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CPRT · Copart $29.32 -0.34 (-1.13%) 2026-SEP-18 12:48 EST

My allocation$7,1100.16% of portfolio2 accounts · as of 2026-SEP-03 · allocation page ↗
AccountSharesPriceValue% of acctCost/shGain $Gain %Target
401K180$33.78$6,0800.25%$33.00$140+2.4%
HSA32$32.16$1,0290.95%$31.50$21+2.1%
Total212$7,1100.16%$161+2.3%
Research: QT · SA · STK · FA11 mentions
2026-SEP-17 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack, paid post) · Positivemention · read ↗ · source page ↗$30.80

In short: BUY. ER 13.86%; fwd PE 20.9 vs 30.7 (31.9% under); RDCF 7.9% vs 11.9%. Fair value $45.6 vs $30.90. YTD −18.2%.

SOD $30.80
2026-AUG-23 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack, paid post) · Positiveinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$34.48

In short: BUY. ER 13.86%; fwd PE 20.9 against a 30.7 average (31.9% under); RDCF 8.3% required vs 11.9% expected. Fair value $47.1 vs $31.88 (32.3% under). YTD −15.6%.

SOD $34.48 (open 2026-AUG-21)
2026-JUL-19 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Positiveinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$28.65

In short: Best Buy #4 — and the month's third-worst performer at -12.8%. A salvage-auction marketplace paid a fee by insurers on every total-loss car, with a two-sided flywheel ("insurance companies want to sell where the most buyers are… buyers want to shop where the most cars are") that is "almost impossible to break for competitors." The physical moat is land: "they own all their salvage yards while its competitors lease theirs," and "strict zoning laws and environmental permits make it nearly impossible for new competitors to build yards near major cities." Growth has slowed, so the board "brought back Jay Adair as CEO," who ran it 2010-2024 while "the stock returned more than 2,000%." Net cash "equals 15% (!) of the current market cap" with buybacks expected.

In plain English

When a car is written off after an accident, the insurer does not want to keep it — it wants cash. Copart runs the online auction where those wrecks are sold to dealers and dismantlers, and takes a fee on every sale. It never owns the risk of the car; it owns the marketplace.

Marketplaces defend themselves the same way everywhere: insurers list where the most buyers are, because more bidders means a higher price, and buyers shop where the most cars are, because more cars means more choice. Each side makes the other side stronger, and a rival starting today has neither.

The less obvious moat is dirt. Copart owns its salvage yards outright while competitors rent theirs. Nobody wants a noisy yard full of leaking fluids near their house, so zoning and environmental rules make new yards near big cities almost impossible to permit — the land Copart already holds cannot be replicated at any price. Owning it also means no rent increases, and each additional car processed on land you already own costs almost nothing, so volume turns straight into margin.

The timing argument is that the shares fell 12.8% in the month, growth has slowed, and the board has brought back Jay Adair — the CEO under whom the stock rose more than 2,000% between 2010 and 2024. Meanwhile the company holds net cash worth about 15% of its entire market value, which is expected to go into buying back shares.

SOD $28.65 (open 2026-JUL-17)
2026-JUL-10 · David Hay · Haymaker (Substack newsletter, paid) · Positiveinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$28.42

In short: Pick of the Week — a long-term compounder on sale (pick and core analysis by contributor Daniel Bustamante). The leading global online salvage/used-vehicle auction & remarketing platform; asset-light intermediary earning 80%+ high-margin service fees via VB3 (275+ locations, 11 countries, since 1982; expanding — new Ireland ops center). Stock down ~45% from highs / −55% since last April at ~17× fwd P/E. Q3 FY2026: rev $1.237B (+2.1%), gross margin 46.3%, op income $464.3M (+2.8%), net income $402M; 9-mo rev $3.5B (flat), diluted EPS $1.20 (+1.7%). Fortress balance sheet: $4.2B cash+HTM, $5.5B liquidity, minimal debt; $1.6B YTD buybacks (43M+ shares) vs ~$27B cap. Tailwind: auto-loan 90-day+ delinquencies 5.6% (Q1 2026, highest since 2010) → more repos into non-insurance volume (next data Aug 4). Jay Adair back as CEO Jul 31 (1,100%+ return over 2010–24). Technicals ugly — wants a mid-$20s base for ~a month; high-$20s an ideal long-term entry; decisive break of $25 concerning, ~$24 a stop/sell-down threshold. "Genuinely a long-term compounder," not a trade.

In plain English

Copart runs the biggest online auction system for salvaged and totaled cars. When an insurer "totals" a wrecked vehicle, or a lender repossesses a car, someone has to sell it — and Copart is the marketplace where those cars get auctioned to dismantlers, rebuilders and exporters worldwide. The clever part is that Copart usually doesn't own the cars; it just takes a fee for storing, moving, titling and auctioning them on its VB3 platform. That makes it "asset-light": more than 80% of its revenue is high-margin service fees, so it throws off a lot of cash, carries almost no debt, and earns very high returns. With 275+ locations across 11 countries and a huge buyer network, smaller rivals can't match its liquidity — a classic "network effect" moat. (This week's write-up comes from Haymaker contributor Daniel Bustamante, not the usual team.)

The reason it's interesting now is that the stock has fallen roughly 45–55% from its highs on soft volumes, down to about 17× next year's earnings — cheap for a business this good. Meanwhile the company is sitting on $4.2 billion of cash (and $5.5 billion of total liquidity), and has spent $1.6 billion this year buying back its own shares — a big chunk of a $27 billion company, bought while the price is low. Two things could turn it around. First, Americans are falling behind on car loans at the fastest rate since 2010, which means more repossessions — and repo'd cars flow straight into Copart's auctions, boosting volume (the next data point lands August 4). Second, Jay Adair — the CEO who oversaw an 1,100%+ stock gain from 2010 to 2024 — is coming back to run the company on July 31. Bustamante calls this a genuine long-term compounder, not a quick trade, but wants to see the stock stop falling and build a base in the mid-to-high $20s first; a decisive drop below $25 (roughly a $24 stop) would be the warning sign that the thesis isn't working yet.

SOD $28.42
2026-JUL-09 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Positiveinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$28.50

In short: BUY. FV $44.2 vs $29.9 = 32.3% under; ER 13.9%; fwd PE 20.9 against 30.7 (31.9% under); RDCF 7.8% vs 11.9% expected — a wider margin than June's. YTD −20.8%.

SOD $28.50
2026-JUL-06 · Joseph Carlson · Joseph Carlson After Hours · Positiveinsight · ▶ 26:39 · source page ↗$29.98

In short: "A very solid moat, a solid business model, but this one has been crushed in this market" — $62 down to $28, over 50% off its highs. Fascinated by the model: they work with unique real estate, insurance companies and their own software; "incredibly strong balance sheet, and they'll still grow over the long term."

In plain English

Copart runs online auctions for salvaged and totaled vehicles, mostly on behalf of insurance companies. Carlson is "fascinated by the business model": it combines hard-to-replicate assets (lots of real estate to store cars), deep relationships with insurers, and its own software — a genuine moat.

The stock has been "crushed in this market," falling from $62 to about $28, more than 50% off its highs, even though nothing is wrong with the business — it has a very strong balance sheet and should keep growing for years. That mismatch between a durable, high-quality company and a beaten-down price is exactly the "left behind" setup he's hunting.

26:39But when we look at DoorDash and Uber, these are two companies that I'm excited about because they're both early in their growth path. They both suffered extensive sell-offs throughout this market dynamic. And then there's other companies that I believe are worth looking at today. For example, Copart is a company that has a very solid moat, a solid business model, but this one has been crushed in this market. It was trading at $62 per share.

SOD $29.98
2026-JUN-18 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Positiveinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$29.55

In short: BUY. FV $45.7 vs $31.0 = 32.3% under; ER 13.9%; fwd PE 20.9 against 30.7 (31.9% under); RDCF 10.8% vs 11.9% — a thin 1.1pp margin. YTD −17.8% and a five-year CAGR of exactly 0.0%.

SOD $29.55
2026-MAY-07 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Positiveinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$33.37

In short: BUY. EPS growth 11.9%, FWD PE 20.9 against a fair exit 25.0, expected return 13.9%, fair value 49.1 against 33.3 = 32.3% undervalued. Priced at $28.7 on 21 April — the model's fair value sits well above that entry target.

SOD $33.37
2026-APR-21 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Neutralinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$33.78

In short: "The eBay for written-off cars", and the closest of the six to its target. Moats: 19,000 owned acres ("when a hurricane wipes out 90,000 cars overnight, you either have the land or you don't. Most competitors lease theirs"), and 1 million registered buyers against the closest competitor's 150,000. Structural driver: sensors and software raise repair costs, so insurers total more cars — "this trend has been running for 40 years." Current trouble acknowledged: "the stock halved from its peak", volumes down, though selling prices still grew 7% last quarter. Valuation given twice — 21.1x forward including cash, 17.9x excluding a net cash pile worth 15% of market cap. "Buying Copart at 18x earnings (including cash) is a no-brainer if you ask me" — $28.7 against a $33.8 price.

In plain English

When an insurer writes off your car, it has a wreck it does not want and no interest in selling. Copart takes it, lists it on an online auction, and charges both the insurer and the buyer a fee. Think of it as eBay for written-off cars.

Two things make it hard to attack. It owns 19,000 acres of land across the United States, which matters enormously when a hurricane produces 90,000 wrecks in a night — most competitors lease their yards and simply run out of space. And it has a million registered buyers worldwide against roughly 150,000 at its nearest rival, so its auctions fetch higher prices, which brings more sellers, which brings more buyers.

The long-run driver is that cars are now full of sensors and software, so repairs cost more, so insurers write off more of them rather than fixing them. That has been true for forty years. Right now the shares have halved from their peak on falling volumes, though prices per car still rose 7% last quarter. The company also holds net cash worth 15% of its market value — strip that out and it costs 18 times profits instead of 21. The stated buying level is 18 times including the cash, about $28.70 against $33.80, which is the stricter of the two ways of counting.

SOD $33.78
2026-MAR-19 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Positiveinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$32.98

In short: BUY. 21.2x forward against a 30.7x five-year average (30.9% under), expected return 13.7%, reverse-DCF margin +1.1pp. A 20.7% ten-year CAGR against a −9.8% year to date.

SOD $32.98
2026-FEB-05 · Pieter Slegers · Compounding Quality (Substack) · Positiveinsight · read ↗ · source page ↗$40.32

In short: BUY. 23.3x forward against a 30.7x average (24.1% under) but only 6.8% under on the Earnings Growth Model, and the reverse DCF dissents (11.5% required against 10.0% expected). The strongest ten-year CAGR on the Buy list at 25.8%.

SOD $40.32

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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.