In short: Passing mention — listed as a Mastercard Agent Pay partner.
36:08Mastercard's agent pay introduces Agentic tokens built on existing tokenization. Pasi capabilities with partnerships spanning from Microsoft, IBM, Brainree, and Checkout.com. These are extensions of network roles. These companies are not trying to win the interface. They don't care. Visa Mastercard never really care about being the interface.
In short: Named only inside Niles' list of failed buy-and-holds — a historical example, not a current view: "IBM was a buy and hold, of market share leaders that then went into trouble. The list is really long of market share leaders."
28:38because you don't know that you have a lot of survivability. You hear from the people who said, "Oh yeah, Apple was a buy and hold." Well, you never have people on that say AOL was a buy and hold. Yahoo was a buy and hold. Nokia was a buy and hold. Cisco was a buy and hold. The list is really long of market share leaders. IBM was a buy and hold, of market share leaders that then went into trouble. But you always have some company that makes it through, right? Microsoft has done great through three different decades, right? But that's one company.
In short: On the buy-and-hold casualty list, cited historically: "IBM was a buy and hold, of market share leaders that then went into trouble."
56:40IBM was a buy and hold, of market share leaders that then went into trouble. But you always have some company that makes it through, like Microsoft has done great through three different decades, right? But that's one company. And so I think you have to have strong conviction but loosely held, and that's the way you want to think about it. And just because a stock's down a lot, like one of my big disasters this year, we'll see how the rest of the year plays out, is Nike. Right.
In short: Trimmed again today, and the seller says out loud where this ends. Simpson: "100% [it's related to the earnings] — those earnings were so disappointing I couldn't believe it as a shareholder. We started selling, I think it was July 14th… we didn't dump it because the stock was down 25% in one day. Maybe we did sell some of it; it recovered quite a bit." Asked directly whether he is slow-walking to the exit and viewers should expect more: "absolutely, because we have 1% left of IBM, and that'll happen. I do everything at a glacier pace." The bull case he still holds: "I love the long-term prospects of IBM. We've owned it for many years. The quantum component is probably the long-term holy grail. I'm sure we could revisit it and own it again." The reason not to wait: "if I'm looking over the next two to three years, I'm really looking at Alphabet as a much better play, more diversified business. And if you're worried about software — and I'm not as worried as other people — that's a little bit of something hanging over IBM that you have to be cognisant of."
Rare candour from a seller. Kevin Simpson began selling IBM on 14 July after an earnings report so bad the stock fell about 25% in a single day — "so disappointing I couldn't believe it as a shareholder." He didn't dump the position; the stock recovered some ground and he has been trimming into it ever since.
Asked directly whether viewers should expect more selling, he says yes: 1% of the portfolio is left and it is going. "I do everything at a glacier pace." That is a useful disclosure, because it tells you the remaining supply from this holder is small and slow, not a sudden liquidation.
He is not hostile to the company. He calls IBM's quantum-computing work the potential long-term prize and says he could own it again. The reason to leave now is opportunity cost plus one risk: if artificial intelligence erodes traditional enterprise software — a worry he shares less than most — that lands on IBM, and over the next two to three years he simply thinks Alphabet is the better place for the same dollars.
In short: The case study behind the regulatory-risk segment, not a rating. Trennert: the 1970s antitrust suit "lasted 12 years. IBM won, quote unquote, but they really lost because it consumes so much of their time and effort that they missed personal computing." Eisman supplies Judge Richard Posner's verdict — "the lawsuit was the punishment… didn't have to win" — plus the discovery story of ten trucks of uncorrelated boxes that added two more years.
29:27I think it lasted 12 years. IBM won, quote unquote, but they really lost because it consumes so much of the — of their time — and effort that they missed personal community computing. Right, they were distracted. They were distracted. And Microsoft in the '90s, very similar story. Right. Well, Meta has a lot of lawsuits, all these social media lawsuits by people who are claiming that the algorithms are basically making them mentally ill.
In short: Illustration only: "high-grade corporate bonds like IBM or Microsoft, very solid, you can use that as collateral for loans" — the step in the collateral ladder before the market moved on to asset-backed securities in the 2000s and pushed the money-like assumption too far. No company view.
17:03It was because government bonds — and then over time people started using high-grade corporate bonds like IBM or Microsoft, very solid, you can use that as collateral for loans. But then of course in the 2000s people started using asset-backed securities and initially those were super solid as well, and eventually we take things too far and they were not the equivalent to money; in fact you couldn't trade them and some of them were close to worthless. And that I think is what really transforms almost like a
In short: A founding member of NVIDIA's Open Secure AI Alliance — the ~40-company coalition building tools to defend against AI-powered cyberattacks — alongside Microsoft and SpaceX. Places IBM inside the open-weight camp and the AI-security build-out that Microsoft is simultaneously monetising with its own first-party stack. (Referenced; not a stance call.)
In short: Eisman drops it in as the live evidence for Luria's budget-squeeze mechanism — "hence the problems IBM had last week when they pre-announced, which was stunning." Luria: "Exactly." Companies "have to spend so much on AI right now that they're looking at their budget and saying where can I cut."
35:23There's a crowding out of products that didn't make their customers happy because companies have to spend so much on AI right now that they're looking at their budget and saying where can I cut and if you're hence the problems IBM had last week when they pre-announced which was stunning. Exactly.
In short: Sold and stays sold — "we had bought that one on its breakout… and we put out a sell on it a few months ago", just before it lost 25% of its value in a single day. "IBM's been known to disappoint a lot… it was called big blue in the old days and its shareholders have had a lot of blue over the last 20 years." Used as proof of "how vicious the market can be in this space when it wants to punish you."
IBM is a position Haymaker owned and exited. They bought it on a technical breakout, it "ran tremendously," and they "put out a sell on it a few months ago" — which turned out to be just before the stock lost 25% of its value in a single day. Hay is modest about it ("we usually aren't that prescient") but the sale stands.
His view of the company is unsentimental: "IBM's been known to disappoint a lot… it was called big blue in the old days and its shareholders have had a lot of blue over the last 20 years."
He uses it mainly to make a point about the current market. Losing a quarter of a very large company's value in one session shows "how vicious the market can be in this space when it wants to punish you" — the same risk sitting under every AI-adjacent stock priced for perfection.
47:58It had a great breakout and it ran tremendously and we put out a sell on it a few months ago, but we usually aren't that preient but it's IBM IBM's been known to disappoint a lot. — Yeah. — It was called big blue in the old days and its shareholders have had a lot of blue over the last 20 years or so. — Yeah.
In short: Q&A: sold off dramatically "but it could decelerate further because of more spending on AI — next quarter could miss as well. I would wait for another quarter or two to add." Quantum isn't a meaningful earnings contributor ("not a big fan of quantum overall"), spend keeps rotating to AI products, and "I just don't see a reason to really own it. It's also not super cheap." Expects three or four quarters of subdued spend before any bounce.
Asked directly about IBM after its big drop, Singh's answer was a clean no. He expects growth to slow further — corporate technology budgets are being redirected to core AI infrastructure, which starves IBM's traditional services and software — so "next quarter could miss as well. I would wait for another quarter or two." Its quantum-computing work sounds impressive but contributes almost nothing to earnings.
The blunt version: "I just don't see a reason to really own it. It's also not super cheap." He expects three or four quarters of subdued spending before any recovery — and would rather put the money into cheap AI names for a trade, or the overlooked cheap software companies like Roper.
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Q2 revenue +1% Y/Y to $17.2B ($60M miss), adj EPS $2.93 roughly in line — the print barely moved the stock because the damage was already done. IBM preannounced on July 14, only the second time in company history (after 2008), and shares fell 25% in a day: the worst single session it has ever had, ~$70B of market value; the stock closed down 31% YTD and at its lowest since November 2024. The mainframe is the whole story — IBM Z revenue fell 42% after surging 51% in Q1, pulling Infrastructure down 7% to $3.8B. CEO Arvind Krishna's explanation: clients abruptly redirected budget toward servers, storage and memory to lock in AI infrastructure ahead of expected price increases, and IBM misjudged the magnitude. Software +5% to $7.8B (missed ~$8.0B), Consulting flat at $5.3B. The defense rests on timing not demand — tens of large deals slipped rather than died, roughly a third already closed in Q3, and Krishna says there's no evidence of clients leaving the mainframe. FCF guidance held at ~$1B of Y/Y growth, protected by cuts to third-party tech spend, supply chain and admin, headcount flat. Starbucks is replacing vendor software incl. IBM's (CFO James Kavanaugh: ~$2M/yr exposed). FY26 cc revenue growth cut to 4%–5% (from >5%), software 6%–8% — Evercore called it "better than feared." >$10B committed to quantum over five years; acquiring HRL Laboratories (the Boeing/GM research venture) by end of Q3. Watch Infrastructure in Q3 for whether the remaining two-thirds of slipped deals close. (Recap, not a stance call.)
The quarter itself was unremarkable; the story is what happened eleven days earlier. On July 14, IBM warned the market its results would fall short — only the second such pre-announcement in the company's history, the last one in 2008 — and the stock lost a quarter of its value in a single day, about $70 billion. The cause was one product line: IBM Z, the mainframe. Mainframes are the giant, extremely reliable computers that still run banks' and airlines' core transaction systems, and they sell in lumpy multi-million-dollar deals. That line fell 42% after growing 51% just three months earlier.
IBM's explanation is that customers suddenly diverted their IT budgets into servers, storage and memory to lock in AI hardware before prices rise — so the mainframe money wasn't cancelled, it was postponed. The CEO says there's no sign customers are abandoning mainframes, and roughly a third of the deals that slipped have already closed this quarter. Whether the other two-thirds close is the whole question. Elsewhere, software grew but missed, consulting was flat, IBM protected its cash flow forecast by cutting costs, and it committed over $10 billion to quantum computing. A recap, not a call.
In short: "IBM is clearly struggling." After last week's negative pre-announcement (stock −25% that day), results came in line with it — EPS 293, +5% — but the company cut its revenue forecast to +4–5% growth. Data-center mainframe sales fell 42% and infrastructure revenue −7%: tech-equipment prices are soaring, so "companies are trying to lock in purchases… abandoning IBM's varied services."
IBM sells big-iron computers (mainframes) and, mostly, consulting and IT services. It had already warned investors that the quarter would be bad — the stock dropped 25% that day — and the actual results matched the warning, with earnings up only 5% and the revenue outlook cut.
The mechanism is unusual and worth remembering: because the price of tech hardware is soaring, customers are rushing to lock in equipment purchases and cutting the discretionary services budget to pay for it. Mainframe sales fell 42%. So the AI hardware boom is actively draining IBM's services business. "IBM is clearly struggling."
12:39Free cash flow was a negative 1.1 billion. Like Google, Tesla was down after hours. IBM, we spoke about IBM last week because IBM negatively pre-announced, and the stock was down last week on that day 25%. The problem the company is facing is that the price of tech equipment is soaring, and companies are trying to lock in purchases.
In short: Haymaker calls attention to its "very timely sell recommendation on IBM, well before it cratered due to a very negative market reaction to its second-quarter earnings." A closed Sells-table exit — sold 06/08/2026 at $280.82 for +49.37% — cited as a vindicated call. (Consistent with the June-8 move to Sell.)
In short: A massive miss (stock −20%+ pre-market, the worst in years). Discretionary IT spending is worsening — the likely theme across software this season: customers shifted quarterly capex to servers/storage/memory to hedge price increases (a Z / transaction-processing shortfall). "IBM has been very slow to innovate."
IBM badly missed and the stock fell more than 20% — its worst drop in years. The reason matters for the whole software sector: companies are diverting their "optional" IT budgets to buy servers, storage and memory now, to get ahead of price increases, which starved IBM's core software sales. Singh expects this "discretionary IT spending is worsening" theme to hit many software companies this earnings season, and adds that IBM has simply "been very slow to innovate."
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Worst day ever (~−25%), downgraded at Oppenheimer to Perform after the pre-announcement — no rebound today. Sechan (owner): "there's no question they're seeing a reset" — its "ability to leverage AI versus being disrupted by it is being challenged," with corporate spend redirecting toward cyber/AI; IBM "admittedly said they stubbed their toe," but "all the metrics meet except the disruption this quarter," it's "still up 60%," and he stays patient that it "can get back on track." A frustrated hold through a reset, not a fresh sell.
IBM had its worst day ever (down about 25%) and got downgraded by Oppenheimer after a disappointing pre-announcement. Rob Sechan, who owns it, calls it "a reset": the market is questioning whether IBM can use AI to its advantage or gets disrupted by it. He links the damage to companies shifting their tech budgets toward AI and cybersecurity (which is why CrowdStrike is soaring) — a market now split into "haves and have-nots."
He's staying patient rather than selling: management admits it "stubbed their toe," but he says the other business metrics are fine and the stock is "still up 60%," so he thinks it "can get back on track." That patient-hold stance nets to neutral.
In short: Her final trade: down 18% from its highs, ~18x earnings — mission-critical software you want to own. The lead example of her "relative value is in mission-critical software" thesis with the SOXX +85% and IGV −17% YTD.
IBM is Link's single favorite idea here (her "final trade") and the cleanest example of her software call. With chip stocks up 85% this year and software stocks down 17%, she argues the value has shifted to software — but only the "mission-critical" kind that big customers can't rip out. IBM fits: it's down 18% from its highs and trades at roughly 18 times earnings, which she sees as cheap for software that enterprises depend on. Lower price, essential product — that's the setup she wants.
In short: Moved to a Sell and pulled off the Hold/Trim list. Up ~50% since his Jan-29-2024 highlight (despite a 14% pullback off last week's spike), now its highest valuation in a decade — P/S and P/E loftiest in 25 years. Raising cash on "ominous" market signals + concentrating on best ideas; ~22x 2026E vs UBER's 18.6x.
Hay flagged IBM a couple of years ago as a bargain; it's since risen ~50% and is now the most expensive it's been in a decade — its price relative to sales and earnings is the highest in 25 years. The cheap-stock reason to own it is gone. With the broader market flashing what he calls "ominous" warning signs, he'd rather hold cash and own fewer, higher-conviction names — so he's selling IBM outright (a rare move for him) and redeploying toward ideas like UBER, which is cheaper (18.6x next year's earnings vs IBM's 22x). His closing line: "cash is definitely not trash" — sometimes the best move is to bank the gain and wait.
In short: One of the "elevator-shaft" moves — equities the market is already singling out as AI-disruption victims.
20:59equities over the last, you know, three months. And if you look at new highs versus new lows within the stock market, we're seeing extreme divergences. Whereas the the beast of the market is already starting to to to really call out the victims. And so, yeah, there's going to be this disruptive period of winners and losers.
In short: Historical chart proxy, not a stance: "using IBM as a proxy for the Nifty Fifty" to illustrate the 1971-74 large-cap experience — the 1971-72 run, the 4Q72 "Broadening Out" moment, then the final rotation back into the Nifty Fifty into the 1973-74 bear.
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