| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HSA | 5 | $102.75 | $514 | 0.48% | $93.91 | $44 | +9.4% | — |
In short: Passing mention — listed among the majors working in the region, all "looking for a new discovery."
33:34map right in the middle of a camp like the Domes region, what does that create? It creates the perfect storm for M&A. And you don't only have Barrick, First Quantum, Ivanhoe. Think about all the groups that are there. China Molybdenum sits just above us with Tenke Fungurume, another amazing deposit, but you have Freeport-McMoRan working there, you have Rio Tinto working there, you have Anglo American working there, you have BHP around, Glencore around. Every major copper producer on the planet is in this region, and most of those groups
In short: Peer with less copper in the mix; only "really started in '24 onwards to spend heavy on capex in copper" after years enjoying iron ore — i.e. behind Teck in the copper cycle.
6:43Actually, they started this copper CapEx much earlier than the others. If you look at Rio Tinto, Vale, Glencore, these guys really started in '24 onwards to spend heavy on CapEx in copper. Before years, they were just enjoying iron ore, especially Rio, BHP, and Vale. They were just enjoying the cash cow of iron ore, buybacks, dividends, whatnot.
In short: Its chairman told him on a panel last year that Rio has "no idea where this copper supply is going to come from"; one of the majors that will have to buy juniors.
31:20I think there's no choice. I was talking to the chairman of Rio Tinto, someone I happen to know, last year and we were on a panel together and he said we, Rio Tinto, have no idea where this copper supply is going to come from. Because as you know you can't just put it online. It takes years and years.
In short: Number two, "similar story to BHP": high-quality diversified miner, excellent balance sheet and credit, ~36% copper plus 20-something % aluminium (a partial copper substitute), dividends not buybacks. "My weakness on the story is really their valuation" — trades at a premium.
Rio Tinto is another Anglo-Australian miner — mostly iron ore, but with about a third of its business in copper and a fifth in aluminium, a lighter metal that can partly replace copper in some uses. That mix makes it less dependent on any one metal, and its balance sheet and credit rating are excellent. He ranks it second behind BHP, with the same problem: investors already pay a premium price for that quality, so he would rather wait for a sell-off.
11:44I really like that they have an excellent balance sheet, of course, very good credit quality, aluminium diversification, and the growing copper exposure. So, they have meaningful copper and then they have 20 something% in aluminium and then the iron, right? to BHP and Rio is very nice from that perspective. They are also same.
In short: Dean: a Pilbara major whose typical ore grades lower than Oceanic's; also cited (via Simandou, "spending $20 billion" because it needs a 600 km railway) as proof iron ore is strategically important.
7:42a specialist producer in the high-grade product. And what we're talking about there is that the percentage of high-grade iron ore that goes towards high quality steel production has been small and needs to increase. The traditional suppliers out of the Pilbara in Western Australia, which is where Rio Tinto and BHP are the biggest operators, and Fortescue, and Vale, which is in Brazil, which is a higher grade more similar product to ours, increasingly is becoming more important to steel production. So steel production could be
In short: The prior operator of producing mines in Wisconsin's belt; GreenLight's whole idea was to tie up the ground Rio Tinto and others walked away from 25 years ago. Context, not a view.
10:42And Rio Tinto used to have some producing mines there. There's a tremendous belt there. Greenlight's idea was we'll tie up all these old Rio Tinto and when people left 25 years ago and start exploring Wisconsin. So it took long a long time for them to go public. I ended up buying more shares because after they went public at the IPO the stock dropped in half because you had a bunch of people that had probably wanted to get in and thought it was going public and once it finally did they just wanted to sell their
In short: One of SLB's DLE partners — headlines of "Schlumberger succeeds with Rio Tinto" coming in 3–12 months. Validation reference.
2:24So if you speculate in junior mining, this is where you need to focus right now. So Schlumberger is working with Rio Tinto, TechMet, which is this big, the US government I think gave $1.4 billion, and they're working with Lithium Bank. They are doing the feasibility study for Lithium Bank. Lithium Bank just acquired a suite of infrastructure at surface in Alberta which is going to make their project the most advanced DLE project in the world.
In short: Cited twice as evidence, not as a holding. As the permitting proof for his scarcity thesis: "there's plenty of stuff in the earth. We just don't want [it]. We have $40 trillion dollars worth of mineral resources in the US. Rio Tinto has been trying to open a copper mine in Arizona for 20 years. They still haven't got it done" — which he calls "good for us," i.e. good for owners of existing supply. And as the absent buyer in uranium: "until I see Rio, until I see BHP, until I see the Lundins come in… this supply demand deficit is going to stay in place." No stance on the shares.
56:14And this is because there's plenty of stuff in the earth. We just don't want. We have $40 trillion dollars worth of mineral resources in the US. Rio Tinto has been trying to open a copper mine in Arizona for 20 years. They still haven't got it done. So — this is good for us. And you put currency debasement on top of that and this should be a layup for most people. This is not hard to understand.
In short: Referenced, not a pick — named by the host as one of the majors invited to the White House hard-rock-mining press conference, which produced project investments plus "a big push for more education about mining and exploration." Gromen's answer is about the policy, not the company: $100 million on mining education "over an undefined period" versus $37 billion spent in Iran in four months.
33:51— Exactly. Nixon. Yeah. So there was a White House press conference last week about mining, hard rock mining. The White House invited all these executives from the mining industry, some of the biggest mining companies in the US as well as the largest ones in the world Rio Tinto, Newmont, Freeport, etc., etc.
In short: A passing jurisdiction-risk reference, not a stock call — but the pivot of the copper supply case: an $8bn mine in the eastern DRC gets built by Chinese-partnered developers ("they're not going to screw around with them"), whereas "if you're Rio or BHP, do you want to go into these places? Selling that to your board is difficult." The majors' board-level risk limit is why the copper that must be found won't be funded — "where is all the money going to come from for the new copper?"
Rio Tinto is one of the two or three biggest Western mining companies. Polomny isn't making a call on the shares — he's using Rio to explain why copper stays short.
The remaining large copper deposits are increasingly in difficult places: his example is the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where a single mine costs on the order of $8 billion and the region is a conflict zone. Chinese-backed developers build there anyway, partly because their state relationship protects them. A London- or Melbourne-listed major cannot: "if you're Rio or BHP, do you want to go into these places? Selling that to your board is difficult." Boards, auditors and shareholders in Western majors ration that kind of risk, so the projects don't get sanctioned. The investment conclusion isn't about Rio's stock — it's that the world "has to mine as much copper as we've mined in the history of the world in the next 20 years" and the companies with the balance sheets to do it are structurally disqualified from the places where the copper is. That missing supply is the floor under his $10–12/lb end-of-decade copper view.
22:44But, if you're Rio or BHP, do you want to go into these places? Selling that to your board is difficult. So, where is all the money going to come from for the new copper? We have to mine as much copper as we've mined in the history of the world in the next 20 years.
In short: Harrington's other diversified-miner holding alongside Freeport — "Jenny, you have Freeport and… Rio" — inside the "all roads lead to copper" view as the metals-and-mining complex posts its best week since March 2022.
Rio Tinto is a large diversified miner and Jenny Harrington's other metals holding alongside Freeport. It sits inside the same "all roads lead to copper" view, in a week when the metals-and-mining index posted its best performance since March 2022 — a diversified way to own the electrification and AI-infrastructure demand for raw materials.
In short: Third name in the same list of heavy-mineral-sand producers ("a Tronox and an Iluka, Rio Tinto, companies like that") whose titanium/zircon operations throw off the monazite byproduct. Mentioned once, in passing, as a potential supplier rather than an investment.
5:33And so all of the world's monazite tailings from titanium mining started to flow into China. And it supports — even I think today it probably supports 10 or 15% of China's rare earth industry is effectively tailings from titanium mining. And we realized that we could replicate that. And so we figured that if heavy mineral sand miners — think about like a Tronox and an Iluka, Rio Tinto, companies like that that have these heavy mineral sand mines — if they had a choice between
In short: The seller: "the Sweetwater assets that we acquired at UEC from Rio Tinto" — a licensed 4 Mlb/yr conventional mill in Wyoming's Great Divide Basin, now being amended to also process in-situ resins. Context, not a view on the company.
13:47So, got the producing assets. I know there's other work going on at different assets in the exploration stage. What would you pull out as highlights there? There's a lot going on. — Yeah, so the fourth area of focus is Sweetwater. The Sweetwater assets that we acquired at UEC from Rio Tinto.
In short: Passing reference in the uranium supply-gap argument: "I thought by this time Rio or BHP or somebody would say… we're going to create a nuclear division" — but no major is putting the billions in, which he reads as bullish for the uranium price.
46:49Where are the new mines? Nobody's investing. I thought by this time Rio or BHP or somebody would say, you know what, we're going to create a nuclear division because this is going somewhere. We still don't have the billions of dollars in serious engineering and geology coming in to supply us with what we need.
In short: Named with BHP and Glencore as a biggest-and-best multi-commodity major to own for the 5–7-year payoff of the resource bull.
Rio Tinto is one of the world's largest diversified miners, heavy in iron ore and copper. Rule names it alongside BHP and Glencore as a "biggest-and-best" holding for a hands-off investor — own it through the multi-year resource upcycle and let scale and cash generation do the work.
10:30Similarly, if that same investor constructing a natural resource portfolio, bought the biggest of the multi-commodity mining companies, the BHPs, the Rio Tintos, the Glencores, they would over the next 5 to 7 years become very, very happy. And similarly, should they buy as an example Exxon Mobil, well, they might not be happy in 2026, maybe 2027, they'd probably be ecstatic by 2029 or 2030.
In short: Named with BHP as a core copper/hard-asset holding that should take a bigger S&P weight over the next 5–10 years.
Rio Tinto is the other giant diversified miner he names alongside BHP — same idea: a core, asset-heavy copper/metals holding that benefits from the supply-suppressed, demand-rich commodity regime and from money rotating out of crowded tech into hard assets.
17:42why I think get out of these tech stocks. And you should own the First Quantums. You should own the BHPs, the Rio Tintos. So you're still all in on copper stocks? Copper stocks, any stocks like aluminum or Alcoa. We've lightened it a little bit. We've had it for three years. But aluminum is going to be a bedrock of the data centers, right, and of the power grid rebuild.
In short: Ranks it a 5 — "identical comment" to BHP: "this is an iron company in drag." (Also flagged as a potential foreign buyer of NexGen via its Saskatchewan phosphate operation.)
Rule's verdict on Rio Tinto is the same as BHP and gets his sharpest line: "this is an iron company in drag." In plain terms — Rio is marketed and thought of as a diversified/copper miner, but where its money actually comes from is iron ore, which he expects to weaken. A solid 5, useful copper exposure, but you should know what's really driving the cash flow. (He also names Rio as a possible buyer of NexGen's uranium deposit, via its Saskatchewan phosphate business.)
36:56— Okay. Next one is Rio Tinto, RIO, on the New York Stock Exchange. It looks like it's got a little bit of a double top here from in May — Identical comment. This is an iron company in drag. — All right. Next one, Glencore. — I've liked Glencore a lot. Ironically, not necessarily because of its copper, but more because of its coal.
In short: Cited as a "major" — a large miner that can buy future copper supply rather than drill it; framed as a potential acquirer in the takeover thesis.
In short: Another logical NexGen acquirer — already in uranium and already running an ~$8B potash mine in Saskatchewan.
Rule cites Rio Tinto as a logical company to eventually buy and build NexGen's giant uranium deposit: it's already in the uranium business and already runs an $8-billion-dollar potash mine in the same province (Saskatchewan), so it has the scale and local footprint. Mentioned as a potential acquirer rather than a direct recommendation.
30:30We can build this thing. We can secure enough offtake contracts that we can build this thing. And politically now you don't just have to sell it to Kamako. You could sell it to the new Anglo. The merger of Anglo American and tech forms a Canadian mining champion that is easily big enough to buy and build this mine. Or I think it would be politically appropriate to sell the mine to Riotinto who are already in the uranium business and already have an 8 billion dollar podash mine in Saskatchewan.
In short: Among the most efficient copper producers (with Glencore/BHP); iron-ore exposure makes it economically sensitive but a big winner as copper gets rationed by price.
Rio Tinto is another of the most-efficient large copper miners, grouped with BHP and Glencore. Like BHP it also mines a lot of iron ore, which makes it economically sensitive in the short run — but it's a big winner in Rule's scenario where copper becomes genuinely scarce and expensive.
28:03there's a recession. The most efficient copper producers are companies like Glenor, BHP, and Rio, which are also large iron ore producers. Uh iron ore is particularly economically sensitive. So to the extent that we have a recession, uh it may be four or five years before these companies pay off in a big way, but then they pay off in a very big way.
In short: "Rio Tinto's destroying the Mag 7" — an iron-ore name and a Bear Traps core position; up while the Mag 7 is flat since October.
Rio Tinto is a giant global miner, best known for iron ore (the raw material for steel). It's one of his core holdings.
"Rio Tinto's destroying the Mag 7." His point: while the big tech names have gone nowhere since October, real-asset miners like Rio are up sharply. As money rotates out of expensive tech and into companies that own physical resources, he expects that outperformance to continue.
12:28There's a lot of institutions so you have to sell down your positions of mag seven. That's why the mag seven is unchanged since October with gold and silver and copper names up 30, 40, 50%. Look at Rio Tinto, the iron ore names. Like these are our core positions. Rio Tinto's destroying the mag seven. BHP is destroying the mag seven.
In short: Same basket — a hard-asset global value name to own instead of the tech-heavy index.
Rio Tinto is another giant global miner, in the same bucket as BHP — it owns and operates mines producing iron ore, copper and other raw materials.
He names it as exactly the kind of "global value" stock to own instead of the tech-heavy U.S. index: a cheap, real-asset business that benefits when commodity prices climb in an inflationary, stagflation-leaning world.
27:44Look at your BHPs, your Rio Tintos, your valet. — Okay. Uh let's turn now to investment opportunities. Your newsletter is called the bear traps report. So how does one identify a bear trap? What what does that mean? What's the process there? — Well, bear traps. So say you're in a bull market and you get a move down and all of a sudden bears some of the bears will lean into that move down and then all of a sudden you get a a big move back up and the bear is trapped.
In short: You could fit ~34 Rio Tintos inside Nvidia's market cap — yet Nvidia needs Rio's copper. RSI-overbought but "extremely cheap, nobody owns it."
Rio Tinto is one of the world's largest miners, including copper — the metal data centers and the power grid can't be built without. His punchline: you could fit about 34 Rio Tintos inside Nvidia's market value, yet Nvidia's buildout needs Rio's copper. In other words, the picks-and-shovels supplier is dirt cheap while the chipmaker is enormous.
One caution he flags: it's "overbought" short-term (it has run up fast and may be due for a breather), but he still sees it as very cheap and under-owned for the multi-year rotation into hard assets.
17:36You noted you could fit 34 Rio Tintos into Nvidia's market cap, yet Nvidia can't build data centers without the copper Rio produces. Does capital rotate from the users of electricity to the owners of the infrastructure? It's started a little. Rio Tinto right now is probably the most overbought on the RSI in a while. But it's still extremely cheap. Nobody owns these stocks. In the new year there's going to be a colossal migration from financial assets into hard-asset companies.
In short: Negative on the operator, not the asset: new CEO Simon Trott (three months in) is cost-cutting — Jadar lithium mothballed (~$700mn sunk), Arizona Sonoran pro-rata refused, an internal travel ban — and "seems lost." At only ~#9 in mined copper and "not investing, so won't grow," Rio let Nuton walk rather than pay $30mn for a PFS on a US$2bn project. He'll buy Rio back "later… and higher" when the big boys inevitably chase growth again.
Rio Tinto is one of the world's biggest miners, but only about #9 in copper production. Paulo has turned negative — not on any single asset, but on the company's direction. A new CEO who came up through operations is trying to prove himself by cutting costs hard: he mothballed a big European lithium project (after sinking ~$700 million into it), refused to fund his share of another copper test project, and even imposed an internal travel ban. Letting Nuton walk away rather than pay a mere $30 million to see the next study on a $2 billion project is, to Paulo, the same story — a company retrenching instead of investing.
His logic: "Rio is not investing, so Rio won't grow." Miners that stop investing eventually have to chase growth by buying assets again — but they always do it later, at higher prices, once the cycle has run. So Paulo would rather own the cheap junior (Aldebaran) that Rio just vacated, and buy Rio back "later… and higher." A negative on the operator, not a permanent write-off.
In short: Reference here (contrast the later Nov-26 negative): Rio owns 49% of Talon's Tamarack JV and 5% of Talon — a Talon FS + US$10mn to Rio by March 2026 earns Talon another 9% (to 60/40). Cited as an alignment/partner fact, not a stance on Rio.
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Verbatim excerpts from the public transcripts (auto-pulled at each mention's timestamp, lightly cleaned). Timestamps link into the video; "source page" opens that commentator's full analysis at this row. Click a mention's header line to expand it (one open at a time). For personal study — not investment advice.