In short: Viking buys scarcity. Viking made Ferrari its #1 buy — the quarter's clearest non-AI conviction bet. "Ferrari behaves more like a luxury brand than an automaker, using constrained supply, personalization, and pricing power to generate exceptional margins. Viking may be betting that this scarcity-driven model can keep compounding regardless of broader pressure in the auto industry." The bet is on business model, not on the auto cycle.
Ferrari is classified as an automaker but does not behave like one. It deliberately builds fewer cars than people want, sells heavy personalization on top, and prices with the confidence of a luxury house — which is why its profit margins look more like a handbag brand's than a car company's.
Viking made it their #1 buy of the quarter, the most prominent non-AI conviction bet in the entire round-up. App Economy's read on the logic: "Viking may be betting that this scarcity-driven model can keep compounding regardless of broader pressure in the auto industry."
In plain terms, this is a bet on the business model insulating the stock from its sector. If tariffs, EV price wars and weak consumer demand hurt car companies, a manufacturer with a multi-year waiting list simply doesn't face the same problem — it is supply-constrained by choice.
In short: #10, and the shortest case on the list. "Ferrari builds fancy sports cars and sells fewer than people want to buy. It also makes money from racing, clothing, and spare parts." Durability, in three lines: "Ferrari is not a car company. It's a luxury company. Rich people keep getting richer. They want things nobody else can have. Ferrari makes fewer cars than current demand (supply < demand)." Summary: "Intentional scarcity for the world's richest people with permanent pricing power." Deliberate under-supply as a business model — the mirror image of the pricing power arguments elsewhere in the batch, where the customer does not notice the price; here the customer cannot get the product at all.
Ferrari sells about ten thousand cars a year and could sell considerably more. It chooses not to. Waiting lists are years long, existing owners get priority on new models, and the scarcity is manufactured and defended deliberately.
That is why the argument here is that it is a luxury company rather than a car company: it is not competing on performance or price against other manufacturers, it is selling access to something deliberately withheld. As long as the number of very wealthy people grows faster than Ferrari's production, the price can rise indefinitely and demand will not fall.
It is the mirror image of the pricing power described elsewhere in this batch. Diploma and PPG raise prices because the customer does not notice; Ferrari raises prices because the customer cannot get the product any other way. The risk, unstated, is that desirability is cultural and cultures change — and that racing, the brand's original justification, is a shrinking part of the story.
In short: Scarcity pays. Q2 revenue +8% Y/Y to €1.94B, topping the ~€1.88B estimate, and adjusted EPS €2.62 (€0.12 beat); EBITDA €755M at a 39% margin, operating margin 31%, net profit +~9% to €463M. The formula is scarcity: Ferrari is deliberately managing deliveries down through a model changeover, yet earnings rose because the mix skewed richer — the €3.6 million F80, a hybrid supercar limited to 799 units, is now contributing (Citi estimates 60–70 delivered in the quarter), and personalisation exceeded 20% of revenue from cars and spare parts, which CEO Benedetto Vigna named as the main driver of the raise. The order book is full through 2027. FY26 guidance raised to revenue of ~€7.6B and adjusted EBITDA of at least €2.97B, with adjusted EPS lifted to €9.68 — and Ferrari rarely raises in Q2, so doing it signals confidence. The open question is the Luce, its first all-electric car: a €550,000 four-door designed with Jony Ive's LoveFrom that drew a rocky reception in May. It reportedly hit its ~500-unit 2026 target, but the next three years of volume rest largely on an EV the market met with skepticism once the F80 tops out. Watch whether the Luce holds pricing power in Q3. (Recap, not a stance call.)
Ferrari's business model is the opposite of every other carmaker: it deliberately sells fewer cars than people want, so the waiting list stays long and prices stay high. That's why it can cut deliveries during a model changeover and still grow profit — the mix got richer, led by the €3.6 million F80 hybrid supercar limited to 799 units, and by personalisation (bespoke paint, trim and options) which now exceeds 20% of revenue. The order book is full through 2027 and Ferrari raised its guidance in a quarter when it almost never does, which is its way of signalling confidence. The open risk is the Luce, its first electric car — a €550,000 four-door designed with Jony Ive's studio that got a cool reception in May. It hit its ~500-unit target for the year, but once the F80 finishes its run, three years of volume rest largely on an EV the market isn't yet sure about. A recap, not a call.
In short: Sethi bought it: a high-quality company down double digits this year on an EV misstep, but "a car you can't get enough of" — sold out for two more years — so he sees it doing "really well going forward." The valuation now gives the opportunity.
Ferrari, the luxury sports-car maker, is down double digits this year after a stumble with its electric-vehicle plans. Sarat Sethi bought it anyway, because the core business is exceptional: demand so far outstrips supply that it's effectively "sold out for two more years." He sees the price weakness as the opportunity to own a high-quality brand that will "do really well going forward."
In short: Added to the watchlist — "Luxury sports car manufacturer." No rating or figures given. The archive's third luxury name alongside LVMH and Hermès, and the one with the tightest supply discipline.
In short: News item — its first EV (down 5.7% on the reveal) "doesn't look like a Ferrari" and dilutes the brand that is the whole company; "a bigger problem… than some investors are giving it credit for."
23:12Now, let's go ahead and move on to some news. Now, the first bit of news that we get to are these headlines about Ferrari. Ferrari just released its first EV. Now, it gave people like a preview of it. Now, it's finally been released. And the market is actually upset with this.
In short: Exor's largest position at 32.4% — a third of the vehicle in one name, and the reason Exor's NAV behaves like a luxury stock rather than an industrial one. Named without comment; the argued Ferrari case in this archive is Arka Bhattacharjee's, four months later.
In short: His costliest "mistake of omission": his 2012 Fiat Chrysler stake included ~1% of Ferrari; he sold when Ferrari was spun out/IPO'd (~2016). Ferrari later grew to a ~$100B cap — "I would have about a billion more if I had not done that stupid thing." A lesson (don't sell the multibagger), not a live buy call.
Ferrari is the Italian luxury-supercar maker. Pabrai never bought it directly — in 2012 he bought Fiat Chrysler (cheap, fresh out of bankruptcy), which happened to own ~80% of Ferrari, so he indirectly owned about 1% of Ferrari. When Ferrari was floated off as its own public company around 2016, he sold his slice.
That sale is the point of the story, not a recommendation. Ferrari has since ballooned to roughly a $100 billion company; had he simply kept his stake, it would be worth about a billion dollars more. He calls it his costliest "mistake of omission" — proof of his rule to "circle the wagons" and never sell a rare, once-in-a-lifetime winner.
1:27:07And when I looked at the business, I thought the business was worth many times the five or six billion even ignoring Ferrari. And I was right. So in the end, I made several times my money. And in 2017 or 2018, they took Ferrari public. So they actually then listed the company and it looked like that they had captured all the value.
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