the issue's spotlight, "trading near its lowest valuation level ever." Fwd PE 24.9 against a 64.3 five-year average (61.3% under); ER 15.04%; fair value €2,063.9 vs €1,027.80. The bear case is named and answered: the first two acquisitions in company history — Talon.One (loyalty, €750m) and Orb (enterprise billing, €335m) — worry investors about organic growth and complexity, but "neither acquisition changes Adyen's core payments platform… Orb strengthens Adyen's position in usage-based billing, which is becoming increasingly important for AI and SaaS companies." Guidance already raised to >20% constant-currency revenue growth; EPS has grown 35% a year for nine years.
Adyen is the plumbing behind card payments for large merchants — one platform that handles the whole transaction end to end, which is unusual in an industry normally stitched together from several vendors. That simplicity is the product, and it is why the letter treats any move away from it as the main risk.
The shares now trade at about 25 times next year's expected earnings against an average of 64 over the past five years. Something that dramatic usually has a reason, and here it is named: this year Adyen made the first two acquisitions in its history — a loyalty platform for €750m and a billing platform for €335m — and some investors read buying growth as a signal that growth has stopped arriving on its own, and worry that the clean single platform is about to get messy.
The counter-argument is that neither purchase touches the payments engine; they sit alongside it and give Adyen more to sell to customers it already has. One of them, usage-based billing, matters more as software companies move to charging per unit of consumption. And management has already raised its full-year guidance to more than 20% revenue growth in constant currency, which is not what a business running out of momentum looks like.
In short: Best Buy #5. The single-platform argument again — "everything is run a single global platform, making it the preferred choice for large enterprise customers" — plus a data flywheel: "every payment helps Adyen approve even more transactions… it helps them to detect fraud earlier. More customers → better data → better results → even more customers." Skin in the game: founder-co-CEO Pieter van der Does "still owns nearly 3% of the company, worth over €750 million." New this issue: the first two acquisitions in Adyen's history — Talon.One (loyalty and promotions) and Orb (AI-powered enterprise billing) — aimed at turning "a payment processor into a full commerce platform."
Adyen handles the plumbing when you pay a large online business — moving the money between the shopper's bank, the card network and the merchant, and taking a small fee. Its competitors mostly grew by acquisition and run a patchwork of incompatible systems; Adyen built one platform for the whole world, which is why big multinational retailers prefer it.
One platform also means one pool of data. Every payment Adyen sees teaches the system a little more about which transactions are genuine, so it approves more real purchases and blocks more fraud than a rival looking at a fraction of the traffic. More merchants means more data means better results means more merchants.
Two things are new in this issue. Adyen, which had famously built everything itself, has made its first two acquisitions — Talon.One for customer loyalty and promotions, Orb for AI-driven enterprise billing — with the stated aim of becoming a full commerce platform rather than just a payments processor. And the alignment is unusual: founder and co-CEO Pieter van der Does still owns close to 3% of the company, worth over €750 million, with other insiders holding nine-figure stakes of their own.
In short: BUY. FV €1,716.9 vs €855.0 = 50.2% under; ER 15.0%; fwd PE 24.9 against 64.3 (61.3% under); RDCF 6.7% vs 15.0% expected — an 8.3pp margin. Eighth-worst performer at −38.8% YTD.
In short: BUY. FV €1,927.8 vs €817.4 = 57.6% under; ER 16.8%; fwd PE 21.2 against a 64.3 five-year average (67.0% under, fifth-largest on the screen); RDCF 10.8% vs 15.0%. Sixth-worst performer of the year at −41.5%.
In short: BUY. EPS growth 15.0%, FWD PE 24.9 against a fair exit 25.0, expected return 15.0%, fair value 1,934.5 against 963.4 = 50.2% undervalued. Note the model's fair value is far above the 21 April €765 entry target, which was set on a 20x multiple.
In short: Quality endorsed, price not met. "Adyen now trades at its cheapest valuation level ever (a FWD PE of 25.3x). At a PE of 20.0x, the company could be a no-brainer" — €765 target against a €970 price. The five-point case: management "doesn't focus on M&A… grows organically"; scale economics in fraud detection and authorisation rates ("more customers → better data → better results"); one platform built clean from day one against rivals "combining old technology together"; expansion from processing into the customer's whole financial back office; and one system for online and in-store.
Adyen is the plumbing behind card payments for large retailers. When you pay, the money has to travel from your bank through the card network to the shop, and normally several middlemen each take a slice. Adyen built one system that does the whole journey, so it removes those middlemen and keeps a fee on every transaction.
Its advantage compounds quietly. Every payment it handles teaches its software a little more about which transactions are fraud and which are genuine, so it declines fewer real customers than rivals do. Better approval rates win bigger merchants, which means more payments, which improves the software again. Competitors, mostly built by bolting old systems together, cannot easily copy that.
The verdict here is quality yes, price no. The shares are at the cheapest valuation in the company's history — 25 times next year's profits — and the stated buying level is 20 times, about €765 against a market price of €970. So it goes on the list, not into the portfolio.
In short: BUY — the earnings-growth-model spotlight. "A global payment platform that processes online and in-store transactions for businesses and earns a fee on each payment. Adyen is now trading at its cheapest valuation level of the past 10 years." 23.3x forward against a 68.1x five-year average (65.8% under) and the sheet's largest stated undervaluation to fair value at 73.1%, with a +3.7pp reverse-DCF margin. Also the fifth-worst performer on the watchlist year-to-date at −34.8%.
Adyen processes card payments for large merchants and keeps a small slice of each transaction. The shares are down 34.8% this year, which makes it the fifth-worst performer on the watchlist, and they now trade at their cheapest level in a decade.
The scale of the derating is the point: 23 times expected earnings against a five-year average of 68. Even allowing that the earlier multiple was extreme, the model puts fair value at more than three times the current price. Unlike Novo, the reverse DCF here is supportive rather than dissenting — the price implies 10.8% growth against 14.5% expected — so all three screens point the same way. The row uses the Amsterdam ticker; the US ADR is ADYEY.
In short: Best Buy #4. A single-platform global payments processor for Uber, Netflix and Starbucks, built from scratch while "most competitors use a patchwork of old systems" — giving technical excellence and higher authorization rates. "Adyen is a true compounding machine": ROIC 10.0%, net margin 44.7%, FCF/net income 173.7%, historically 30%+ growth. The stock fell nearly 40% because H2 2025 volume growth was "only" 12% — but "Adyen is choosing Quality over Volume," walking away from low-margin transactions and expanding embedded finance (card issuing grew 8x). Still run by co-founder Pieter Willem van der Does, who owns 3%.
Adyen is the plumbing behind card payments for companies like Uber, Netflix and Starbucks: it takes a small cut of every transaction it processes. Its advantage is that it built one single system from scratch covering every country and channel, whereas most competitors bolted together older systems through acquisitions. That sounds technical, but it has a commercial edge — a cleaner platform approves more legitimate transactions, and a merchant losing fewer sales to false declines will not switch away.
The stock fell nearly 40% because payment volume in the second half of 2025 grew "only" 12% after years above 30%, and investors used to 30% panicked. Slegers argues the slowdown is a choice: Adyen is deliberately turning away low-margin transactions to focus on more profitable enterprise relationships, and investing in new lines like card issuing, which grew eightfold. The economics support that reading — a 44.7% net margin and cash flow well in excess of accounting profit — and the co-founder still runs the company with a 3% stake. The row uses the Amsterdam ticker (ADYEN.AS); the US ADR is ADYEY.
In short: BUY. 36.2x forward against a 68.1x five-year average — 46.8% under, ninth on the forward-PE screen — on 15.0% EPS growth for an 11.9% expected return ($1,890.9 fair value against $1,369). The reverse DCF is almost exactly balanced (15.7% required against 15.0% expected), so the case rests entirely on the multiple halving.
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