In short: BUY. ER 14.53%; fwd PE 19.5 vs 21.9 (11.0% under); RDCF 8.1% vs 12.0%. Fair value $263.3 vs $157.10.
In short: BUY. An exchange operator — the same "toll bridge" category as MCO and SPGI. ER 14.53%; fwd PE 19.5 against a 21.9 average (11.0% under); RDCF 7.9% required vs 12.0% expected. Fair value $258.8 vs $154.38 (40.3% under).
In short: The third incumbent exchange Wapner names as having "fallen off the best stocks in the market list" — the mechanical signal behind Brown's caution. The competitive threat is generational rather than cyclical: binary betting and prediction markets substituting for options and futures education, aimed squarely at the exchanges' highest-margin commissionable flow, with unresolved political fights ahead.
In short: One of Pershing Square's six new Q2 positions — the exchange/market-infrastructure leg of the same basket. Owner of the NYSE and of the mortgage-technology stack.
In short: A new Ackman position Carlson does not own — relayed, not endorsed. Most of ICE's exchange revenue comes from its futures and options exchanges; "these seem like a new type of business for the Ackman portfolio, but it does remind me of S&P Global." Ackman's case: a favorable macro backdrop plus "powerful secular tailwinds" supporting low-to-mid-teens growth, and "a classic, simple, predictable, free cash flow generative business that is sold off on concerns that we view as unwarranted."
ICE owns exchanges — most of its exchange revenue comes from futures and options trading, where it collects a fee on every contract traded. Carlson doesn't own it and relays Ackman's case rather than making his own, but he recognises the shape: "it does remind me of S&P Global" — a toll-collector on financial activity rather than a company betting on any particular market direction.
Ackman's summary is the template for all six buys: "a classic, simple, predictable, free cash flow generative business that is sold off on concerns that we view as unwarranted," with a favorable macro backdrop and secular tailwinds supporting low-to-mid-teens growth.
18:06But then he also added companies that I don't own. So, there's some additions here we'll go over. One of them is the Intercontinental Exchange. Most of ICE's exchange revenue comes from its future and options exchanges. These seem like a new type of business for the Ackman portfolio, but it does remind me of S&P Global. He says that we believe the favorable macro backdrop and powerful secular tailwinds should enable ICE to achieve a low-to-mid-teens growth.
In short: "The parent of the NYSE is paying $6 billion for a corporate-bond venue in the same window, more consolidation of the plumbing all this debt has to run through" — filed alongside the securitization rule change as evidence of how much is being built around the credit pipe, not as a view on the exchange itself.
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In short: Named alongside Nasdaq as having "ramped up their own presence in Texas" — the New York Stock Exchange is the third of the venues Dallas Mayor Eric Johnson counts when he says Dallas is "clearly winning" as "the only city in the world with three major exchanges." Passing mention; no view expressed, and the Texas venues remain under 1% of US volume.
In short: GreensKeeper Value Fund: "our largest detractor during the quarter… declined 21.7%," while "revenue and earnings increas[ed] 20% and 34%, respectively, to start the year." The sell-off came with CBOE and CME "amid concerns of a cyclical peak in earnings" and a newer fear: that "perpetual futures could pose a competitive threat to incumbent derivatives exchanges." Their rebuttal is customer-shaped: "ICE's core users are commercial hedgers and institutional investors, not retail speculators," who "rely on fixed settlement dates, standardized contracts, deep liquidity, robust clearing, and established regulatory oversight — features perpetual futures do not prioritize," and if demand did appear "ICE is well-positioned to launch its own offerings." The franchise: Brent crude and TTF natural gas, plus exchanges, data and mortgage technology.
ICE runs exchanges — most importantly the market for Brent crude oil and European gas — plus financial data and mortgage software. It was GreensKeeper's worst performer, down nearly 22%, even though revenue rose 20% and profits 34%.
Two fears did the damage. One is that earnings have peaked after a volatile period. The other is a new product called perpetual futures, popular in cryptocurrency, which never expires and might in theory pull business away from traditional contracts.
GreensKeeper's rebuttal is about who ICE's customers are. They are not speculators but oil companies, utilities and institutions hedging real exposures, and they need contracts that settle on known dates, are standardised, are guaranteed by a clearing house and are recognised by regulators — none of which perpetual futures prioritise. And if institutional demand ever did appear, ICE has the technology, clearing and customer relationships to launch its own version faster than a start-up could.
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In short: Valuation "hasn't been this low in the 17 years since the Great Financial Crisis" while the business compounds: 2025 revenue +6% turned into double-digit per-share earnings growth on a 33% after-tax net margin, and the year's 14% EPS increase matches the 20-year annualized 15%. Owns 17% of Polymarket ($1B in late 2025, +$600M in March) for the crowd-sourced data, not the wagering; NYSE is exploring blockchain settlement for 24/7 trading. 85–90% institutional, and no futures contract failure in nearly three decades — the reason perpetuals are not the threat the tape assumed.
ICE runs exchanges and clearinghouses — the New York Stock Exchange, and the world's main oil futures markets — plus a large data business. It takes a small toll on every trade, and the cost of handling one more trade is close to zero, so revenue growth drops almost straight to profit. That's why 6% revenue growth in 2025 turned into double-digit earnings-per-share growth at a 33% after-tax margin, and why the last twenty years have averaged 15% annual per-share earnings growth.
The stock fell with every other exchange in mid-May on a fear that new crypto-native venues offering "perpetual futures" would take the business. Horizon Kinetics' counter is that a perpetual has no expiry date and no delivery, so it cannot actually hedge anything — which makes it useless to the commercial customers who are 85–90% of ICE's business. Meanwhile ICE is buying into the new world rather than fighting it: 17% of Polymarket for $1.6 billion, for the prediction data it can package and sell, and blockchain settlement work that could eventually let the NYSE trade around the clock. The result of the selloff is that ICE trades at its cheapest valuation since 2009 — a better business than the market at a lower multiple than the market.
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In short: The third of "the big ones here in the US" (with CBOE and CME) caught in the exchange-group correction — quality, high-margin, inflation-protected businesses whose moat the Kalshi/Polymarket legislation didn't actually damage; his exchange buy was CBOE.
ICE (Intercontinental Exchange) owns futures markets and the New York Stock Exchange. It's the third of "the big ones" Polomny names alongside Cboe and CME as quality exchanges caught in the same headline-driven correction. Same reasoning: a wide moat that the new prediction-market rules didn't really dent, so the drop is an opportunity rather than a reason to avoid it.
3:49For example, in the last couple weeks, you've seen a major correction in a lot of the exchanges here in the US, CBOE, CME, ICE, the big ones here in the US. What precipitated that? Well, they were very highly valued because we've had a bull market and so CBOE and some of these other things really got ahead of themselves, and then some rules were passed by the SEC allowing for these perpetual futures I think for Kalshi and Polymarket that people interpreted as a threat to the moats for these exchanges. However on further analysis it doesn't appear that that's really the case, which we don't have time to get into.
In short: BUY. FV $233.0 vs $132.8 = 43.0% under; ER 14.8%; fwd PE 19.5 against 21.9 (11.0% under); RDCF 6.4% vs 12.0% expected. YTD −17.0%.
In short: BUY. FV $244.5 vs $141.5 = 42.1% under; ER 14.7%; fwd PE 19.5 against 21.9 (11.0% under — one of the smaller de-ratings, this is not an AI-fear name); RDCF 8.8% vs 12.0% expected. YTD −11.6%.
In short: Named in the same exchange peer set — financial-infrastructure businesses unfairly hit by the Bitcoin-perps reaction and the AI-disintermediation fear.
54:55These perpetuals are purely speculative and they're very oriented towards retail which is a very small amount of the user base of TMX, CME, ICE, BATS, MYX, et cetera. And so it's just really surprising that it got this big of a reaction in the market um which is actually continuing even through today. I thought the market would have realized how illogical this was, but sometimes the narrative can take a hold of itself until there's kind of something to confirm otherwise.
In short: BUY. EPS growth 12.0%, dividend 1.3%, FWD PE 19.5 against a fair exit 21.9, expected return 14.5%, fair value 259.3 against 154.7 = 40.3% undervalued.
In short: BUY. An exchange operator in the same toll family as MCO and SPGI, but the multiple screen barely helps: 20.9x forward against a 21.9x five-year average, only 4.6% under. Fair value $218 against $160.8 (23.8% under), expected return 12.7%, +2.1pp reverse-DCF margin, and roughly flat on the year (+0.5%).
In short: UPGRADED Hold → Buy — "global exchange and market data operator," the same transaction-toll family as Moody's and S&P Global. 21.7x forward against a 21.9x average (0.9% under — the multiple is not the argument), but a 12.3% expected return and a $225.1 fair value against $173.98 (22.7% under), with a +1.8pp reverse-DCF margin.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.