| Account | Shares | Price | Value | % of acct | Cost/sh | Gain $ | Gain % | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 401K | 117 | $157.50 | $18,428 | 0.75% | $134.89 | $2,645 | +16.8% | — |
| HSA | 10 | $150.91 | $1,509 | 1.40% | $131.68 | $192 | +14.6% | — |
| RLT | 27 | $157.50 | $4,252 | 0.25% | $134.28 | $627 | +17.3% | — |
| Total | 154 | $24,189 | 0.54% | $3,464 | +16.7% | — |
In short: Named in the same royalty/streaming template for Uranium Royalty. Analogue only.
11:47And it was patterned and launched in 2017 to become the Franco-Nevada, Wheaton Precious Metals, Sandstorm Royal Gold company in the uranium space. Quite simply, it's a capital provider to new mines in development that are around the world, not just in North America, that are going to help fill this gap of production deficit.
In short: Host notes it's held; Davolos contrasts it with Franco — ex-Silver Wheaton, now more gold than silver but still trades with a fairly high silver beta. Agrees royalty names now carry higher sensitivity to gold/silver than historically.
40:29So take one of your royalty companies, whether it's Wheaton or one of the other ones, and just give us the elevator pitch. I think Franco-Nevada. So Franco-Nevada is heavily focused on gold streams whereas Wheaton used to be Silver Wheaton and now they're more gold than silver but it actually still trades with a fairly high beta to silver because of its history and it does have a lot of silver exposure.
In short: The second royalty/streaming name in that same anecdote — evidence that generalist deep-value screens are starting to surface gold equities rather than gold specialists buying them.
Wheaton is the other big royalty-and-streaming name — same model as Franco-Nevada: fund a mine in advance, then buy a fixed share of its output at a locked-in low price for the life of the mine.
Like Franco-Nevada, it appears here as evidence rather than as a recommendation: it was in the portfolio of the deep-value manager who found gold miners through a valuation screen, not through a gold thesis.
1:22:51And he said, "Yeah, my portfolio is full with Agnico, with some royalty names, Franco, Wheaton. I've got a couple of smaller producers and developers." And so I said, "Well, you're actually also running a mining fund." And he said, "No, I'm running a deep value fund." And I thought that that was really interesting.
In short: The other big royalty/streaming name held passively in retirement accounts ("Wheatens or whatever it's called now") — mentioned as the mature end of the curve he is not speculating on.
18:24So on the royalty front again I only own I mean when I say I only own I have retirement accounts that own some of the bigger like Franco Neadas and Wheatens or whatever it's called now. But the smaller company I have that I've been impressed with I actually came into the financing about four years ago when Rick did it and he did most of it himself is a company called Empress Royalty — run by Alexandra Wood Chiron.
In short: "We have Wheaton. Wheaton is in there" — the streaming company held alongside Royal Gold and Franco-Nevada in the royalty sleeve.
Wheaton is a "streamer" — a close cousin of a royalty company. It pays a miner up front for the right to buy a fixed share of the mine's future gold or silver at a set, very low price, then sells that metal at whatever the market pays. The gap between the two is the profit, and it widens automatically as metal prices rise.
Oakley names it in the same breath as Royal Gold and Franco-Nevada: "we have Wheaton. Wheaton is in there." It's the low-operational-risk way of owning both metals at once, which suits a book where the silver exposure is deliberately smaller than the gold.
29:08And then in between we have a lot, we have all of the — not all of them but most of the big royalty companies. We have Royal Gold. We have Wheaton. Wheaton is in there. Franco-Nevada. And then we own the biggest silver company is Hecla that we own, a miner there.
In short: The Antamina silver stream bought from BHP is the template for the next decade: "If BHP had mined that ore and sold the silver, it would have been valued as though it were copper… six or seven times cash flow. Isolated in a silver stream, it trades at 15 times cash flow. So you have a smaller company Wheaton Precious that has a lower cost of capital than a bigger company BHP. This is a transaction that is literally accretive to BHP shareholders and Wheaton shareholders simultaneously… a true win-win." It is also uncapped — "you get access to the silver that's discovered subsequent to that, and you don't have to pay the sustaining costs, the discovery costs, the development costs" — on a long-life deposit where "big deposits get bigger." He owns "a lot of Wheaton," and calls the deal "a harbinger of things to come."
Wheaton is a streamer. It doesn't dig anything up. It hands a mining company a large amount of cash today, and in exchange gets the right to buy a fixed share of a metal that mine produces — here, silver from BHP's giant Antamina copper mine in Peru — at a small fixed price forever (roughly 20% of the spot price). No mining costs, no cost overruns, no exploration bills.
Why this particular deal is so good comes down to how the stock market prices cash. Antamina is a copper mine, so every dollar it earns — including the dollars from the silver that comes up alongside the copper — gets valued by investors as copper money, worth about six or seven times annual cash flow. Take exactly the same silver, put it in a stream owned by Wheaton, and the market pays about fifteen times for it. Nothing physical changed; only the label did. That gap is why both sides can win at once: BHP gets cash it badly needs at a price its own shareholders think is fair, and Wheaton buys cash flow the market will pay more than double for. Rick calls it "literally accretive to BHP shareholders and Wheaton shareholders simultaneously."
The second feature is the one most people skip. The stream is uncapped: Wheaton gets a cut of all the silver at Antamina, including silver nobody has found yet. Very large, very long-life mines almost always turn out to hold more than the original engineering study said — "big deposits get bigger" — and Wheaton pays none of the drilling, building or maintenance costs that turn that extra ore into metal. So the asset quietly grows for free.
His conclusion is that this is not a one-off. Copper miners face roughly $250 billion of spending just to keep producing what they produce today, and streams are one of the few ways to fund it without issuing cheap shares. Wheaton is one of the very few firms that can write cheques in the $3–5 billion range. He owns "a lot of Wheaton."
32:12If BHP had mined that ore and sold the silver, it would have been valued as though it were copper. It would trade in the market at six or seven times cash flow. Isolated in a silver stream, it trades at 15 times cash flow. So you have a smaller company Wheaton Precious that has a lower cost of capital than a bigger company BHP.
In short: "For most investors, buying yourself a package of Wheaton, Franco-Nevada and Agnico Eagle and then reading books you like, looking after your garden, playing with your kids — it's the right course of action."
Wheaton is a streamer — a close cousin of a royalty company. It hands a miner cash up front in exchange for the right to buy a fixed share of the metal produced at a locked-in low price, for the life of the mine. So it gets metal-price upside with none of the mine-operating risk.
Rick's prescription for the ordinary investor is literally a three-stock package: Wheaton, Franco-Nevada and Agnico Eagle — "and then reading books you like, looking after your garden, playing with your kids or your grandkids. It's the right course of action." The point is that at these prices you no longer need to take risk to be paid; only "the freaks like you and I" need to go further down the quality scale.
13:48risk — for most investors buying yourself a package of Wheaton, Franco-Nevada and Agnico Eagle
13:57and then reading books you like, looking after your garden, playing with your kids or your grandkids. It's the right course of action. It's only the freaks like you and I
In short: Named with Franco-Nevada as the leading precious-metals royalty company and the direct answer to "why did we reduce or sell?" — a valuation decision, not a gold call. They are qualitatively wonderful (highest ROE, cheapest cost of capital, a virtuous cycle) but trade at roughly 2x consensus NAV, where those NAVs already assume today's ~$4,100 gold and discount 20-year cash flows at just 3–5% — the equivalent of a 20–33x P/E. The 2015 setup, when gold below cash cost let royalty companies sign double-digit-rate contracts on world-class mines, is gone: gold is now comfortably above all-in sustaining cost and miners have capital access. A fade from 2x to 1.5x NAV over five years cuts a 15%-a-year earnings compounder to an 8.6% annualized return.
A royalty (or "streaming") company pays a mining company cash up front in exchange for a fixed share of that mine's gold for twenty years or more. It never operates a mine, never pays for one, and gets free upside on anything else discovered nearby — a genuinely superior business model, and Wheaton is one of the two best at it.
Horizon Kinetics bought these companies around 2015 for a specific reason that has now disappeared. Gold was then below the cash cost of production for much of the industry; miners were desperate for capital and would sign away future ounces at very high implied interest rates. You didn't need a gold forecast to win — you were buying $2 million of future payments for about 30 cents on the dollar. Today gold sits comfortably above mining costs, miners can raise money normally, and no such terms are available.
The exit is arithmetic, not disappointment. Wheaton trades near twice its net asset value, and that asset value is itself generous: it assumes today's gold price, ignores non-producing royalties entirely, and discounts twenty years of cash flow at only 3–5% — which is like paying 20 to 33 times earnings. Suppose the company does everything right and grows earnings 15% a year, but the multiple slips from 2x to 1.5x book value over five years. Your return is 8.6% a year. A great business at the wrong price is still a mediocre investment, and that is the entire answer to "why did you sell?"
Full passage: premium transcript (PDF).
In short: Named with Franco-Nevada and Agnico as the quality precious-metals "beta" (sector-outperformance) to buy and forget for 5–10 years; the safe way to express the secular bull for someone who won't do junior-mining work.
Wheaton is the silver-heavy sibling of Franco-Nevada — a streaming company that finances miners in return for cheap future metal. Rule groups it with Franco-Nevada and Agnico as a "buy-and-forget" quality holding: the safe, hands-off way to ride the precious-metals cycle without owning riskier operators.
9:56If I'm right, the beta, and I would define beta as the outperformance of a sector relative to the broad market, the beta in the best of the best precious metals stocks, the aforementioned Franco-Nevada, Wheaton Precious and Agnico Eagle, could form all by itself a portfolio that somebody could buy and 5 years from now, 7 years from now, 10 years from now, having paid no more attention to it, having watched baseball, played with their kids, read books, they would be very, very, very happy.
In short: Buy, $182 target (+48.5% from $122.57) — a premium streamer (1.5× P/NAV, 26.5× P/E) he still rates Buy with ~49% upside; implied gold only $2,549 levered.
In short: Likes it around $110 (better closer to $100). Its big streams sit on very long-life assets — 30/40/50-year mine lives — so unlike smaller royalty names it has no asset-replacement worry, plus "a lot of growth coming."
Wheaton Precious Metals is one of the big streamers. Its edge is unusually long mine lives — its key assets last 30 to 50 years — so unlike smaller royalty companies it isn't constantly spending to replace assets running out in 5–10 years. Rusche likes it near $110 (better around $100), with plenty of growth still ahead.
28:59I think if you can buy that for anywhere around $15 per share, you're getting it at a pretty good price. Wheaton Precious Metals is another one he mentioned. Oh, can you pull up the Wheaton chart? Absolutely. — Let me know what that's at today. But if you can buy Wheaton around $110 today, I think you're getting a pretty good value. I'm not sure where it's trading at right now, but 14 — right on my yellow line. — Yeah. So I do like Wheaton here. They also have a lot of growth coming, and something about Wheaton is they have very long mine lives. So a lot of the smaller royalty companies, you have to worry about how do they replace their assets that are coming offline and are set to come offline within five or 10 years.
In short: Named alongside Franco-Nevada as the key streaming peer — Wall Street wrongly thinks the big transactions are behind them; he believes they're ahead (copper miners will sell huge gold/silver streams to fund the $250B capex, as in the recent BHP-to-Wheaton deal).
Wheaton is a "streaming" company, a close cousin of a royalty firm: it pays upfront for the right to buy a mine's future gold or silver at a fixed low price, profiting on the spread. Rule pairs it with Franco-Nevada and makes the same contrarian argument — Wall Street assumes its biggest deals are in the past, but he thinks they're coming, because copper miners facing enormous spending needs will sell off their gold and silver byproduct streams (as BHP recently did to Wheaton) to raise cash. That's a structural pipeline of future deals the market isn't pricing in.
13:08Finally, with both Franco-Nevada and Wheaton Precious, their key competitor in the financial stack, the big transactions, Wall Street believes that the big transactions are behind them, and I believe that the big transactions are ahead of them. Specifically, I believe that the $250 billion that the copper industry must spend in the next 10 years to maintain current copper production will involve massive massive sales by the copper producers of gold and silver streams.
In short: His preferred silver play (lower-risk than miners). Canadian streaming/royalty pioneer (ex-Silver Wheaton); enough silver beta without single-mine/cost-overrun risk, and non-producing assets are a "free call option" as they turn economic at $50–80/oz.
Wheaton is a "streamer": instead of digging mines itself, it pays miners cash upfront in exchange for the right to buy a slice of their future silver and gold at a low fixed price. That delivers silver-price upside without the operational headaches — cost overruns, accidents, a single mine going bad.
It's his preferred way to own silver (lower-risk than the miners). As a bonus, the deposits in its portfolio that aren't producing yet are a "free call option" — they cost nothing extra and become valuable if silver climbs to $50–80/oz.
32:38So, Wheaton is a very large uh Canadian-based streaming and royalty company. It was actually originally called Silver Wheaton because they revolutionized the model called streaming where to be just to be distinguished from royalties, instead of just getting a straight cash flow based on silver production, they pay a very small amount per silver on an ongoing basis.
In short: "Best of the best" — where a generalist should start a silver-stock book; primarily a gold producer by revenue but a strong silver constituency, and just bought a ~$4B silver stream.
Wheaton is a "streamer": instead of digging mines itself, it pays miners cash upfront in exchange for the right to buy a slice of their future silver and gold at a low fixed price. That gives it metal-price upside without the operational headaches — cost overruns, accidents, a single mine going bad.
Rule calls it the "best of the best" and the place a regular investor should start a silver-stock portfolio. It earns most of its money from gold but has meaningful silver exposure, and it just locked in a roughly $4 billion silver stream — a big new claim on someone else's future silver output.
25:12Uh what you find in natural resource bull markets is that even the beta I define beta as the extent to which the sector outperforms the the broad market is attractive. And so I would suggest that people begin their silver stock portfolio if they don't have one by buying the best of the best uh wheat and precious which is primarily by revenue uh gold producer but still has a strong silver constituency and just bought a very large silver stream 4 billion dollar silver stream.
In short: The leading royalty/streamer made a record move — $4.3B for BHP's 33.75% Antamina silver, lifting it to 67.5% of the mine's silver and its second-largest asset (~18% of GEO production); a big near-term cash-flow bump funded by $1.9B cash + new debt.
Wheaton is a "streaming" company: instead of running mines itself, it pays cash up front for the right to buy a share of a mine's metal cheaply for years. It just paid $4.3 billion to lock in more silver from the giant Antamina mine in Peru — its biggest deal ever, doubling its slice of that mine's silver. The upside is a big jump in cash coming in; the downside is it took on debt and tied a lot of money to one mine. Rubino's takeaway: expect strong profits but fewer new deals from Wheaton for a while.
In short: The other proof point — ~$1B in 2008, now ~$65B. Same tollbooth model and outperformance; now needs $500M deals to move the needle, so the high-compounding stage has passed to smaller royalty players.
Wheaton is the other big "streaming" company and Prins's second example of the same winning playbook. It started small in 2008 and is now worth around $65B. The catch: it's so big it now needs half-billion-dollar deals to grow meaningfully, so the easy, rapid compounding is over for it. Her point is that the next batch of fast growth will come from much smaller royalty companies copying what Wheaton and Franco-Nevada did years ago.
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